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fix(cognito): OAuth scope checks for federation and client_credentials (#2263)

iot-rocketd581576ca337
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index 4acce07e..e1cafb1a 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ Versioning follows [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
## [Unreleased]
### Fixed
+- **Cognito — OAuth scope checks for federation and `client_credentials`** — `/oauth2/authorize` with an `identity_provider` went on to the identity provider whatever the `scope`; it now redirects to the callback with `error_description=invalid_scope` (and the `state`) when a requested scope is not in the client's `AllowedOAuthScopes`, as the managed login does. The `client_credentials` grant answered `invalid_scope` to any request naming an undefined resource server scope; it now ignores those once a defined scope is requested, so `api/read bogus/x` is granted `api/read` and `api/admin bogus/x` answers `invalid_grant`, as AWS does. Contributed by @iot-rocket.
- **S3 — Block Public Access settings and public bucket ACL grants** — any one of the four Block Public Access settings shut off every public grant on a bucket, none refused setting a public ACL, and a public bucket ACL opened every read and write in the bucket. `BlockPublicAcls` now refuses a call that sets a public ACL on a bucket with ACLs enabled (403 `AccessDenied`) and leaves the grants in place, `IgnorePublicAcls` drops public ACL grants and `RestrictPublicBuckets` the bucket policy. A bucket ACL grants what its permission covers: `READ` the listings, `WRITE` adding and removing objects, `READ_ACP` and `WRITE_ACP` the bucket ACL. Contributed by @iot-rocket.
- **CloudTrail — `RecursiveLogging` on trails** — `CreateTrail` and `UpdateTrail` ignored `RecursiveLogging` and no trail response carried it; trails now store it (default `true`, kept by an `UpdateTrail` that leaves it out) and return it from `CreateTrail`, `UpdateTrail`, `GetTrail` and `DescribeTrails`. Contributed by @iot-rocket.
- **CloudWatch — composite alarms follow their rule** — a composite alarm stayed in `INSUFFICIENT_DATA` whatever its children did and `DeleteAlarms` removed alarms that composite alarms depend on; a composite alarm now evaluates its `AlarmRule` (`ALARM`, `OK`, `INSUFFICIENT_DATA`, `TRUE`, `FALSE`, `AND`, `OR`, `NOT`, `AT_LEAST`) when it is created or updated and whenever a child changes state, with the `StateReason`, `StateReasonData` and history items AWS writes, `PutCompositeAlarm` refuses an unknown child or a malformed rule with `ValidationError`, `DeleteAlarms` refuses an alarm a composite alarm depends on and more than one composite alarm per call, and `DescribeAlarmHistory` returns composite alarm items only for `AlarmTypes=["CompositeAlarm"]`, as AWS does. Contributed by @iot-rocket.
diff --git a/ministack/services/cognito.py b/ministack/services/cognito.py
index 88e0886a..08beb4e1 100644
--- a/ministack/services/cognito.py
+++ b/ministack/services/cognito.py
@@ -808,7 +808,7 @@ def _id_token_granted(scope: str | None) -> bool:
def _client_credentials_scope_error(pool: dict, client: dict, requested: str | None):
- """invalid_scope for an undefined scope, invalid_grant for one the client doesn't allow; the whole grant fails."""
+ """invalid_scope for a non-custom scope or no defined one, invalid_grant for one the client doesn't allow."""
allowed = client.get("AllowedOAuthScopes") or []
wanted = requested.split() if requested else [s for s in allowed if "/" in s]
defined = {
@@ -816,10 +816,13 @@ def _client_credentials_scope_error(pool: dict, client: dict, requested: str | N
for identifier, server in (pool.get("_resource_servers") or {}).items()
for scope in server.get("Scopes", [])
}
- if (requested and not wanted) or any(scope not in defined for scope in wanted):
+ # An undefined resource server scope is dropped when a defined one is requested
+ if (requested and not wanted) or any("/" not in scope for scope in wanted):
error = "invalid_scope"
- elif any(scope not in allowed for scope in wanted):
+ elif any(scope in defined and scope not in allowed for scope in wanted):
error = "invalid_grant"
+ elif wanted and not defined.intersection(wanted):
+ error = "invalid_scope"
else:
return None
return 400, {"Content-Type": "application/json"}, json.dumps({"error": error}).encode()
@@ -5960,6 +5963,18 @@ def _oauth2_error(error: str, description: str, status: int = 400):
return status, {"Content-Type": "application/json"}, body
+def _invalid_scope_redirect(client, redirect_uri: str, scope: str, state: str):
+ """The redirect back to the app for an authorize request with a scope the client does not allow, or None."""
+ allowed_scopes = client.get("AllowedOAuthScopes") or []
+ if not (redirect_uri and scope and allowed_scopes and any(s not in allowed_scopes for s in scope.split())):
+ return None
+ sep = "&" if "?" in redirect_uri else "?"
+ location = f"{redirect_uri}{sep}error=invalid_request&error_description=invalid_scope"
+ if state:
+ location += f"&state={quote(state)}"
+ return 302, {"Location": location, "Cache-Control": "no-store"}, b""
+
+
def _use_choice_based_ui(client) -> bool:
"""True when the client's ExplicitAuthFlows opts into USER_AUTH (choice-based
sign-in), which drives a multi-step Hosted UI instead of the single-page form."""
@@ -6169,6 +6184,9 @@ def _oauth2_authorize_federation(query_params):
if callback_urls and redirect_uri not in callback_urls:
return error_response_json("InvalidParameterException",
f"redirect_uri {redirect_uri} is not in CallbackURLs.", 400)
+ invalid_scope = _invalid_scope_redirect(client, redirect_uri, _qp(query_params, "scope"), state)
+ if invalid_scope:
+ return invalid_scope
if not identity_provider:
return error_response_json("InvalidParameterException", "identity_provider is required.", 400)
@@ -6275,14 +6293,9 @@ def handle_oauth2_authorize(method, path, headers, query_params):
return _oauth2_error("invalid_request", "redirect_uri is required.")
if callback_urls and redirect_uri not in callback_urls:
return _oauth2_error("invalid_request", f"redirect_uri is not allowed: {redirect_uri}")
-
- allowed_scopes = client.get("AllowedOAuthScopes") or []
- if scope and allowed_scopes and any(s not in allowed_scopes for s in scope.split()):
- sep = "&" if "?" in redirect_uri else "?"
- location = f"{redirect_uri}{sep}error=invalid_request&error_description=invalid_scope"
- if state:
- location += f"&state={quote(state)}"
- return 302, {"Location": location, "Cache-Control": "no-store"}, b""
+ invalid_scope = _invalid_scope_redirect(client, redirect_uri, scope, state)
+ if invalid_scope:
+ return invalid_scope
if _use_choice_based_ui(client):
html_body = _username_page_html(
diff --git a/tests/test_apigatewayv1.py b/tests/test_apigatewayv1.py
index bc2770f3..fa5a7c07 100644
--- a/tests/test_apigatewayv1.py
+++ b/tests/test_apigatewayv1.py
@@ -4878,7 +4878,7 @@ def test_apigwv1_cognito_client_credentials_http(apigw_v1, cognito_idp, basic):
assert (status, body) == (401, {"message": "Unauthorized"})
assert headers["x-amzn-errortype"] == "UnauthorizedException"
for scope, error in (("api/admin", "invalid_grant"), ("api/missing", "invalid_scope"),
- ("api/read api/admin", "invalid_grant"), ("api/read api/missing", "invalid_scope")):
+ ("api/read api/admin", "invalid_grant"), ("api/admin bogus/x", "invalid_grant")):
status, response = get_token(scope)
assert status == 400, response
assert response["error"] == error
diff --git a/tests/test_cognito.py b/tests/test_cognito.py
index ada92b58..5ac86de0 100644
--- a/tests/test_cognito.py
+++ b/tests/test_cognito.py
@@ -3091,6 +3091,27 @@ def test_cognito_oauth2_authorize_oidc_redirect(cognito_idp):
stop()
+def test_cognito_oauth2_authorize_oidc_invalid_scope_redirects_to_the_callback(cognito_idp):
+ """A scope the client does not allow is refused before the IdP redirect."""
+ _pid, cid = _setup_oidc_pool(cognito_idp, "https://idp.example.com/token")
+ url = (
+ f"{ENDPOINT}/oauth2/authorize?"
+ f"response_type=code&client_id={cid}"
+ f"&redirect_uri=http://localhost:3000/callback"
+ f"&identity_provider=TestOIDC&state=mystate&scope=openid+profile"
+ )
+ try:
+ _no_redirect_opener.open(url)
+ assert False, "Expected 302"
+ except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
+ assert e.code == 302
+ location = e.headers.get("Location", "")
+ assert location.startswith("http://localhost:3000/callback?")
+ assert _parse_qs(urlparse(location).query) == {
+ "error": ["invalid_request"], "error_description": ["invalid_scope"], "state": ["mystate"],
+ }
+
+
def test_cognito_oidc_full_flow(cognito_idp):
"""End-to-end OIDC federation: authorize → IdP callback → token exchange
against fake IdP → user provisioned → app redirect with MS auth code."""
@@ -4805,6 +4826,8 @@ def test_oauth2_token_client_credentials_expires_with_the_client():
('api/read', 'api/read'),
('api/read api/write zeta/x', 'zeta/x api/write api/read'),
('api/read api/read', 'api/read'),
+ ('api/read bogus/x', 'api/read'),
+ ('api/read api/bogus', 'api/read'),
])
def test_oauth2_token_client_credentials_carries_granted_scopes(requested, scope):
"""No scope parameter grants every scope the client allows."""
@@ -4859,7 +4882,7 @@ def test_oauth2_token_client_credentials_refuses_scopes_it_cannot_grant(requeste
('api/missing', 'invalid_scope'),
('missing/read', 'invalid_scope'),
('api/read api/admin', 'invalid_grant'),
- ('api/read api/missing', 'invalid_scope'),
+ ('api/admin missing/read', 'invalid_grant'),
('openid', 'invalid_scope'),
(' ', 'invalid_scope'),
])