Browser-based graphical shell and control plane for a Linux server you own — real terminal, file manager, live metrics and BYOK AI in one mobile-first workspace. Next.js 16 · React 19 · node-pty · Tailwind v4 · shadcn/ui. Public alpha, self-hosted.
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// OS_SESSION_COOKIE_DOMAIN widens the session cookie to every host under a
// domain, so the validator is a security boundary, not cosmetics: anything it
// waves through lands verbatim in a Set-Cookie header, and anything it wrongly
// rejects only falls back to today's host-only cookie (fail closed).
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import { configuredSessionCookieScope, hostOnlyClearHeader, sessionCookieAttrs, sessionCookieDomain } from "./session-cookie";
const req = (host: string, forwarded?: string) =>
new Request("http://internal/api/auth/login", {
method: "POST",
headers: { host, ...(forwarded ? { "x-forwarded-host": forwarded } : {}) },
});
const domainFor = (value: string | undefined, host = "mso.example.com") => {
if (value === undefined) delete process.env.OS_SESSION_COOKIE_DOMAIN;
else process.env.OS_SESSION_COOKIE_DOMAIN = value;
return sessionCookieDomain(req(host));
};
afterEach(() => {
delete process.env.OS_SESSION_COOKIE_DOMAIN;
});
describe("configuredSessionCookieScope", () => {
it("canonicalizes the policy that signed sessions are bound to", () => {
delete process.env.OS_SESSION_COOKIE_DOMAIN;
expect(configuredSessionCookieScope()).toBe("host");
process.env.OS_SESSION_COOKIE_DOMAIN = " .MSO.Example.com ";
expect(configuredSessionCookieScope()).toBe("host");
process.env.OS_SESSION_COOKIE_DOMAIN = "bad; Domain=evil.test";
expect(configuredSessionCookieScope()).toBe("host");
});
});
describe("sessionCookieDomain", () => {
it("is host-only when unset or blank", () => {
expect(domainFor(undefined)).toBeUndefined();
expect(domainFor("")).toBeUndefined();
expect(domainFor(" ")).toBeUndefined();
});
it("widens to the configured domain on the cockpit host", () => {
expect(domainFor("mso.example.com")).toBe("mso.example.com");
});
it("widens on the split-origin app hosts (the whole point)", () => {
expect(domainFor("mso.example.com", "hermes.mso.example.com")).toBe("mso.example.com");
expect(domainFor("mso.example.com", "openclaw.mso.example.com")).toBe("mso.example.com");
});
it("normalises a leading dot, casing, port and trailing dot", () => {
expect(domainFor(".MSO.Example.com", "HERMES.mso.example.com.:4005")).toBe("mso.example.com");
});
it.each([
["mso.example.com; Path=/", "attribute smuggling"],
["mso.example.com Path=/", "space"],
["os_rahmanef.com", "underscore"],
["-bad.com", "leading hyphen"],
["bad-.com", "trailing hyphen"],
["com", "single label / public suffix"],
["localhost", "single label"],
["1.2.3.4", "IPv4 literal"],
["os..rahmanef.com", "empty label"],
["os.rah\nmanef.com", "interior control char"],
["ötzi.rahmanef.com", "non-ASCII (must be punycode)"],
])("fails closed to host-only for %s (%s)", (value) => {
expect(domainFor(value, "hermes.mso.example.com")).toBeUndefined();
});
it("tolerates surrounding whitespace from a hand-edited env file", () => {
expect(domainFor(" mso.example.com\n")).toBe("mso.example.com");
});
it("fails closed when a label or the whole name is over length", () => {
const long = (labels: number) => `${`${"a".repeat(60)}.`.repeat(labels)}com`;
expect(domainFor(`${"a".repeat(64)}.com`, `x.${"a".repeat(64)}.com`)).toBeUndefined();
// 4 × 61 + 3 = 247 chars is legal; 5 × 61 + 3 = 308 is over the 253 cap.
expect(domainFor(long(4), long(4))).toBe(long(4));
expect(domainFor(long(5), long(5))).toBeUndefined();
});
it("fails closed when the request host does not domain-match", () => {
// Otherwise the browser drops the whole Set-Cookie and login 200s with no
// session — a login loop with no error anywhere.
expect(domainFor("mso.example.com", "76.13.23.37")).toBeUndefined();
expect(domainFor("mso.example.com", "localhost")).toBeUndefined();
// Suffix without a dot boundary is NOT a subdomain (RFC 6265 §5.1.3).
expect(domainFor("mso.example.com", "notos.rahmanef.com")).toBeUndefined();
});
it("ignores x-forwarded-host while a real Host header is present", () => {
// Host wins, so a client-settable header cannot steer the decision.
process.env.OS_SESSION_COOKIE_DOMAIN = "mso.example.com";
expect(sessionCookieDomain(req("mso.example.com", "evil.example"))).toBe("mso.example.com");
});
});
describe("sessionCookieAttrs", () => {
it("keeps the host-only attribute set unchanged when no domain is configured", () => {
delete process.env.OS_SESSION_COOKIE_DOMAIN;
expect(sessionCookieAttrs(req("mso.example.com"), 86_400)).toEqual({
httpOnly: true,
secure: true,
sameSite: "strict",
path: "/",
maxAge: 86_400,
});
});
it("adds only the Domain when configured — SameSite stays strict", () => {
// Strict is correct across the app hosts: SameSite is per SITE (registrable
// domain), and mso.example.com / hermes.mso.example.com share rahmanef.com.
process.env.OS_SESSION_COOKIE_DOMAIN = "mso.example.com";
expect(sessionCookieAttrs(req("mso.example.com"), 0)).toEqual({
httpOnly: true,
secure: true,
sameSite: "strict",
path: "/",
maxAge: 0,
domain: "mso.example.com",
});
});
});
describe("hostOnlyClearHeader", () => {
it("carries no Domain, so it targets the pre-widening cookie", () => {
const header = hostOnlyClearHeader("session");
expect(header).toBe("session=; Path=/; Max-Age=0; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Strict");
expect(header.toLowerCase()).not.toContain("domain");
});
});