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Response to SSRF advisory (issue #108)
Status: Fixed — current releases not affected. Issue closed as fixed.
Summary
A responsible-disclosure report (issue #108, dated 2026-08-06) described
authenticated SSRF via the fetch_url tool: model-driven fetch() with no
destination filtering, allowing a chat user to probe loopback / internal
endpoints and reflect response bodies back into the conversation.
- Affected: ≤ 1.1.13 —
fetch_urlcalled plainfetch(url)directly. - Fixed: tool routed through the SSRF guard (
src/utils/ssrf.ts) in the 1.2.3 release; hardened via #121 and #124.
Guard coverage
| Vector | Handling |
|---|---|
Loopback / RFC 1918 / link-local (incl. 169.254.169.254) / CGNAT / multicast |
blocked |
localhost, .local, .internal hostnames |
blocked |
| Non-http(s) schemes | blocked |
| DNS answers containing any private record | fail-closed |
| Redirects | every hop re-validated (manual redirect mode) |
| DNS rebinding | validated address pinned to the socket |
Verification
The report's PoC was reproduced against main: a loopback canary was never
contacted; all four attempted vectors were rejected by the guard. A sweep of
remaining fetch() call sites found only one raw fetch (Slack file upload),
which targets a URL issued by Slack's API — not model-controllable input.
Maintenance notes
guardedFetchis the only sanctioned path for model-reachable fetches.- Re-run a sink sweep (
rg "fetch\(" src --type ts) when adding new network surfaces; local-provider base URLs are exempt by design (loopback trust boundary, web server binds127.0.0.1only).