Email for professionals and teams
Resolve client IP at the socket; never trust raw forwarded headers
ssthormessa0cdae49b368
diff --git a/server/index.ts b/server/index.tsindex a196bc3..45ed774 100644--- a/server/index.ts+++ b/server/index.ts@@ -46,7 +46,26 @@ async function main() {const handle = app.getRequestHandler();await app.prepare();+ // Set TRUST_PROXY=1 when a reverse proxy terminates in front of this+ // process; the client IP it appended to x-forwarded-for is then trusted.+ // Direct exposure must leave it unset so only the socket IP is trusted.+ const trustProxy = ["1", "true", "yes"].includes((process.env.TRUST_PROXY ?? "").toLowerCase());+const server = createServer((request, response) => {+ // The only client IP that cannot be forged is the socket's. Next sees+ // re-serialized headers, so stamp the resolved IP into a private header+ // after removing every client-supplied forwarding header — otherwise a+ // direct attacker could rotate them to dodge the login rate limiter.+ const forwarded = request.headers["x-forwarded-for"];+ const hops = (Array.isArray(forwarded) ? forwarded.at(-1) : forwarded)+ ?.split(",")+ .map((hop) => hop.trim())+ .filter(Boolean) ?? [];+ const clientIp = (trustProxy ? hops.at(-1) : undefined) ?? request.socket.remoteAddress;+ delete request.headers["cf-connecting-ip"];+ delete request.headers["x-forwarded-for"];+ delete request.headers["x-mailflare-client-ip"];+ if (clientIp) request.headers["x-mailflare-client-ip"] = clientIp;void handle(request, response, parse(request.url ?? "/", true));});diff --git a/src/lib/auth/activity.ts b/src/lib/auth/activity.tsindex 4abaff5..cb39a84 100644--- a/src/lib/auth/activity.ts+++ b/src/lib/auth/activity.ts@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@import { createAuditLog } from "@/lib/mailboxes/audit";+import { getClientIp } from "./client-ip";import type { AuthActivityAction, AuthActivityMetadata } from "./activity-types";export async function recordAuthActivity(@@ -34,10 +35,7 @@ export function getAuthActivityMetadata(request: Request): AuthActivityMetadata}function getRequestIpAddress(request: Request): string {- const cfIp = getHeaderValue(request, "cf-connecting-ip");- if (cfIp) return cfIp;- const forwardedFor = getHeaderValue(request, "x-forwarded-for");- return forwardedFor?.split(",")[0]?.trim() || "Unknown";+ return getClientIp(request) ?? "Unknown";}function getHeaderValue(request: Request, name: string): string | null {diff --git a/src/lib/auth/client-ip.ts b/src/lib/auth/client-ip.tsnew file mode 100644index 0000000..a794bed--- /dev/null+++ b/src/lib/auth/client-ip.ts@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@+/**+ * Resolve the real client IP for rate limiting and audit metadata.+ *+ * Forwarded headers are only meaningful when someone trustworthy set them:+ * the self-host server resolves the IP at the socket (or the proxy hop it+ * appended under TRUST_PROXY), stamps it into x-mailflare-client-ip, and+ * strips every client-supplied forwarding header before app code runs. On+ * Workers, cf-connecting-ip is platform-set and cannot be forged. A bare+ * x-forwarded-for is the last resort for other runtimes — its rightmost+ * hop is the least attacker-controlled entry.+ */+export function getClientIp(request: Request): string | null {+ return (+ // cf-connecting-ip first: on Workers it is platform-set and unforgeable,+ // and checking it before x-mailflare-client-ip keeps a client-injected+ // copy of the private header from winning there. The self-host server+ // deletes cf-connecting-ip outright, so the stamped value is used next.+ headerValue(request, "cf-connecting-ip") ||+ headerValue(request, "x-mailflare-client-ip") ||+ headerValue(request, "x-forwarded-for")?.split(",").at(-1)?.trim() ||+ null+ );+}++function headerValue(request: Request, name: string): string | null {+ return request.headers.get(name)?.trim() || null;+}diff --git a/src/lib/auth/password-reset.ts b/src/lib/auth/password-reset.tsindex 59fa374..0fe782a 100644--- a/src/lib/auth/password-reset.ts+++ b/src/lib/auth/password-reset.ts@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import { deleteUserSessions, hashSessionToken } from "@/lib/auth/session";import { getBranding } from "@/lib/branding/service";import { sendSystemEmail } from "@/lib/email/system-mail";import { createAuditLog } from "@/lib/mailboxes/audit";+import { getClientIp } from "@/lib/auth/client-ip";import { buildPasswordResetEmail } from "@/lib/auth/password-reset-utils";import type { Translator } from "@/lib/i18n/utils";@@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ export async function completePasswordReset(actorUserId: row.userId,targetUserId: row.userId,action: "auth.password_reset",- metadata: { ipAddress: request.headers.get("cf-connecting-ip") ?? "unknown" },+ metadata: { ipAddress: getClientIp(request) ?? "unknown" },});return { ok: true };}diff --git a/src/lib/auth/rate-limit.ts b/src/lib/auth/rate-limit.tsindex 83f89a2..1283729 100644--- a/src/lib/auth/rate-limit.ts+++ b/src/lib/auth/rate-limit.ts@@ -1,16 +1,13 @@+import { getClientIp } from "./client-ip";+/**- * Client IP for rate-limit keys. On Workers, cf-connecting-ip is set by the- * platform; self-hosted sits behind a reverse proxy, so fall back to the- * proxy-set x-forwarded-for first hop. Without a real per-client key every+ * Key rate limits by the resolved client IP. Without a per-client key every* visitor lands in one shared "unknown" bucket and scanners can lock out- * legitimate logins.+ * legitimate logins; trusting raw forwarding headers here would be worse —+ * a client could rotate them to leave the bucket entirely.*/function clientRateLimitKey(request: Request): string {- return (- request.headers.get("cf-connecting-ip")?.trim() ||- request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for")?.split(",")[0]?.trim() ||- "unknown"- );+ return getClientIp(request) ?? "unknown";}/** Mobile sign-ins have their own, stricter budget (they skip Turnstile). */diff --git a/src/lib/auth/turnstile.ts b/src/lib/auth/turnstile.tsindex aedf32f..6a96ffb 100644--- a/src/lib/auth/turnstile.ts+++ b/src/lib/auth/turnstile.ts@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@import { newId } from "@/lib/ids";+import { getClientIp } from "@/lib/auth/client-ip";type TurnstileResponse = {success: boolean;@@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ export async function verifyTurnstileToken(body: JSON.stringify({secret,response: token,- remoteip: request.headers.get("cf-connecting-ip") ?? undefined,+ remoteip: getClientIp(request) ?? undefined,idempotency_key: newId("ts"),}),});