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restore 1.5.27 changelog (#2224)
Nahuel Nucera2c2eacd33cfe
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.mdindex c10c1ab4..56a36381 100644--- a/CHANGELOG.md+++ b/CHANGELOG.md@@ -9,14 +9,32 @@ Versioning follows [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).### Added- **RDS — `DescribeEvents` with reboot events** — `DescribeEvents` returns the `availability` event `DB instance restarted.` once a `RebootDBInstance` has finished, filtered by source, source type, category and time, paged with `Marker` and kept for 14 days; other RDS lifecycle events are not recorded yet. Contributed by @jayjanssen.--### Changed-- **RDS — real instance reboot** — `RebootDBInstance` now returns `rebooting`, stops and starts its backing database container, and waits for SQL readiness before reporting `available`. Data and endpoint bindings are preserved. An instance that is not `available` answers `InvalidDBInstanceState`, and a Docker failure reports `failed` rather than a successful reboot. Contributed by @jayjanssen.--### Added- **S3 Control — Multi-Region Access Points** — `CreateMultiRegionAccessPoint`, `DeleteMultiRegionAccessPoint`, `PutMultiRegionAccessPointPolicy`, `DescribeMultiRegionAccessPointOperation`, `GetMultiRegionAccessPoint`, `GetMultiRegionAccessPointPolicy`, `ListMultiRegionAccessPoints`, `GetMultiRegionAccessPointRoutes` and `SubmitMultiRegionAccessPointRoutes`. The async operations apply at once and `Describe` reports `SUCCEEDED`, or `FAILED` with AWS's `ErrorDetails` for a missing bucket, two buckets in one region or a name already in use. Management is served from `us-west-2` and route operations from `us-east-1`, `us-west-2`, `eu-west-1`, `ap-northeast-1` and `ap-southeast-2`, as on AWS; other regions get `301 PermanentRedirect`. `DeleteBucket` on a member returns `BucketHasAccessPointsAttached`. Under `AUTH=true` each operation needs its `s3:` IAM action and `x-amz-account-id` must name the caller's account. Access points from `AWS::S3::MultiRegionAccessPoint` appear in the API. Contributed by @fabio-andre-rodrigues.- **S3 — Multi-Region Access Point failover** — a request through the MRAP host goes to the member with a traffic dial of 100 that is homed in `MINISTACK_REGION`, else the first active member. Setting a dial to 0 moves traffic to the other member, and an update that leaves every dial at 0 is refused. Contributed by @fabio-andre-rodrigues.- **CloudFormation — `DescribeEvents`** — returns the validation errors of a create that fails pre-deployment validation, which the stack's `CREATE_FAILED` event tells the caller to look up; every request member is optional. Contributed by @fabio-andre-rodrigues.+- **WAF v2 — regex pattern sets** — `CreateRegexPatternSet`, `GetRegexPatternSet`, `UpdateRegexPatternSet`, `DeleteRegexPatternSet` and `ListRegexPatternSets` now manage regional and CloudFront-scoped regex pattern sets, with their ARN (`regexpatternset`), tags and `LockToken` checks on update and delete (`WAFOptimisticLockException` for a stale token), as AWS does. Web ACL and rule group rules are stored as sent, so a `RegexPatternSetReferenceStatement` pointing at a pattern set ARN round-trips; the statement is not evaluated, as MiniStack does not inspect requests. Contributed by @OS-kiranmalsetty.+- **IoT — job rollout rates** — `jobExecutionsRolloutConfig` was stored but every execution was created at once; a job now creates `maximumPerMinute` executions a minute, or a rate that starts at `baseRatePerMinute` and grows by `incrementFactor` for every `rateIncreaseCriteria` step of notified or succeeded things, notifies each thing when its execution is created, reports `isConcurrent` until the last batch and stops when the job is canceled or deleted. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **Health — `auth` field** — `/_ministack/health` reports `"auth": "enabled"` or `"disabled"`, the effective `AUTH` mode. Contributed by @jgrumboe.+- **Auth — REST API resource policies are evaluated under `AUTH=true`** — an API Gateway resource policy took no part in the decision; for an `execute-api:Invoke` a statement naming the calling user or role now allows the call without an identity policy, a statement naming only the account still needs one, a Deny wins over an identity Allow, and a call without a SigV4 signature (none, or a bearer token) to a method without authorization passes only when the policy, if any, allows everyone, else it answers `ACCESS_DENIED` with API Gateway's message. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **Auth — KMS key policies are evaluated under `AUTH=true`** — a key policy took no part in the decision; it now has to allow even in the key's own account: a statement naming the calling user or role allows the call without an identity policy, identity policies count only when the key policy has a statement for the account (the default key policy does), and a Deny wins over an identity Allow. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **Auth — ECR repository policies count under `AUTH=true`** — a repository policy took no part in the decision; a statement naming the calling user or role now allows the call without an identity policy, a statement naming only the account still needs one, and a Deny wins over an identity Allow. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **Auth — Secrets Manager resource policies count under `AUTH=true`** — a secret's resource policy took no part in the decision; a statement naming the calling user or role now allows the call without an identity policy, a statement naming only the account still needs one, and a Deny wins over an identity Allow. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **Auth — Lambda function policies count under `AUTH=true`** — an `AddPermission` statement naming the calling user or role did not let a caller without an identity policy in; it now allows the actions it names (`InvokeFunction`, `GetFunction`, ...), while a statement naming only the account still needs an identity Allow, and a call that names the function by ARN is checked against that ARN. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **Auth — bucket policies count under `AUTH=true` in the owner's account** — a bucket policy was consulted only for another account's requests; in the owner's account a statement naming the calling user or role now allows the request without an identity policy, a statement naming only the account still needs one, and a Deny wins over an identity Allow, CDK's `aws:SecureTransport` Deny on the bootstrap bucket included. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **Auth — queue and topic policies count under `AUTH=true`** — a queue or topic policy statement naming the calling user or role did not let a caller without an identity policy in; in the owner's account it now allows the call, a statement naming only the account still needs an identity Allow, and across accounts both have to allow. A denial answers `AuthorizationError` on SNS and reports `AccessDenied` to SDKs on SQS, its message says "with an explicit deny in a resource-based policy" when the resource's policy denied, and the check reads the queue of the account the `QueueUrl` names. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **IoT — `EnableTopicRule` and `DisableTopicRule`** — both calls were missing (`POST /rules/{ruleName}/enable` answered `Invalid ruleName`), so a rule could only be switched off by replacing it; they now set `ruleDisabled`, which `GetTopicRule` and `ListTopicRules` report and which stops the rule from acting on matching publishes and Basic Ingest until it is enabled again. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **IoT — job documents from S3** — `CreateJob` and `CreateJobTemplate` read a `documentSource` (`s3://` or an S3 object URL) from MiniStack's S3 once, at creation, where they stored a `{"documentSource": "<url>"}` placeholder. A missing bucket or object, an object that is not JSON or is over 32 KB and a URL that names no S3 host are refused with AWS's messages, and `CreateJob` refuses `document` together with `documentSource`. Devices get every job document re-serialized as AWS sends it, without spaces and without object members that are null, while `GetJobDocument` keeps the stored text. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **IoT — presigned URLs in job documents** — devices got `${aws:iot:s3-presigned-url:<url>}` and `${aws:iot:s3-presigned-url-v2:<url>}` placeholders as written; the `iot-jobs-data` API and the MQTT jobs topics now replace each with a SigV4 presigned GET URL of MiniStack's S3, signed with a session of `presignedUrlConfig.roleArn` and valid for `expiresInSec`, and `CreateJob` and `CreateJobTemplate` refuse a placeholder without a role or an S3 object URL with AWS's messages. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **IoT — fleet provisioning by claim** — `CreateProvisioningClaim` issues a five-minute claim certificate that the mTLS listener accepts until it expires, and a device connected with it (or with any registered certificate) gets a certificate from `$aws/certificates/create/json` and registers itself through `$aws/provisioning-templates/<name>/provision/json`: the template's parameters, `Ref` and `Fn::Join` are resolved, the thing is created or checked against its `OverrideSettings`, and the certificate is activated and attached to the thing and the template's policies, with AWS's replies and rejections on the requesting connection; with `AUTH=true` a claim connection is limited to the certificate topics and its own template's, as on AWS. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **IoT — pre-provisioning hook** — `RegisterThing` over MQTT now invokes the template's `preProvisioningHook` Lambda before the template is resolved and applies its answer the way AWS does: `parameterOverrides` are merged into the device's parameters, `allowProvisioning: false` is rejected as `AccessDenied`, and a function that fails, answers in another shape, takes longer than six seconds or may not be invoked gets AWS's `InvocationError` or `InvalidResult`. `CreateProvisioningTemplate` and `UpdateProvisioningTemplate` check the hook like AWS (a Lambda function ARN, payload version `2020-04-01`, no hook on JITP templates, and an invoke permission for `iot.amazonaws.com` that covers the template) and store the default payload version. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **IoT — provisioning template versions** — `CreateProvisioningTemplateVersion`, `ListProvisioningTemplateVersions`, `DescribeProvisioningTemplateVersion` and `DeleteProvisioningTemplateVersion` answered `Unsupported IoT path` and `UpdateProvisioningTemplate` refused every `defaultVersionId` but 1; a template now keeps up to five versions whose ids are never reused, `setAsDefault` and `defaultVersionId` choose the version that `DescribeProvisioningTemplate` returns and `RegisterThing` applies, the default version cannot be deleted, and an `AWS::IoT::ProvisioningTemplate` whose `TemplateBody` changes gets a new default version (deleting the oldest at the limit), all with AWS's errors, including its message for a body that is not JSON. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **Cognito — `UpdateUserPoolDomain` and `AWS::Cognito::UserPoolDomain` stack updates** — `UpdateUserPoolDomain` was an unknown action; it now changes a domain's `ManagedLoginVersion` and a custom domain's certificate, `CreateUserPoolDomain` and `DescribeUserPoolDomain` return the version, and a second prefix domain on a pool is refused as on AWS. A stack update applies `ManagedLoginVersion` and `CustomDomainConfig` through it instead of running the create again, a `Domain` or `UserPoolId` change replaces the domain, the create keeps `CustomDomainConfig`, `Ref` returns the domain name and `Fn::GetAtt` returns `CloudFrontDistribution`. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **CloudFormation — SES configuration set updates** — `AWS::SES::ConfigurationSet` and `AWS::SES::ConfigurationSetEventDestination` stored none of their options, tags or destinations, and a change re-ran the create; both now provision through the SES v2 calls and update in place, a removed option goes back to its default as on AWS, and only a `Name` or `ConfigurationSetName` change replaces them. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **SES v2 — configuration set options and event destinations** — `GetConfigurationSet` returned only the name and the tags given at creation; it now returns the tracking, delivery, reputation, sending, suppression, VDM and archiving options that `CreateConfigurationSet` and the seven `PutConfigurationSet*Options` calls set, and a call clears the members it leaves out, as on AWS. `CreateConfigurationSetEventDestination`, `GetConfigurationSetEventDestinations`, `UpdateConfigurationSetEventDestination` and `DeleteConfigurationSetEventDestination` are new. `CreateConfigurationSet` with a name already in use is refused with `AlreadyExistsException` instead of replacing the set. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **IoT — job abort criteria** — a job's `abortConfig` was stored but never acted on; once a device report, a `CancelJobExecution`, a `DeleteJobExecution` or a timeout meets one of its criteria, the job is now canceled with reasonCode `ABORT_CANCEL` and AWS's comment, together with its `QUEUED` executions. `CreateJob` and `CreateJobTemplate` stored any `abortConfig`; they now refuse what `UpdateJob` refuses, and all three refuse a missing criterion member, a threshold of 0 or less or with more than two decimals, and a failure type given twice. A `CancelJob` without `force` now reports `forceCanceled` as false. Contributed by @iot-rocket.++### Changed+- **RDS — real instance reboot** — `RebootDBInstance` now returns `rebooting`, stops and starts its backing database container, and waits for SQL readiness before reporting `available`. Data and endpoint bindings are preserved. An instance that is not `available` answers `InvalidDBInstanceState`, and a Docker failure reports `failed` rather than a successful reboot. Contributed by @jayjanssen.### Fixed- **CloudFront — function status follows publish and association** — `DescribeFunction` and `ListFunctions` reported the `DEVELOPMENT` stage as `UNPUBLISHED` even after `PublishFunction`, so Terraform's `aws_cloudfront_function.status`, which reads that stage, never left `UNPUBLISHED`; once the current development version is published it now reports `UNASSOCIATED`, or `DEPLOYED` while a distribution's cache behavior references the function, and an `UpdateFunction` makes it `UNPUBLISHED` again until the next publish. Contributed by @fabio-andre-rodrigues.@@ -29,11 +47,6 @@ Versioning follows [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).- **Resource Groups Tagging — S3 buckets by region** — `GetResources`, `GetTagKeys` and `GetTagValues` list only buckets homed in the region they are called in. Contributed by @fabio-andre-rodrigues.- **CloudFormation — `User Initiated` on stack events** — the stack's `CREATE_IN_PROGRESS` and `UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS` events of `CreateStack` and `UpdateStack` carried no reason; they now carry `User Initiated`, as AWS does.- **CloudFormation — `AWS::S3::Bucket` and existing names** — an `AWS::S3::Bucket` whose `BucketName` already exists, in this account or another, was adopted (another account's became a second bucket of that name); it now fails pre-deployment validation with `NAME_CONFLICT_VALIDATION`, or with `DisableValidation` the resource's create with `<name> already exists`, as on AWS, and auto-named buckets get a new name for each stack instance. `CreateStack`, `UpdateStack` and `CreateChangeSet` take `DisableValidation`, and an update now runs the same pre-deployment validation, ending in `UPDATE_ROLLBACK_COMPLETE` without touching a resource (a bucket the stack already owns is not a conflict). With rollback disabled, a failed validation emits AWS's second `CREATE_FAILED` event (breaking: a stack no longer adopts a bucket left over from an earlier stack or an S3-only restore). Contributed by @fabio-andre-rodrigues.-- **Step Functions — JSONata Fail and Wait fields are evaluated** — a JSONata Fail state raised its `Error` and `Cause` expressions as literal text, a JSONata Wait failed on a `Seconds` expression, ignored a `Timestamp` expression and dropped its `Output` and `Assign`, and JSONPath `ErrorPath`/`CausePath` were ignored; they are now evaluated, with AWS's `States.QueryEvaluationError` or `States.Runtime` for a result of the wrong type, a `Seconds` that is not a non-negative integer and an unparsable `Timestamp`.-- **S3 — presigned URLs keep AWS's time limits under `AUTH=true`** — an `X-Amz-Expires` over 604800 seconds or not a number, or a malformed `X-Amz-Date`, answers 400 `AuthorizationQueryParametersError`, and a URL dated more than 15 minutes ahead answers 403 `AccessDenied` `Request is not yet valid`, where they were served. Contributed by @iot-rocket.-- **Auth — credential failures in the service's protocol** — under `AUTH=true` an unknown, inactive or expired access key answered `UnrecognizedClientException` 403 from every service; it now gets the code, status and `Content-Type` AWS sends for the service's protocol, for example `InvalidClientTokenId` 403 from IAM and SQS, `UnrecognizedClientException` 400 from DynamoDB, `InvalidAccessKeyId` 403 from S3 and `AuthFailure` 401 from EC2. Contributed by @iot-rocket.-### Fixed-- **Step Functions — `ListExecutions` order and pagination** — executions came back oldest first, so `maxResults=1` returned the oldest, and `nextToken` was an offset; they now come back most recent first (running executions by `startDate`, the rest by `stopDate`), the token resumes after the last execution returned so one started between pages is not repeated, an unreadable token answers `InvalidToken` and `maxResults=0` uses the default, as on AWS.- **AppSync — GraphQL requests on the API's own host** — a `POST /graphql` to `{apiId}.appsync-api.{region}.{host}`, the endpoint `uris.GRAPHQL` reports, was routed to AppSync Events when unsigned and found its API only by `x-api-key` when signed, so an `AWS_IAM` API could not be called there once a second API existed; the host label now selects the API (in the host's region for an unsigned request) and `/graphql` on an Event API host answers `404 ResourceNotFoundException`, as on AWS. Contributed by @iot-rocket.- **Cognito — no ID token without `openid`** — the `/oauth2/token` authorization code and refresh token grants returned an `id_token` whatever was granted; they now return one only when the grant carries `openid`, as AWS does, and a refresh token from `InitiateAuth` or `AdminInitiateAuth` still gets one. Contributed by @iot-rocket.- **Cognito — token endpoint access tokens carry the granted scopes** — `/oauth2/token` wrote `aws.cognito.signin.user.admin` into every access token whatever was granted; the authorization code, client credentials and refresh token grants now write the requested scopes the app client allows (all of them when none are requested, only resource server scopes for client credentials) in the order AWS lists them, refreshed tokens keep the original scopes, and the pre token generation event's `request.scopes` lists them, so API Gateway scope checks decide as on AWS. Contributed by @iot-rocket.@@ -45,73 +58,69 @@ Versioning follows [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).- **IoT — not-found messages match AWS** — a call naming a thing, thing type, thing group, certificate, CA certificate, principal, policy, policy version, job, job execution, job target or provisioning template that does not exist answered `ResourceNotFoundException` with a generic `<Resource> '<name>' not found`, and the device jobs plane (HTTP and MQTT `/rejected`) with `No job execution found for thing … and job …`; each now carries the wording AWS uses for that operation, with the same error code and status. Contributed by @iot-rocket.- **IoT Jobs — terminal job executions on the device plane** — a device's `DescribeJobExecution` (HTTP and the MQTT `get` topic) of a SUCCEEDED, FAILED, REJECTED, TIMED_OUT, CANCELED or REMOVED execution answered with the execution; it now answers `TerminalStateException` (410) and `TerminalStateReached` over MQTT, as AWS does. `UpdateJobExecution` and `CancelJobExecution` of a terminal execution now refuse with AWS's messages (over MQTT `InvalidStateTransition` with the `executionState`), a refused status such as QUEUED is checked first, and a device that reports SUCCEEDED or FAILED straight from QUEUED now stamps `startedAt`. Contributed by @iot-rocket.- **IoT / CloudFormation — stack tags and provisioning templates** — stack-level tags never reached IoT resources; they now reach thing types, thing groups, policies, topic rules, CA certificates and provisioning templates without the `aws:cloudformation:` tags (job templates get none, as on AWS), and an update that only changes tags no longer adds a policy version. An `AWS::IoT::ProvisioningTemplate` `Enabled` of `"false"` from a parameter or the template enabled the template; it now disables it. `CreateProvisioningTemplate` and the CloudFormation type accepted any certificate resource; they now refuse one without a `Status` of `Active` or `Inactive` (any case) or whose `CertificateId` is not a reference to `AWS::IoT::Certificate::Id`, a second certificate resource and a resource without `Properties`, with AWS's messages. Contributed by @iot-rocket.-### Added-- **WAF v2 — regex pattern sets** — `CreateRegexPatternSet`, `GetRegexPatternSet`, `UpdateRegexPatternSet`, `DeleteRegexPatternSet` and `ListRegexPatternSets` now manage regional and CloudFront-scoped regex pattern sets, with their ARN (`regexpatternset`), tags and `LockToken` checks on update and delete (`WAFOptimisticLockException` for a stale token), as AWS does. Web ACL and rule group rules are stored as sent, so a `RegexPatternSetReferenceStatement` pointing at a pattern set ARN round-trips; the statement is not evaluated, as MiniStack does not inspect requests.-### Fixed- **IoT — device certificates take the mode of their CA** — a device certificate registered under a CA in `SNI_ONLY` mode, with or without `caCertificatePem`, or created by just-in-time registration reported `certificateMode` `DEFAULT`; it now takes its CA's mode, and RegisterCertificateWithoutCA stays `SNI_ONLY`. Contributed by @iot-rocket.- **IoT — deletes of unknown resources and `DeleteThing` `expectedVersion`** — `DeleteThing`, `DeleteThingType`, `DeleteThingGroup`, `RemoveThingFromThingGroup` with an unknown group and `DetachPolicy` with an unknown policy answered `ResourceNotFoundException`, and `DeleteThing` ignored `expectedVersion`; they now answer 200 as AWS does, and `DeleteThing` refuses a wrong `expectedVersion` with `VersionConflictException` before the attached-principal check. Contributed by @iot-rocket.- **CloudFormation — IoT policy and thing type deletes check what still uses them** — a stack delete removed an `AWS::IoT::Policy` or `AWS::IoT::ThingType` directly, even while a certificate outside the stack had the policy attached or a thing used the type; the policy delete now removes the non-default versions and then calls `DeletePolicy`, the thing type delete deprecates the type and then calls `DeleteThingType`, so a resource still in use fails its delete with the service's message and the stack ends in `DELETE_FAILED`, as on AWS. Contributed by @iot-rocket.- **IoT — MQTT 5 message expiry** — the broker forwarded the Message Expiry Interval unchanged and never expired a message; a subscriber now receives the seconds left (60 arrives as 59, 0 counts as 1, intervals above seven days are capped at 604800), an expired retained message is no longer replayed to new subscribers or returned by `GetRetainedMessage` and `ListRetainedMessages`, and a QoS 1 message queued for an offline persistent session is dropped once it expires (the queue also keeps the MQTT 5 properties now). Contributed by @iot-rocket.- **IoT — HTTP `Publish` keeps the MQTT 5 properties and a literal `%` in the topic** — `Publish` ignored `userProperties`, `payloadFormatIndicator`, `contentType`, `responseTopic`, `correlationData` and `messageExpiry`, so MQTT 5 subscribers got none of them and `GetRetainedMessage` returned no `userProperties`; they now reach subscribers and the retained message, and invalid values are refused with AWS's `InvalidRequestException` messages. `Publish`, `GetRetainedMessage` and the `AUTH=true` topic ARN decoded the topic a second time, so `p%41q` became `pAq`; the topic is now kept as sent. `/_ministack/reset` kept messages retained over MQTT when no iot-data call had loaded that module; it now clears them. Contributed by @iot-rocket.- **IoT Core — MQTT 5 PUBACK reports Success without subscribers** — a QoS 1 PUBLISH that no subscriber matched (including a topic only a rule reads, Basic Ingest and a retained publish) was acknowledged with reason code `0x10` No matching subscribers; it now gets `0x00` Success, as AWS IoT answers over both MQTT over TLS and MQTT over WebSocket. Contributed by @iot-rocket.-- **IoT — HTTP `Publish` keeps the MQTT 5 properties and a literal `%` in the topic** — `Publish` ignored `userProperties`, `payloadFormatIndicator`, `contentType`, `responseTopic`, `correlationData` and `messageExpiry`, so MQTT 5 subscribers got none of them and `GetRetainedMessage` returned no `userProperties`; they now reach subscribers and the retained message, and invalid values are refused with AWS's `InvalidRequestException` messages. `Publish`, `GetRetainedMessage` and the `AUTH=true` topic ARN decoded the topic a second time, so `p%41q` became `pAq`; the topic is now kept as sent. `/_ministack/reset` kept messages retained over MQTT when no iot-data call had loaded that module; it now clears them. Contributed by @iot-rocket.- **CloudFormation — AppSync data sources and resolvers keep their configuration** — `AWS::AppSync::DataSource` dropped `Description`, `HttpConfig` and `EventBridgeConfig` and stored `DynamoDBConfig` and `LambdaConfig` in the template's PascalCase, and `AWS::AppSync::Resolver` dropped `Kind`, `Runtime`, `Code`, `PipelineConfig` and `MaxBatchSize`, so a DynamoDB resolver from a stack answered `null` and an `APPSYNC_JS` resolver never ran; both now go through `CreateDataSource` and `CreateResolver` and read back as on AWS, and a new data source `Name` or resolver `TypeName` or `FieldName` is reported as a replacement. `GetDataSource` and `GetResolver` leave out a description, service role or mapping template that was never set, a DynamoDB data source reports `useCallerCredentials` and `versioned`, an EventBridge one keeps `eventBridgeConfig`, and a resolver reports `maxBatchSize`. Contributed by @iot-rocket.- **CloudFormation — `AWS::AutoScaling::LifecycleHook` updates** — a stack update ran the create again, so a member dropped from the template went back to its default and a hook with a generated name moved to another group stayed on the old group too; the hook now updates in place and keeps a dropped member, and an `AutoScalingGroupName` or `LifecycleHookName` change replaces it. `NotificationMetadata` is stored and returned by `DescribeLifecycleHooks`, and a group deleted by its stack takes its lifecycle hooks along. Contributed by @iot-rocket.- **IoT — mTLS refusals close without a CONNACK under `AUTH=true`** — with `AUTH=true` the mTLS listener closes the connection of an unknown, inactive, revoked or doubly-registered client certificate after its CONNECT without sending a CONNACK, as AWS does on MQTT 3.1.1 and 5; without `AUTH` it still answers a "not authorized" CONNACK, and the log names the reason either way. Contributed by @iot-rocket.- **IoT — `AttachPolicy` to a target that does not exist** — `AttachPolicy` and `AttachPrincipalPolicy` accepted any target string; they now answer `ResourceNotFoundException` for an unknown certificate or thing group, `InvalidRequestException` for anything else that is not a certificate, a thing group (`AttachPolicy` only) or a Cognito identity id, and `AccessDeniedException` for another account's certificate, which also fails an `AWS::IoT::PolicyPrincipalAttachment` naming such a principal. Contributed by @iot-rocket.-- **Cognito — confirmation codes are checked under `AUTH=true`** — `ConfirmSignUp` and `ConfirmForgotPassword` accepted any code, and `ConfirmForgotPassword` changed the password even when no reset was requested; with `AUTH=true` they take only the issued code (`123456` for sign-up and `654321` for a password reset, as before), answer a wrong one with `CodeMismatchException` and a code that was never issued with `ExpiredCodeException`, and `ConfirmSignUp` refuses a user who is not `UNCONFIRMED` with `NotAuthorizedException`, as AWS does. Contributed by @iot-rocket.-- **Cognito — `ExplicitAuthFlows` is enforced for the password flows under `AUTH=true`** — with `AUTH=true` a client that lists its auth flows now refuses `USER_PASSWORD_AUTH`, `ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD_AUTH` and `ADMIN_NO_SRP_AUTH` unless the list enables them (the legacy `USER_PASSWORD_AUTH` and `ADMIN_NO_SRP_AUTH` names included), with the `InvalidParameterException` AWS returns. Contributed by @iot-rocket.-- **Cognito — `CUSTOM_AUTH` on clients without `ALLOW_` flows** — a client created without `ExplicitAuthFlows`, or with only the legacy names, refused `CUSTOM_AUTH`; it is now enabled, as on AWS, and a client whose `ALLOW_` list leaves it out answers `CUSTOM_AUTH is not enabled for the client.` as AWS does. Contributed by @iot-rocket.-- **Cognito — token lifetimes follow the app client** — access and ID tokens, `ExpiresIn` and the `/oauth2/token` `expires_in` were always one hour; they now follow the client's `AccessTokenValidity`, `IdTokenValidity` and `TokenValidityUnits` (one hour when unset, as on AWS), a client created without the two validities no longer reports `60` for them, and an expired token is refused by API Gateway's Cognito and JWT authorizers and, with `AUTH=true`, an expired access token by Cognito with `Access Token has expired`. Contributed by @iot-rocket.-- **Cognito — access tokens are verified under `AUTH=true`** — `GetUser` and the other calls that take an `AccessToken` accepted any JWT carrying a user's `sub`, including an ID token, a token with an altered payload and a token revoked by `GlobalSignOut`, `AdminUserGlobalSignOut` or `RevokeToken`; with `AUTH=true` they now answer `NotAuthorizedException` with `Invalid Access Token`, `Could not verify signature for Access Token` or `Access Token has been revoked`, as AWS does. Contributed by @iot-rocket.--- **Cognito — token lifetimes follow the app client** — access and ID tokens, `ExpiresIn` and the `/oauth2/token` `expires_in` were always one hour; they now follow the client's `AccessTokenValidity`, `IdTokenValidity` and `TokenValidityUnits` (one hour when unset, as on AWS), a client created without the two validities no longer reports `60` for them, and an expired token is refused by API Gateway's Cognito and JWT authorizers and, with `AUTH=true`, an expired access token by Cognito with `Access Token has expired`. Contributed by @iot-rocket.-- **Cognito — access tokens are verified under `AUTH=true`** — `GetUser` and the other calls that take an `AccessToken` accepted any JWT carrying a user's `sub`, including an ID token, a token with an altered payload and a token revoked by `GlobalSignOut`, `AdminUserGlobalSignOut` or `RevokeToken`; with `AUTH=true` they now answer `NotAuthorizedException` with `Invalid Access Token`, `Could not verify signature for Access Token` or `Access Token has been revoked`, as AWS does. Contributed by @iot-rocket.--- **CloudFormation — API Gateway v2 stage `Ref`** — `Ref` returned `<apiId>/<stageName>`, causing an `AWS::ApiGatewayV2::ApiMapping` using the reference as its `Stage` to fail with `Invalid stage identifier specified`; new stages now return the stage name. Stage updates, replacement on `ApiId` or `StageName` changes, and deletion use the resolved resource properties, including for stacks with legacy physical IDs.-- **IAM / CloudFormation — user and role tag keys** — IAM user and role tag keys now compare without case while preserving their spelling. Create and tag operations reject duplicate keys, untag operations match keys regardless of case, and CloudFormation validates duplicate keys and merges stack tags accordingly. User tag updates also compare keys without case. Other resource types retain case-sensitive tag handling.-- **Signer — signing material checks in `PutSigningProfile` under `AUTH=true`** — `PutSigningProfile` accepted any certificate ARN, or no `signingMaterial` at all, on every platform; with `AUTH=true` the IoT and FreeRTOS platforms now refuse a profile without `signingMaterial` and a certificate ARN that is malformed, in another region or account, unknown to ACM or not issued, and the Lambda and Notation platforms refuse any `signingMaterial`, with AWS's errors. Contributed by @iot-rocket.--### Added--- **IoT — job rollout rates** — `jobExecutionsRolloutConfig` was stored but every execution was created at once; a job now creates `maximumPerMinute` executions a minute, or a rate that starts at `baseRatePerMinute` and grows by `incrementFactor` for every `rateIncreaseCriteria` step of notified or succeeded things, notifies each thing when its execution is created, reports `isConcurrent` until the last batch and stops when the job is canceled or deleted. Contributed by @iot-rocket.-- **IoT — MQTT publish, subscribe and receive evaluate IoT policies under `AUTH=true`** — after the CONNECT a certificate session could publish, subscribe and receive on any topic; it now needs `iot:Publish` on the topic (and `iot:RetainPublish` for a retained message or will), `iot:Subscribe` per topic filter and `iot:Receive` per delivered message. A refused PUBLISH or SUBSCRIBE closes an MQTT 3.1.1 connection (disconnect reason `CLIENT_ERROR`), MQTT 5 answers PUBACK 0x87, DISCONNECT 0x87 at QoS 0 (`AUTH_ERROR`) or 0x87 for the refused filter, which the `subscribed` event leaves out (no event when none is granted), a refused will refuses the CONNECT, and a message the subscriber may not receive is dropped. Contributed by @iot-rocket.-- **IoT — MQTT connections evaluate `iot:Connect` under `AUTH=true`** — a device certificate on the mTLS listener connected under any client id, with or without a policy; with `AUTH=true` the CONNECT now needs an attached policy that allows `iot:Connect` on `client/<client id>` and none that denies it, with `${iot:ClientId}`, `${iot:Connection.Thing.ThingName}`, `iot:Connection.Thing.IsAttached` and `${iot:Certificate.Subject.CommonName}` resolved. A refusal closes an MQTT 3.1.1 connection without a CONNACK, answers MQTT 5 with CONNACK 0x87 and publishes `$aws/events/presence/connect_failed/{clientId}`. Contributed by @iot-rocket.-- **Health — `auth` field** — `/_ministack/health` reports `"auth": "enabled"` or `"disabled"`, the effective `AUTH` mode. Contributed by @jgrumboe.+- **IoT — `SetDefaultPolicyVersion`** — the call was missing (`PATCH /policies/{policyName}/version/{policyVersionId}` answered `Unsupported policy path`), so only `CreatePolicyVersion` with `setAsDefault` could move a policy's default version; it now sets the default that `GetPolicy`, `GetPolicyVersion`, `ListPolicyVersions` and the MQTT policy evaluation under `AUTH=true` use, deleting the default version answers `DeleteConflictException` (409) instead of 400, and `ListPolicyVersions` lists the newest version first. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **STS — session policies and `GetFederationToken`** — `AssumeRole` ignored `Policy` and `PolicyArns` and `GetFederationToken` answered `InvalidAction`; under `AUTH=true` a role session now gets only what both the role and its session policies allow, a `Deny` in them denies, and `AssumeRole` rejects a malformed policy with `MalformedPolicyDocument` and an unknown policy ARN with `ValidationError`. `GetFederationToken` is added: its federated user gets the calling user's permissions within the session policies (none without one) and its `Tags`, not the user's tags, as `aws:PrincipalTag/*`; it checks its `Name`, policies and tags, and under `AUTH=true` a temporary caller answers `AccessDenied`. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **IAM — permissions boundaries are enforced** — the boundaries of users and roles were stored and never applied; under `AUTH=true` a boundary now limits what the identity policies allow and a `Deny` in it denies, a boundary must name a known managed policy (`ValidationError` for a malformed ARN, CloudFormation `AWS::IAM::User` included), deleting an absent boundary answers `NoSuchEntity`, and a policy in use as a boundary cannot be deleted. `ListUsers` and `ListRoles` leave the boundary out, `ListEntitiesForPolicy` lists boundary users and roles and honours `PolicyUsageFilter`, and a managed policy reports `PermissionsBoundaryUsageCount`. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **API Gateway — `GetExport` includes Lambda authorizers** — a REST API export had no security scheme for a `TOKEN` or `REQUEST` authorizer and no `security` field on its methods, so tools such as Swagger UI showed no "Authorize" button. Each authorizer that a `CUSTOM` method uses is now a scheme in `components.securitySchemes` (OAS 3.0) or `securityDefinitions` (Swagger 2.0), and the method has `security`. With `extensions=authorizers` or `extensions=apigateway`, the scheme also has the `x-amazon-apigateway-authorizer` block. Checked against a real AWS export and the `x-amazon-apigateway-authorizer` docs. Contributed by @mishukdutta-cz.+- **STS — trust policies see principal tags, session tags and web identities under `AUTH=true`** — `AssumeRole` trust conditions had no `aws:PrincipalTag/*`, a `Service` principal matched any IAM user whose ARN contained the service name, `Tags` passed without `sts:TagSession` in the trust policy, and `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` skipped the trust policy; trust conditions now see the caller's keys and the session tags as `aws:RequestTag/*` and `aws:TagKeys`, a `Service` principal no longer matches an IAM user, session tags need `sts:TagSession`, and a web identity needs a `Federated` principal naming its issuer, with `<issuer>:aud`, `:sub` and `:amr` evaluated. Under `AUTH=true` session tag keys that differ only in case answer `InvalidParameterValue`. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **IAM — `aws:ResourceTag/*` under `AUTH=true`** — the key was always absent outside CloudWatch Logs, so a tag-scoped grant denied every request; a request on an existing SQS queue, SNS topic, DynamoDB table, Lambda function, IAM user or role, SSM parameter, Secrets Manager secret or KMS key now sees that resource's tags. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **IAM — `aws:RequestTag/*` and `aws:TagKeys` under `AUTH=true`** — only CloudWatch Logs filled them; a call whose API takes `Tags` or `TagKeys` (create, tag and untag calls such as `CreateQueue`, `CreateTable`, `CreateUser`, `PutParameter`, `CreateSecret`, `CreateKey`) now carries the tags it sets and the keys it names, `aws:TagKeys` is absent on a call that names none, and Lambda `TagResource`, `UntagResource` and `ListTags` are authorized against the ARN in the path instead of skipped. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **IAM — caller and transport condition keys under `AUTH=true`** — identity policies saw none of the caller's keys and a fixed `127.0.0.1` over plain HTTP; they now see `aws:username`, `aws:userid`, `aws:PrincipalTag/*` (the user's or role's tags, `AssumeRole` session tags taking precedence; in `rds-db:connect` too), for temporary credentials `aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent` and `aws:TokenIssueTime`, the client's address as `aws:SourceIp` and `aws:SecureTransport` as `true` over HTTPS or behind a proxy that sends `X-Forwarded-Proto: https`, and `AssumedRoleId` starts with the role's `RoleId` with or without `AUTH`. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **S3 — requests without credentials are anonymous under `AUTH=true`** — an unsigned request (no `Authorization` header, presigned query or POST form credential) ran as the root key, so a private bucket in the caller's own account answered 200 to anyone; it is now anonymous, and only the owner's public grants let it in: an `AllUsers` ACL grant or a bucket policy that allows `*`, unless Public Access Block shuts them off. Anything else answers 403 `AccessDenied`. A `public-read` object ACL is now also found for an unversioned object, which the grant check missed for cross-account callers too. Without `AUTH` nothing changes. Contributed by @prandogabriel.+- **Cognito — `InboundFederation` `userName`** — the trigger received `<provider>_<NameID>` for SAML and `<provider>_<sub>` for OIDC; it now receives the bare SAML `NameID` or OIDC `sub`. Contributed by @kjdev.+- **S3 Tables — `CreateTable` keeps Iceberg column types** — a `schema` or `schemaV2` field type other than `string`, `int`, `long`, `boolean`, `date`, `timestamp`, `float` or `double` was stored as `string`, and `timestamp` as `timestamptz`; types such as `decimal(19, 2)`, `uuid`, `fixed[16]` and nested `list`, `struct` and `map` are now stored as given. Reported by @anatollius.-### Fixed+## [1.5.27] — 2026-10-13-- **IoT — republish inside the rule's own topic filter** — `CreateTopicRule` and `ReplaceTopicRule` accepted a `republish` action whose topic the rule's `FROM` filter matches, so the rule fed on its own output; they now refuse it with AWS's `InvalidRequestException`, and an `AWS::IoT::TopicRule` with such an action fails its stack. Contributed by @iot-rocket.-- **IoT — `SetDefaultPolicyVersion`** — the call was missing (`PATCH /policies/{policyName}/version/{policyVersionId}` answered `Unsupported policy path`), so only `CreatePolicyVersion` with `setAsDefault` could move a policy's default version; it now sets the default that `GetPolicy`, `GetPolicyVersion`, `ListPolicyVersions` and the MQTT policy evaluation under `AUTH=true` use, deleting the default version answers `DeleteConflictException` (409) instead of 400, and `ListPolicyVersions` lists the newest version first. Contributed by @iot-rocket.### Added-- **Auth — REST API resource policies are evaluated under `AUTH=true`** — an API Gateway resource policy took no part in the decision; for an `execute-api:Invoke` a statement naming the calling user or role now allows the call without an identity policy, a statement naming only the account still needs one, a Deny wins over an identity Allow, and a call without a SigV4 signature (none, or a bearer token) to a method without authorization passes only when the policy, if any, allows everyone, else it answers `ACCESS_DENIED` with API Gateway's message. Contributed by @iot-rocket.-- **Auth — KMS key policies are evaluated under `AUTH=true`** — a key policy took no part in the decision; it now has to allow even in the key's own account: a statement naming the calling user or role allows the call without an identity policy, identity policies count only when the key policy has a statement for the account (the default key policy does), and a Deny wins over an identity Allow. Contributed by @iot-rocket.-- **Auth — ECR repository policies count under `AUTH=true`** — a repository policy took no part in the decision; a statement naming the calling user or role now allows the call without an identity policy, a statement naming only the account still needs one, and a Deny wins over an identity Allow. Contributed by @iot-rocket.-- **Auth — Secrets Manager resource policies count under `AUTH=true`** — a secret's resource policy took no part in the decision; a statement naming the calling user or role now allows the call without an identity policy, a statement naming only the account still needs one, and a Deny wins over an identity Allow. Contributed by @iot-rocket.-- **Auth — Lambda function policies count under `AUTH=true`** — an `AddPermission` statement naming the calling user or role did not let a caller without an identity policy in; it now allows the actions it names (`InvokeFunction`, `GetFunction`, ...), while a statement naming only the account still needs an identity Allow, and a call that names the function by ARN is checked against that ARN. Contributed by @iot-rocket.-- **Auth — bucket policies count under `AUTH=true` in the owner's account** — a bucket policy was consulted only for another account's requests; in the owner's account a statement naming the calling user or role now allows the request without an identity policy, a statement naming only the account still needs one, and a Deny wins over an identity Allow, CDK's `aws:SecureTransport` Deny on the bootstrap bucket included. Contributed by @iot-rocket.-- **Auth — queue and topic policies count under `AUTH=true`** — a queue or topic policy statement naming the calling user or role did not let a caller without an identity policy in; in the owner's account it now allows the call, a statement naming only the account still needs an identity Allow, and across accounts both have to allow. A denial answers `AuthorizationError` on SNS and reports `AccessDenied` to SDKs on SQS, its message says "with an explicit deny in a resource-based policy" when the resource's policy denied, and the check reads the queue of the account the `QueueUrl` names. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **API Gateway — failed SigV4 authentication answers through the gateway responses** — under `AUTH=true` a REST API invoke that failed authentication got the generic JSON error and ignored the API's gateway responses; a wrong secret, a skewed clock or a credential date other than the request date now answers `INVALID_SIGNATURE` (`InvalidSignatureException`), an expired session `EXPIRED_TOKEN` (`ExpiredTokenException`), and an unknown key or a malformed `Authorization` header `DEFAULT_4XX` with the matching `x-amzn-ErrorType`, 403 with `{"message": ...}`. Contributed by @iot-rocket.- **Auth — the request time of a header-signed request is checked** — under `AUTH=true` a request signed with an IAM user or STS session key was served whatever its time; one signed more than 15 minutes (STS, IAM, SNS, SQS, DynamoDB, S3, ECR, RDS, ElastiCache) or 5 minutes (the default for other services) from the server clock answers `SignatureDoesNotMatch` / `InvalidSignatureException` with AWS's `Signature expired` or `Signature not yet current` message, `RequestTimeTooSkewed` from S3 and `AuthFailure` from EC2. Contributed by @iot-rocket.- **Auth — the session token of a header-signed request is checked** — under `AUTH=true` an STS session key sent without its token was accepted and now answers as an unknown key, and a wrong token, or a token with an IAM user key, answers `InvalidClientTokenId` (`UnrecognizedClientException` from JSON services, `InvalidToken` 400 from S3), as on AWS. Contributed by @iot-rocket.- **Auth — header signatures are verified for IAM user and STS session keys** — under `AUTH=true` a request signed with such a key and the wrong secret, or changed after signing, was served; it now answers `SignatureDoesNotMatch` (or the service's `InvalidSignatureException`), an `Authorization` header without its `Signature` or `SignedHeaders` answers `IncompleteSignature` (Lambda `MissingAuthenticationTokenException`, S3 `AuthorizationHeaderMalformed`) and a credential date other than the request date `SignatureDoesNotMatch` (S3 `AuthorizationHeaderMalformed`), S3 unsigned, streaming and signed-chunk payloads are checked the same way, and the root key still accepts any secret. Contributed by @iot-rocket.--- **IoT — `EnableTopicRule` and `DisableTopicRule`** — both calls were missing (`POST /rules/{ruleName}/enable` answered `Invalid ruleName`), so a rule could only be switched off by replacing it; they now set `ruleDisabled`, which `GetTopicRule` and `ListTopicRules` report and which stops the rule from acting on matching publishes and Basic Ingest until it is enabled again. Contributed by @iot-rocket.- **IoT — MQTT publish, subscribe and receive evaluate IoT policies under `AUTH=true`** — after the CONNECT a certificate session could publish, subscribe and receive on any topic; it now needs `iot:Publish` on the topic (and `iot:RetainPublish` for a retained message or will), `iot:Subscribe` per topic filter and `iot:Receive` per delivered message. A refused PUBLISH or SUBSCRIBE closes an MQTT 3.1.1 connection (disconnect reason `CLIENT_ERROR`), MQTT 5 answers PUBACK 0x87, DISCONNECT 0x87 at QoS 0 (`AUTH_ERROR`) or 0x87 for the refused filter, which the `subscribed` event leaves out (no event when none is granted), a refused will refuses the CONNECT, and a message the subscriber may not receive is dropped. Contributed by @iot-rocket.- **IoT — MQTT connections evaluate `iot:Connect` under `AUTH=true`** — a device certificate on the mTLS listener connected under any client id, with or without a policy; with `AUTH=true` the CONNECT now needs an attached policy that allows `iot:Connect` on `client/<client id>` and none that denies it, with `${iot:ClientId}`, `${iot:Connection.Thing.ThingName}`, `iot:Connection.Thing.IsAttached` and `${iot:Certificate.Subject.CommonName}` resolved. A refusal closes an MQTT 3.1.1 connection without a CONNACK, answers MQTT 5 with CONNACK 0x87 and publishes `$aws/events/presence/connect_failed/{clientId}`. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **IoT — `TagResource`, `UntagResource` and `ListTagsForResource`** — the three operations answered `Unsupported IoT path`, so the tags the Create calls accept could not be read back. They now work on thing types, thing groups, policies, topic rules, jobs, job templates, CA certificates, provisioning templates and domain configurations with AWS's limits and errors, Create calls and CloudFormation `Tags` write the same tags, and deleting a resource drops them. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **IoT — retained messages** — `GetRetainedMessage` and `ListRetainedMessages` answered 501 `not yet implemented`; they now return the broker's retained messages (newest first, paged by `maxResults` and `nextToken`, with the user properties of an MQTT 5 publish), and a `PERSIST_STATE=1` restart keeps each message's `lastModifiedTime` and user properties. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **IoT — `ListJobExecutionsForJob`** — `GET /jobs/{jobId}/things` answered 400 `Unsupported IoT path`; it now lists every execution of the job, earlier ones of a rejoined thing included, most recently updated first, with the `status` filter and `maxResults` / `nextToken` paging. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **IoT — `DeleteJobExecution`** — `DELETE /things/{thingName}/jobs/{jobId}/executionNumber/{executionNumber}` answered 400 `Unsupported IoT path`; it now deletes the execution (an `IN_PROGRESS` one only with `force`), drops it from the job's lists and counts, completes the job when only finished executions are left, and publishes the `deleted` job execution event and the thing's `jobs/notify` topics; a `CONTINUOUS` job's thing left with no execution gets none back until it leaves the group, which leaves a `REMOVED` execution 1. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **Cognito — `InboundFederation` trigger on SAML and OIDC sign-in** — `LambdaConfig.InboundFederation` was stored but never invoked; SAML and OIDC federated sign-in now call the Lambda with `InboundFederation_ExternalProvider`, the provider-prefixed `userName` and the IdP's `samlResponse` or `idToken`. A non-empty `userAttributesToMap` replaces the IdP attributes before `AttributeMapping`, `{}` keeps them, and a failing or missing function fails the sign-in with `UserLambdaValidationException`. Contributed by @kjdev.+### Fixed+- **Step Functions — aws-sdk Parameters for JSON-protocol services take the wire names** — `ecs` and `ecr` received an aws-sdk task's PascalCase `Parameters` as sent, so their handlers ignored them (`describeClusters` with `Clusters` described `default`, `describeRepositories` with `RepositoryNames` returned every repository), and `sfn` and `cloudwatchlogs` lowercased every key, map keys included, so `tagResource` stored `Team-Name` as `team-Name`; the parameters are now renamed by the operation's input model, with map keys such as tag keys kept as written. Reported by @lucasmfraser.+- **Step Functions — aws-sdk results for JSON-protocol services keep the SDK's shape at every depth** — only the result's top-level keys took the SDK's names, so nested members kept their wire casing (`Executions[].executionArn`, `SecretList[].ARN`), timestamps stayed epoch numbers and absent members came back as `null`; the result is now shaped by the service's output model: structure members renamed at every depth (DynamoDB's `BOOL`, `NULL` and `SS` as `Bool`, `Nul` and `Ss`), map keys such as attribute names and tag keys kept as sent, timestamps as ISO 8601 with milliseconds, and absent members left out. A leading acronym is now lowered in every aws-sdk result, including two-letter names and ones with digits (`ID` as `Id`, `EC2InstanceId` as `Ec2InstanceId`, `MD5OfMessageBody` as `Md5OfMessageBody`). Contributed by @lucasmfraser.+- **S3 — `s3:prefix`, `s3:delimiter` and `s3:max-keys` under `AUTH=true`** — `ListObjects`, `ListObjectsV2` and `ListObjectVersions` set none of the three condition keys, so a `ListBucket` or `ListBucketVersions` grant scoped by them, such as `StringLike` on `s3:prefix` for one user's home folder, never matched and the listing answered `AccessDenied`; they now carry the request's `prefix`, `delimiter` and `max-keys`, path-style and virtual-hosted. Reported by @bettiah.+- **Idle memory** — the IoT mTLS listener built its TLS context at boot, which imported `cryptography` and minted the broker certificate before any device connected. It now binds port 8883 without TLS and builds the context on the first connection, and `x509_utils` imports `cryptography` on first use: an idle container drops from about 36.7 to 32.8 MiB.+- **Cognito — token lifetimes follow the app client** — access and ID tokens, `ExpiresIn` and the `/oauth2/token` `expires_in` were always one hour; they now follow the client's `AccessTokenValidity`, `IdTokenValidity` and `TokenValidityUnits` (one hour when unset, as on AWS), a client created without the two validities no longer reports `60` for them, and an expired token is refused by API Gateway's Cognito and JWT authorizers and, with `AUTH=true`, an expired access token by Cognito with `Access Token has expired`. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **Cognito — access tokens are verified under `AUTH=true`** — `GetUser` and the other calls that take an `AccessToken` accepted any JWT carrying a user's `sub`, including an ID token, a token with an altered payload and a token revoked by `GlobalSignOut`, `AdminUserGlobalSignOut` or `RevokeToken`; with `AUTH=true` they now answer `NotAuthorizedException` with `Invalid Access Token`, `Could not verify signature for Access Token` or `Access Token has been revoked`, as AWS does. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **IAM — user and role tag keys are case-insensitive** — `TagUser` and `TagRole` with `department` added a second tag beside `Department`, and `UntagUser` and `UntagRole` missed a key spelled differently; user and role tag keys now compare without case and keep the spelling last written, and `CreateUser`, `CreateRole`, `TagUser` and `TagRole` refuse keys that repeat without case with `InvalidInput` `Duplicate tag keys found. Please note that Tag keys are case insensitive.`, as does an `AWS::IAM::User` or `AWS::IAM::Role` whose stack tag differs from one of its own tags only in case. Other IAM resources keep case-sensitive keys. Contributed by @gakuto-cw21.+- **Signer — signing material checks in `PutSigningProfile`** — `PutSigningProfile` accepted any certificate ARN, or no `signingMaterial` at all, on every platform; the Lambda and Notation platforms now refuse any `signingMaterial` (`InvalidProfileParameters`), and with `AUTH=true` the IoT and FreeRTOS platforms refuse a profile without `signingMaterial` and a certificate ARN that is malformed, in another region or account, unknown to ACM or not issued, with AWS's errors. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **Step Functions — JSONata Fail and Wait fields are evaluated** — a JSONata Fail state raised its `Error` and `Cause` expressions as literal text, a JSONata Wait failed on a `Seconds` expression, ignored a `Timestamp` expression and dropped its `Output` and `Assign`, and JSONPath `ErrorPath`/`CausePath` were ignored; they are now evaluated, with AWS's `States.QueryEvaluationError` or `States.Runtime` for a result of the wrong type, a `Seconds` that is not a non-negative integer and an unparsable `Timestamp`. Contributed by @lucasmfraser.- **S3 — presigned URLs keep AWS's time limits under `AUTH=true`** — an `X-Amz-Expires` over 604800 seconds or not a number, or a malformed `X-Amz-Date`, answers 400 `AuthorizationQueryParametersError`, and a URL dated more than 15 minutes ahead answers 403 `AccessDenied` `Request is not yet valid`, where they were served. Contributed by @iot-rocket.- **Auth — credential failures in the service's protocol** — under `AUTH=true` an unknown, inactive or expired access key answered `UnrecognizedClientException` 403 from every service; it now gets the code, status and `Content-Type` AWS sends for the service's protocol, for example `InvalidClientTokenId` 403 from IAM and SQS, `UnrecognizedClientException` 400 from DynamoDB, `InvalidAccessKeyId` 403 from S3 and `AuthFailure` 401 from EC2. Contributed by @iot-rocket.-- **STS — session policies and `GetFederationToken`** — `AssumeRole` ignored `Policy` and `PolicyArns` and `GetFederationToken` answered `InvalidAction`; under `AUTH=true` a role session now gets only what both the role and its session policies allow, a `Deny` in them denies, and `AssumeRole` rejects a malformed policy with `MalformedPolicyDocument` and an unknown policy ARN with `ValidationError`. `GetFederationToken` is added: its federated user gets the calling user's permissions within the session policies (none without one) and its `Tags`, not the user's tags, as `aws:PrincipalTag/*`; it checks its `Name`, policies and tags, and under `AUTH=true` a temporary caller answers `AccessDenied`. Contributed by @iot-rocket.-- **IAM — permissions boundaries are enforced** — the boundaries of users and roles were stored and never applied; under `AUTH=true` a boundary now limits what the identity policies allow and a `Deny` in it denies, a boundary must name a known managed policy (`ValidationError` for a malformed ARN, CloudFormation `AWS::IAM::User` included), deleting an absent boundary answers `NoSuchEntity`, and a policy in use as a boundary cannot be deleted. `ListUsers` and `ListRoles` leave the boundary out, `ListEntitiesForPolicy` lists boundary users and roles and honours `PolicyUsageFilter`, and a managed policy reports `PermissionsBoundaryUsageCount`. Contributed by @iot-rocket.--### Fixed-- **API Gateway — `GetExport` includes Lambda authorizers** — a REST API export had no security scheme for a `TOKEN` or `REQUEST` authorizer and no `security` field on its methods, so tools such as Swagger UI showed no "Authorize" button. Each authorizer that a `CUSTOM` method uses is now a scheme in `components.securitySchemes` (OAS 3.0) or `securityDefinitions` (Swagger 2.0), and the method has `security`. With `extensions=authorizers` or `extensions=apigateway`, the scheme also has the `x-amazon-apigateway-authorizer` block. Checked against a real AWS export and the `x-amazon-apigateway-authorizer` docs.-- **STS — trust policies see principal tags, session tags and web identities under `AUTH=true`** — `AssumeRole` trust conditions had no `aws:PrincipalTag/*`, a `Service` principal matched any IAM user whose ARN contained the service name, `Tags` passed without `sts:TagSession` in the trust policy, and `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` skipped the trust policy; trust conditions now see the caller's keys and the session tags as `aws:RequestTag/*` and `aws:TagKeys`, a `Service` principal no longer matches an IAM user, session tags need `sts:TagSession`, and a web identity needs a `Federated` principal naming its issuer, with `<issuer>:aud`, `:sub` and `:amr` evaluated. Under `AUTH=true` session tag keys that differ only in case answer `InvalidParameterValue`. Contributed by @iot-rocket.-- **IAM — `aws:ResourceTag/*` under `AUTH=true`** — the key was always absent outside CloudWatch Logs, so a tag-scoped grant denied every request; a request on an existing SQS queue, SNS topic, DynamoDB table, Lambda function, IAM user or role, SSM parameter, Secrets Manager secret or KMS key now sees that resource's tags. Contributed by @iot-rocket.-- **IAM — `aws:RequestTag/*` and `aws:TagKeys` under `AUTH=true`** — only CloudWatch Logs filled them; a call whose API takes `Tags` or `TagKeys` (create, tag and untag calls such as `CreateQueue`, `CreateTable`, `CreateUser`, `PutParameter`, `CreateSecret`, `CreateKey`) now carries the tags it sets and the keys it names, `aws:TagKeys` is absent on a call that names none, and Lambda `TagResource`, `UntagResource` and `ListTags` are authorized against the ARN in the path instead of skipped. Contributed by @iot-rocket.-- **IAM — caller and transport condition keys under `AUTH=true`** — identity policies saw none of the caller's keys and a fixed `127.0.0.1` over plain HTTP; they now see `aws:username`, `aws:userid`, `aws:PrincipalTag/*` (the user's or role's tags, `AssumeRole` session tags taking precedence; in `rds-db:connect` too), for temporary credentials `aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent` and `aws:TokenIssueTime`, the client's address as `aws:SourceIp` and `aws:SecureTransport` as `true` over HTTPS or behind a proxy that sends `X-Forwarded-Proto: https`, and `AssumedRoleId` starts with the role's `RoleId` with or without `AUTH`. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **Step Functions — `ListExecutions` order and pagination** — executions came back oldest first, so `maxResults=1` returned the oldest, and `nextToken` was an offset; they now come back most recent first (running executions by `startDate`, the rest by `stopDate`), the token resumes after the last execution returned so one started between pages is not repeated, an unreadable token answers `InvalidToken` and `maxResults=0` uses the default, as on AWS. Contributed by @lucasmfraser.+- **Cognito — confirmation codes are checked under `AUTH=true`** — `ConfirmSignUp` and `ConfirmForgotPassword` accepted any code, and `ConfirmForgotPassword` changed the password even when no reset was requested; with `AUTH=true` they take only the issued code (`123456` for sign-up and `654321` for a password reset, as before), answer a wrong one with `CodeMismatchException` and a code that was never issued with `ExpiredCodeException`, and `ConfirmSignUp` refuses a user who is not `UNCONFIRMED` with `NotAuthorizedException`, as AWS does. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **Cognito — `ExplicitAuthFlows` is enforced for the password flows under `AUTH=true`** — with `AUTH=true` a client that lists its auth flows now refuses `USER_PASSWORD_AUTH`, `ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD_AUTH` and `ADMIN_NO_SRP_AUTH` unless the list enables them (the legacy `USER_PASSWORD_AUTH` and `ADMIN_NO_SRP_AUTH` names included), with the `InvalidParameterException` AWS returns. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **Cognito — `CUSTOM_AUTH` on clients without `ALLOW_` flows** — a client created without `ExplicitAuthFlows`, or with only the legacy names, refused `CUSTOM_AUTH`; it is now enabled, as on AWS, and a client whose `ALLOW_` list leaves it out answers `CUSTOM_AUTH is not enabled for the client.` as AWS does. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **CloudFormation — API Gateway v2 stage `Ref`** — `Ref` returned `<apiId>/<stageName>`, causing an `AWS::ApiGatewayV2::ApiMapping` using the reference as its `Stage` to fail with `Invalid stage identifier specified`; new stages now return the stage name. Stage updates, replacement on `ApiId` or `StageName` changes, and deletion use the resolved resource properties, including for stacks with legacy physical IDs. Contributed by @matuscongrady.+- **IoT — republish inside the rule's own topic filter** — `CreateTopicRule` and `ReplaceTopicRule` accepted a `republish` action whose topic the rule's `FROM` filter matches, so the rule fed on its own output; they now refuse it with AWS's `InvalidRequestException`, and an `AWS::IoT::TopicRule` with such an action fails its stack. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **IoT — deleting things, certificates, policies and thing types still in use** — `DeleteThing` detached a thing's certificates and deleted it, and `DeleteCertificate` refused only an `ACTIVE` certificate. Now `DeleteThing` refuses a thing with a certificate attached, `DeleteCertificate` refuses a certificate with things attached and, without `forceDelete`, one with policies attached (`forceDelete` detaches them), `DeletePolicy` refuses a policy with non-default versions and `DeleteThingType` one that things still use, all with AWS's messages. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **IoT — `RegisterCertificate` under an inactive CA** — a certificate issued by a CA that is not `ACTIVE` registered anyway; it is now refused with `CertificateStateException`, with or without `caCertificatePem`. An unregistered CA and a CA that did not issue the certificate are refused with AWS's codes and messages. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **IoT — rule SQL `principal()` and `traceid()`** — both resolved to Undefined; `principal()` now returns the client certificate id for mTLS, the caller's `GetCallerIdentity` `UserId` for HTTP Publish and SigV4 WebSocket sessions (also their lifecycle events' `principalIdentifier`) and the rule role's session for a republish, and `traceid()` returns a per-message id that the errorAction document carries as `cloudwatchTraceId`. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **CloudFormation — `AWS::Logs::LogGroup` delete** — a stack delete or a `LogGroupName` replacement removed only the group record, so a metric filter or resource policy added through the Logs API stayed and came back with a new group of the same name; the group is now deleted through `DeleteLogGroup`. Contributed by @iot-rocket.- **Cognito Identity — `GetOpenIdToken` claims** — the token was a user-pool ID token with an empty audience; it is now issued by `https://cognito-identity.amazonaws.com` with the identity pool id as `aud`, the identity id as `sub`, an `amr` list naming the login providers and the user-pool sign-in, the pool ARN in `https://cognito-identity.amazonaws.com/identity-pool-arn` and a 10-minute lifetime. An identity id that no pool knows gets `ResourceNotFoundException` instead of a token. Contributed by @iot-rocket.-- **S3 — requests without credentials are anonymous under `AUTH=true`** — an unsigned request (no `Authorization` header, presigned query or POST form credential) ran as the root key, so a private bucket in the caller's own account answered 200 to anyone; it is now anonymous, and only the owner's public grants let it in: an `AllUsers` ACL grant or a bucket policy that allows `*`, unless Public Access Block shuts them off. Anything else answers 403 `AccessDenied`. A `public-read` object ACL is now also found for an unversioned object, which the grant check missed for cross-account callers too. Without `AUTH` nothing changes.+- **CloudTrail — new trails start with logging off** — `CreateTrail` left a new trail logging, and `GetTrailStatus` reported a `StartLoggingTime` an hour back and a `LatestDeliveryTime` of now. A new trail now reports `IsLogging` false until `StartLogging`, and `GetTrailStatus` returns only the `StartLoggingTime` and `StopLoggingTime` of calls made (a restart keeps the last stop time), without `LatestDeliveryTime` or empty error strings. Contributed by @iot-rocket.+- **CloudFormation — EventBridge rules accept a bus ARN** — `AWS::Events::Rule` stored an ARN-valued `EventBusName` as the bus name, so `PutEvents` succeeded without delivering to its targets. Create, update, delete and drift detection now resolve the ARN through the existing EventBridge parser and use the bus name internally. Contributed by @matuscongrady.+- **Cognito — SAML `/oauth2/authorize` with `MetadataFile`** — a SAML provider created with only `MetadataFile` was refused with `InvalidParameterException`; the IdP sign-in URL now comes from `IDPSSOEndpoint`, then the metadata's HTTP-Redirect `SingleSignOnService`, then `MetadataURL`. Contributed by @kjdev.## [1.5.26] — 2026-10-11diff --git a/ministack/services/s3tables.py b/ministack/services/s3tables.pyindex e626ab60..db6e8741 100644--- a/ministack/services/s3tables.py+++ b/ministack/services/s3tables.py@@ -186,19 +186,6 @@ def _set_bucket_region_value(store, bucket_arn, key, value):store.set_scoped(spec.account_id, spec.region, key, value)-def _to_iceberg_type(kind):- return {- "string": "string",- "int": "int",- "long": "long",- "boolean": "boolean",- "date": "date",- "timestamp": "timestamptz",- "float": "float",- "double": "double",- }.get(kind, "string")--def _initial_iceberg_metadata(table_name, schema_fields, location):table_uuid = new_uuid()fields = []@@ -208,7 +195,7 @@ def _initial_iceberg_metadata(table_name, schema_fields, location):"id": i + 1,"name": f["name"],"required": f.get("required", False),- "type": _to_iceberg_type(f.get("type", "string")),+ "type": f.get("type", "string"),})schema = {"type": "struct", "schema-id": 0, "fields": fields}@@ -409,7 +396,7 @@ def _create_table(bucket_arn, namespace, data):{"id": f.get("id", i + 1),"name": f["name"],- "type": _to_iceberg_type(f.get("type", "string")) if isinstance(f.get("type"), str) else "string",+ "type": f.get("type", "string"),"required": f.get("required", False),})diff --git a/tests/test_s3tables.py b/tests/test_s3tables.pyindex fbdd7ba8..563f5430 100644--- a/tests/test_s3tables.py+++ b/tests/test_s3tables.py@@ -1346,3 +1346,33 @@ def test_s3tables_table_subresources_and_rename(s3tables):with pytest.raises(ClientError) as exc:s3tables.get_table(tableBucketARN=arn, namespace="a", name="t")assert exc.value.response["Error"]["Code"] == "NotFoundException"+++def test_s3tables_create_table_keeps_iceberg_types(s3tables):+ bucket = s3tables.create_table_bucket(name=f"types-{_uuid_mod.uuid4().hex[:8]}")["arn"]+ s3tables.create_namespace(tableBucketARN=bucket, namespace=["ns"])+ primitives = ["decimal(19, 2)", "timestamp", "timestamptz", "time", "uuid", "fixed[16]", "binary", "long"]+ nested = {"type": "list", "element-id": 3, "element": "string", "element-required": False}+ try:+ s3tables.create_table(+ tableBucketARN=bucket, namespace="ns", name="flat", format="ICEBERG",+ metadata={"iceberg": {"schema": {"fields": [+ {"name": f"c{i}", "type": t, "required": False} for i, t in enumerate(primitives)]}}},+ )+ s3tables.create_table(+ tableBucketARN=bucket, namespace="ns", name="nested", format="ICEBERG",+ metadata={"iceberg": {"schemaV2": {"type": "struct", "fields": [+ {"id": 1, "name": "amount", "type": "decimal(9,2)", "required": True},+ {"id": 2, "name": "tags", "type": nested, "required": False}]}}},+ )+ prefix = _arn_prefix(bucket)+ flat = _iceberg_json(f"/iceberg/v1/{prefix}/namespaces/ns/tables/flat")["metadata"]+ assert [f["type"] for f in flat["schemas"][0]["fields"]] == primitives+ fields = _iceberg_json(f"/iceberg/v1/{prefix}/namespaces/ns/tables/nested")["metadata"]["schemas"][0]["fields"]+ assert [f["type"] for f in fields] == ["decimal(9,2)", nested]+ finally:+ for name in ("flat", "nested"):+ with contextlib.suppress(ClientError):+ s3tables.delete_table(tableBucketARN=bucket, namespace="ns", name=name)+ s3tables.delete_namespace(tableBucketARN=bucket, namespace="ns")+ s3tables.delete_table_bucket(tableBucketARN=bucket)