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Ministack: Free, open-source local AWS emulator - 60+ services, Terraform compatible, real databases. Free forever. MIT licensed.

release v1.5.7 (#1620)

Nahuel Nuceraa6ed563782c3
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index 725d13bc..afb4fcbd 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -5,10 +5,30 @@ All notable changes to MiniStack will be documented here.
Format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/).
Versioning follows [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
-## [Unreleased]
+## [1.5.7] — 2026-09-04
### Added
-- **Cognito — identity pool principal tag attribute maps** — `SetPrincipalTagAttributeMap` and `GetPrincipalTagAttributeMap` were missing, so a CDK or CloudFormation deployment declaring `AWS::Cognito::IdentityPoolPrincipalTag` rolled the stack back on an unknown resource type. The two operations now round-trip a per-provider mapping on the identity pool, verified against botocore `cognito-identity-2014-06-30`: both members are optional and are stored as sent, a provider nobody has configured answers `ResourceNotFoundException` with AWS's `No Principal Tags configured for Provider {name}` message rather than an empty mapping, and each identity provider on a pool keeps its own map. `UseDefaults` is not expanded into a tag map — AWS applies the per-provider default claim mapping when it vends credentials — and it is accepted alongside `PrincipalTags`, which is what terraform-provider-aws sends on every destroy. The CloudFormation resource provisions onto the pool, keys its physical id on the pool/provider pair so several providers coexist, applies a changed `PrincipalTags` in place, and clears the mapping on delete or on a replacement that moves the pool or provider. The mapping is stored and reported only — `GetCredentialsForIdentity` vends stub credentials without evaluating policy, so the tags never reach a session's `aws:PrincipalTag` context. State is account- and region-scoped and persisted.
+- **Cognito — identity pool principal tag attribute maps** — `SetPrincipalTagAttributeMap` and `GetPrincipalTagAttributeMap` were missing, so a CDK or CloudFormation deployment declaring `AWS::Cognito::IdentityPoolPrincipalTag` rolled the stack back. The operations round-trip a per-provider mapping on the identity pool, per botocore `cognito-identity-2014-06-30`: both members optional and stored as sent, an unconfigured provider answers `ResourceNotFoundException` with `No Principal Tags configured for Provider {name}`, and each provider keeps its own map. `UseDefaults` is not expanded into a tag map — AWS applies the default claim mapping when vending credentials — and is accepted alongside `PrincipalTags`, as terraform-provider-aws sends on destroy. The CloudFormation resource keys its physical id on the pool/provider pair, applies a changed `PrincipalTags` in place, and clears the mapping on delete or replacement. State is account- and region-scoped and persisted. Contributed by @ppettitau.
+- **EC2 — cross-account AMI sharing** — a registered image was invisible to other accounts, with no way to grant access, so a Terraform `aws_ami` lookup across simulated accounts found nothing. `ModifyImageAttribute` applies `launchPermission` add/remove in both wire forms (structured `LaunchPermission.Add/Remove` and legacy `Attribute`+`OperationType`+`UserId`/`UserGroup`), `DescribeImageAttribute` and `ResetImageAttribute` round-trip and revoke it, and `DescribeImages` shows another account's image when the caller holds a permission or `all` is granted — keeping the owner's `OwnerId`, flipping `Public` on `Group=all`, honouring `ExecutableUsers` and `Owners`, shapes per botocore `ec2-2016-11-15`. A shared AMI launches through the same permission check. A non-owner modifying an image answers `AuthFailure` "Not authorized for image:{id}", as real EC2 does; an unknown id keeps `InvalidAMIID.NotFound`. Reported by @edersonbrilhante.
+- **API Gateway — IAM-authorized methods report the caller's identity** — a REST method with `authorizationType: AWS_IAM` handed its Lambda only `sourceIp` and `userAgent`; the resolved caller now fills the payload-1.0 fields (`accessKey`, `accountId`, `caller`, `user`, `userArn`, `principalOrgId` from the account's Organization when one exists) and, for identity-pool credentials, the four `cognito*` fields — `cognitoAuthenticationProvider` in the documented `<provider>,<provider>:CognitoSignIn:<sub>` format. HTTP API `AWS_IAM` routes reject a request with no `Authorization` header (`403 Forbidden`) and fill `requestContext.authorizer.iam` (`accessKey`, `accountId`, `callerId`, `userArn`, `userId`, `cognitoIdentity` with `amr`/`identityId`/`identityPoolId`). Signatures are not verified — key resolution only, per the documented no-SigV4 stance. `GetCredentialsForIdentity` also registers its credentials as an STS session — `GetCallerIdentity` reports `arn:aws:sts::<account>:assumed-role/<PoolRole>/CognitoIdentityCredentials`, as on AWS — so identity-pool credentials work under `AUTH=true` instead of being rejected as an invalid token. Reported by @iot-rocket.
+
+### Changed
+- **RDS — Aurora MySQL global writer switchover foundations** — deadline-bounded helpers for writer fencing, GTID convergence, replication-channel management and verified write enablement, plus lifecycle guards reserving clusters mid-switchover. No user-visible behavior changes; dormant until an orchestrator calls them. Contributed by @Areson.
+
+### Fixed
+- **Lambda — a Docker-executed function sees its real ARN in `context.invoked_function_arn`** — the RIE inside the official images hardcodes `arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:012345678912:function:{name}`, account and region, so a handler self-registering its own ARN (the standard pattern for wiring a Cognito trigger) stored a scope where nothing exists and the trigger never fired. Python and Node.js zip functions run through a shim handing user code the control-plane ARN; for `provided` and Image-type functions, where MiniStack owns no code path, an ARN carrying exactly the RIE's hardcoded scope resolves as the caller's own function, so a stored trigger still fires. Reported by @TomaszKupka.
+- **Cognito — TOTP codes verify** — `VerifySoftwareToken` answered `SUCCESS` for any six digits and the `SOFTWARE_TOKEN_MFA` challenge issued tokens for any code. The `AssociateSoftwareToken` secret is now stored and verified with RFC 6238 (HMAC-SHA1, 30-second step, ±1 step): a wrong code answers `EnableSoftwareTokenMFAException` on verify and `CodeMismatchException` on the challenge, both in the operations' botocore error models, and success promotes the secret and enrolls the user. The CloudFormation provisioner maps `EnabledMfas: [SOFTWARE_TOKEN_MFA]` (what CDK emits) onto `GetUserPoolMfaConfig`. Tests sending a fixed code must derive one from the `SecretCode` they receive; users enrolled before this release keep the old behavior until re-enrolment. Reported by @iot-rocket.
+- **RDS — the Aurora reader endpoint is a name that resolves** — `CreateDBCluster` handed out an AWS-shaped `cluster-ro-` name that nothing registered, so a consumer that stored it (Terraform reads `reader_endpoint` during the creating apply) held an unresolvable endpoint, hanging until client timeout. The reader name is registered as a Docker network alias alongside the writer name, and `DescribeDBClusters` reports it whenever the writer reports its stable name — per the Aurora documentation, a cluster with no replicas resolves its reader endpoint to the primary. With PG streaming replication on, the name stays off the writer so a standby can carry it. Outside alias mode everything behaves as before. Reported by @jbschooley.
+- **CloudWatch — Timestamp members over JSON are epoch numbers** — the awsJson1_0 branches returned the XML path's ISO strings, which AWS SDK timestamp parsers reject (`Expected real number, got implicit NaN`), failing `GetMetricStatistics`, `GetMetricData` and `DescribeAlarmHistory` reads. Timestamps convert to integer epoch seconds at the JSON serialization boundary. Contributed by @mm-salesqueze.
+- **CloudFront — `GetDistribution` returns a config every SDK can read** — re-serialising the client's namespaced `config_xml` made ElementTree invent an `ns0:` prefix on every child, which REST-XML SDK parsers read as absent, so `Origins`, `DefaultCacheBehavior` and `CallerReference` were invisible on read-back. The re-parsed config has its namespaces stripped, on all four response paths. Contributed by @mm-salesqueze.
+- **STS — cross-account `AssumeRole` works, and an assumed session runs in the right account** — the role was resolved in the caller's account, so a cross-account role was never found and refused under `AUTH=true`; and a session's non-12-digit key fell back to the default account, so every assumed session saw the wrong tenant while `AssumeRole` reported success. The role resolves in the account its ARN names — the ARN's account is authoritative, a miss stays the `AccessDenied` real STS returns without disclosing role existence — and a session key resolves to the account of the role it assumed. Contributed by @mm-salesqueze.
+- **CloudFormation — a stack addressed by its unique stack ID deletes and updates** — every `StackName` parameter accepts the name or the stack ID per the API reference, and the CDK CLI addresses stacks by ARN; `DeleteStack` resolved the name only, so `cdk destroy` returned OK and deleted nothing, and an update by ID hung in `UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS`. Both — plus `DescribeStackResource(s)`, `DescribeStackEvents`, `ListStackResources` and `GetTemplate` — resolve either form through one helper. Contributed by @mm-salesqueze.
+- **CodeBuild — a build the agent never ran no longer reports `SUCCEEDED`** — the local agent exits 0 after failing to start anything (denied the Docker socket under SELinux), and the outcome was read off the exit code alone. A zero exit with no completed phase lands the build `FAULT`. The agent container also takes extra `docker run` flags through `CODEBUILD_DOCKER_FLAGS` — same syntax and parser as `LAMBDA_DOCKER_FLAGS`, both gaining `--security-opt` — the only lever that makes the agent work under SELinux. Contributed by @mm-salesqueze.
+- **SNS — a Lambda subscription delivers for every account** — the delivery thread resolved the subscriber with an empty request context, reading back the default account, so a tenant under a 12-digit key had every SNS→Lambda notification silently dropped. The publisher's context travels into the delivery thread. The CloudWatch Logs subscription-filter delivery had the sibling defect and now invokes through the function's own account and region.
+- **Pagination tokens are omitted when empty** — MSK, Organizations, WAF Classic, Bedrock agent/runtime, AppSync item listings and the Lambda durable/microVM surfaces emitted `NextToken: null` or `NextMarker: ""` on every list; a present-but-empty token reads as real to non-boto clients and as drift to Terraform. All now omit the member, matching the models.
+- **ElastiCache — `DescribeCacheClusters` reports `CacheClusterCreateTime`** — the cluster-level creation time was stored but never serialized; it is emitted as ISO8601 alongside the node-level times.
+- **DynamoDB — ContributorInsights timestamps are integer epoch** — `LastUpdateDateTime` was a float on the wire, against the JSON timestamp convention.
+- **EC2 — the seeded public AMIs carry their real owners** — the stub images reported no owner, so `Owners=["amazon"]` (Terraform's `aws_ami` data source) selected nothing. They carry the real publishing accounts — 137112412989 for Amazon Linux, 801119661308 for Windows, 099720109477 for Canonical — with `ImageOwnerAlias: amazon` on the Amazon-published pair, as `DescribeImages` reports on AWS.
## [1.5.6] — 2026-09-02
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index f03629d2..1e416656 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -575,11 +575,11 @@ MiniStack expands AWS SAM transforms (`Transform: AWS::Serverless-2016-10-31`) i
| **Athena** | StartQueryExecution, GetQueryExecution, GetQueryResults, StopQueryExecution, ListQueryExecutions, BatchGetQueryExecution, CreateWorkGroup, DeleteWorkGroup, GetWorkGroup, ListWorkGroups, UpdateWorkGroup, CreateNamedQuery, DeleteNamedQuery, GetNamedQuery, ListNamedQueries, BatchGetNamedQuery, CreateDataCatalog, GetDataCatalog, ListDataCatalogs, DeleteDataCatalog, UpdateDataCatalog, CreatePreparedStatement, GetPreparedStatement, DeletePreparedStatement, ListPreparedStatements, GetTableMetadata, ListTableMetadata, TagResource, UntagResource, ListTagsForResource | Real SQL via **DuckDB** when installed (`pip install duckdb`), otherwise returns mock results; result pagination; column type metadata |
| **Firehose** | CreateDeliveryStream, DeleteDeliveryStream, DescribeDeliveryStream, ListDeliveryStreams, PutRecord, PutRecordBatch, UpdateDestination, TagDeliveryStream, UntagDeliveryStream, ListTagsForDeliveryStream, StartDeliveryStreamEncryption, StopDeliveryStreamEncryption | S3 destinations write records to the local S3 emulator; all other destination types buffer in-memory; concurrency-safe `UpdateDestination` via `VersionId`; `DeliveryStreamType=KinesisStreamAsSource` consumes records from the source Kinesis stream on `PutRecord` / `PutRecords` and forwards them to the configured S3 destination, honoring `Prefix` and `DeliveryStartTimestamp`; `ProcessingConfiguration.Processors[].Type=Lambda` invoked per-batch with the AWS-shape event (`{invocationId, deliveryStreamArn, region, records:[{recordId, approximateArrivalTimestamp, data}]}`) — `Ok` records ship the transformed data downstream, `Dropped`/`ProcessingFailed` are omitted, Lambda failures pass records through unchanged (best-effort per AWS) |
| **Route53** | CreateHostedZone, GetHostedZone, DeleteHostedZone, ListHostedZones, ListHostedZonesByName, UpdateHostedZoneComment, ChangeResourceRecordSets (CREATE/UPSERT/DELETE), ListResourceRecordSets, GetChange, CreateHealthCheck, GetHealthCheck, DeleteHealthCheck, ListHealthChecks, UpdateHealthCheck, ChangeTagsForResource, ListTagsForResource | REST/XML protocol; SOA + NS records auto-created; CallerReference idempotency; alias records, weighted/failover/latency routing; marker-based pagination |
-| **EC2** | RunInstances, DescribeInstances, DescribeInstanceAttribute, DescribeInstanceTypes, DescribeVpcAttribute, TerminateInstances, StopInstances, StartInstances, RebootInstances, AssociateIamInstanceProfile, DescribeIamInstanceProfileAssociations, DisassociateIamInstanceProfile, ReplaceIamInstanceProfileAssociation, DescribeImages, RegisterImage, DeregisterImage, CreateSecurityGroup, DeleteSecurityGroup, DescribeSecurityGroups, AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress, RevokeSecurityGroupIngress, AuthorizeSecurityGroupEgress, RevokeSecurityGroupEgress, DescribeSecurityGroupRules, CreateKeyPair, DeleteKeyPair, DescribeKeyPairs, ImportKeyPair, CreatePlacementGroup, DeletePlacementGroup, DescribePlacementGroups, CreateVpc, DeleteVpc, DescribeVpcs, ModifyVpcAttribute, CreateSubnet, DeleteSubnet, DescribeSubnets, ModifySubnetAttribute, CreateInternetGateway, DeleteInternetGateway, DescribeInternetGateways, AttachInternetGateway, DetachInternetGateway, CreateRouteTable, DeleteRouteTable, DescribeRouteTables, AssociateRouteTable, DisassociateRouteTable, ReplaceRouteTableAssociation, CreateRoute, ReplaceRoute, DeleteRoute, CreateNetworkInterface, DeleteNetworkInterface, DescribeNetworkInterfaces, AttachNetworkInterface, DetachNetworkInterface, CreateVpcEndpoint, DeleteVpcEndpoints, DescribeVpcEndpoints, ModifyVpcEndpoint, DescribePrefixLists, DescribeAvailabilityZones, AllocateAddress, ReleaseAddress, AssociateAddress, DisassociateAddress, DescribeAddresses, DescribeAddressesAttribute, CreateTags, DeleteTags, DescribeTags, CreateNatGateway, DescribeNatGateways, DeleteNatGateway, CreateNetworkAcl, DescribeNetworkAcls, DeleteNetworkAcl, CreateNetworkAclEntry, DeleteNetworkAclEntry, ReplaceNetworkAclEntry, ReplaceNetworkAclAssociation, CreateFlowLogs, DescribeFlowLogs, DeleteFlowLogs, CreateVpcPeeringConnection, AcceptVpcPeeringConnection, DescribeVpcPeeringConnections, DeleteVpcPeeringConnection, CreateDhcpOptions, AssociateDhcpOptions, DescribeDhcpOptions, DeleteDhcpOptions, CreateEgressOnlyInternetGateway, DescribeEgressOnlyInternetGateways, DeleteEgressOnlyInternetGateway, CreateManagedPrefixList, DescribeManagedPrefixLists, GetManagedPrefixListEntries, ModifyManagedPrefixList, DeleteManagedPrefixList, CreateVpnGateway, DescribeVpnGateways, AttachVpnGateway, DetachVpnGateway, DeleteVpnGateway, EnableVgwRoutePropagation, DisableVgwRoutePropagation, CreateCustomerGateway, DescribeCustomerGateways, DeleteCustomerGateway, DescribeInstanceCreditSpecifications, DescribeInstanceMaintenanceOptions, DescribeInstanceAutoRecoveryAttribute, ModifyInstanceMaintenanceOptions, DescribeInstanceTopology, DescribeSpotInstanceRequests, DescribeCapacityReservations, DescribeInstanceStatus, DescribeVpcClassicLink, DescribeVpcClassicLinkDnsSupport, CreateLaunchTemplate, CreateLaunchTemplateVersion, DescribeLaunchTemplates, DescribeLaunchTemplateVersions, ModifyLaunchTemplate, DeleteLaunchTemplate, CreateFleet, DescribeFleets | 147 actions; EC2 Fleet (`CreateFleet` / `DescribeFleets`) with `instant`-type synchronous launch and `maintain` / `request` async fulfillment, multi-config × multi-override round-robin capacity distribution, and `DefaultTargetCapacityType`-driven spot/on-demand selection — unblocks Karpenter / Cluster Autoscaler local validation; IAM instance profile association lifecycle is persisted (`Associate*`, `Describe*`, `Replace*`, `Disassociate*`) so Terraform `aws_instance.iam_instance_profile` round-trips without drift; `AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress` is idempotent on duplicate rules (same behavior as egress; avoids Terraform re-apply failures); metadata-only instance records by default — `RegisterImage` with a container reference makes an AMI whose launches get a real box, so SSM Run Command returns a real exit code (see *Instances with a real box*); CreateVpc provisions per-VPC default route table, network ACL, and security group; full Terraform VPC module v6.6.0 compatible; VPN/Customer gateways, managed prefix lists, VPC endpoints with modify support; launch templates with versioning ($Latest/$Default) |
+| **EC2** | RunInstances, DescribeInstances, DescribeInstanceAttribute, DescribeInstanceTypes, DescribeVpcAttribute, TerminateInstances, StopInstances, StartInstances, RebootInstances, AssociateIamInstanceProfile, DescribeIamInstanceProfileAssociations, DisassociateIamInstanceProfile, ReplaceIamInstanceProfileAssociation, DescribeImages, RegisterImage, DeregisterImage, ModifyImageAttribute, DescribeImageAttribute, ResetImageAttribute, CreateSecurityGroup, DeleteSecurityGroup, DescribeSecurityGroups, AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress, RevokeSecurityGroupIngress, AuthorizeSecurityGroupEgress, RevokeSecurityGroupEgress, DescribeSecurityGroupRules, CreateKeyPair, DeleteKeyPair, DescribeKeyPairs, ImportKeyPair, CreatePlacementGroup, DeletePlacementGroup, DescribePlacementGroups, CreateVpc, DeleteVpc, DescribeVpcs, ModifyVpcAttribute, CreateSubnet, DeleteSubnet, DescribeSubnets, ModifySubnetAttribute, CreateInternetGateway, DeleteInternetGateway, DescribeInternetGateways, AttachInternetGateway, DetachInternetGateway, CreateRouteTable, DeleteRouteTable, DescribeRouteTables, AssociateRouteTable, DisassociateRouteTable, ReplaceRouteTableAssociation, CreateRoute, ReplaceRoute, DeleteRoute, CreateNetworkInterface, DeleteNetworkInterface, DescribeNetworkInterfaces, AttachNetworkInterface, DetachNetworkInterface, CreateVpcEndpoint, DeleteVpcEndpoints, DescribeVpcEndpoints, ModifyVpcEndpoint, DescribePrefixLists, DescribeAvailabilityZones, AllocateAddress, ReleaseAddress, AssociateAddress, DisassociateAddress, DescribeAddresses, DescribeAddressesAttribute, CreateTags, DeleteTags, DescribeTags, CreateNatGateway, DescribeNatGateways, DeleteNatGateway, CreateNetworkAcl, DescribeNetworkAcls, DeleteNetworkAcl, CreateNetworkAclEntry, DeleteNetworkAclEntry, ReplaceNetworkAclEntry, ReplaceNetworkAclAssociation, CreateFlowLogs, DescribeFlowLogs, DeleteFlowLogs, CreateVpcPeeringConnection, AcceptVpcPeeringConnection, DescribeVpcPeeringConnections, DeleteVpcPeeringConnection, CreateDhcpOptions, AssociateDhcpOptions, DescribeDhcpOptions, DeleteDhcpOptions, CreateEgressOnlyInternetGateway, DescribeEgressOnlyInternetGateways, DeleteEgressOnlyInternetGateway, CreateManagedPrefixList, DescribeManagedPrefixLists, GetManagedPrefixListEntries, ModifyManagedPrefixList, DeleteManagedPrefixList, CreateVpnGateway, DescribeVpnGateways, AttachVpnGateway, DetachVpnGateway, DeleteVpnGateway, EnableVgwRoutePropagation, DisableVgwRoutePropagation, CreateCustomerGateway, DescribeCustomerGateways, DeleteCustomerGateway, DescribeInstanceCreditSpecifications, DescribeInstanceMaintenanceOptions, DescribeInstanceAutoRecoveryAttribute, ModifyInstanceMaintenanceOptions, DescribeInstanceTopology, DescribeSpotInstanceRequests, DescribeCapacityReservations, DescribeInstanceStatus, DescribeVpcClassicLink, DescribeVpcClassicLinkDnsSupport, CreateLaunchTemplate, CreateLaunchTemplateVersion, DescribeLaunchTemplates, DescribeLaunchTemplateVersions, ModifyLaunchTemplate, DeleteLaunchTemplate, CreateFleet, DescribeFleets | 133 actions; EC2 Fleet (`CreateFleet` / `DescribeFleets`) with `instant`-type synchronous launch and `maintain` / `request` async fulfillment, multi-config × multi-override round-robin capacity distribution, and `DefaultTargetCapacityType`-driven spot/on-demand selection — unblocks Karpenter / Cluster Autoscaler local validation; IAM instance profile association lifecycle is persisted (`Associate*`, `Describe*`, `Replace*`, `Disassociate*`) so Terraform `aws_instance.iam_instance_profile` round-trips without drift; `AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress` is idempotent on duplicate rules (same behavior as egress; avoids Terraform re-apply failures); metadata-only instance records by default — `RegisterImage` with a container reference makes an AMI whose launches get a real box, so SSM Run Command returns a real exit code (see *Instances with a real box*); CreateVpc provisions per-VPC default route table, network ACL, and security group; cross-account AMI sharing via launch permissions (`ModifyImageAttribute` add/remove, `Group=all` makes the image public, `DescribeImages` shows shared images with the owner's `OwnerId`, `ExecutableUsers` honored, shared AMIs launch); full Terraform VPC module v6.6.0 compatible; VPN/Customer gateways, managed prefix lists, VPC endpoints with modify support; launch templates with versioning ($Latest/$Default) |
| **EBS** | CreateVolume, DeleteVolume, DescribeVolumes, DescribeVolumeStatus, AttachVolume, DetachVolume, ModifyVolume, DescribeVolumesModifications, EnableVolumeIO, ModifyVolumeAttribute, DescribeVolumeAttribute, CreateSnapshot, DeleteSnapshot, DescribeSnapshots, CopySnapshot, ModifySnapshotAttribute, DescribeSnapshotAttribute | Part of EC2 Query/XML service; attach/detach updates volume state; snapshots stored as completed immediately; Pro-only on LocalStack — free here |
| **EFS** | CreateFileSystem, DescribeFileSystems, DeleteFileSystem, UpdateFileSystem, CreateMountTarget, DescribeMountTargets, DeleteMountTarget, DescribeMountTargetSecurityGroups, ModifyMountTargetSecurityGroups, CreateAccessPoint, DescribeAccessPoints, DeleteAccessPoint, TagResource, UntagResource, ListTagsForResource, PutLifecycleConfiguration, DescribeLifecycleConfiguration, PutBackupPolicy, DescribeBackupPolicy, DescribeAccountPreferences, PutAccountPreferences | REST/JSON `/2015-02-01/*`; CreationToken idempotency; FileSystem deletion blocked when mount targets exist; Pro-only on LocalStack — free here |
| **EMR** | RunJobFlow, DescribeCluster, ListClusters, TerminateJobFlows, ModifyCluster, SetTerminationProtection, SetVisibleToAllUsers, AddJobFlowSteps, DescribeStep, ListSteps, CancelSteps, AddInstanceFleet, ListInstanceFleets, ModifyInstanceFleet, AddInstanceGroups, ListInstanceGroups, ModifyInstanceGroups, ListBootstrapActions, AddTags, RemoveTags, GetBlockPublicAccessConfiguration, PutBlockPublicAccessConfiguration | Control plane only — no real Spark/Hadoop; clusters start in WAITING (KeepAlive=true) or TERMINATED (KeepAlive=false); steps stored as COMPLETED immediately; all three instance modes (simple, InstanceGroups, InstanceFleets); TerminationProtected enforced; Pro-only on LocalStack — free here |
-| **Cognito** | **User Pools**: CreateUserPool, DeleteUserPool, DescribeUserPool, ListUserPools, UpdateUserPool, CreateUserPoolClient, DeleteUserPoolClient, DescribeUserPoolClient, ListUserPoolClients, UpdateUserPoolClient, CreateResourceServer, UpdateResourceServer, DescribeResourceServer, DeleteResourceServer, ListResourceServers, AdminCreateUser, AdminDeleteUser, AdminGetUser, ListUsers, AdminSetUserPassword, AdminUpdateUserAttributes, AdminConfirmSignUp, AdminDisableUser, AdminEnableUser, AdminResetUserPassword, AdminUserGlobalSignOut, AdminAddUserToGroup, AdminRemoveUserFromGroup, AdminListGroupsForUser, AdminListUserAuthEvents, AdminInitiateAuth, AdminRespondToAuthChallenge, InitiateAuth, RespondToAuthChallenge, GlobalSignOut, RevokeToken, SignUp, ConfirmSignUp, ForgotPassword, ConfirmForgotPassword, ChangePassword, GetUser, UpdateUserAttributes, DeleteUser, CreateGroup, DeleteGroup, GetGroup, ListGroups, ListUsersInGroup, CreateUserPoolDomain, DeleteUserPoolDomain, DescribeUserPoolDomain, GetUserPoolMfaConfig, SetUserPoolMfaConfig, AssociateSoftwareToken, VerifySoftwareToken, AdminSetUserMFAPreference, SetUserMFAPreference, CreateIdentityProvider, DescribeIdentityProvider, UpdateIdentityProvider, DeleteIdentityProvider, ListIdentityProviders, GetIdentityProviderByIdentifier, AdminLinkProviderForUser, AdminDisableProviderForUser, TagResource, UntagResource, ListTagsForResource; **Identity Pools**: CreateIdentityPool, DeleteIdentityPool, DescribeIdentityPool, ListIdentityPools, UpdateIdentityPool, GetId, GetCredentialsForIdentity, GetOpenIdToken, SetIdentityPoolRoles, GetIdentityPoolRoles, SetPrincipalTagAttributeMap, GetPrincipalTagAttributeMap, ListIdentities, DescribeIdentity, MergeDeveloperIdentities, UnlinkDeveloperIdentity, UnlinkIdentity, TagResource, UntagResource, ListTagsForResource; **OAuth2**: /oauth2/token (client_credentials) | Stub JWT tokens (structurally valid base64url JWTs); SRP auth returns PASSWORD_VERIFIER challenge; **CUSTOM_AUTH flow** wired through the configured `DefineAuthChallenge` / `CreateAuthChallenge` / `VerifyAuthChallengeResponse` Lambda triggers (passwordless / magic-link / SMS-OTP); session TTL honors `AuthSessionValidity`, capped at 3 answered rounds per AWS; confirmation codes hardcoded (signup: 123456, forgot-password: 654321); TOTP SOFTWARE_TOKEN_MFA challenge flow; MFA config and per-user enrollment stored in-memory; **user pool domains**: `CreateUserPoolDomain` with `CustomDomainConfig` registers a custom domain served on its own FQDN (without it, `Domain` is a prefix expanded to `{prefix}.auth.{region}.amazoncognito.com`), and the SAML ACS URL and OIDC federation callback are built from it — set one when MiniStack is reached through an external TLS terminator, so external IdPs get a reachable `https://{domain}/oauth2/idpresponse` instead of the internal gateway address; **federated user linking**: `AdminLinkProviderForUser` links an external identity to an existing profile before its first sign-in, so that sign-in resolves to the linked profile instead of minting a second `{Provider}_id` one, and the profile carries the `identities` attribute (also an ID-token claim); **`PreventUserExistenceErrors=ENABLED`** hides an unknown user across the auth flows (generic `NotAuthorizedException` incl. at `RespondToAuthChallenge`, simulated `CodeDeliveryDetails` with the masked `Destination` on `ForgotPassword`/`ResendConfirmationCode`, `CodeMismatchException` on `ConfirmForgotPassword`; the API default is `LEGACY`, as on AWS); `AdminListUserAuthEvents` requires `UserPoolAddOns.AdvancedSecurityMode` != `OFF`, else `UserPoolAddOnNotEnabledException` as on AWS — events themselves are never recorded, so the answer is always an empty list; **principal tag attribute maps** are stored and reported verbatim per identity provider, and a provider that was never configured answers `ResourceNotFoundException` (`No Principal Tags configured for Provider {name}`) as on AWS — `UseDefaults` round-trips but is never expanded into a tag map, since AWS applies the default claim mapping when it vends credentials, and `GetCredentialsForIdentity` here returns stub credentials without evaluating policy, so tags never reach a session's `aws:PrincipalTag` context |
+| **Cognito** | **User Pools**: CreateUserPool, DeleteUserPool, DescribeUserPool, ListUserPools, UpdateUserPool, CreateUserPoolClient, DeleteUserPoolClient, DescribeUserPoolClient, ListUserPoolClients, UpdateUserPoolClient, CreateResourceServer, UpdateResourceServer, DescribeResourceServer, DeleteResourceServer, ListResourceServers, AdminCreateUser, AdminDeleteUser, AdminGetUser, ListUsers, AdminSetUserPassword, AdminUpdateUserAttributes, AdminConfirmSignUp, AdminDisableUser, AdminEnableUser, AdminResetUserPassword, AdminUserGlobalSignOut, AdminAddUserToGroup, AdminRemoveUserFromGroup, AdminListGroupsForUser, AdminListUserAuthEvents, AdminInitiateAuth, AdminRespondToAuthChallenge, InitiateAuth, RespondToAuthChallenge, GlobalSignOut, RevokeToken, SignUp, ConfirmSignUp, ForgotPassword, ConfirmForgotPassword, ChangePassword, GetUser, UpdateUserAttributes, DeleteUser, CreateGroup, DeleteGroup, GetGroup, ListGroups, ListUsersInGroup, CreateUserPoolDomain, DeleteUserPoolDomain, DescribeUserPoolDomain, GetUserPoolMfaConfig, SetUserPoolMfaConfig, AssociateSoftwareToken, VerifySoftwareToken, AdminSetUserMFAPreference, SetUserMFAPreference, CreateIdentityProvider, DescribeIdentityProvider, UpdateIdentityProvider, DeleteIdentityProvider, ListIdentityProviders, GetIdentityProviderByIdentifier, AdminLinkProviderForUser, AdminDisableProviderForUser, TagResource, UntagResource, ListTagsForResource; **Identity Pools**: CreateIdentityPool, DeleteIdentityPool, DescribeIdentityPool, ListIdentityPools, UpdateIdentityPool, GetId, GetCredentialsForIdentity, GetOpenIdToken, SetIdentityPoolRoles, GetIdentityPoolRoles, SetPrincipalTagAttributeMap, GetPrincipalTagAttributeMap, ListIdentities, DescribeIdentity, MergeDeveloperIdentities, UnlinkDeveloperIdentity, UnlinkIdentity, TagResource, UntagResource, ListTagsForResource; **OAuth2**: /oauth2/token (client_credentials) | Stub JWT tokens (structurally valid base64url JWTs); SRP auth returns PASSWORD_VERIFIER challenge; **CUSTOM_AUTH flow** wired through the configured `DefineAuthChallenge` / `CreateAuthChallenge` / `VerifyAuthChallengeResponse` Lambda triggers (passwordless / magic-link / SMS-OTP); session TTL honors `AuthSessionValidity`, capped at 3 answered rounds per AWS; confirmation codes hardcoded (signup: 123456, forgot-password: 654321); TOTP verifies for real: the `AssociateSoftwareToken` secret is stored and checked with RFC 6238 (wrong code = `EnableSoftwareTokenMFAException` on verify, `CodeMismatchException` on the SOFTWARE_TOKEN_MFA challenge); MFA config and per-user enrollment stored in-memory; **user pool domains**: `CreateUserPoolDomain` with `CustomDomainConfig` registers a custom domain served on its own FQDN (without it, `Domain` is a prefix expanded to `{prefix}.auth.{region}.amazoncognito.com`), and the SAML ACS URL and OIDC federation callback are built from it — set one when MiniStack is reached through an external TLS terminator, so external IdPs get a reachable `https://{domain}/oauth2/idpresponse` instead of the internal gateway address; **federated user linking**: `AdminLinkProviderForUser` links an external identity to an existing profile before its first sign-in, so that sign-in resolves to the linked profile instead of minting a second `{Provider}_id` one, and the profile carries the `identities` attribute (also an ID-token claim); **`PreventUserExistenceErrors=ENABLED`** hides an unknown user across the auth flows (generic `NotAuthorizedException` incl. at `RespondToAuthChallenge`, simulated `CodeDeliveryDetails` with the masked `Destination` on `ForgotPassword`/`ResendConfirmationCode`, `CodeMismatchException` on `ConfirmForgotPassword`; the API default is `LEGACY`, as on AWS); `AdminListUserAuthEvents` requires `UserPoolAddOns.AdvancedSecurityMode` != `OFF`, else `UserPoolAddOnNotEnabledException` as on AWS — events themselves are never recorded, so the answer is always an empty list; **principal tag attribute maps** are stored and reported verbatim per identity provider, and a provider that was never configured answers `ResourceNotFoundException` (`No Principal Tags configured for Provider {name}`) as on AWS — `UseDefaults` round-trips but is never expanded into a tag map, since AWS applies the default claim mapping when it vends credentials, and `GetCredentialsForIdentity` registers its credentials as an STS session (GetCallerIdentity reports the pool role assumed as `CognitoIdentityCredentials`, and `AUTH=true` evaluates the session like any AssumeRole), though principal tags still never reach a session's `aws:PrincipalTag` policy context |
| **ECR** | CreateRepository, DescribeRepositories, DeleteRepository, ListImages, DescribeImages, PutImage, BatchGetImage, BatchDeleteImage, GetAuthorizationToken, GetRepositoryPolicy, SetRepositoryPolicy, DeleteRepositoryPolicy, PutLifecyclePolicy, GetLifecyclePolicy, DeleteLifecyclePolicy, ListTagsForResource, TagResource, UntagResource, PutImageTagMutability, PutImageScanningConfiguration, DescribeRegistry, GetDownloadUrlForLayer, BatchCheckLayerAvailability, InitiateLayerUpload, UploadLayerPart, CompleteLayerUpload | In-memory image registry; Docker V2 manifest support; authorization token generation; lifecycle policies; tag mutability; Pro-only on LocalStack — free here |
| **AppSync** | **GraphQL APIs**: CreateGraphQLApi, GetGraphQLApi, ListGraphQLApis, UpdateGraphQLApi, DeleteGraphQLApi, CreateApiKey, UpdateApiKey, DeleteApiKey, ListApiKeys, CreateDataSource, GetDataSource, ListDataSources, UpdateDataSource, DeleteDataSource, CreateResolver, GetResolver, ListResolvers, UpdateResolver, DeleteResolver, CreateFunction, GetFunction, ListFunctions, UpdateFunction, DeleteFunction, CreateType, GetType, ListTypes, UpdateType, StartSchemaCreation, GetSchemaCreationStatus, GetIntrospectionSchema, PutGraphqlApiEnvironmentVariables, GetGraphqlApiEnvironmentVariables, CreateApiCache, GetApiCache, UpdateApiCache, DeleteApiCache, FlushApiCache, EvaluateCode, TagResource, UntagResource, ListTagsForResource; **Event APIs**: CreateApi, GetApi, ListApis, UpdateApi, DeleteApi, CreateChannelNamespace, GetChannelNamespace, ListChannelNamespaces, UpdateChannelNamespace, DeleteChannelNamespace, CreateApiKey, ListApiKeys, DeleteApiKey, HTTP Publish, WebSocket subscribe/publish | GraphQL execution goes through `graphql-core` when the API has a schema (parse, validate, execute; an AppSync prelude supplies the `AWS*` scalars and `@aws_*` directives; a schemaless API keeps a lenient path); **`APPSYNC_JS` resolvers execute** — unit and pipeline, `util`/`runtime`/`extensions` globals, the `@aws-appsync/utils/dynamodb` helpers, `NONE`/`HTTP`/`AMAZON_DYNAMODB`/`AWS_LAMBDA` data sources — on a pool of warm Node workers (one evaluation in flight per worker, 30s bound with kill-and-respawn, heap cap; reuses the image's Node, no new dependency); `GetIntrospectionSchema` serves SDL or a real `format=JSON` introspection document; the API cache is honored by the data plane under `FULL_REQUEST_CACHING` and `PER_RESOLVER_CACHING`; a data-plane request satisfying none of the API's auth modes answers `401 UnauthorizedException`, as on AWS (credentials are not verified — only their absence is refused). Event APIs support AWS-shaped `/v2/apis` management, `/v1/apis/{apiId}/apikeys` API-key operations, `POST /event` on `*.appsync-api.*`, and realtime `*.appsync-realtime-api.*` WebSocket flows with API-key and Lambda-authorizer checks |
| **Cloud Map** | CreateHttpNamespace, CreatePrivateDnsNamespace, CreatePublicDnsNamespace, GetNamespace, ListNamespaces, DeleteNamespace, UpdateHttpNamespace, UpdatePrivateDnsNamespace, UpdatePublicDnsNamespace, CreateService, GetService, ListServices, DeleteService, UpdateService, RegisterInstance, DeregisterInstance, DiscoverInstances, DiscoverInstancesRevision, ListInstances, GetInstancesHealthStatus, UpdateInstanceCustomHealthStatus, GetServiceAttributes, UpdateServiceAttributes, DeleteServiceAttributes, GetOperation, ListOperations, TagResource, UntagResource, ListTagsForResource | DNS namespaces create Route53 hosted zones; operation tracking; Terraform `aws_service_discovery_*` compatible |
diff --git a/pyproject.toml b/pyproject.toml
index c7eb1567..2c3c8e31 100644
--- a/pyproject.toml
+++ b/pyproject.toml
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
[project]
name = "ministack"
-version = "1.5.6"
+version = "1.5.7"
description = "Free, open-source local AWS emulator — drop-in LocalStack replacement"
readme = "README.md"
license = { file = "LICENSE" }