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fix(agentcore): enforce runtime invocation IAM (#1867)

Lisandro Pintos5e96c080d847
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index c7452a3e..238d75aa 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -7,6 +7,17 @@ Versioning follows [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
## [Unreleased]
+### Fixed
+
+- **Bedrock AgentCore — `InvokeAgentRuntime` enforces IAM policies** — with `AUTH=true`, runtime invocations now resolve to `bedrock-agentcore:InvokeAgentRuntime` and authorize against the ARN in the request path, so a policy can allow one runtime and deny another. Previously, the action was not extracted and the request bypassed identity-policy evaluation.
+- **IAM — a negated condition operator is true when its key is absent** — the evaluator treated an absent key as a failed condition for every operator, so a `Deny` guarded by `StringNotEquals`, `StringNotLike`, `ArnNotLike`, `NotIpAddress` or another negated operator never applied to a request without that key. AWS evaluates such a condition as true and denies. The single-valued negated operators now do the same, while `ForAnyValue` and the affirmative operators still fail on an absent key. Contributed by @iot-rocket.
+- **KMS — `GenerateDataKey` returns `KeyMaterialId`** — requests without `Recipient` now include the identifier of the wrapping key material. The identifier remains stable across requests and persistence reloads, and changes when the wrapping material changes. Fixes #1853.
+- **Secrets Manager — `BatchGetSecretValue` returns only the secrets the caller may read** — under `AUTH=true` a grant on `secretsmanager:BatchGetSecretValue` alone returned every secret in the request, and `Filters` were ignored, so a filtered call returned the whole store. Each secret now needs `secretsmanager:GetSecretValue` and lands in `Errors` as `AccessDeniedException` without it, a call by `Filters` also needs `secretsmanager:ListSecrets`, and the filters select the secrets as in `ListSecrets`. Contributed by @iot-rocket.
+- **CloudFormation — change set members follow the action** — `Add` and `Remove` changes carried `Replacement: False`, a `Remove` had no physical id, `PolicyAction` was never sent and a `Metadata` or policy detail had no `RequiresRecreation`. `Remove` and `Modify` now name the physical resource, a `Remove` answers `PolicyAction: Delete` and a replacing `Modify` `ReplaceAndDelete` unless the resource retains or snapshots, and attribute details answer `Never`. Contributed by @iot-rocket.
+- **CloudFormation — `AWS::SQS::Queue` applies every queue property** — `RedrivePolicy`, `RedriveAllowPolicy`, `KmsMasterKeyId`, `KmsDataKeyReusePeriodSeconds`, `SqsManagedSseEnabled`, `DeduplicationScope` and `FifoThroughputLimit` were dropped on create and update, so a dead-letter queue declared in a template never received messages, and a value SQS refuses now fails the resource instead of being stored. Contributed by @iot-rocket.
+- **Lambda — Docker executor honors timeouts above 300 seconds** — pass the configured `Timeout` to AWS RIE through `AWS_LAMBDA_FUNCTION_TIMEOUT`, preventing its default 300-second limit from ending longer invocations early. Timeout updates recycle warm containers so the RIE deadline follows the new configuration (#1844).
+- **KMS — `GenerateDataKey` returns `KeyMaterialId`** — requests without `Recipient` now include the identifier of the wrapping key material. The identifier remains stable across requests and persistence reloads, and changes when the wrapping material changes. Fixes #1853.
+- **CloudFormation — a nested stack's update deletes the resources its template drops** — a resource removed from the child template, or created by a failed child update that was rolled back, stayed in its service and in the nested stack's resource list. Contributed by @iot-rocket.
### Added
- **RDS — IAM database authentication for MySQL and Aurora MySQL** — users created `IDENTIFIED WITH AWSAuthenticationPlugin AS 'RDS'` log in with an SDK-generated token over `mysql_clear_password`, as on AWS. The instance or cluster must have `IAMDatabaseAuthenticationEnabled`; with `AUTH=true` the token and the `rds-db:connect` policy are verified too. `ModifyDBInstance` accepts `EnableIAMDatabaseAuthentication`. Contributed by @Areson.
diff --git a/ministack/core/iam_actions.py b/ministack/core/iam_actions.py
index e298764e..d9f434da 100644
--- a/ministack/core/iam_actions.py
+++ b/ministack/core/iam_actions.py
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ SERVICE_TO_IAM_NAMESPACE: dict[str, str] = {
"bedrock": "bedrock",
"bedrock-agent": "bedrock",
"bedrock-agent-runtime": "bedrock",
- "bedrock-agentcore": "bedrock",
+ "bedrock-agentcore": "bedrock-agentcore",
"bedrock-runtime": "bedrock",
"cloudcontrol": "cloudformation",
"cloudformation": "cloudformation",
@@ -456,7 +456,9 @@ _BOTOCORE_SERVICE_MAP: dict[str, list[str]] = {
"bedrock-runtime": ["bedrock-runtime"],
"bedrock-agent": ["bedrock-agent"],
"bedrock-agent-runtime": ["bedrock-agent-runtime"],
- "bedrock-agentcore": [], # no botocore model yet
+ # InvokeAgentRuntime is mapped explicitly below so AUTH works even with
+ # Botocore versions that predate the AgentCore service model.
+ "bedrock-agentcore": [],
"cloudfront": ["cloudfront"],
"cloudfront-keyvaluestore": ["cloudfront-keyvaluestore"],
"dsql": ["dsql"],
@@ -656,6 +658,12 @@ def _match_rest_action(service: str, method: str, path: str,
return best_match
+def _agentcore_runtime_arn(path: str) -> str | None:
+ """Extract the runtime ARN from an InvokeAgentRuntime URI."""
+ match = re.fullmatch(r"/runtimes/(.+?)/invocations/?", unquote(path))
+ return match.group(1) if match else None
+
+
def extract_iam_action(service: str, method: str, path: str,
headers: dict, body: bytes,
query_params: dict) -> str | None:
@@ -687,6 +695,10 @@ def extract_iam_action(service: str, method: str, path: str,
if action_name:
return f"lambda:{action_name}"
+ if service == "bedrock-agentcore" and method == "POST":
+ if _agentcore_runtime_arn(path):
+ return "bedrock-agentcore:InvokeAgentRuntime"
+
# Tier 4: Generic botocore route matcher (all other REST services)
action_name = _match_rest_action(service, method, path, query_params)
if action_name:
@@ -847,6 +859,9 @@ def extract_resource_arn(service: str, method: str, path: str,
return resources[0]
return "*"
+ if service == "bedrock-agentcore" and method == "POST":
+ return _agentcore_runtime_arn(path) or "*"
+
if service == "lambda":
# Path: /2015-03-31/functions/{name}/...
path_parts = [p for p in path.split("/") if p]
diff --git a/tests/test_iam_auth.py b/tests/test_iam_auth.py
index 8a2137b8..025545d5 100644
--- a/tests/test_iam_auth.py
+++ b/tests/test_iam_auth.py
@@ -2152,6 +2152,126 @@ class TestActionExtraction:
assert extract_iam_action("iot", "PUT", "/jobs/rollout-2024", {}, b"", {}) == "iot:CreateJob"
assert extract_iam_action("iot-data", "POST", "/topics/a/b/c", {}, b"", {}) == "iot:Publish"
+ def test_agentcore_invoke_resolves_through_the_router(self):
+ """The AgentCore signing scope and InvokeAgentRuntime path are recognized."""
+ from ministack.core.iam_actions import extract_iam_action, extract_resource_arn
+ from ministack.core.router import detect_service
+
+ headers = _sigv4_headers(
+ "bedrock-agentcore", "bedrock-agentcore.us-east-1.amazonaws.com"
+ )
+ path = (
+ "/runtimes/arn%3Aaws%3Abedrock-agentcore%3Aus-east-1%3A"
+ "000000000000%3Aruntime%2Frt-example/invocations"
+ )
+ service = detect_service("POST", path, headers, {})
+ assert service == "bedrock-agentcore"
+ assert extract_iam_action(service, "POST", path, headers, b"{}", {}) == (
+ "bedrock-agentcore:InvokeAgentRuntime"
+ )
+ decoded_path = (
+ "/runtimes/arn:aws:bedrock-agentcore:us-east-1:000000000000:"
+ "runtime/rt-example/invocations"
+ )
+ assert extract_iam_action(service, "POST", decoded_path, headers, b"{}", {}) == (
+ "bedrock-agentcore:InvokeAgentRuntime"
+ )
+ assert extract_resource_arn(
+ service, "POST", path, headers, b"{}", {}, "us-east-1", "000000000000"
+ ) == "arn:aws:bedrock-agentcore:us-east-1:000000000000:runtime/rt-example"
+ assert extract_resource_arn(
+ service, "POST", decoded_path, headers, b"{}", {}, "us-east-1", "000000000000"
+ ) == "arn:aws:bedrock-agentcore:us-east-1:000000000000:runtime/rt-example"
+ assert extract_iam_action(service, "GET", decoded_path, headers, b"{}", {}) is None
+ assert extract_iam_action(
+ service, "POST", "/runtimes//invocations", headers, b"{}", {}
+ ) is None
+
+
+class TestBedrockAgentCoreAuthorization:
+ _RUNTIME_ARN = "arn:aws:bedrock-agentcore:us-east-1:000000000000:runtime/rt-example"
+ _OTHER_RUNTIME_ARN = "arn:aws:bedrock-agentcore:us-east-1:000000000000:runtime/rt-other"
+
+ @staticmethod
+ def _invoke(path, monkeypatch, policy):
+ import asyncio
+
+ import ministack.app as app_mod
+ from ministack.core import iam_evaluator
+
+ statements = parse_policy_document(policy)
+ seen = []
+
+ def enforce_stub(access_key_id, iam_action, service, region, resource_arn="*",
+ service_context=None):
+ seen.append((iam_action, service, region, resource_arn))
+ result = evaluate(_ctx(action=iam_action, resource=resource_arn), [statements])
+ if result.decision == "Allow":
+ return None
+ result.principal_arn = "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:user/testuser"
+ return result
+
+ async def invoke_handler(method, request_path, headers, body, query):
+ return 200, {"Content-Type": "application/json"}, b"{}"
+
+ monkeypatch.setattr(app_mod, "AUTH", True, raising=False)
+ monkeypatch.setattr(iam_evaluator, "enforce", enforce_stub)
+ monkeypatch.setitem(app_mod.SERVICE_HANDLERS, "bedrock-agentcore", invoke_handler)
+ headers = {
+ **_sigv4_headers(
+ "bedrock-agentcore", "bedrock-agentcore.us-east-1.amazonaws.com"
+ ),
+ "host": "bedrock-agentcore.us-east-1.amazonaws.com",
+ }
+ headers["authorization"] = headers["authorization"].replace(
+ "20260101/eu-central-1/", "20260101/us-east-1/"
+ )
+ response = asyncio.run(
+ app_mod._dispatch_service_request("POST", path, headers, b"{}", {}, "req-agentcore")
+ )
+ return response, seen
+
+ def test_invoke_allows_the_exact_runtime_resource(self, monkeypatch):
+ path = "/runtimes/" + self._RUNTIME_ARN.replace(":", "%3A").replace("/", "%2F") + "/invocations"
+ response, seen = self._invoke(
+ path,
+ monkeypatch,
+ {"Statement": [{
+ "Effect": "Allow",
+ "Action": "bedrock-agentcore:InvokeAgentRuntime",
+ "Resource": self._RUNTIME_ARN,
+ }]},
+ )
+
+ assert response[0] == 200
+ assert seen == [(
+ "bedrock-agentcore:InvokeAgentRuntime",
+ "bedrock-agentcore",
+ "us-east-1",
+ self._RUNTIME_ARN,
+ )]
+
+ def test_invoke_denies_a_different_runtime_resource(self, monkeypatch):
+ path = "/runtimes/" + self._OTHER_RUNTIME_ARN.replace(":", "%3A").replace("/", "%2F") + "/invocations"
+ response, seen = self._invoke(
+ path,
+ monkeypatch,
+ {"Statement": [{
+ "Effect": "Allow",
+ "Action": "bedrock-agentcore:InvokeAgentRuntime",
+ "Resource": self._RUNTIME_ARN,
+ }]},
+ )
+
+ assert response[0] == 403
+ assert b"AccessDenied" in response[2]
+ assert seen == [(
+ "bedrock-agentcore:InvokeAgentRuntime",
+ "bedrock-agentcore",
+ "us-east-1",
+ self._OTHER_RUNTIME_ARN,
+ )]
+
@pytest.mark.parametrize("granted,decision", [
("iot:*", "ImplicitDeny"),
("iotjobsdata:UpdateJobExecution", "Allow"),