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feat(iam): GenerateCredentialReport, GetCredentialReport (#860)

Shai Lahmishfa29d1ac088e
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index 12777975..c77c0949 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ Versioning follows [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
- **SQS — out-of-range numeric attributes rejected with `InvalidAttributeValue`** — `CreateQueue` and `SetQueueAttributes` accepted any value and stored it verbatim, so `VisibilityTimeout=99999` (and every other numeric attribute) was silently kept. Now `VisibilityTimeout` (0..43200), `MaximumMessageSize` (1024..262144), `MessageRetentionPeriod` (60..1209600), `DelaySeconds` (0..900), `ReceiveMessageWaitTimeSeconds` (0..20), and `KmsDataKeyReusePeriodSeconds` (60..86400) are validated against the AWS ranges and rejected with `InvalidAttributeValue` (400) when outside the documented bounds or non-numeric. Reported by @dcabib.
- **EventBridge — `anything-but` honors nested `prefix` / `suffix` / `wildcard` content filters** — `{"anything-but": {"prefix": "TEST-"}}` (and `suffix` / `wildcard` variants) was silently ignored at dispatch and every event matched regardless of the field value, because the handler only recognized literal and list-of-literal forms. The nested-matcher form per AWS docs is now negated correctly: an event whose field matches the nested filter is excluded. Reported by @aldirrix.
- **ElastiCache — Redis container respawned after restart** — with `PERSIST_STATE=1`, restored cluster metadata reported `CacheClusterStatus=available` but the persisted Docker container id no longer existed, so the endpoint was unreachable even though `DescribeCacheClusters` looked healthy. Restored clusters and replication groups are now marked pending respawn at `restore_state` time and lazily spawned (under a lock to prevent concurrent first-requests from double-spawning) on the first dispatcher call — endpoint metadata is rewritten to the freshly-spawned container before any caller can read it. Failures are logged once and cleared from the pending set (no retry storm). Reported by @ItsSmiffy.
+- **IAM — `GenerateCredentialReport`, `GetCredentialReport`** — generates and returns the account credential report as a CSV (exact AWS column header). One row per user including `password_enabled` (from login profiles), `mfa_active` (from MFA device assignments), and `access_key_1/2_active` (from access-key status). Root account synthetic row included. `GetCredentialReport` returns `ReportNotPresent` (410) when no report has been generated. `Content` is base64-encoded per the AWS blob encoding contract.
- **IAM — `GetAccountSummary`, `GetAccountPasswordPolicy`, `UpdateAccountPasswordPolicy`, `DeleteAccountPasswordPolicy`, `ListAccountAliases`, `CreateAccountAlias`, `DeleteAccountAlias`** — account-level hygiene reads. `GetAccountSummary` returns computed counts (`Users`, `Groups`, `Roles`, `Policies`, `MFADevices`, `MFADevicesInUse`, `AccountMFAEnabled`) plus static quotas. `GetAccountPasswordPolicy` returns `NoSuchEntity` (404) before any policy is set, matching real AWS. Account aliases stored per-account (replace-on-create semantics).
---
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 6a112dfa..7f32f362 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -356,6 +356,7 @@ subnet = ec2.create_subnet(
| **DynamoDB** | CreateTable, UpdateTable, DeleteTable, DescribeTable, ListTables, PutItem, GetItem, DeleteItem, UpdateItem, Query, Scan, BatchWriteItem, BatchGetItem, TransactWriteItems, TransactGetItems, DescribeTimeToLive, UpdateTimeToLive, DescribeContinuousBackups, UpdateContinuousBackups, DescribeEndpoints, TagResource, UntagResource, ListTagsOfResource, EnableKinesisStreamingDestination, DisableKinesisStreamingDestination, DescribeKinesisStreamingDestination, UpdateKinesisStreamingDestination | TTL enforced via thread-safe background reaper (60s cadence); DynamoDB Streams — `StreamSpecification` emits INSERT/MODIFY/REMOVE records on all write operations, respects `StreamViewType`; Kinesis streaming destinations (`aws_dynamodb_kinesis_streaming_destination`) fan item mutations out into any Kinesis stream by ARN while the destination is ACTIVE |
| **DynamoDB Streams** | ListStreams, DescribeStream, GetShardIterator, GetRecords | Reads records emitted by the main DynamoDB service via `boto3.client("dynamodbstreams")` — single synthetic shard per stream; `TRIM_HORIZON`/`LATEST`/`AT_SEQUENCE_NUMBER`/`AFTER_SEQUENCE_NUMBER` iterator types; `NEW_AND_OLD_IMAGES`, `NEW_IMAGE`, `OLD_IMAGE`, `KEYS_ONLY` view types; opaque base64 iterator tokens |
| **Lambda** | CreateFunction, DeleteFunction, GetFunction, GetFunctionConfiguration, ListFunctions, Invoke, UpdateFunctionCode, UpdateFunctionConfiguration, AddPermission, RemovePermission, GetPolicy, ListVersionsByFunction, PublishVersion, CreateAlias, GetAlias, UpdateAlias, DeleteAlias, ListAliases, TagResource, UntagResource, ListTags, CreateEventSourceMapping, DeleteEventSourceMapping, GetEventSourceMapping, ListEventSourceMappings, UpdateEventSourceMapping, CreateFunctionUrlConfig, GetFunctionUrlConfig, UpdateFunctionUrlConfig, DeleteFunctionUrlConfig, ListFunctionUrlConfigs, PutFunctionConcurrency, GetFunctionConcurrency, DeleteFunctionConcurrency, PutFunctionEventInvokeConfig, GetFunctionEventInvokeConfig, DeleteFunctionEventInvokeConfig, PublishLayerVersion, GetLayerVersion, GetLayerVersionByArn, ListLayerVersions, DeleteLayerVersion, ListLayers, AddLayerVersionPermission, RemoveLayerVersionPermission, GetLayerVersionPolicy, CheckpointDurableExecution, GetDurableExecution, GetDurableExecutionState, GetDurableExecutionHistory, ListDurableExecutionsByFunction, StopDurableExecution, SendDurableExecutionCallbackSuccess, SendDurableExecutionCallbackFailure, SendDurableExecutionCallbackHeartbeat | Python and Node.js runtimes execute with warm worker pool; `provided.al2023`/`provided.al2` runtimes execute via Docker RIE (Go, Rust, C++ support); `Publish=True` creates immutable numbered versions; Code via `ZipFile`, `S3Bucket`/`S3Key` (with optional `S3ObjectVersion`), or `ImageUri` (Docker image); `PackageType: Image` pulls and invokes user-provided Docker images via Lambda RIE; SQS, Kinesis, and DynamoDB Streams event source mappings; Function URL CRUD; Lambda Layers CRUD; Aliases; Concurrency; EventInvokeConfig; **Durable Functions** — `CreateFunction` accepts `DurableConfig`; checkpoint/state/history/list/stop ops at the preview API (`2025-12-01`); external `SendCallback{Success,Failure,Heartbeat}` resume the SDK across invocations; resume scheduler fires WAIT expiries, callback timeouts, and step-retry backoffs; verified against the official `aws-durable-execution-sdk-python` and `aws-durable-execution-sdk-java`; **X-Ray active tracing** — `TracingConfig.Mode=Active` injects `_X_AMZN_TRACE_ID` (`Root=1-<hex>-<hex>;Parent=<hex>;Sampled=1`) into the runtime per invocation so the AWS X-Ray SDK runs without `Missing AWS Lambda trace data`; supported on the warm Python / Node executor, provided runtimes, and the local subprocess fallback (docker RIE upstream does not implement X-Ray and is logged but unsupported) |
+| **IAM** | CreateUser, GetUser, ListUsers, DeleteUser, CreateRole, GetRole, ListRoles, DeleteRole, CreatePolicy, GetPolicy, DeletePolicy, AttachRolePolicy, DetachRolePolicy, PutRolePolicy, GetRolePolicy, DeleteRolePolicy, ListRolePolicies, ListAttachedRolePolicies, CreateAccessKey, ListAccessKeys, DeleteAccessKey, UpdateAccessKey, GetAccessKeyLastUsed, CreateInstanceProfile, GetInstanceProfile, DeleteInstanceProfile, AddRoleToInstanceProfile, RemoveRoleFromInstanceProfile, ListInstanceProfiles, CreateGroup, GetGroup, AddUserToGroup, RemoveUserFromGroup, CreateServiceLinkedRole, DeleteServiceLinkedRole, GetServiceLinkedRoleDeletionStatus, CreateOpenIDConnectProvider, ListOpenIDConnectProviders, CreateSAMLProvider, GetSAMLProvider, ListSAMLProviders, UpdateSAMLProvider, DeleteSAMLProvider, CreateLoginProfile, GetLoginProfile, UpdateLoginProfile, DeleteLoginProfile, CreateVirtualMFADevice, EnableMFADevice, DeactivateMFADevice, ResyncMFADevice, ListMFADevices, ListVirtualMFADevices, DeleteVirtualMFADevice, GetAccountAuthorizationDetails, GenerateServiceLastAccessedDetails, GetServiceLastAccessedDetails, TagRole, UntagRole, TagUser, UntagUser, TagPolicy, UntagPolicy , GenerateCredentialReport, GetCredentialReport | |
| **IAM** | CreateUser, GetUser, ListUsers, DeleteUser, CreateRole, GetRole, ListRoles, DeleteRole, CreatePolicy, GetPolicy, DeletePolicy, AttachRolePolicy, DetachRolePolicy, PutRolePolicy, GetRolePolicy, DeleteRolePolicy, ListRolePolicies, ListAttachedRolePolicies, CreateAccessKey, ListAccessKeys, DeleteAccessKey, UpdateAccessKey, GetAccessKeyLastUsed, CreateInstanceProfile, GetInstanceProfile, DeleteInstanceProfile, AddRoleToInstanceProfile, RemoveRoleFromInstanceProfile, ListInstanceProfiles, CreateGroup, GetGroup, AddUserToGroup, RemoveUserFromGroup, CreateServiceLinkedRole, DeleteServiceLinkedRole, GetServiceLinkedRoleDeletionStatus, CreateOpenIDConnectProvider, ListOpenIDConnectProviders, CreateSAMLProvider, GetSAMLProvider, ListSAMLProviders, UpdateSAMLProvider, DeleteSAMLProvider, CreateLoginProfile, GetLoginProfile, UpdateLoginProfile, DeleteLoginProfile, CreateVirtualMFADevice, EnableMFADevice, DeactivateMFADevice, ResyncMFADevice, ListMFADevices, ListVirtualMFADevices, DeleteVirtualMFADevice, GetAccountAuthorizationDetails, GenerateServiceLastAccessedDetails, GetServiceLastAccessedDetails, TagRole, UntagRole, TagUser, UntagUser, TagPolicy, UntagPolicy , GetAccountSummary, GetAccountPasswordPolicy, UpdateAccountPasswordPolicy, DeleteAccountPasswordPolicy, ListAccountAliases, CreateAccountAlias, DeleteAccountAlias | |
| **STS** | GetCallerIdentity, AssumeRole, GetSessionToken, AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity | |
| **IMDS** (EC2 Instance Metadata) | `PUT /latest/api/token`, `GET /latest/meta-data/instance-id`, `GET /latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/`, `GET /latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role>`, `GET /latest/meta-data/iam/info`, `GET /latest/meta-data/placement/{region,availability-zone,...}`, `GET /latest/dynamic/instance-identity/document` | IMDSv1 + IMDSv2; default credential chain falls through to a `ministack-instance-role` document with `ASIA*` session creds. Point SDKs at ministack via `AWS_EC2_METADATA_SERVICE_ENDPOINT=http://localhost:4566` (or `ec2_metadata_service_endpoint` in `~/.aws/config`); set `MINISTACK_IMDS_V2_REQUIRED=1` to require the token PUT |
diff --git a/ministack/services/iam.py b/ministack/services/iam.py
index 0d7613fe..b88da81f 100644
--- a/ministack/services/iam.py
+++ b/ministack/services/iam.py
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ _sla_jobs = AccountScopedDict()
_saml_providers = AccountScopedDict()
_mfa_devices = AccountScopedDict()
_login_profiles = AccountScopedDict()
+_credential_reports = AccountScopedDict()
_account_password_policy = AccountScopedDict()
_account_aliases = AccountScopedDict()
@@ -293,6 +294,7 @@ def get_state():
"saml_providers": copy.deepcopy(_saml_providers),
"mfa_devices": copy.deepcopy(_mfa_devices),
"login_profiles": copy.deepcopy(_login_profiles),
+ "credential_reports": copy.deepcopy(_credential_reports),
"account_password_policy": copy.deepcopy(_account_password_policy),
"account_aliases": copy.deepcopy(_account_aliases),
}
@@ -314,6 +316,7 @@ def restore_state(data):
_saml_providers.update(data.get("saml_providers", {}))
_mfa_devices.update(data.get("mfa_devices", {}))
_login_profiles.update(data.get("login_profiles", {}))
+ _credential_reports.update(data.get("credential_reports", {}))
_account_password_policy.update(data.get("account_password_policy", {}))
_account_aliases.update(data.get("account_aliases", {}))
@@ -1910,6 +1913,96 @@ def _delete_login_profile(p):
return _xml(200, "DeleteLoginProfileResponse", "", ns="iam")
+# -------------------- Credential report --------------------
+
+_CRED_REPORT_HEADER = (
+ "user,arn,user_creation_time,password_enabled,password_last_used,"
+ "password_last_changed,password_next_rotation,mfa_active,"
+ "access_key_1_active,access_key_1_last_rotated,access_key_1_last_used_date,"
+ "access_key_1_last_used_region,access_key_1_last_used_service,"
+ "access_key_2_active,access_key_2_last_rotated,access_key_2_last_used_date,"
+ "access_key_2_last_used_region,access_key_2_last_used_service,"
+ "cert_1_active,cert_1_last_rotated,cert_2_active,cert_2_last_rotated"
+)
+
+
+def _build_credential_report():
+ acct = get_account_id()
+ rows = [_CRED_REPORT_HEADER]
+
+ # Synthetic root account row
+ rows.append(
+ f"<root_account>,arn:aws:iam::{acct}:root,{_now()},"
+ "not_supported,not_supported,not_supported,not_supported,false,"
+ "false,N/A,N/A,N/A,N/A,"
+ "false,N/A,N/A,N/A,N/A,"
+ "false,N/A,false,N/A"
+ )
+
+ # One row per user
+ for name, user in _users.items():
+ has_password = name in _login_profiles
+ has_mfa = any(
+ dev.get("User") == name for dev in _mfa_devices.values()
+ )
+
+ # Collect up to 2 active access keys (sorted by creation for stable output)
+ user_keys = sorted(
+ [v for v in _access_keys.values() if v["UserName"] == name],
+ key=lambda k: k.get("CreateDate", ""),
+ )
+ key1 = user_keys[0] if len(user_keys) > 0 else None
+ key2 = user_keys[1] if len(user_keys) > 1 else None
+
+ def _key_cols(k):
+ if k is None:
+ return "false,N/A,N/A,N/A,N/A"
+ active = "true" if k.get("Status") == "Active" else "false"
+ rotated = k.get("CreateDate", "N/A")
+ return f"{active},{rotated},N/A,N/A,N/A"
+
+ row = (
+ f"{name},{user['Arn']},{user['CreateDate']},"
+ f"{'true' if has_password else 'false'},"
+ f"N/A,N/A,N/A,"
+ f"{'true' if has_mfa else 'false'},"
+ f"{_key_cols(key1)},"
+ f"{_key_cols(key2)},"
+ "false,N/A,false,N/A"
+ )
+ rows.append(row)
+
+ return "\n".join(rows)
+
+
+def _generate_credential_report(p):
+ _credential_reports["report"] = {
+ "content": _build_credential_report(),
+ "generated_time": _now(),
+ }
+ return _xml(200, "GenerateCredentialReportResponse",
+ "<GenerateCredentialReportResult>"
+ "<State>COMPLETE</State>"
+ "<Description>No report exists. Starting a new report generation task</Description>"
+ "</GenerateCredentialReportResult>",
+ ns="iam")
+
+
+def _get_credential_report(p):
+ report = _credential_reports.get("report")
+ if not report:
+ return _error(410, "ReportNotPresent",
+ "No credential report exists. Generate one with GenerateCredentialReport.", ns="iam")
+ content_b64 = base64.b64encode(report["content"].encode("utf-8")).decode()
+ return _xml(200, "GetCredentialReportResponse",
+ f"<GetCredentialReportResult>"
+ f"<Content>{content_b64}</Content>"
+ f"<ReportFormat>text/csv</ReportFormat>"
+ f"<GeneratedTime>{report['generated_time']}</GeneratedTime>"
+ f"</GetCredentialReportResult>",
+ ns="iam")
+
+
# -------------------- OIDC providers --------------------
def _create_oidc_provider(p):
@@ -2573,6 +2666,8 @@ _IAM_HANDLERS = {
"GetLoginProfile": _get_login_profile,
"UpdateLoginProfile": _update_login_profile,
"DeleteLoginProfile": _delete_login_profile,
+ "GenerateCredentialReport": _generate_credential_report,
+ "GetCredentialReport": _get_credential_report,
"GetAccountSummary": _get_account_summary,
"GetAccountPasswordPolicy": _get_account_password_policy,
"UpdateAccountPasswordPolicy": _update_account_password_policy,
@@ -2600,6 +2695,7 @@ def reset():
_saml_providers.clear()
_mfa_devices.clear()
_login_profiles.clear()
+ _credential_reports.clear()
_account_password_policy.clear()
_account_aliases.clear()
# Re-seed AWS-managed policies. They're not customer state, so a
diff --git a/tests/conftest.py b/tests/conftest.py
index af4b9abf..38b3e855 100644
--- a/tests/conftest.py
+++ b/tests/conftest.py
@@ -96,6 +96,10 @@ _SERIAL_TESTS = {
"tests/test_appsync.py::test_appsync_lambda_authorizer_rejection_returns_unauthorized",
"tests/test_appsync.py::test_appsync_lambda_missing_authorizer_returns_unauthorized",
"tests/test_appsync.py::test_appsync_lambda_failing_authorizer_returns_unauthorized",
+ # Credential report reflects all users in the account; run serially to avoid
+ # parallel-test interference on the account-global CSV snapshot.
+ "tests/test_iam.py::test_iam_credential_report_mfa_and_password",
+ "tests/test_iam.py::test_iam_credential_report_header",
# Account-global mutations (password policy, alias); must run serially.
"tests/test_iam.py::test_iam_password_policy_absent_then_set",
"tests/test_iam.py::test_iam_account_alias_crud",
diff --git a/tests/test_elasticache.py b/tests/test_elasticache.py
index 067a9631..e17f0e96 100644
--- a/tests/test_elasticache.py
+++ b/tests/test_elasticache.py
@@ -899,7 +899,9 @@ def test_elasticache_restore_state_marks_clusters_for_respawn(monkeypatch):
def test_elasticache_restore_state_wipes_stale_replication_group_container_ids(monkeypatch):
+ from ministack.core.responses import set_request_account_id
from ministack.services import elasticache as _ec
+ set_request_account_id("000000000000")
_ec.reset()
monkeypatch.setattr(_ec, "_spawn_redis_container",
lambda name, engine, engine_version, labels: ("rg-host", 6379, f"cid-{name}"))
diff --git a/tests/test_iam.py b/tests/test_iam.py
index 85884dac..ecdb6ad7 100644
--- a/tests/test_iam.py
+++ b/tests/test_iam.py
@@ -963,6 +963,7 @@ def test_iam_delete_assigned_mfa_conflict(iam):
except Exception:
pass
iam.delete_user(UserName=user_name)
+
# ── Login profiles ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -1018,6 +1019,76 @@ def test_iam_delete_login_profile(iam):
iam.delete_user(UserName=name)
+# ── Credential report ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+_CRED_REPORT_COLUMNS = (
+ "user,arn,user_creation_time,password_enabled,password_last_used,"
+ "password_last_changed,password_next_rotation,mfa_active,"
+ "access_key_1_active,access_key_1_last_rotated,access_key_1_last_used_date,"
+ "access_key_1_last_used_region,access_key_1_last_used_service,"
+ "access_key_2_active,access_key_2_last_rotated,access_key_2_last_used_date,"
+ "access_key_2_last_used_region,access_key_2_last_used_service,"
+ "cert_1_active,cert_1_last_rotated,cert_2_active,cert_2_last_rotated"
+)
+
+
+def test_iam_credential_report_get_before_generate(iam):
+ with pytest.raises(Exception) as exc_info:
+ iam.get_credential_report()
+ assert exc_info.value.response["Error"]["Code"] == "ReportNotPresent"
+
+
+def test_iam_credential_report_mfa_and_password(iam):
+ user_a = "cr-user-a-mfapw"
+ user_b = "cr-user-b-neither"
+ device_name = "cr-mfa-device"
+
+ iam.create_user(UserName=user_a)
+ iam.create_user(UserName=user_b)
+ iam.create_login_profile(UserName=user_a, Password="Test1234!")
+ serial = iam.create_virtual_mfa_device(VirtualMFADeviceName=device_name)["VirtualMFADevice"]["SerialNumber"]
+ iam.enable_mfa_device(UserName=user_a, SerialNumber=serial,
+ AuthenticationCode1="111111", AuthenticationCode2="222222")
+ try:
+ iam.generate_credential_report()
+ resp = iam.get_credential_report()
+ csv_bytes = resp["Content"]
+ csv_text = csv_bytes.decode("utf-8") if isinstance(csv_bytes, (bytes, bytearray)) else csv_bytes
+ rows = {r.split(",")[0]: r.split(",") for r in csv_text.strip().splitlines()[1:]}
+
+ # user A: password_enabled=true, mfa_active=true
+ assert rows[user_a][3] == "true", f"Expected password_enabled=true for {user_a}"
+ assert rows[user_a][7] == "true", f"Expected mfa_active=true for {user_a}"
+
+ # user B: password_enabled=false, mfa_active=false
+ assert rows[user_b][3] == "false", f"Expected password_enabled=false for {user_b}"
+ assert rows[user_b][7] == "false", f"Expected mfa_active=false for {user_b}"
+ finally:
+ try:
+ iam.deactivate_mfa_device(UserName=user_a, SerialNumber=serial)
+ except Exception:
+ pass
+ try:
+ iam.delete_virtual_mfa_device(SerialNumber=serial)
+ except Exception:
+ pass
+ try:
+ iam.delete_login_profile(UserName=user_a)
+ except Exception:
+ pass
+ iam.delete_user(UserName=user_a)
+ iam.delete_user(UserName=user_b)
+
+
+def test_iam_credential_report_header(iam):
+ iam.generate_credential_report()
+ resp = iam.get_credential_report()
+ csv_bytes = resp["Content"]
+ csv_text = csv_bytes.decode("utf-8") if isinstance(csv_bytes, (bytes, bytearray)) else csv_bytes
+ lines = csv_text.strip().splitlines()
+ assert lines[0] == _CRED_REPORT_COLUMNS
+ user_col = [r.split(",")[0] for r in lines]
+ assert "<root_account>" in user_col
# ── Account posture (summary / password policy / aliases) ─────────────