The all-in-one local AI studio for your desktop: chat, image and video generation and a coding agent in one free, open source app. Windows and Linux. No Docker, no terminal, no cloud required.
TypeScript agentai-chatai-studioall-in-onecoding-agentdesktop-appfluximage-generationlinuxllmlocal-ailocal-llmopen-sourceprivacyself-hostedstable-diffusionuncensoreduncensored-aivideo-generationwindows
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<!--
Hardened Runtime entitlements (referenced via bundle.macOS.entitlements in
tauri.conf.json; derived from the proven LU-Labs bridge set). The bundler
applies this one file to the main binary AND to every externalBin, so
lu-llama-server runs with the same set.
The app is signed with the Hardened Runtime (tauri's default), ad hoc in a
local build and with a Developer ID in the release lane. The first three
keys are exceptions to it, and each one switches a protection off. Which of
the three a notarized build still needs has not been measured;
Entitlements.minimal.plist is the candidate to test before any of them is
dropped.
Checked on 2026-10-08 against what the app does, for the Developer ID and
notarized build (release.yml, build-tauri-macos):
- allow-jit + allow-unsigned-executable-memory: kept from the bridge set.
WKWebView runs its JavaScript JIT in Apple's own web content process, so
the app itself is not known to need them. They do not stand in the way of
notarization; removing them needs a hand test on a signed build first.
- disable-library-validation: lets the app process load libraries that are
not signed by our team. The Python sidecars (Voice, the MLX image and
video engines) do NOT depend on it: they are separate processes started
from a venv in the app data folder, they do not inherit the Hardened
Runtime, and their own interpreter and wheels are ad hoc signed.
The same holds for the Python the app downloads for itself when the Mac
has none (private_python.rs): its binaries are ad hoc signed by the
linker, the app writes them without a quarantine attribute, and they run
as child processes. No entitlement was added for it.
- network.client / network.server: App Sandbox keys. LU is not sandboxed,
so they change nothing today; they document that the app talks to local
engines, Hugging Face and Civitai, and that Remote Access listens.
- device.audio-input: microphone for dictation and Voice. Required under
the Hardened Runtime even with NSMicrophoneUsageDescription (Info.plist).
macOS charges a child process's microphone use to the app that started
it, so this one entry also covers the voice sidecar.
Deliberately absent:
- automation.apple-events: the app sends no Apple events (no osascript).
- device.camera: no camera use.
- Computer control needs Accessibility and Screen Recording. Both are
privacy permissions the user grants in System Settings; neither has an
entitlement or a usage string.
- get-task-allow: the notary service rejects it.
-->
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>com.apple.security.cs.allow-jit</key>
<true/>
<key>com.apple.security.cs.allow-unsigned-executable-memory</key>
<true/>
<key>com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation</key>
<true/>
<key>com.apple.security.network.client</key>
<true/>
<key>com.apple.security.network.server</key>
<true/>
<key>com.apple.security.device.audio-input</key>
<true/>
</dict>
</plist>