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Consolidate data-apps e2e tests (#84009)

Chris Vandoodewaard0043f5cc0f28
diff --git a/e2e/support/assets/data-apps/isolation/src/App.tsx b/e2e/support/assets/data-apps/isolation/src/App.tsx
index 8bca01fc91e..0358c9d86c9 100644
--- a/e2e/support/assets/data-apps/isolation/src/App.tsx
+++ b/e2e/support/assets/data-apps/isolation/src/App.tsx
@@ -16,24 +16,40 @@ import { describeError, getEnv } from "./utils";
export default function App() {
const env = getEnv();
const [result, setResult] = useState("pending");
+ const [probeId, setProbeId] = useState<string | null>(null);
const [reactMode, setReactMode] = useState<ReactMode | null>(null);
const firedRef = useRef(false);
+ const timerRef = useRef<number | undefined>(undefined);
+ const currentProbeRef = useRef<string | null>(null);
useProbeCustomElement(setResult);
// If a probe never reports, `no-probe-observed` fails the spec (the probe
// never fired) rather than hanging.
- const arm = () =>
- window.setTimeout(
+ const arm = (id: string) => {
+ currentProbeRef.current = id;
+ window.clearTimeout(timerRef.current);
+ setProbeId(id);
+ setResult("pending");
+ timerRef.current = window.setTimeout(
() => setResult((r) => (r === "pending" ? "no-probe-observed" : r)),
20000,
);
+ };
- const fire = (run: () => void) => {
- arm();
+ const reportFor = (id: string) => (value: string) => {
+ if (currentProbeRef.current === id) {
+ setResult(value);
+ }
+ };
+
+ const fire = (id: string) => {
+ arm(id);
try {
- run();
+ createProbes(env, reportFor(id))
+ .find((p) => p.id === id)
+ ?.run();
} catch (err) {
setResult(`isolated:${describeError(err)}`);
}
@@ -44,14 +60,16 @@ export default function App() {
return (
<div data-testid="data-app-isolation" style={{ padding: 24 }}>
<h1>Isolation probe</h1>
- <div data-testid="isolation-result">{result}</div>
+ <div data-testid="isolation-result" data-probe-id={probeId ?? ""}>
+ {result}
+ </div>
<div style={{ display: "flex", gap: 8, marginTop: 16, flexWrap: "wrap" }}>
{probes.map((probe) => (
<button
key={probe.id}
data-testid={`isolation-${probe.id}`}
- onClick={() => fire(probe.run)}
+ onClick={() => fire(probe.id)}
>
{probe.label}
</button>
@@ -61,7 +79,7 @@ export default function App() {
key={probe.id}
data-testid={`isolation-${probe.id}`}
onClick={() => {
- arm();
+ arm(probe.id);
firedRef.current = false;
setReactMode(probe.mode);
}}
diff --git a/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/admin.cy.spec.ts b/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/admin.cy.spec.ts
index 84697a63443..d2f825c905e 100644
--- a/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/admin.cy.spec.ts
+++ b/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/admin.cy.spec.ts
@@ -139,17 +139,13 @@ describe("scenarios > data apps > upsell (OSS)", { tags: "@OSS" }, () => {
// settings page shows the upsell instead of the management UI.
});
- it("shows the data-apps upsell instead of the management UI", () => {
+ it("shows the data-apps upsell instead of the management UI, and marks the Data apps settings nav item with an upsell gem", () => {
cy.visit("/admin/settings/apps");
H.main().within(() => {
cy.findByText("Build custom data apps").should("be.visible");
cy.findByText("Try for free").should("be.visible");
});
- });
-
- it("marks the Data apps settings nav item with an upsell gem", () => {
- cy.visit("/admin/settings/apps");
cy.findByRole("link", { name: /Data apps/ }).within(() => {
cy.findByTestId("upsell-gem").should("be.visible");
diff --git a/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/resources-production-actions.cy.spec.ts b/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/resources-production-actions.cy.spec.ts
index 6cae23a578b..6a56b7f1e90 100644
--- a/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/resources-production-actions.cy.spec.ts
+++ b/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/resources-production-actions.cy.spec.ts
@@ -80,7 +80,8 @@ describe(
.then((app) => cy.wrap({ app, actionCopy }, { log: false }));
});
- it("serializes the action an author copies, with no model, as its file holds it", () => {
+ it("serializes the action an author copies, and executes the app's copy rather than the authored action, for a member of the app's group", () => {
+ cy.log("serialize an action with no model, as its file holds it");
H.createDataAppScoreboardAction().then((source) => {
// Executing the action reads this, so the copy must keep it.
cy.request("PUT", `/api/action/${source.id}`, {
@@ -109,9 +110,8 @@ describe(
.that.deep.include({ hidden: true, defaultValue: 0 });
});
});
- });
- it("executes the app's copy rather than the authored action, for a member of the app's group", () => {
+ cy.log("execute the app's copy of a separate action");
publishApp().then(({ app, actionCopy }) => {
H.assignTestGroupToDataApp(app.name).then((groupId) => {
H.addUserToGroup(groupId, USERS.normal.email);
diff --git a/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/resources-production.cy.spec.ts b/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/resources-production.cy.spec.ts
index 3b1faf127c9..5d6930a1db7 100644
--- a/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/resources-production.cy.spec.ts
+++ b/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/resources-production.cy.spec.ts
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ describe("scenarios > data apps > resources in production", () => {
),
);
- it("runs the saved question rather than the authored table query", () => {
+ it("runs the saved question rather than the authored table query, and both return the same rows", () => {
publishApp().then(({ cardId }) => {
cy.intercept("POST", "/api/dataset").as("dataset");
H.mockDataApp(APP_SLUG, { displayName: APP_DISPLAY_NAME });
@@ -133,15 +133,12 @@ describe("scenarios > data apps > resources in production", () => {
undefined,
);
});
- });
- });
- // The swap is only safe if the saved question the author wrote returns what
- // the definition does. The dev preview runs the definition; production runs
- // the card. A deployed app cannot run the definition at all, so the two sides
- // are captured separately rather than side by side.
- it("returns the same rows from the saved question as from the authored query", () => {
- publishApp().then(({ cardId }) => {
+ // The swap is only safe if the saved question the author wrote returns what
+ // the definition does. The dev preview runs the definition; production runs
+ // the card. A deployed app cannot run the definition at all, so the two sides
+ // are captured separately rather than side by side.
+ cy.log("the saved question returns the same rows as the authored query");
cy.request("POST", "/api/dataset", {
type: "query",
database: SAMPLE_DB_ID,
diff --git a/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/sandbox.cy.spec.ts b/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/sandbox.cy.spec.ts
index ba92be95e1f..068dd43a036 100644
--- a/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/sandbox.cy.spec.ts
+++ b/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/sandbox.cy.spec.ts
@@ -21,58 +21,6 @@ describe("scenarios > data apps > sandbox & isolation", () => {
const ALLOWED_URL = `${ALLOWED_ORIGIN}/ping`;
const BLOCKED_URL = "https://blocked.data-app.test/ping";
- it("blocks disallowed APIs and cross-origin fetch, but permits allowed_hosts", () => {
- // The allowed host is stubbed with a CORS header so the sandbox's real
- // network call resolves; the blocked host is never intercepted because the
- // sandbox rejects it before it reaches the network.
- cy.intercept("GET", ALLOWED_URL, {
- statusCode: 200,
- headers: { "access-control-allow-origin": "*" },
- body: "pong",
- });
-
- H.mockDataApp(APP_NAME, {
- displayName: APP_DISPLAY_NAME,
- allowedHosts: [ALLOWED_ORIGIN],
- testEnv: {
- ...TEST_ENV,
- sandbox: { allowedUrl: ALLOWED_URL, blockedUrl: BLOCKED_URL },
- },
- });
-
- H.openDataApp(APP_NAME);
- H.dataAppIframe(APP_DISPLAY_NAME).within(() => {
- cy.findByRole("heading", { name: "Orders overview" }).should(
- "be.visible",
- );
- cy.findByRole("link", { name: "Sandbox" }).click();
-
- // A blocked DOM API throws synchronously inside the sandbox.
- cy.findByTestId("probe-script", { timeout: 30000 }).should(
- "have.text",
- "blocked",
- );
-
- // A fetch to a host not in allowed_hosts is rejected by the sandbox.
- cy.findByTestId("blocked-fetch-result", { timeout: 30000 }).should(
- "contain",
- "not in allowed_hosts",
- );
-
- // A fetch to a host in allowed_hosts reaches the (stubbed) network.
- cy.findByTestId("allowed-fetch-result", { timeout: 30000 }).should(
- "have.text",
- "ok: 200",
- );
- });
- });
- });
-
- describe("sandbox breadth", () => {
- const ALLOWED_ORIGIN = "https://allowed.data-app.test";
- const ALLOWED_URL = `${ALLOWED_ORIGIN}/ping`;
- const BLOCKED_URL = "https://blocked.data-app.test/ping";
-
// Method/constructor calls the sandbox distortion replaces with a throwing
// shim. (Getter-only reads like `localStorage` aren't intercepted, so they
// aren't asserted here.)
@@ -86,7 +34,10 @@ describe("scenarios > data apps > sandbox & isolation", () => {
"sendbeacon",
];
- it("blocks a broad set of dangerous globals, strips innerHTML, and gates XHR", () => {
+ it("blocks dangerous globals, strips innerHTML, gates XHR, and blocks cross-origin fetch but permits allowed_hosts", () => {
+ // The allowed host is stubbed with a CORS header so the sandbox's real
+ // network call resolves; the blocked host is never intercepted because the
+ // sandbox rejects it before it reaches the network.
cy.intercept("GET", ALLOWED_URL, {
statusCode: 200,
headers: { "access-control-allow-origin": "*" },
@@ -118,6 +69,18 @@ describe("scenarios > data apps > sandbox & isolation", () => {
cy.findByTestId("probe-innerhtml").should("have.text", "stripped");
+ // A fetch to a host not in allowed_hosts is rejected by the sandbox.
+ cy.findByTestId("blocked-fetch-result", { timeout: 30000 }).should(
+ "contain",
+ "not in allowed_hosts",
+ );
+
+ // A fetch to a host in allowed_hosts reaches the (stubbed) network.
+ cy.findByTestId("allowed-fetch-result", { timeout: 30000 }).should(
+ "have.text",
+ "ok: 200",
+ );
+
// XHR is hard-blocked entirely — data apps are fetch-only. It can't opt out
// of following a redirect back to the instance, so it's never allowlisted
// like fetch: both blocked and allowed hosts are refused.
@@ -131,24 +94,44 @@ describe("scenarios > data apps > sandbox & isolation", () => {
});
describe("isolation", () => {
- const openIsolationPage = () => {
+ it("serves the embed document with locked-down headers, renders the app in a sandboxed iframe, and keeps the app's CSS and JS globals inside it", () => {
H.mockDataApp(APP_NAME, {
displayName: APP_DISPLAY_NAME,
testEnv: TEST_ENV,
});
+
+ cy.request({
+ url: `/embed/apps/${APP_NAME}`,
+ followRedirect: false,
+ }).then((res) => {
+ expect(res.status).to.eq(200);
+ expect(String(res.body)).to.contain("app-data-app");
+ const csp = String(res.headers["content-security-policy"] ?? "");
+ expect(csp).to.contain("frame-ancestors 'self'");
+ expect(csp).to.contain("default-src 'none'");
+ expect(csp).to.contain("form-action 'none'");
+ // The data-app document deliberately does NOT grant 'unsafe-eval' — it's
+ // confined to the sandbox-host realm doc (see the BE sandbox-host-endpoint-test).
+ expect(csp).to.not.contain("'unsafe-eval'");
+ expect(String(res.headers["x-frame-options"] ?? "")).to.match(
+ /sameorigin/i,
+ );
+ });
+
H.openDataApp(APP_NAME);
+
+ cy.get(`iframe[title="${APP_DISPLAY_NAME}"]`)
+ .should("have.attr", "sandbox")
+ .and("contain", "allow-scripts")
+ .and("not.contain", "allow-top-navigation")
+ .and("not.contain", "allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox");
+
H.dataAppIframe(APP_DISPLAY_NAME).within(() => {
cy.findByRole("heading", { name: "Orders overview" }).should(
"be.visible",
);
cy.findByRole("link", { name: "Isolation" }).click();
- });
- };
- it("keeps the app's CSS inside the iframe", () => {
- openIsolationPage();
-
- H.dataAppIframe(APP_DISPLAY_NAME).within(() => {
// The injected <style> applies to the app's own document.
cy.findByTestId("css-injected").should("have.text", "ok");
cy.findByTestId("isolation-css-probe").should(
@@ -156,6 +139,9 @@ describe("scenarios > data apps > sandbox & isolation", () => {
"color",
"rgb(0, 128, 0)",
);
+
+ // The app set the global in its own realm and read it back.
+ cy.findByTestId("js-marker").should("have.text", "in-app");
});
// The aggressive `body` rule injected in the iframe does not reach the
@@ -165,54 +151,9 @@ describe("scenarios > data apps > sandbox & isolation", () => {
"background-color",
"rgb(0, 128, 0)",
);
- });
-
- it("keeps the app's JS globals out of the parent realm (near-membrane)", () => {
- openIsolationPage();
-
- H.dataAppIframe(APP_DISPLAY_NAME).within(() => {
- // The app set the global in its own realm and read it back.
- cy.findByTestId("js-marker").should("have.text", "in-app");
- });
// The parent window never sees the app's global.
cy.window().should("not.have.property", "__DATA_APP_ISOLATION_MARKER__");
});
});
-
- describe("iframe security headers", () => {
- it("serves the embed document with the expected CSP + framing headers", () => {
- H.mockDataApp(APP_NAME, { displayName: APP_DISPLAY_NAME });
-
- cy.request({
- url: `/embed/apps/${APP_NAME}`,
- failOnStatusCode: false,
- }).then((res) => {
- expect(res.status).to.equal(200);
-
- const csp = String(res.headers["content-security-policy"] ?? "");
- expect(csp).to.contain("frame-ancestors 'self'");
- expect(csp).to.contain("default-src 'none'");
- expect(csp).to.contain("form-action 'none'");
- // The data-app document deliberately does NOT grant 'unsafe-eval' — it's
- // confined to the sandbox-host realm doc (see the BE sandbox-host-endpoint-test).
- expect(csp).to.not.contain("'unsafe-eval'");
- expect(String(res.headers["x-frame-options"] ?? "")).to.match(
- /sameorigin/i,
- );
- });
- });
-
- it("renders the app in a locked-down sandboxed iframe", () => {
- H.mockDataApp(APP_NAME, {
- displayName: APP_DISPLAY_NAME,
- testEnv: TEST_ENV,
- });
-
- H.openDataApp(APP_NAME);
- cy.get(`iframe[title="${APP_DISPLAY_NAME}"]`)
- .should("have.attr", "sandbox")
- .and("contain", "allow-scripts");
- });
- });
});
diff --git a/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/sandboxing_isolation.cy.spec.ts b/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/sandboxing_isolation.cy.spec.ts
index dd51946489e..795fa56c458 100644
--- a/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/sandboxing_isolation.cy.spec.ts
+++ b/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/sandboxing_isolation.cy.spec.ts
@@ -18,222 +18,100 @@ describe("scenarios > data apps > sandbox isolation", () => {
H.mockDataApp(APP_NAME, { displayName: APP_DISPLAY_NAME, testEnv });
H.openDataApp(APP_NAME);
- };
-
- /**
- * Click a probe and assert it reported that the boundary held. Every probe
- * stops at the first sign it reached across the boundary: `isolated:` means it
- * did not, `reached:` means it did. `pending` / `no-probe-observed` mean the
- * probe never fired, which is also a failure — none of those contain
- * `isolated:`, so a single assertion covers all three.
- */
- const runProbe = (buttonTestId: string) => {
H.dataAppIframe(APP_DISPLAY_NAME).within(() => {
- cy.findByTestId(buttonTestId).scrollIntoView().click();
-
- cy.findByTestId("isolation-result", { timeout: 30000 })
- .should("not.have.text", "pending")
- .invoke("text")
- .then((text) => {
- cy.log(`isolation-result: ${text}`);
- expect(text, "the boundary held").to.contain("isolated:");
- });
+ cy.findByTestId("isolation-result", { timeout: 30000 }).should(
+ "have.text",
+ "pending",
+ );
});
};
/**
- * For the probes whose element is refused during React's own render pass.
- *
- * The guard throws from `createElement` inside the reconciler, and the app's
- * `BoundaryReporter` never catches it: that boundary is declared in the GUEST
- * realm while HOST React renders the tree, and React's error-boundary detection
- * does not survive the membrane. The throw therefore reaches the host boundary
- * and takes the data app down — which is the correct outcome, but it also
- * destroys the probe, so there is no `isolation-result` left to read. Assert on
- * the guard's own message instead.
+ * Click each probe in turn and record what it reported, then assert that the
+ * boundary held for all of them at once, so every failing probe shows. Every
+ * probe stops at the first sign it reached across the boundary: `isolated:`
+ * means it did not, `reached:` means it did. `no-probe-observed` means the
+ * probe never fired, which is also a failure. The fixture resets the result to
+ * `pending` and tags it with the probe's id on each click, so a result is only
+ * read once it belongs to the probe just clicked.
*/
- const runProbeExpectingGuard = (buttonTestId: string) => {
+ const runProbes = (probeIds: string[]) => {
+ const results: Record<string, string> = {};
+
H.dataAppIframe(APP_DISPLAY_NAME).within(() => {
- cy.findByTestId(buttonTestId).scrollIntoView().click();
+ probeIds.forEach((probeId) => {
+ cy.findByTestId(`isolation-${probeId}`).scrollIntoView().click();
+
+ cy.findByTestId("isolation-result", { timeout: 30000 })
+ .should(($result) => {
+ expect($result.attr("data-probe-id")).to.eq(probeId);
+ expect($result.text()).not.to.eq("pending");
+ })
+ .invoke("text")
+ .then((text) => {
+ cy.log(`${probeId}: ${text}`);
+ results[probeId] = text;
+ });
+ });
});
- cy.contains("blocked host createElement", { timeout: 30000 }).should(
- "exist",
- );
+ cy.then(() => {
+ expect(Object.keys(results), "every probe reported").to.deep.eq(probeIds);
+ expect(
+ probeIds
+ .filter((probeId) => !results[probeId].includes("isolated:"))
+ .map((probeId) => `${probeId}: ${results[probeId]}`),
+ "probes that crossed the boundary",
+ ).to.deep.eq([]);
+ });
};
- it("keeps a document.createElement about:blank iframe within the gated realm", () => {
- setup();
- runProbe("isolation-create-element");
- });
-
- it("gates a host-React about:blank iframe", () => {
- setup();
- runProbeExpectingGuard("isolation-react-about-blank");
- });
-
- it("gates an iframe pointing at Metabase itself", () => {
- setup();
- runProbeExpectingGuard("isolation-react-src");
- });
-
- it("gates a srcdoc iframe", () => {
- setup();
- runProbeExpectingGuard("isolation-react-srcdoc");
- });
-
- it("keeps a window.open realm within the gated realm", () => {
- setup();
- runProbe("isolation-window-open");
- });
-
- it("gates the Worker constructor", () => {
- setup();
- runProbe("isolation-worker");
- });
-
- it("gates the SharedWorker constructor", () => {
- setup();
- runProbe("isolation-shared-worker");
- });
-
- it("gates the service worker registration API", () => {
- setup();
- runProbe("isolation-service-worker");
- });
-
- it("gates dynamic import", () => {
- setup();
- runProbe("isolation-dynamic-import");
- });
-
- it("keeps a dangerouslySetInnerHTML iframe within the gated realm", () => {
- setup();
- runProbe("isolation-inner-html");
- });
-
- it("keeps a Function-constructor fetch gated", () => {
- setup();
- runProbe("isolation-function-constructor");
- });
-
- it("keeps a DOMParser iframe within the gated realm", () => {
- setup();
- runProbe("isolation-dom-parser");
- });
-
- it("keeps a createHTMLDocument iframe adopted into the realm gated", () => {
- setup();
- runProbe("isolation-adopt-html-doc-iframe");
- });
-
- it("keeps a createHTMLDocument iframe imported into the realm gated", () => {
- setup();
- runProbe("isolation-import-html-doc-iframe");
- });
-
- it("keeps a createDocument iframe adopted into the realm gated", () => {
- setup();
- runProbe("isolation-xml-doc-iframe");
- });
-
- it("keeps a template owner-document iframe adopted into the realm gated", () => {
- setup();
- runProbe("isolation-template-doc-iframe");
- });
-
- it("keeps a raw API out of the SDK endowments", () => {
- setup();
- runProbe("isolation-endowment-api");
- });
-
- it("keeps an Error.prepareStackTrace realm reference gated", () => {
- setup();
- runProbe("isolation-stack-trace-realm");
- });
-
- it("keeps window.parent within the gated realm", () => {
- setup();
- runProbe("isolation-window-parent");
- });
-
- it("keeps window.top within the gated realm", () => {
- setup();
- runProbe("isolation-window-top");
- });
-
- it("keeps window.frameElement's owner realm gated", () => {
- setup();
- runProbe("isolation-frame-element");
- });
-
- it("keeps window.parent.parent within the gated realm", () => {
- setup();
- runProbe("isolation-parent-chain");
- });
-
- it("gates document.cookie on the parent realm", () => {
- setup();
- runProbe("isolation-parent-cookie");
- });
-
- it("gates localStorage on the parent realm", () => {
- setup();
- runProbe("isolation-parent-local-storage");
- });
-
- it("gates sessionStorage on the parent realm", () => {
- setup();
- runProbe("isolation-parent-session-storage");
- });
-
- it("gates indexedDB on the parent realm", () => {
- setup();
- runProbe("isolation-parent-indexeddb");
- });
-
- it("gates caches on the parent realm", () => {
- setup();
- runProbe("isolation-parent-caches");
- });
+ const guardMessage = () =>
+ cy.contains("blocked host createElement", { timeout: 30000 });
- it("keeps indexed window.frames access gated", () => {
+ it("keeps the realms the app creates within the gated realm", () => {
setup();
- runProbe("isolation-window-frames");
- });
- it("keeps window.opener's realm gated", () => {
- setup();
- runProbe("isolation-window-opener");
+ runProbes([
+ "window-frames",
+ "create-element",
+ "dom-parser",
+ "adopt-html-doc-iframe",
+ "import-html-doc-iframe",
+ "xml-doc-iframe",
+ "template-doc-iframe",
+ "range-fragment-iframe",
+ "inner-html",
+ "custom-element",
+ "window-open",
+ ]);
});
- it("gates FontFace.load", () => {
- setup();
- runProbe("isolation-font-face");
- });
-
- it("gates cookieStore", () => {
- setup();
- runProbe("isolation-cookie-store");
- });
-
- it("gates performance resource timing", () => {
- setup();
- runProbe("isolation-perf-resource-timing");
- });
+ // The 403s the marker produces are backend behaviour, covered by
+ // `data_app_scope_test.clj`. What only e2e can prove is the premise those 403s rest
+ // on: that the real transport stamps `X-Metabase-Client: data-app` on the requests the
+ // SDK makes from inside the sandbox. The header cannot be spoofed to gain access —
+ // host-realm code the membraned guest can't reach sets it, and it only ever narrows —
+ // but if it ever stopped being sent, the confinement would silently stop applying.
+ it("keeps the host window, its storage and a host iframe's realm gated, and marks the SDK's requests as data-app", () => {
+ const markedPaths = new Set<string>();
- it("keeps a Range.createContextualFragment iframe within the gated realm", () => {
- setup();
- runProbe("isolation-range-fragment-iframe");
- });
+ cy.intercept("/api/**", (req) => {
+ if (req.headers["x-metabase-client"] === "data-app") {
+ markedPaths.add(new URL(req.url).pathname);
+ }
+ });
- it("keeps a custom element's upgrade callback in the gated realm", () => {
setup();
- runProbe("isolation-custom-element");
- });
- it("keeps a host iframe's realm gated", () => {
- setup();
+ // `/api/user/current` is the whole marked surface this fixture produces — it renders
+ // isolation probes, not questions, and the SDK's bootstrap takes site settings from
+ // the auth prefetch rather than refetching `/api/session/properties`.
+ cy.wrap(markedPaths, { timeout: 30000 }).should((paths) => {
+ expect([...paths], "requests marked as data-app").to.include(
+ "/api/user/current",
+ );
+ });
// A srcless (about:blank) iframe is same-origin, so its `contentWindow` is a
// live realm with an un-gated `fetch` — the same capability html2canvas's
@@ -252,7 +130,72 @@ describe("scenarios > data apps > sandbox isolation", () => {
);
});
- runProbe("isolation-child-frame-grab");
+ runProbes([
+ "child-frame-grab",
+ "window-parent",
+ "window-top",
+ "frame-element",
+ "parent-chain",
+ "window-opener",
+ "parent-cookie",
+ "parent-local-storage",
+ "parent-session-storage",
+ "parent-indexeddb",
+ "parent-caches",
+ ]);
+ });
+
+ it("gates the APIs that run code, read host data or reach a host realm", () => {
+ setup();
+
+ runProbes([
+ "perf-resource-timing",
+ "function-constructor",
+ "worker",
+ "shared-worker",
+ "service-worker",
+ "dynamic-import",
+ "font-face",
+ "cookie-store",
+ "endowment-api",
+ "stack-trace-realm",
+ ]);
+ });
+
+ /**
+ * For the probes whose element is refused during React's own render pass.
+ *
+ * The guard throws from `createElement` inside the reconciler, and the app's
+ * `BoundaryReporter` never catches it: that boundary is declared in the GUEST
+ * realm while HOST React renders the tree, and React's error-boundary detection
+ * does not survive the membrane. The throw therefore reaches the host boundary
+ * and takes the data app down — which is the correct outcome, but it also
+ * destroys the probe, so there is no `isolation-result` left to read. Assert on
+ * the guard's own message instead, and open the app again for each probe.
+ */
+ it("gates host-React iframes: about:blank, Metabase itself and srcdoc", () => {
+ const instanceUrl = Cypress.config("baseUrl") ?? "";
+ const testEnv: IsolationTestEnv = { instanceUrl };
+
+ H.mockDataApp(APP_NAME, { displayName: APP_DISPLAY_NAME, testEnv });
+
+ ["react-about-blank", "react-src", "react-srcdoc"].forEach((probeId) => {
+ cy.log(probeId);
+ H.openDataApp(APP_NAME);
+
+ H.dataAppIframe(APP_DISPLAY_NAME).within(() => {
+ cy.findByTestId("isolation-result", { timeout: 30000 }).should(
+ "have.text",
+ "pending",
+ );
+ });
+ guardMessage().should("not.exist");
+
+ H.dataAppIframe(APP_DISPLAY_NAME).within(() => {
+ cy.findByTestId(`isolation-${probeId}`).scrollIntoView().click();
+ });
+ guardMessage().should("exist");
+ });
});
it("gates an allowed_host redirect to the instance", () => {
@@ -278,7 +221,7 @@ describe("scenarios > data apps > sandbox isolation", () => {
statusCode: 307,
headers: { ...cors, Location: `${instanceUrl}/api/session/properties` },
});
- });
+ }).as("allowedHostRedirect");
H.mockDataApp(APP_NAME, {
displayName: APP_DISPLAY_NAME,
@@ -286,40 +229,14 @@ describe("scenarios > data apps > sandbox isolation", () => {
allowedHosts: ["http://localhost:4444"],
});
H.openDataApp(APP_NAME);
-
- runProbe("isolation-allowed-host-redirect");
- });
-
- // The 403s the marker produces are backend behaviour, covered by
- // `data_app_scope_test.clj`. What only e2e can prove is the premise those 403s rest
- // on: that the real transport stamps `X-Metabase-Client: data-app` on the requests the
- // SDK makes from inside the sandbox. The header cannot be spoofed to gain access —
- // host-realm code the membraned guest can't reach sets it, and it only ever narrows —
- // but if it ever stopped being sent, the confinement would silently stop applying.
- it("marks the requests the SDK makes from inside the sandbox as data-app", () => {
- const markedPaths = new Set<string>();
-
- cy.intercept("/api/**", (req) => {
- if (req.headers["x-metabase-client"] === "data-app") {
- markedPaths.add(new URL(req.url).pathname);
- }
- });
-
- setup();
-
- // Wait for the guest bundle to have rendered — the SDK's bootstrap requests are
- // still in flight while it loads, so asserting earlier races them.
H.dataAppIframe(APP_DISPLAY_NAME).within(() => {
- cy.findByTestId("isolation-result", { timeout: 30000 }).should("exist");
- });
-
- // `/api/user/current` is the whole marked surface this fixture produces — it renders
- // isolation probes, not questions, and the SDK's bootstrap takes site settings from
- // the auth prefetch rather than refetching `/api/session/properties`.
- cy.then(() => {
- expect([...markedPaths], "requests marked as data-app").to.include(
- "/api/user/current",
+ cy.findByTestId("isolation-result", { timeout: 30000 }).should(
+ "have.text",
+ "pending",
);
});
+
+ runProbes(["allowed-host-redirect"]);
+ cy.wait("@allowedHostRedirect");
});
});
diff --git a/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/sdk.cy.spec.ts b/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/sdk.cy.spec.ts
index cd36ffe053a..277f46fd9d7 100644
--- a/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/sdk.cy.spec.ts
+++ b/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/sdk.cy.spec.ts
@@ -35,7 +35,8 @@ describe("scenarios > data apps > SDK runtime", () => {
},
});
- it("surfaces the useMetabaseQuery error state", () => {
+ it("surfaces the useMetabaseQuery error state, and re-runs the query when the app calls refetch", () => {
+ cy.intercept("POST", "/api/dataset").as("datasetQuery");
setupQueryStatesApp();
visitAppRoute("query-states");
@@ -44,15 +45,7 @@ describe("scenarios > data apps > SDK runtime", () => {
"have.text",
"error",
);
- });
- });
-
- it("re-runs the query when the app calls refetch", () => {
- cy.intercept("POST", "/api/dataset").as("datasetQuery");
- setupQueryStatesApp();
- visitAppRoute("query-states");
- H.dataAppIframe(APP_DISPLAY_NAME).within(() => {
// The query has to have resolved before refetching means anything.
cy.findByTestId("query-value", { timeout: 30000 })
.invoke("text")
diff --git a/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/sync.cy.spec.ts b/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/sync.cy.spec.ts
index 35d9c0baf03..e45c87614d2 100644
--- a/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/sync.cy.spec.ts
+++ b/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/sync.cy.spec.ts
@@ -17,11 +17,10 @@ describe("scenarios > data apps > repo sync", () => {
H.setupGitSync();
});
- it("materializes each app with its bundle", () => {
+ it("materializes each app with its bundle, then removes an app whose files are removed from the repo on the next sync", () => {
H.copySyncedCollectionFixture();
H.copySyncedDataAppsFixture();
H.commitToRepo("Add data apps");
-
H.configureGitAndPullChanges("read-write");
cy.visit("/admin/settings/apps");
@@ -57,13 +56,6 @@ describe("scenarios > data apps > repo sync", () => {
.should("eq", app.resource_collection_id);
expect(app.table_ids).to.deep.eq([ORDERS_ID]);
});
- });
-
- it("removes an app whose directory and collection files are removed from the repo on the next sync", () => {
- H.copySyncedCollectionFixture();
- H.copySyncedDataAppsFixture();
- H.commitToRepo("Add data apps");
- H.configureGitAndPullChanges("read-write");
// An author deletes an app by deleting its directory and its collection's
// files in one commit; the pull deletes the app, and the app deletes its
diff --git a/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/user-access.cy.spec.ts b/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/user-access.cy.spec.ts
index ecaa4f6bf45..c7ce75dd8ca 100644
--- a/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/user-access.cy.spec.ts
+++ b/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/user-access.cy.spec.ts
@@ -42,59 +42,78 @@ describe("scenarios > data apps > authentication", () => {
ALLOWED_HOST,
);
});
+ cy.request(`/api/apps/${SYNCED_APP_SLUG}/bundle`).then((res) => {
+ expect(
+ String(res.headers["x-metabase-data-app-allowed-hosts"]),
+ ).to.contain(ALLOWED_HOST);
+ });
cy.signOut();
});
- it("does not serve the iframe document or its allowed hosts", () => {
+ it("does not serve the app, its bundle, its metadata or its allowed hosts", () => {
cy.request({
url: `/embed/apps/${SYNCED_APP_SLUG}`,
failOnStatusCode: false,
followRedirect: false,
- }).then((res) => {
- expect(res.status).to.eq(302);
- expect(String(res.headers["location"])).to.contain("/auth/login");
- expect(
- String(res.headers["content-security-policy"] ?? ""),
- ).not.to.contain(ALLOWED_HOST);
- });
- });
-
- it("does not put the allowed hosts on the top-level app page", () => {
+ }).as("iframeDocument");
cy.request({
url: `/apps/${SYNCED_APP_SLUG}`,
failOnStatusCode: false,
followRedirect: false,
- }).then((res) => {
- // The SPA shell is still served; the React app sends the visitor to
- // login. Anchor on it so a 404 or an empty response can't pass the
- // negative check below.
- expect(res.status).to.eq(200);
- expect(String(res.headers["content-type"])).to.contain("text/html");
- expect(res.headers["content-security-policy"]).to.be.a("string");
- expect(res.headers["content-security-policy"]).not.to.contain(
- ALLOWED_HOST,
- );
- });
- });
-
- it("refuses the bundle and app metadata", () => {
+ }).as("appPage");
cy.request({
url: `/api/apps/${SYNCED_APP_SLUG}/bundle`,
failOnStatusCode: false,
- }).then((res) => {
- expect(res.status).to.eq(401);
- expect(res.headers).not.to.have.property(
- "x-metabase-data-app-allowed-hosts",
- );
- });
-
+ }).as("bundle");
cy.request({
url: `/api/apps/${SYNCED_APP_SLUG}`,
failOnStatusCode: false,
- })
- .its("status")
- .should("eq", 401);
+ }).as("metadata");
+
+ cy.then(function () {
+ const iframeDocument: Cypress.Response<unknown> = this.iframeDocument;
+ const appPage: Cypress.Response<unknown> = this.appPage;
+ const bundle: Cypress.Response<unknown> = this.bundle;
+ const metadata: Cypress.Response<unknown> = this.metadata;
+ const appPageCsp = appPage.headers["content-security-policy"];
+
+ // The SPA shell is still served for the app page; the React app sends
+ // the visitor to login. Anchor on it so a 404 or an empty response can't
+ // pass the negative checks.
+ expect({
+ iframeDocumentStatus: iframeDocument.status,
+ iframeDocumentRedirectsToLogin: String(
+ iframeDocument.headers["location"],
+ ).includes("/auth/login"),
+ iframeDocumentCspHasAllowedHost: String(
+ iframeDocument.headers["content-security-policy"] ?? "",
+ ).includes(ALLOWED_HOST),
+ appPageStatus: appPage.status,
+ appPageIsHtml: String(appPage.headers["content-type"]).includes(
+ "text/html",
+ ),
+ appPageHasCsp: typeof appPageCsp === "string",
+ appPageCspHasAllowedHost: String(appPageCsp ?? "").includes(
+ ALLOWED_HOST,
+ ),
+ bundleStatus: bundle.status,
+ bundleHasAllowedHostsHeader:
+ "x-metabase-data-app-allowed-hosts" in bundle.headers,
+ metadataStatus: metadata.status,
+ }).to.deep.equal({
+ iframeDocumentStatus: 302,
+ iframeDocumentRedirectsToLogin: true,
+ iframeDocumentCspHasAllowedHost: false,
+ appPageStatus: 200,
+ appPageIsHtml: true,
+ appPageHasCsp: true,
+ appPageCspHasAllowedHost: false,
+ bundleStatus: 401,
+ bundleHasAllowedHostsHeader: false,
+ metadataStatus: 401,
+ });
+ });
});
});
});
diff --git a/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/viewing.cy.spec.ts b/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/viewing.cy.spec.ts
index ff3ea761cb4..fc9e1e7c1f4 100644
--- a/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/viewing.cy.spec.ts
+++ b/e2e/test/scenarios/data-apps/viewing.cy.spec.ts
@@ -110,12 +110,22 @@ describe("scenarios > data apps > viewing & routing", () => {
});
describe("internal routing", () => {
- it("mirrors internal route changes into the parent URL", () => {
+ it("starts on a deep-linked sub-route, and mirrors link and imperative route changes into the parent URL", () => {
H.mockDataApp(APP_NAME, {
displayName: APP_DISPLAY_NAME,
testEnv: TEST_ENV,
});
+ cy.log("deep-link directly to a sub-route");
+ visitAppRoute("details");
+ H.dataAppIframe(APP_DISPLAY_NAME).within(() => {
+ cy.findByRole("heading", { name: "Order details" }).should(
+ "be.visible",
+ );
+ cy.findByTestId("current-pathname").should("have.text", "/details");
+ });
+
+ cy.log("navigate with a DataAppLink");
H.openDataApp(APP_NAME);
H.dataAppIframe(APP_DISPLAY_NAME).within(() => {
cy.findByRole("heading", { name: "Orders overview" }).should(
@@ -133,29 +143,8 @@ describe("scenarios > data apps > viewing & routing", () => {
// The iframe's client-side navigation is mirrored to the parent's URL bar
// (via replaceState), so the top-level path reflects the nested route.
cy.location("pathname").should("eq", `/apps/${APP_NAME}/details`);
- });
-
- it("starts on the target page when deep-linked directly to a sub-route", () => {
- H.mockDataApp(APP_NAME, {
- displayName: APP_DISPLAY_NAME,
- testEnv: TEST_ENV,
- });
-
- visitAppRoute("details");
- H.dataAppIframe(APP_DISPLAY_NAME).within(() => {
- cy.findByRole("heading", { name: "Order details" }).should(
- "be.visible",
- );
- cy.findByTestId("current-pathname").should("have.text", "/details");
- });
- });
-
- it("navigates imperatively via useDataAppLocation().navigate", () => {
- H.mockDataApp(APP_NAME, {
- displayName: APP_DISPLAY_NAME,
- testEnv: TEST_ENV,
- });
+ cy.log("navigate imperatively via useDataAppLocation().navigate");
H.openDataApp(APP_NAME);
H.dataAppIframe(APP_DISPLAY_NAME).within(() => {
cy.findByRole("heading", { name: "Orders overview" }).should(