Skip to content

armgit / mem0

Public Imported from GitHub
0

The Memory Layer for AI Agents - Drop-in memory infrastructure for AI agents and apps. Context that persists. Built for production.

fix(openclaw): clear security scanner exfiltration warning (#4678)

Chaithanya Kumar33d2bc495dba
diff --git a/openclaw/CHANGELOG.md b/openclaw/CHANGELOG.md
index f75fa2c59..5e9b271f1 100644
--- a/openclaw/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/openclaw/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -2,6 +2,24 @@
All notable changes to the `@mem0/openclaw-mem0` plugin will be documented in this file.
+## [1.0.3] - 2026-04-03
+
+### Fixed
+- **Path traversal vulnerability**: Added `safePath()` containment helper to `readSkillFile` and `readDomainOverlay` in `skill-loader.ts` — prevents directory traversal via `config.domain` or the exported `loadSkill` API
+- **Noise filter regression**: Reverted incorrect `After-Compaction` regex rename back to `Post-Compaction` so the filter correctly matches real upstream compaction audit messages
+- **Cosmetic revert**: Restored `// Over-fetch for ranking` comment in `recall.ts` (was changed to work around a false-positive scanner match on the substring `fetch`)
+
+### Changed
+- **Supply-chain hardening**: Pinned `mem0ai` dependency to exact `2.3.0` (was `^2.3.0`)
+
+### Added
+- **Path traversal tests**: 12 new tests covering `safePath`, `readSkillFile`, `readDomainOverlay`, and `loadSkill` with traversal inputs
+
+## [1.0.2] - 2026-04-02
+
+### Fixed
+- **Security scanner warning**: Removed `resolveEnvVars()` and `resolveEnvVarsDeep()` from `config.ts` — OpenClaw already resolves `${VAR}` in `openclaw.json` before passing config to the plugin, so plugin-side env resolution was redundant and triggered the "credential harvesting" static analysis warning ([#4676](https://github.com/mem0ai/mem0/pull/4676))
+
## [1.0.1] - 2026-04-02
### Added
diff --git a/openclaw/package.json b/openclaw/package.json
index 7f4d42406..1d7310a53 100644
--- a/openclaw/package.json
+++ b/openclaw/package.json
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"name": "@mem0/openclaw-mem0",
- "version": "1.0.2",
+ "version": "1.0.3",
"type": "module",
"description": "Mem0 memory backend for OpenClaw — platform or self-hosted open-source",
"license": "Apache-2.0",
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
},
"dependencies": {
"@sinclair/typebox": "0.34.47",
- "mem0ai": "^2.3.0"
+ "mem0ai": "2.3.0"
},
"openclaw": {
"extensions": [
diff --git a/openclaw/pnpm-lock.yaml b/openclaw/pnpm-lock.yaml
index fa6c23b34..ad201b224 100644
--- a/openclaw/pnpm-lock.yaml
+++ b/openclaw/pnpm-lock.yaml
@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ importers:
specifier: 0.34.47
version: 0.34.47
mem0ai:
- specifier: ^2.3.0
+ specifier: 2.3.0
devDependencies:
'@types/node':
specifier: ^22.15.0
@@ -1466,8 +1466,8 @@ packages:
resolution: {integrity: sha512-T1GITYmFaKuO91vxyoQMFETst+O71VUPEU3ze5GNzDm0OWdP8v1ziTaAEPUr/3kLsY3Sftgz242A1SetQiDL7g==}
- resolution: {integrity: sha512-b1V8KXUse8ySvio8D0bRHOvgxa9BlmP4g4bjtEnA3uILcu+2PAtcAiHDPdBxUIeoxTxAeJM+0wBGaMIps4bIaw==}
+ resolution: {integrity: sha512-9e0B9hgM7nxnKDD6zmSRkfkrQ2sa9tGdpZE3CPsp7eIu18soYbXvm9YT08mllCYuiW+EdEW7L/+DNCphOfvkKQ==}
engines: {node: '>=18'}
peerDependencies:
'@anthropic-ai/sdk': ^0.40.1
@@ -3543,7 +3543,7 @@ snapshots:
crypt: 0.0.2
is-buffer: 1.1.6
dependencies:
'@anthropic-ai/sdk': 0.40.1
'@azure/identity': 4.13.0
diff --git a/openclaw/skill-loader.test.ts b/openclaw/skill-loader.test.ts
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ab2125e54
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openclaw/skill-loader.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+/**
+ * Tests for path traversal prevention in skill-loader.
+ */
+import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
+import { safePath, loadSkill } from "./skill-loader.ts";
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// safePath — path containment
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+describe("safePath", () => {
+ it("rejects parent directory traversal", () => {
+ expect(safePath("../../etc/passwd")).toBeNull();
+ });
+
+ it("rejects deep traversal", () => {
+ expect(safePath("../../../etc/shadow")).toBeNull();
+ });
+
+ it("rejects traversal in nested segment", () => {
+ expect(safePath("valid", "../../etc")).toBeNull();
+ });
+
+ it("rejects bare '..' as segment", () => {
+ expect(safePath("..")).toBeNull();
+ });
+
+ it("accepts valid skill paths", () => {
+ expect(safePath("memory-triage", "SKILL.md")).not.toBeNull();
+ });
+
+ it("accepts valid domain overlay paths", () => {
+ expect(safePath("memory-triage", "domains", "companion.md")).not.toBeNull();
+ });
+
+ it("returns null for empty segments that resolve to skills root with subpath escape", () => {
+ // path.resolve("skills", "", "../../etc") still escapes
+ expect(safePath("", "../../etc")).toBeNull();
+ });
+
+ it("rejects traversal disguised with valid prefix", () => {
+ expect(safePath("memory-triage/../../etc/passwd")).toBeNull();
+ });
+});
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// loadSkill — integration tests for traversal prevention
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+describe("loadSkill path traversal", () => {
+ it("returns null for traversal skillName", () => {
+ expect(loadSkill("../../etc/passwd")).toBeNull();
+ });
+
+ it("returns null for deep traversal skillName", () => {
+ expect(loadSkill("../../../..")).toBeNull();
+ });
+
+ it("loads a valid skill", () => {
+ const result = loadSkill("memory-triage");
+ expect(result).not.toBeNull();
+ expect(result?.prompt).toBeTruthy();
+ });
+
+ it("blocks domain traversal while loading valid skill", () => {
+ // Valid skill name, malicious domain — should load skill but skip the overlay
+ const result = loadSkill("memory-triage", { domain: "../../etc/passwd" });
+ // Should still succeed (skill itself is valid), domain overlay is just skipped
+ expect(result).not.toBeNull();
+ expect(result?.prompt).toBeTruthy();
+ });
+});
diff --git a/openclaw/skill-loader.ts b/openclaw/skill-loader.ts
index 3e265b472..abe443023 100644
--- a/openclaw/skill-loader.ts
+++ b/openclaw/skill-loader.ts
@@ -110,10 +110,26 @@ function resolveSkillsDir(): string {
}
const SKILLS_DIR = resolveSkillsDir();
+const RESOLVED_SKILLS_DIR = path.resolve(SKILLS_DIR);
+
+/**
+ * Resolve path segments under SKILLS_DIR and verify the result doesn't escape.
+ * Returns null if the resolved path is outside the skills directory (path traversal).
+ * Note: path.resolve follows symlinks lexically; the skills directory is
+ * package-owned so symlink escape is not a practical concern.
+ */
+export function safePath(...segments: string[]): string | null {
+ const resolved = path.resolve(SKILLS_DIR, ...segments);
+ if (resolved !== RESOLVED_SKILLS_DIR &&
+ !resolved.startsWith(RESOLVED_SKILLS_DIR + path.sep)) {
+ return null;
+ }
+ return resolved;
+}
function readSkillFile(skillName: string): string | null {
- // Skills use OpenClaw directory format: <skill-name>/SKILL.md
- const filePath = path.join(SKILLS_DIR, skillName, "SKILL.md");
+ const filePath = safePath(skillName, "SKILL.md");
+ if (!filePath) return null;
try {
return fs.readFileSync(filePath, "utf-8");
} catch {
@@ -127,8 +143,8 @@ function readSkillFile(skillName: string): string | null {
* The `applies_to` frontmatter field is checked for backward compatibility.
*/
function readDomainOverlay(domain: string, targetSkill: string): string | null {
- // Domain overlays are stored inside the target skill's directory
- const filePath = path.join(SKILLS_DIR, targetSkill, "domains", `${domain}.md`);
+ const filePath = safePath(targetSkill, "domains", `${domain}.md`);
+ if (!filePath) return null;
try {
const content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, "utf-8");
const parsed = parseSkillFile(content);