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fix: sanitize custom.css (#9131)

Myles Scolnick248219c96c7c
diff --git a/marimo/_server/templates/templates.py b/marimo/_server/templates/templates.py
index f65dff4369..f4f3209755 100644
--- a/marimo/_server/templates/templates.py
+++ b/marimo/_server/templates/templates.py
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import html
import json
import os
+import re
from pathlib import Path
from textwrap import dedent
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any, Literal, cast
@@ -577,10 +578,24 @@ def get_version() -> str:
)
+# HTML5 terminates a <style> raw-text element at the first "</style"
+# (case-insensitive, optional whitespace). Neutralize that sequence so
+# notebook-controlled CSS cannot break out of the block and inject HTML.
+_STYLE_END_RE = re.compile(r"</(?=\s*style)", re.IGNORECASE)
+
+
+def _sanitize_css_for_style_block(css_contents: str) -> str:
+ # "\/" is a valid CSS escape for "/", so the CSS tokenizer still sees
+ # a (harmlessly invalid) token, while the HTML parser no longer
+ # matches the end-tag.
+ return _STYLE_END_RE.sub(r"<\\/", css_contents)
+
+
def _custom_css_block(css_contents: str) -> str:
# marimo-custom is used by the frontend to identify this stylesheet
# comes from marimo
- return f"<style title='marimo-custom'>{css_contents}</style>"
+ safe = _sanitize_css_for_style_block(css_contents)
+ return f"<style title='marimo-custom'>{safe}</style>"
def _inject_custom_css_for_config(
diff --git a/tests/_server/templates/test_templates.py b/tests/_server/templates/test_templates.py
index 90862f247c..6cae18ec9d 100644
--- a/tests/_server/templates/test_templates.py
+++ b/tests/_server/templates/test_templates.py
@@ -177,6 +177,45 @@ class TestNotebookPageTemplate(unittest.TestCase):
assert css in result
_assert_no_leftover_replacements(result)
+ def test_notebook_page_template_custom_css_escapes_style_breakout(
+ self,
+ ) -> None:
+ # Regression: a notebook-controlled css_file must not be able to
+ # break out of the <style> block and inject script/html. See the
+ # pre-execution XSS originally reported against marimo 0.23.0.
+ payload = "</style><script>window.__xss__ = 1;</script><style>"
+ css_file = self.filename.parent / "custom.css"
+ css_file.write_text(payload)
+
+ result = templates.notebook_page_template(
+ html=self.html,
+ base_url=self.base_url,
+ user_config=self.user_config,
+ config_overrides=self.config_overrides,
+ server_token=self.server_token,
+ app_config=_AppConfig(css_file="custom.css"),
+ filename=str(self.filename),
+ mode=SessionMode.EDIT,
+ )
+
+ # The escaped form must be present — proving the sanitizer ran
+ # rather than the attacker's payload having been silently dropped.
+ assert "<\\/style>" in result
+ # And the raw breakout sequence from the payload must not survive.
+ # The only literal "</style" the HTML parser should see inside our
+ # injected block is the legitimate closer emitted by
+ # _custom_css_block itself.
+ marker = "<style title='marimo-custom'>"
+ assert marker in result
+ body_after_marker = result.split(marker, 1)[1]
+ # Up to the first real closer, the content is our sanitized CSS;
+ # the attacker's payload should be present only in escaped form
+ # (so the browser stays in <style> raw-text mode the whole time).
+ injected = body_after_marker.split("</style>", 1)[0]
+ assert "<\\/style>" in injected
+ assert "</style" not in injected # case-sensitive: no raw end-tag
+ _assert_no_leftover_replacements(result)
+
def test_notebook_page_template_custom_css_workspace_relative(
self,
) -> None: