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armgit / mso

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Browser-based graphical shell and control plane for a Linux server you own — real terminal, file manager, live metrics and BYOK AI in one mobile-first workspace. Next.js 16 · React 19 · node-pty · Tailwind v4 · shadcn/ui. Public alpha, self-hosted.

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Source concurrency and integration contract

Launch target. Repository policy already requires isolated worktrees for parallel source work. Public-beta readiness requires the rule to be enforced by tooling and remote protection, not only by agent instructions.

Invariant

main is the release/integration authority. It is never a shared agent scratchpad.

user request
  → workflow ownership
  → isolated task worktree
  → scoped commit(s)
  → exact-SHA verification
  → integration queue on latest main
  → changed-base verification
  → release
  → live SHA verification

Required behaviour

  1. Every source-changing automated workflow owns exactly one isolated hidden worktree.
  2. Two active workflows never share a Git index, worktree or branch.
  3. A dirty canonical checkout owned by another workflow is a hard stop, not an invitation to stash/reset/commit its work.
  4. Integration uses a clean latest main; candidate ancestry and remote head are revalidated immediately before integration.
  5. Candidate verification does not transfer automatically to a changed integration base. Relevant changed-base tests and the release gate run again.
  6. Only the integration/release authority advances canonical main.
  7. A worktree is removed only after unique tracked/untracked work is proven preserved and accounted for.
  8. Release evidence records candidate SHA, integrated SHA, deployed SHA and live SHA separately.

Mutation-surface classification

Source isolation is about protecting repository/source authority, not relocating every durable control-plane store into a Git worktree.

Surface Classification during isolated source workflow Rule
fs_*, shell, project functions Source/host mutation Must target the task worktree; canonical/implicit cwd is refused.
Project MCP config/calls, project assets, project-agent write/exec, project flow run/manage, Tool Forge promotion Project source/config or project-code execution Must resolve to the task worktree. Canonical project targets fail closed.
.mso/KNOWLEDGE.md, .agent/ memory/evidence/recipes/scripts Canonical private project metadata Remain project-private/canonical and gitignored; they must not authorize source writes or destructive cleanup.
Workflow graph private store, session/artifact indexes, organization, local/A2A messages Control-plane private state Stay in their existing private authority store; no worktree redirection.
Project database calls, integrations and infrastructure providers External/provider state Keep provider-scoped authorization/concurrency rules; worktree isolation does not replace those boundaries.

Dynamic/project automation does not create an escape hatch: any downstream source-facing tool is still workspace-bound, and project flow execution itself must select the owned worktree. Read-only discovery may inspect canonical state.

Remote protection target

GitHub is code storage and a remote policy boundary; MSO/Batonly may remain the CI/CD executor. Protect main with a ruleset/branch policy that, where account/repository capabilities allow:

  • blocks force pushes and branch deletion;
  • requires the project's external status checks before integration;
  • requires the branch to be current with the integration head or uses a merge queue equivalent;
  • restricts direct updates to the designated integration identity;
  • keeps bypass narrow and auditable.

As of the 2026-09-26 launch audit, the public GitHub rulesets collection for rahmanef63/mso returned empty. Branch-protection detail could not be read through the installed GitHub App because that integration lacks repository administration permission. Do not claim remote protection from that incomplete evidence.

Acceptance tests for 10/10

  • Simultaneous synthetic workflows attempt to mutate the same canonical project; only task-owned worktrees receive writes.
  • A workflow with an isolated-worktree classification cannot silently write source into canonical main.
  • A dirty canonical tree causes integration to fail without mutation.
  • Two independently green candidates are replayed against latest main; stale candidate evidence is not reused as release proof.
  • Remote policy rejects unauthorized direct/force update of main.