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fix(bg): route /bg shell commands through the approval boundary
SeashoreShiefb8a451f403
diff --git a/src/core/agent.ts b/src/core/agent.tsindex 9c490b5e..d4388a50 100644--- a/src/core/agent.ts+++ b/src/core/agent.ts@@ -2176,6 +2176,17 @@ export class Agent {return;}+ // `/bg <command>` is an alternate shell entry point: it must honor the+ // same approval boundary as the run_command tool, otherwise an+ // authenticated chat user can bypass Ask-Me approval and run arbitrary+ // commands. checkShellCommand() also enforces the blocked list and any+ // cwd/scope containment rules.+ const check = await this.capabilities.permissions.checkShellCommand(command);+ if (!check.allowed) {+ await channel.send(`⛔ Not running in background: ${check.reason ?? 'command requires approval'}\nApprove the command first (or run it without /bg) and try again.`, msg.channelId);+ return;+ }+const cwd = this.capabilities.getCwd();const bgId = this.backgroundTasks.spawnShell(command, cwd);await channel.send(`📋 Background task ${bgId} started: "${command.slice(0, 50)}${command.length > 50 ? '...' : ''}"`, msg.channelId);diff --git a/src/core/bg-shell-approval.test.ts b/src/core/bg-shell-approval.test.tsnew file mode 100644index 00000000..0d77e41c--- /dev/null+++ b/src/core/bg-shell-approval.test.ts@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';+import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';+import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';+import { dirname, join } from 'node:path';++const agentSrc = readFileSync(join(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), 'agent.ts'), 'utf8');++/**+ * `/bg <command>` is an alternate shell entry point. It used to call+ * `backgroundTasks.spawnShell()` directly, so an authenticated chat user could+ * bypass Ask-Me approval and run arbitrary OS commands (reported in #73). The+ * contract: the background shell path must run the command through+ * `PermissionManager.checkShellCommand()` before spawning, exactly like the+ * `run_command` tool, and must not spawn when the check denies it.+ */+describe('/bg <command> honors the shell approval boundary', () => {+ it('checks the command before spawning it in the background', () => {+ // The shell branch must call checkShellCommand(command) and bail out when+ // it is not allowed, before reaching spawnShell(command, cwd).+ const shellBranch = agentSrc.match(/const command = args \|\| ''[\s\S]*?spawnShell\(command, cwd\)/s)?.[0] ?? '';+ expect(shellBranch).toContain('checkShellCommand(command)');+ expect(shellBranch).toMatch(/if \(!check\.allowed\)/);+ expect(shellBranch.indexOf('checkShellCommand(command)')).toBeLessThan(shellBranch.indexOf('spawnShell(command, cwd)'));+ });+});