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docs(security): response record for SSRF advisory #108

Mercury87f002f2c786
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+# Response to SSRF advisory (issue #108)
+
+Status: **Fixed — current releases not affected.** Issue closed as fixed.
+
+## Summary
+
+A responsible-disclosure report (issue #108, dated 2026-08-06) described
+authenticated SSRF via the `fetch_url` tool: model-driven `fetch()` with no
+destination filtering, allowing a chat user to probe loopback / internal
+endpoints and reflect response bodies back into the conversation.
+
+- **Affected:** ≤ 1.1.13 — `fetch_url` called plain `fetch(url)` directly.
+- **Fixed:** tool routed through the SSRF guard (`src/utils/ssrf.ts`) in the
+ 1.2.3 release; hardened via #121 and #124.
+
+## Guard coverage
+
+| Vector | Handling |
+| --- | --- |
+| Loopback / RFC 1918 / link-local (incl. `169.254.169.254`) / CGNAT / multicast | blocked |
+| `localhost`, `.local`, `.internal` hostnames | blocked |
+| Non-http(s) schemes | blocked |
+| DNS answers containing any private record | fail-closed |
+| Redirects | every hop re-validated (manual redirect mode) |
+| DNS rebinding | validated address pinned to the socket |
+
+## Verification
+
+The report's PoC was reproduced against `main`: a loopback canary was never
+contacted; all four attempted vectors were rejected by the guard. A sweep of
+remaining `fetch()` call sites found only one raw fetch (Slack file upload),
+which targets a URL issued by Slack's API — not model-controllable input.
+
+## Maintenance notes
+
+- `guardedFetch` is the only sanctioned path for model-reachable fetches.
+- Re-run a sink sweep (`rg "fetch\(" src --type ts`) when adding new network
+ surfaces; local-provider base URLs are exempt by design (loopback trust
+ boundary, web server binds `127.0.0.1` only).
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