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TypeScript agentai-chatai-studioall-in-onecoding-agentdesktop-appfluximage-generationlinuxllmlocal-ailocal-llmopen-sourceprivacyself-hostedstable-diffusionuncensoreduncensored-aivideo-generationwindows
/**
* The agent shell's OS sandbox, prepared and not switched on (CA, David's E3
* of 13.11.2026: "nur vorbereiten, damit sie später ein Schalter ist").
*
* Claude Code and Codex run agent commands under Seatbelt on macOS (Landlock /
* bubblewrap on Linux) with the workspace writable and the rest of the home
* folder closed. LU's bench already does this for its own runs
* (dev-server/bench-sandbox.ts). This module is the product side of the same
* idea, as pure data, so the switch later is a setting plus one wrapper call in
* src-tauri/src/commands/shell.rs and bg_tasks.rs:
*
* mode 'workspace' on macOS → spawn `/usr/bin/sandbox-exec -p <profile> <shell> …`
*
* Nothing calls it yet. Mode 'off' is today's behaviour.
*/
export type ShellSandboxMode = 'off' | 'workspace'
/** The switch's value until David decides otherwise. */
export const DEFAULT_SHELL_SANDBOX: ShellSandboxMode = 'off'
export interface SandboxPaths {
/** The real home folder. */
home: string
/** The run's working folder: readable and writable. */
workspace: string
/** Temp folders: readable and writable (npm, pip, compilers). */
temp: readonly string[]
/** Toolchains under the home (nvm, cargo, pyenv …): readable only. */
toolchains: readonly string[]
/** Under the home and still needed to read: ~/.gitconfig and the like. */
readOnlyFiles?: readonly string[]
}
const q = (p: string) => JSON.stringify(p)
/**
* A Seatbelt profile: everything allowed except reading or writing under the
* home folder and /Volumes; inside that, the workspace and temp are open again,
* toolchains are readable. The network stays on (package installs, git).
* Secret files inside the workspace are still refused by name by the tool
* guard (lib/secret-paths), before the command runs.
*/
export function seatbeltProfile(p: SandboxPaths): string {
const readable = [...p.toolchains.map((d) => `(subpath ${q(d)})`), ...(p.readOnlyFiles ?? []).map((f) => `(literal ${q(f)})`)]
const writable = [p.workspace, ...p.temp].map((d) => `(subpath ${q(d)})`)
return [
'(version 1)',
'(allow default)',
`(deny file-read-data file-write* (subpath ${q(p.home)}) (subpath "/Volumes"))`,
...(readable.length ? [`(allow file-read-data ${readable.join(' ')})`] : []),
`(allow file-read-data file-write* ${writable.join(' ')})`,
].join('\n')
}
/** Whether a workspace can be fenced at all: it must not be the home itself
* or a parent of it (the fence would open everything again). */
export function workspaceIsFenceable(home: string, workspace: string): boolean {
const norm = (s: string) => s.replace(/\/+$/, '')
const h = norm(home)
const w = norm(workspace)
return !!w && w !== h && !h.startsWith(w + '/') && w !== ''
}