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test(mfa): auth-mechanism matrix + lockout-corner coverage (#77624)
bryan64588d02fbb1
diff --git a/enterprise/backend/src/metabase_enterprise/mfa/management.clj b/enterprise/backend/src/metabase_enterprise/mfa/management.cljindex 5b3f4206f1c..2f949b6f747 100644--- a/enterprise/backend/src/metabase_enterprise/mfa/management.clj+++ b/enterprise/backend/src/metabase_enterprise/mfa/management.clj@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@[metabase.sso.core :as sso][metabase.util.encryption :as encryption][metabase.util.i18n :refer [tru]]+ [metabase.util.log :as log][metabase.util.malli.schema :as ms][metabase.util.password :as u.password][throttle.core :as throttle]@@ -67,9 +68,15 @@(t2/select-one-fn :credentials :model/AuthIdentity :user_id user-id :provider "password")](and password_hash (u.password/verify-password password password_salt password_hash)))(when (sso/ldap-enabled)- (when-let [user-email (t2/select-one-fn :email :model/User user-id)]- (when-let [user-info (sso/find-user user-email)]- (sso/verify-password user-info password))))))))+ ;; an unreachable directory fails closed: re-auth is denied (the user retries when the+ ;; directory is back; admin/remove needs no re-auth), never an unhandled 500+ (try+ (when-let [user-email (t2/select-one-fn :email :model/User user-id)]+ (when-let [user-info (sso/find-user user-email)]+ (sso/verify-password user-info password)))+ (catch Exception e+ (log/warn e "LDAP re-auth failed because the directory is unreachable")+ false)))))));; Notification emails here are fire-and-log by construction: the messages/send-mfa-*-email!;; senders route through email/send-message!, which catches and logs delivery failures — so an@@ -164,14 +171,23 @@;;; -------------------------------------------------- Admin --------------------------------------------------(api.macros/defendpoint :post "/admin/remove" :- nil- "Admin: remove a user's two-factor enrollment entirely — the lockout escape hatch for a lost- authenticator with no recovery codes. Never feature-gated (a lapsed license must not make- lockouts permanent). The affected user is notified by email. They re-enroll from scratch —- there is nothing to \"reset\", the secret lives on their device."+ "Admin: remove *another* user's two-factor enrollment entirely — the lockout escape hatch for a+ lost authenticator with no recovery codes. Never feature-gated (a lapsed license must not make+ lockouts permanent). The affected user is notified by email. They re-enroll from scratch — there+ is nothing to \"reset\", the secret lives on their device.++ Removing your *own* enrollment is deliberately refused here: this is a user-management endpoint+ that takes no second factor (the target can't produce one — that's why an admin is removing it),+ and the admin UI never collects a code. Self-removal goes through the normal Security page, which+ re-auths with a fresh factor via `/disable`. Without this guard a hijacked admin session could+ strip its own 2FA with only a cookie, turning transient access into a permanent password bypass."[_route-params_query-params{user-id :user_id} :- [:map [:user_id ms/PositiveInt]]](api/check-superuser)+ (when (= user-id api/*current-user-id*)+ (throw (ex-info (tru "You cannot administratively remove your own two-factor authentication. Please use the normal removal method in your account settings.")+ {:status-code 400})))(when (enrollment/disable! user-id)(let [user (t2/select-one :model/User :id user-id)](messages/send-mfa-removed-by-admin-email! (:email user))diff --git a/enterprise/backend/test/metabase_enterprise/mfa/admin_test.clj b/enterprise/backend/test/metabase_enterprise/mfa/admin_test.cljindex c49d61bc6ee..717d65a9ba7 100644--- a/enterprise/backend/test/metabase_enterprise/mfa/admin_test.clj+++ b/enterprise/backend/test/metabase_enterprise/mfa/admin_test.clj@@ -5,7 +5,8 @@[metabase-enterprise.mfa.enrollment :as enrollment][metabase-enterprise.mfa.totp :as totp][metabase.test :as mt]- [metabase.test.fixtures :as fixtures]))+ [metabase.test.fixtures :as fixtures]+ [toucan2.core :as t2]))(use-fixtures :once (fixtures/initialize :db :web-server :test-users))@@ -22,6 +23,23 @@(mt/user-http-request :crowberto :post 204 "ee/mfa/admin/remove" {:user_id user-id})(is (nil? (enrollment/enrolled-method user-id)))))))+(deftest admin-cannot-self-remove-test+ ;; admin/remove is "manage OTHER users" — self-removal is refused so a hijacked admin cookie+ ;; can't strip its own 2FA (this endpoint takes no factor; a stolen session has none to give).+ ;; Removing your own enrollment goes through /disable, which re-auths with a fresh code.+ (mt/with-temp [:model/AuthIdentity _ {:user_id (mt/user->id :crowberto)+ :provider "totp"+ :confirmed_at (t/instant)+ :credentials {:secret (totp/generate-secret)}}]+ (try+ (testing "removing your own id is refused, enrollment intact"+ (is (re-find #"cannot administratively remove your own"+ (mt/user-http-request :crowberto :post 400 "ee/mfa/admin/remove"+ {:user_id (mt/user->id :crowberto)})))+ (is (= :totp (enrollment/enrolled-method (mt/user->id :crowberto)))))+ (finally+ (t2/delete! :model/AuthIdentity :user_id (mt/user->id :crowberto) :provider "totp")))))+(deftest admin-remove-is-audited-test;; audit rows require the :audit-app feature at event time (premium-features/log-enabled?)(mt/with-premium-features #{:audit-app}diff --git a/enterprise/backend/test/metabase_enterprise/mfa/gate_test.clj b/enterprise/backend/test/metabase_enterprise/mfa/gate_test.cljindex 9022d422011..93e6a9e8a47 100644--- a/enterprise/backend/test/metabase_enterprise/mfa/gate_test.clj+++ b/enterprise/backend/test/metabase_enterprise/mfa/gate_test.clj@@ -68,6 +68,81 @@(is (true? (:mfa/pending? gated)))(is (nil? (:mfa/first-factor gated)))))))))))+(deftest gate-sso-provider-matrix-test+ (testing "every SSO provider is exempt for an enrolled user — the IdP owns MFA there"+ (mt/with-premium-features #{:multi-factor-auth}+ (mt/with-temporary-setting-values [mfa-enforcement :optional]+ (with-enrolled-user!+ (fn [user-id]+ (let [result {:success? true :user {:id user-id}}]+ (doseq [provider [:provider/google+ :provider/saml+ :provider/jwt+ :provider/oidc+ :provider/custom-oidc+ :provider/slack-connect]]+ (testing provider+ (is (= result (auth-identity.provider/apply-mfa-gate provider result))))))))))))++(deftest gate-provider-registry-exhaustiveness-test+ ;; The gate's fall-through branch is exempt, so a provider nobody classified silently bypasses+ ;; MFA. This test forces the decision: every provider in the auth-identity hierarchy must appear+ ;; below. If you added a provider and landed here, decide its MFA posture — challenged providers+ ;; also go in `metabase-enterprise.mfa.gate/challenged-providers`, session-suppressed ones in+ ;; `session-suppressed-providers`; exemption is the default and needs only this map.+ (let [classification {:provider/password :challenged+ :provider/ldap :challenged+ :provider/emailed-secret-password-reset :session-suppressed+ ;; IdP owns MFA for SSO logins+ :provider/google :exempt+ :provider/saml :exempt+ :provider/jwt :exempt+ :provider/oidc :exempt+ :provider/custom-oidc :exempt+ :provider/slack-connect :exempt+ ;; admin-granted, time-boxed, audited; staff can't hold the second factor+ :provider/support-access-grant :exempt+ ;; abstract parent (reset/verification/magic links) — a concrete login+ ;; child must be classified here on its own when it ships+ :provider/emailed-secret :exempt+ ;; the second factor itself, never a first factor+ :provider/totp :exempt}]+ (testing "every registered provider has a deliberate MFA classification"+ (is (= (set (keys classification))+ (set (descendants :metabase.auth-identity.provider/provider)))))+ (testing "the gate's behavior matches each classification for an enrolled user"+ (mt/with-premium-features #{:multi-factor-auth}+ (mt/with-temporary-setting-values [mfa-enforcement :optional]+ (with-enrolled-user!+ (fn [user-id]+ (let [result {:success? true :user {:id user-id}}]+ (doseq [[provider posture] classification]+ (testing provider+ (let [gated (auth-identity.provider/apply-mfa-gate provider result)]+ (case posture+ :challenged (is (= :mfa-required (:success? gated)))+ :session-suppressed (do (is (true? (:success? gated)))+ (is (true? (:mfa/pending? gated))))+ :exempt (is (= result gated))))))))))))))++(deftest gate-env-var-escape-hatch-test+ ;; The last-admin lockout recovery: the only superuser loses authenticator + recovery codes, so+ ;; nobody can log in to flip the setting. Restarting with MB_MFA_ENFORCEMENT=off must win over+ ;; the :optional stored in the DB and let them in single-step.+ (mt/with-premium-features #{:multi-factor-auth}+ (mt/with-temporary-setting-values [mfa-enforcement :optional]+ (with-enrolled-user!+ (fn [user-id]+ (let [result {:success? true :user {:id user-id}}]+ (is (= :mfa-required+ (:success? (auth-identity.provider/apply-mfa-gate :provider/password result)))+ "sanity: challenged before the override")+ (mt/with-temp-env-var-value! [mb-mfa-enforcement "off"]+ (is (false? (mfa.settings/mfa-enabled?))+ "the env var beats the DB value")+ (is (= result (auth-identity.provider/apply-mfa-gate :provider/password result))+ "the gate no-ops, so the locked-out admin can log in"))))))))+(deftest mfa-enforcement-write-path-test(mt/with-temporary-setting-values [mfa-enforcement :off](testing "enabling (:optional) requires the :multi-factor-auth feature (setup is gated; enforcement is not)"diff --git a/enterprise/backend/test/metabase_enterprise/mfa/ldap_flow_test.clj b/enterprise/backend/test/metabase_enterprise/mfa/ldap_flow_test.cljindex 788043caa40..930f68ed5b2 100644--- a/enterprise/backend/test/metabase_enterprise/mfa/ldap_flow_test.clj+++ b/enterprise/backend/test/metabase_enterprise/mfa/ldap_flow_test.clj@@ -5,9 +5,11 @@(:require[clojure.test :refer :all][java-time.api :as t]+ [metabase-enterprise.mfa.enrollment :as enrollment][metabase-enterprise.mfa.management :as mfa.management][metabase-enterprise.mfa.totp :as totp][metabase.session.api :as api.session]+ [metabase.sso.core :as sso][metabase.sso.ldap-test-util :as ldap.test][metabase.test :as mt][metabase.test.fixtures :as fixtures]@@ -73,6 +75,35 @@(testing "the enroll endpoint's schema also refuses a blank password"(mt/client session-key :post 400 "ee/mfa/enroll" {:password ""})))))))+(deftest ldap-directory-unreachable-fails-closed-test+ ;; Lockout-corner: the directory goes down while a user is enrolled. Re-auth (disable) must fail+ ;; closed as a denied verification — not a 500 — and must not touch the enrollment. The recovery+ ;; path that needs no directory, admin/remove, keeps working.+ (mt/with-premium-features #{:multi-factor-auth}+ (mt/with-temporary-setting-values [mfa-enforcement :optional]+ (ldap.test/with-ldap-server!+ (let [{session-key :id} (mt/client :post 200 "session" {:username sally-email+ :password sally-directory-password})+ user-id (t2/select-one-fn :id :model/User :email sally-email)+ secret (totp/generate-secret)]+ (try+ (t2/insert! :model/AuthIdentity {:user_id user-id+ :provider "totp"+ :confirmed_at (t/instant)+ :credentials {:secret secret}})+ (with-redefs [sso/find-user (fn [& _] (throw (ex-info "connection refused" {})))]+ (testing "enroll re-auth with the directory down is a 400, not a 500"+ (is (=? {:errors {:password some?}}+ (mt/client session-key :post 400 "ee/mfa/enroll"+ {:password sally-directory-password}))))+ (testing "the enrollment is untouched"+ (is (= :totp (enrollment/enrolled-method user-id))))+ (testing "admin/remove needs no directory and still recovers the account"+ (mt/user-http-request :crowberto :post 204 "ee/mfa/admin/remove" {:user_id user-id})+ (is (nil? (enrollment/enrolled-method user-id)))))+ (finally+ (t2/delete! :model/AuthIdentity :user_id user-id :provider "totp"))))))))+(deftest ldap-only-user-enrolls-with-directory-password-test(mt/with-premium-features #{:multi-factor-auth}(mt/with-temporary-setting-values [mfa-enforcement :optional]diff --git a/enterprise/backend/test/metabase_enterprise/mfa/verification_test.clj b/enterprise/backend/test/metabase_enterprise/mfa/verification_test.cljindex 993e2bc013b..a9e4964d65d 100644--- a/enterprise/backend/test/metabase_enterprise/mfa/verification_test.clj+++ b/enterprise/backend/test/metabase_enterprise/mfa/verification_test.clj@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@(:require[clojure.test :refer :all][java-time.api :as t]+ [metabase-enterprise.mfa.enrollment :as enrollment][metabase-enterprise.mfa.recovery-codes :as recovery-codes][metabase-enterprise.mfa.totp :as totp][metabase-enterprise.mfa.verification :as verification]@@ -194,3 +195,25 @@(t2/select-one-fn :credentials :model/AuthIdentity:user_id user-id :provider "totp"))"sanity: the old key can no longer read the row"))))))++(deftest lost-encryption-key-fails-closed-test+ (testing "an instance started with the wrong key: verify errors (no bypass, no session), and+ admin removal — which never decrypts — still recovers the account"+ (let [secret (totp/generate-secret)+ k1 "0123456789abcdef-key-A"+ k2 "totally-different-key-B!"]+ (mt/with-temp [:model/User {user-id :id} {}]+ (encryption-test/with-secret-key k1+ (t2/insert! :model/AuthIdentity {:user_id user-id+ :provider "totp"+ :confirmed_at (t/instant)+ :credentials {:secret secret}}))+ (encryption-test/with-secret-key k2+ (testing "verification fails closed — an error, never a false-positive login"+ (is (thrown? Exception+ (verification/verify-attempt! user-id (totp/generate-code secret) (fresh-jti)))))+ (testing "the enrollment row survives the failed attempt"+ (is (= 1 (t2/count :auth_identity :user_id user-id :provider "totp"))))+ (testing "disable! deletes without decrypting, so the admin escape hatch works"+ (is (true? (enrollment/disable! user-id)))+ (is (zero? (t2/count :auth_identity :user_id user-id :provider "totp")))))))))