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Browser-based graphical shell and control plane for a Linux server you own — real terminal, file manager, live metrics and BYOK AI in one mobile-first workspace. Next.js 16 · React 19 · node-pty · Tailwind v4 · shadcn/ui. Public alpha, self-hosted.

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Agent security launch contract

Current-reference security extension. SECURITY-ASSURANCE.md remains the evidence authority for current scanners and claim boundaries. This document defines agent-specific abuse cases that must be proven before a stronger public launch label.

Principle

The model is not an authorization boundary. Downstream tools enforce identity, scope, policy, confirmation and resource bounds on every call.

Tool risk classes

Class Examples Default control
Read bounded status, metadata, project inspection authenticated scope + rate/bounds + redaction
Reversible write draft/config changes with CAS/revision write scope + stale-write protection + audit + verify
High impact shell, deploy, delete, credential/provider mutation exec/owner scope + explicit policy/confirmation + audit + post-action verification
Critical/external irreversible broad destructive actions, identity/security boundary changes dedicated bounded API, fresh confirmation/human review, deny generic fallback

Abuse-case matrix

The release security suite must include repeatable failures for:

  1. Direct/indirect prompt injection — retrieved web/docs/tool output cannot replace system/developer/tool policy.
  2. Tool misuse — persuasive model text cannot call a tool outside current scope/allowlist.
  3. Privilege escalation — Viewer/Operator/read/write identities cannot reach Owner/exec authority.
  4. Data exfiltration — secret-bearing files, credential stores, cookies and private tool results cannot leak through normal output, logs, artifacts or external tool arguments.
  5. Memory poisoning — untrusted observations retain provenance and cannot silently become high-authority durable instructions.
  6. Cross-agent identity confusion — Local Agent/A2A/subagent handoff does not widen the originating principal's authority.
  7. Recursive/cascading failure — depth, retry, runtime, token/cost and workflow bounds stop runaway delegation.
  8. Stale approval/replay — revision/CAS/one-time confirmation cannot be reused after target state changes.
  9. Confused deputy — downstream integrations enforce the intended user/connection/resource rather than accepting model-selected identity by implication.
  10. Audit poisoning — user/model-provided strings cannot forge successful audit/evidence status.

Memory admission target

Durable memory should distinguish at minimum:

  • user-provided vs system-observed vs verified evidence;
  • principal/project scope;
  • confidence and provenance;
  • superseded/retracted state;
  • review/admission status for behavior-shaping procedural memory.

Memory may recommend a route. It may never grant permissions, approve deletion, or override a failed authorization check.

Launch evidence

A 10/10 agent-security claim requires the abuse matrix to run after material changes to models, prompts/instructions, tools, memory, retrieval, workflow policy or provider integrations. Failure is a release blocker for the affected authority class.