Browser-based graphical shell and control plane for a Linux server you own — real terminal, file manager, live metrics and BYOK AI in one mobile-first workspace. Next.js 16 · React 19 · node-pty · Tailwind v4 · shadcn/ui. Public alpha, self-hosted.
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import { createHash, randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
// PKCE (RFC 7636) and secret-hashing primitives shared by protocol adapters.
// Raw codes/bearers stay in flight; persistent callers store only hashes.
export function sha256hex(s: string): string {
return createHash("sha256").update(s).digest("hex");
}
/** base64url, NOT base64 — `+`→`-`, `/`→`_`, no padding. Standard base64 here
* silently produces a challenge that never matches (RFC 7636 §4.2). */
export function sha256b64url(s: string): string {
return createHash("sha256").update(s).digest("base64url");
}
export function randomToken(prefix: string, bytes = 32): string {
return prefix + randomBytes(bytes).toString("base64url");
}
/** Constant-time for equal-length input; length itself is not a secret. */
export function safeEqualHex(a: string, b: string): boolean {
if (a.length !== b.length) return false;
return timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(a), Buffer.from(b));
}
/**
* True when `verifier` is the one that produced `challenge`.
*
* `plain` is refused outright — OAuth 2.1 drops it, and accepting it would mean a
* proxy that saw the authorization redirect could complete the exchange itself.
* The 43..128 bound is RFC 7636 §4.1: anything outside it cannot be a verifier at
* all, so rejecting early keeps a malformed value out of the hash comparison.
*/
export function verifyPkce(verifier: string, challenge: string, method: string): boolean {
if (method !== "S256") return false;
if (typeof verifier !== "string" || verifier.length < 43 || verifier.length > 128) return false;
if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9\-._~]+$/.test(verifier)) return false;
const computed = sha256b64url(verifier);
return computed.length === challenge.length && safeEqualHex(computed, challenge);
}
/** https, or loopback for a desktop client's local callback. Anything else — a
* custom scheme, an http host on the internet — can leak the code in transit. */
export function isAllowedRedirect(u: string): boolean {
try {
const url = new URL(u);
if (url.protocol === "https:") return true;
return url.protocol === "http:" && (url.hostname === "localhost" || url.hostname === "127.0.0.1");
} catch {
return false;
}
}