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docs: security clarification on pyproject.toml (#10986)
Dylan Madisetti5120eadc21cb
diff --git a/docs/security.md b/docs/security.mdindex 2cf69f280d..d13818b78b 100644--- a/docs/security.md+++ b/docs/security.md@@ -45,6 +45,16 @@ marimo behaves differently depending on how you run it:This distinction reflects the different threat models: editing is exploratory and may involve untrusted notebooks; deployed apps are intentional publications.+### Project files++marimo reads configuration settings from three sources: your user config, the nearest `pyproject.toml`, and the notebook's inline script metadata (PEP 723).+Configuration is merged in order of precedence, as explained in the [configuration guide](guides/configuration/index.md).+For security reasons marimo applies priority to these settings as follows:++- **Script metadata** or [notebook level settings](guides/configuration/index.md#script-metadata-configuration) strips several settings for security. Since notebooks can be opened from remote sources, marimo intentionally removes certain settings from script metadata to prevent malicious configuration.+- **In `pyproject.toml` and `.marimo.toml` files most configuration options are respected**. You should only open a notebook from a project you trust. Projects can install arbitrary code, and other settings (including marimo's) may be configured maliciously.+- **User config** (XDG config) options are always trusted. These configs are stored in your personal directories and only you can modify them.+### Authenticationmarimo provides token-based authentication:@@ -61,6 +71,7 @@ See the [Authentication guide](guides/deploying/authentication.md) for more deta- Auto-running cells is disabled on notebook load (you can disable this during your session)- Custom head tags are disabled+- Notebook script metadata is stripped as described under [Project files](#project-files)These restrictions prevent code execution without explicit user consent.diff --git a/marimo/_config/manager.py b/marimo/_config/manager.pyindex 5e07f458c5..7a9293cbfc 100644--- a/marimo/_config/manager.py+++ b/marimo/_config/manager.py@@ -303,7 +303,9 @@ class ProjectConfigManager(PartialMarimoConfigReader):project_config = self._resolve_dotenv(project_config)project_config = self._resolve_custom_css(project_config)project_config = self._resolve_vimrc(project_config)- # A cloned repo's pyproject.toml cannot anchor cache-signing trust.+ # pyproject.toml is honoured as written apart from trust anchors.+ # Opening a notebook inside a project already means trusting that+ # project, so an allowlist here adds little protection.project_config = strip_untrusted_config(project_config)except Exception as e:LOGGER.warning("Failed to read project config: %s", e)diff --git a/marimo/_config/reader.py b/marimo/_config/reader.pyindex 5c1651dacc..64cf10146e 100644--- a/marimo/_config/reader.py+++ b/marimo/_config/reader.py@@ -121,9 +121,12 @@ def allowlist_script_config(return pyproject_dict-# Settings that an untrusted-origin config layer must not set. Both take effect-# before any cell runs, so a layer that sets one decides something the operator-# never agreed to:+# We typically do not strip pyproject configuration keys on the basis that a+# malicious project can provide behavior as bad as, if not worse than, our options.+# However, we are reserving these keys for potential TOFU-style trust anchors.+# Reporters, do not read into this as a security guarantee for stripping+# project options. See https://docs.marimo.io/security/#project-files for+# more discussion.## signing trusting a key is a code-execution grant, because a# cache restore is `pickle.loads`