Browser-based graphical shell and control plane for a Linux server you own — real terminal, file manager, live metrics and BYOK AI in one mobile-first workspace. Next.js 16 · React 19 · node-pty · Tailwind v4 · shadcn/ui. Public alpha, self-hosted.
TypeScript browser-shellcontrol-planefile-managerhomelabmobile-firstnextjsptyreactself-hostedserver-managementshadcn-uisysadmintailwindcssterminaltypescriptvpsweb-desktopweb-terminal
fix(security): pin store paths and eliminate unsafe file-read patterns
Rahman006029617a15
diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yml b/.github/workflows/ci.ymlindex 5cce8be2..554f34fb 100644--- a/.github/workflows/ci.yml+++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ name: CIon:push:- branches: [main]+ branches: [main, "security/**"]pull_request:branches: [main]workflow_dispatch:diff --git a/.github/workflows/codeql.yml b/.github/workflows/codeql.ymlindex a7253460..1f0d3d57 100644--- a/.github/workflows/codeql.yml+++ b/.github/workflows/codeql.yml@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ name: CodeQLon:push:- branches: [main]+ branches: [main, "security/**"]pull_request:branches: [main]schedule:@@ -38,3 +38,7 @@ jobs:uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@cdf488f595d80d6e07e03d4674febd5ab45fa938 # v4with:category: /language:javascript-typescript+ output: ${{ runner.temp }}/mso-codeql-results++ - name: Report every result from this exact CodeQL analysis+ run: node scripts/codeql-report.mjs "$RUNNER_TEMP/mso-codeql-results"diff --git a/.github/workflows/security-alerts.yml b/.github/workflows/security-alerts.ymlindex b4284ec6..001e0a6c 100644--- a/.github/workflows/security-alerts.yml+++ b/.github/workflows/security-alerts.yml@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ on:push:branches: [main, "security/**"]workflow_run:- workflows: [CodeQL, Scorecard]+ workflows: [CodeQL, OpenSSF Scorecard]types: [completed]branches: [main]workflow_dispatch:diff --git a/.github/workflows/security-core.yml b/.github/workflows/security-core.ymlindex 15c642da..158f90ee 100644--- a/.github/workflows/security-core.yml+++ b/.github/workflows/security-core.yml@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ name: Security Coreon:push:- branches: [main]+ branches: [main, "security/**"]pull_request:branches: [main]schedule:diff --git a/bun.lock b/bun.lockindex 24007713..8c9ed4ed 100644--- a/bun.lock+++ b/bun.lock@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@"eslint": "^9.39.4","eslint-config-next": "^16.3.2","fast-check": "^4.9.0",+ "parse5": "8.0.1","postcss": "^8.5.26","tailwindcss": "^4.3.0","typescript": "^5.9.3",@@ -623,6 +624,8 @@"enhanced-resolve": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "graceful-fs": "^4.2.4", "tapable": "^2.3.3" } }, "sha512-L1l8TNvomm6UVW5B253AGxQagSQr+vGwhMlrrfRS2qmhx46AMpMVJKQYLvWYbysTMY8VoicOvzHzoHMbyzB+4A=="],+ "entities": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-zwfzJecQ/Uej6tusMqwAqU/6KL2XaB2VZ2Jg54Je6ahNBGNH6Ek6g3jjNCF0fG9EWQKGZNddNjU5F1ZQn/sBnA=="],+"es-abstract": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "array-buffer-byte-length": "^1.0.2", "arraybuffer.prototype.slice": "^1.0.4", "available-typed-arrays": "^1.0.7", "call-bind": "^1.0.8", "call-bound": "^1.0.4", "data-view-buffer": "^1.0.2", "data-view-byte-length": "^1.0.2", "data-view-byte-offset": "^1.0.1", "es-define-property": "^1.0.1", "es-errors": "^1.3.0", "es-object-atoms": "^1.1.1", "es-set-tostringtag": "^2.1.0", "es-to-primitive": "^1.3.0", "function.prototype.name": "^1.1.8", "get-intrinsic": "^1.3.0", "get-proto": "^1.0.1", "get-symbol-description": "^1.1.0", "globalthis": "^1.0.4", "gopd": "^1.2.0", "has-property-descriptors": "^1.0.2", "has-proto": "^1.2.0", "has-symbols": "^1.1.0", "hasown": "^2.0.2", "internal-slot": "^1.1.0", "is-array-buffer": "^3.0.5", "is-callable": "^1.2.7", "is-data-view": "^1.0.2", "is-negative-zero": "^2.0.3", "is-regex": "^1.2.1", "is-set": "^2.0.3", "is-shared-array-buffer": "^1.0.4", "is-string": "^1.1.1", "is-typed-array": "^1.1.15", "is-weakref": "^1.1.1", "math-intrinsics": "^1.1.0", "object-inspect": "^1.13.4", "object-keys": "^1.1.1", "object.assign": "^4.1.7", "own-keys": "^1.0.1", "regexp.prototype.flags": "^1.5.4", "safe-array-concat": "^1.1.3", "safe-push-apply": "^1.0.0", "safe-regex-test": "^1.1.0", "set-proto": "^1.0.0", "stop-iteration-iterator": "^1.1.0", "string.prototype.trim": "^1.2.10", "string.prototype.trimend": "^1.0.9", "string.prototype.trimstart": "^1.0.8", "typed-array-buffer": "^1.0.3", "typed-array-byte-length": "^1.0.3", "typed-array-byte-offset": "^1.0.4", "typed-array-length": "^1.0.7", "unbox-primitive": "^1.1.0", "which-typed-array": "^1.1.19" } }, "sha512-2FpH9Q5i2RRwyEP1AylXe6nYLR5OhaJTZwmlcP0dL/+JCbgg7yyEo/sEK6HeGZRf3dFpWwThaRHVApXSkW3xeg=="],"es-abstract-get": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "es-errors": "^1.3.0", "es-object-atoms": "^1.1.2", "is-callable": "^1.2.7", "object-inspect": "^1.13.4" } }, "sha512-6PMWXpdhshVvFp+FoWYs1EvG1Nj0tvk0dZM+XcK0xMEM1czRVcP6ohqPWHy6qPagSpC8j4+p89WXlT+xXJs/fg=="],@@ -985,6 +988,8 @@"parent-module": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "callsites": "^3.0.0" } }, "sha512-GQ2EWRpQV8/o+Aw8YqtfZZPfNRWZYkbidE9k5rpl/hC3vtHHBfGm2Ifi6qWV+coDGkrUKZAxE3Lot5kcsRlh+g=="],+ "parse5": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "entities": "^8.0.0" } }, "sha512-z1e/HMG90obSGeidlli3hj7cbocou0/wa5HacvI3ASx34PecNjNQeaHNo5WIZpWofN9kgkqV1q5YvXe3F0FoPw=="],+"path-exists": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-ak9Qy5Q7jYb2Wwcey5Fpvg2KoAc/ZIhLSLOSBmRmygPsGwkVVt0fZa0qrtMz+m6tJTAHfZQ8FnmB4MG4LWy7/w=="],"path-key": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-ojmeN0qd+y0jszEtoY48r0Peq5dwMEkIlCOu6Q5f41lfkswXuKtYrhgoTpLnyIcHm24Uhqx+5Tqm2InSwLhE6Q=="],diff --git a/docs/PROGRESS.md b/docs/PROGRESS.mdindex b8f6d7d0..3d715abf 100644--- a/docs/PROGRESS.md+++ b/docs/PROGRESS.md@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@+## 2026-09-05 — Resolve actual CodeQL findings and restore the demo++The actual GitHub alert inventory exposed 22 default-branch findings, unlike the previously green scanner-completion jobs. Security-store locks now use an owner-root-validated pinned directory while preserving adjacent CLI lock names; bounded no-follow reads replace file check/reopen pairs. HTML fixture extraction uses parse5; the terminal picker opens its device once. Owner facts and activity logs now have explicit field/byte limits, private no-follow storage, concurrency and rejection tests. Diagnostic logging failures remain isolated from authorized tool execution. Security branches receive real CodeQL, CI and independent scanners; unfiltered SARIF summaries and a separate actual-alert inventory make pending evidence visible. README restores the existing real GIF inline and has a regression test for animation and screenshot presence. No alert is automatically dismissed by these changes.+## 2026-09-05 — MCP Page preview lifecyclediff --git a/lib/agent/legacy-owner-memory.test.ts b/lib/agent/legacy-owner-memory.test.tsindex b24dafb9..009de739 100644--- a/lib/agent/legacy-owner-memory.test.ts+++ b/lib/agent/legacy-owner-memory.test.ts@@ -1,25 +1,47 @@-import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";+import { afterAll, beforeEach, describe, it, expect } from "vitest";+import { promises as fs } from "node:fs";import os from "node:os";import path from "node:path";-process.env.OS_MEMORY_STORE = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `mso-memory-test-${process.pid}.json`);+const directory = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "mso-memory-test-"));+const file = path.join(directory, "memory.json");+process.env.OS_MEMORY_STORE = file;const { addMemory, recall, listMemories, removeMemory } = await import("./legacy-owner-memory");+beforeEach(async () => { await fs.rm(file, { force: true }); });+afterAll(async () => { delete process.env.OS_MEMORY_STORE; await fs.rm(directory, { recursive: true, force: true }); });-describe("memory store + recall", () => {+describe("owner memory store + recall", () => {it("adds, recalls by word overlap, and removes", async () => {- const a = await addMemory("I deploy mso with bun run build then restart");+ const a = await addMemory("I deploy mso with the guarded release command");await addMemory("My favorite color is blue");-- const hits = await recall("how do I deploy?");- const joined = hits.map((m) => m.text).join();- expect(joined).toMatch(/deploy/);- expect(joined).not.toMatch(/color/); // "deploy" doesn't overlap the color fact-- await removeMemory(a.id);- expect((await listMemories()).some((m) => m.id === a.id)).toBe(false);+ const joined = (await recall("how do I deploy?")).map((m) => m.text).join();+ expect(joined).toMatch(/deploy/); expect(joined).not.toMatch(/color/);+ await removeMemory(a.id); expect((await listMemories()).some((m) => m.id === a.id)).toBe(false);});-- it("falls back to recent facts when the query has no ≥3-char words", async () => {- expect(Array.isArray(await recall("a b"))).toBe(true);+ it("falls back to recent facts when the query has no long words", async () => {+ await addMemory("Keep this user fact as data"); expect(await recall("a b")).toHaveLength(1);+ });+ it("serializes parallel additions without losing a fact", async () => {+ await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: 12 }, (_, i) => addMemory(`Concurrent fact ${i}`)));+ const rows = await listMemories(); expect(rows).toHaveLength(12); expect(new Set(rows.map((x) => x.id)).size).toBe(12);+ });+ it("refuses malformed existing state rather than overwriting it", async () => {+ await fs.writeFile(file, "invalid existing content", { mode: 0o600 });+ await expect(addMemory("new data")).rejects.toThrow();+ expect(await fs.readFile(file, "utf8")).toBe("invalid existing content");+ });+ it("refuses symlinked state without changing the target", async () => {+ const victim = path.join(directory, "victim.json"); await fs.writeFile(victim, "[]", { mode: 0o600 });+ await fs.symlink(victim, file);+ await expect(addMemory("do not follow symlinks")).rejects.toThrow();+ expect(await fs.readFile(victim, "utf8")).toBe("[]");+ });+ it("rejects empty or control-character input and keeps arbitrary text non-executable", async () => {+ await expect(addMemory(" ")).rejects.toThrow(); await expect(addMemory("bad\0text")).rejects.toThrow();+ const literal = "User fact: <script>example()</script>; $(not-executed)";+ const memory = await addMemory(literal); expect((await listMemories())[0].text).toBe(literal);+ const stored = JSON.parse(await fs.readFile(file, "utf8"));+ expect(Object.keys(stored[0]).sort()).toEqual(["createdAt", "id", "text"]);+ expect(stored[0].id).toBe(memory.id);});});diff --git a/lib/agent/legacy-owner-memory.ts b/lib/agent/legacy-owner-memory.tsindex 3170c443..f1d8f03d 100644--- a/lib/agent/legacy-owner-memory.ts+++ b/lib/agent/legacy-owner-memory.ts@@ -1,61 +1,91 @@-import { promises as fs } from "node:fs";+import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";+import { constants, promises as fs } from "node:fs";import os from "node:os";import path from "node:path";+import { pinSecurityStorePath } from "@/lib/security-store-path";+import { withSecurityStoreLock } from "@/lib/security-store-lock";-// Durable cross-session facts recalled into Alfa's system prompt. One JSON file in-// ~/.mso (small structured records, chmod 600). Recall is substring scoring for-// now. ponytail: substring recall — swap for embeddings if it gets noisy at scale.-export interface Memory {- id: string;- text: string;- createdAt: number;-}-+// Owner-authenticated facts, persisted as bounded JSON data, never executable source.+export interface Memory { id: string; text: string; createdAt: number; }const FILE = process.env.OS_MEMORY_STORE || path.join(os.homedir(), ".mso", "memory.json");+const MAX_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024;+const MAX_RECORDS = 1000;++function records(value: unknown): Memory[] {+ if (!Array.isArray(value) || value.length > MAX_RECORDS) throw new Error("Invalid or oversized memory store");+ return value.map((row) => {+ if (!row || typeof row !== "object" || Array.isArray(row)+ || typeof row.id !== "string" || !/^mem_[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{1,80}$/.test(row.id)+ || typeof row.text !== "string" || row.text.length > 500+ || !Number.isSafeInteger(row.createdAt) || row.createdAt < 0) throw new Error("Invalid memory record");+ // Deliberate projection: persisted objects cannot inject additional fields.+ return { id: row.id, text: row.text, createdAt: row.createdAt };+ });+}async function read(): Promise<Memory[]> {+ const pinned = await pinSecurityStorePath(FILE);+ let handle;try {- const j = JSON.parse(await fs.readFile(FILE, "utf8"));- return Array.isArray(j) ? j : [];- } catch {- return [];- }+ handle = await fs.open(pinned.file, constants.O_RDONLY | constants.O_NOFOLLOW | constants.O_NONBLOCK);+ const stat = await handle.stat();+ if (!stat.isFile() || stat.uid !== process.getuid?.() || stat.nlink !== 1 || (stat.mode & 0o077) || stat.size > MAX_BYTES) throw new Error("Unsafe memory store");+ const bytes = Buffer.alloc(Number(stat.size));+ let offset = 0;+ while (offset < bytes.length) {+ const read = await handle.read(bytes, offset, bytes.length - offset, offset);+ if (!read.bytesRead) throw new Error("Memory store changed during read");+ offset += read.bytesRead;+ }+ const after = await handle.stat();+ if (after.size !== stat.size || after.mtimeMs !== stat.mtimeMs) throw new Error("Memory store changed during read");+ return records(JSON.parse(bytes.toString("utf8")));+ } catch (error) {+ if ((error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === "ENOENT") return [];+ throw error; // Never overwrite corrupt/unreadable existing state with an empty list.+ } finally { await handle?.close(); await pinned.directory.close(); }}async function write(list: Memory[]): Promise<void> {- await fs.mkdir(path.dirname(FILE), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });- const tmp = `${FILE}.tmp`;- await fs.writeFile(tmp, JSON.stringify(list, null, 2), { encoding: "utf8", mode: 0o600 });- await fs.rename(tmp, FILE);+ const body = JSON.stringify(records(list), null, 2) + "\n";+ if (Buffer.byteLength(body) > MAX_BYTES) throw new Error("Memory store exceeds its byte limit");+ const pinned = await pinSecurityStorePath(FILE);+ const temporary = `${pinned.file}.${randomUUID()}.tmp`;+ try {+ const handle = await fs.open(temporary, constants.O_WRONLY | constants.O_CREAT | constants.O_EXCL | constants.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600);+ try { await handle.writeFile(body, "utf8"); await handle.sync(); }+ finally { await handle.close(); }+ await fs.rename(temporary, pinned.file);+ } finally {+ await fs.unlink(temporary).catch((error: NodeJS.ErrnoException) => { if (error.code !== "ENOENT") throw error; });+ await pinned.directory.close();+ }}-export async function listMemories(): Promise<Memory[]> {- return (await read()).sort((a, b) => b.createdAt - a.createdAt);-}+export async function listMemories(): Promise<Memory[]> { return (await read()).sort((a, b) => b.createdAt - a.createdAt); }export async function addMemory(text: string): Promise<Memory> {- const m: Memory = { id: `mem_${Date.now().toString(36)}`, text: text.trim().slice(0, 500), createdAt: Date.now() };- const list = await read();- list.push(m);- await write(list);- return m;+ if (typeof text !== "string") throw new Error("Memory text must be a string");+ const clean = text.trim().slice(0, 500);+ if (!clean || /[\u0000-\u0008\u000b\u000c\u000e-\u001f\u007f]/u.test(clean)) throw new Error("Memory text is empty or contains control characters");+ const memory: Memory = { id: `mem_${randomUUID()}`, text: clean, createdAt: Date.now() };+ return withSecurityStoreLock(FILE, async () => {+ const list = await read();+ if (list.length >= MAX_RECORDS) throw new Error("Memory store is full; remove an old record first");+ await write([...list, memory]);+ return memory;+ });}export async function removeMemory(id: string): Promise<void> {- await write((await read()).filter((m) => m.id !== id));+ await withSecurityStoreLock(FILE, async () => { await write((await read()).filter((memory) => memory.id !== id)); });}-// Recall facts relevant to `query` (scored by how many of its ≥3-char words appear),-// capped. No query signal → the most recent facts.+// Bounded substring recall, not a claim of semantic retrieval or trusted instructions.export async function recall(query: string, limit = 8): Promise<Memory[]> {- const all = await read();- if (all.length === 0) return [];+ const all = await read(), count = Math.max(1, Math.min(100, Math.floor(limit) || 8));const words = query.toLowerCase().match(/[a-z0-9]{3,}/g) ?? [];- if (words.length === 0) return all.slice(-limit);- return all- .map((m) => ({ m, hits: words.filter((w) => m.text.toLowerCase().includes(w)).length }))- .filter((s) => s.hits > 0)- .sort((a, b) => b.hits - a.hits)- .slice(0, limit)- .map((s) => s.m);+ if (!words.length) return all.slice(-count);+ return all.map((memory) => ({ memory, hits: words.filter((word) => memory.text.toLowerCase().includes(word)).length }))+ .filter((row) => row.hits > 0).sort((a, b) => b.hits - a.hits).slice(0, count).map((row) => row.memory);}diff --git a/lib/capabilities/activity-security.test.ts b/lib/capabilities/activity-security.test.tsnew file mode 100644index 00000000..c29d2c12--- /dev/null+++ b/lib/capabilities/activity-security.test.ts@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@+import { promises as fs } from "node:fs";+import os from "node:os";+import path from "node:path";+import { afterAll, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";++const directory = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "mso-activity-security-"));+const file = path.join(directory, "activity.jsonl");+process.env.OS_MCP_ACTIVITY_LOG = file;+const { recordCapabilityActivity, readCapabilityActivity } = await import("./activity");+beforeEach(async () => { await fs.rm(file, { force: true }); });+afterAll(async () => { delete process.env.OS_MCP_ACTIVITY_LOG; await fs.rm(directory, { recursive: true, force: true }); });++describe("private activity metadata persistence", () => {+ it("projects approved fields and redacts text without persisting request bodies", async () => {+ const entry = { id: "test", tool: "fs_write", state: "completed" as const, target: "token=synthetic-value", detail: "password=synthetic-value", content: "request-body-not-for-log", arbitrary: "do-not-keep" };+ await recordCapabilityActivity(entry);+ const raw = await fs.readFile(file, "utf8");+ expect(raw).not.toContain("synthetic-value"); expect(raw).not.toContain("request-body-not-for-log"); expect(raw).not.toContain("arbitrary");+ expect((await readCapabilityActivity(1))[0].target).toBe("token=[redacted]");+ });+ it("leaves symlink destinations untouched and isolates diagnostic failures", async () => {+ const victim = path.join(directory, "victim"); await fs.writeFile(victim, "untouched", { mode: 0o600 }); await fs.symlink(victim, file);+ const log = vi.spyOn(console, "error").mockImplementation(() => {});+ try {+ await recordCapabilityActivity({ id: "refused", tool: "fs_write", state: "completed" });+ expect(await fs.readFile(victim, "utf8")).toBe("untouched"); expect(log).toHaveBeenCalled();+ await expect(readCapabilityActivity()).rejects.toThrow();+ } finally { log.mockRestore(); }+ });+ it("rejects invalid identities and oversized metadata cannot grow an unbounded record", async () => {+ expect(() => recordCapabilityActivity({ id: "bad\nrow", tool: "fs_write", state: "completed" })).toThrow();+ await recordCapabilityActivity({ id: "bounded", tool: "fs_write", state: "completed", detail: "x".repeat(20000) });+ expect(Buffer.byteLength(await fs.readFile(file))).toBeLessThan(1024);+ });+});diff --git a/lib/capabilities/activity.ts b/lib/capabilities/activity.tsindex 2960dcdc..ef829385 100644--- a/lib/capabilities/activity.ts+++ b/lib/capabilities/activity.ts@@ -1,93 +1,100 @@-import { promises as fs } from "fs";-import os from "os";-import path from "path";-import { randomUUID } from "crypto";+import { constants, promises as fs } from "node:fs";+import os from "node:os";+import path from "node:path";+import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";+import { pinSecurityStorePath } from "@/lib/security-store-path";export type CapabilityActivityState = "started" | "completed" | "failed" | "denied" | "rate_limited" | "invalid_args";-export interface CapabilityActivityEntry {- id: string;- ts: string;- actor?: string | null;- tool: string;- state: CapabilityActivityState;- scope?: string;- workflowId?: string;- workflowIntent?: string;- workflowProject?: string;- target?: string;- durationMs?: number;- detail?: string;+ id: string; ts: string; actor?: string | null; tool: string;+ state: CapabilityActivityState; scope?: string; workflowId?: string;+ workflowIntent?: string; workflowProject?: string; target?: string;+ durationMs?: number; detail?: string;}-+const STATES = new Set(["started", "completed", "failed", "denied", "rate_limited", "invalid_args"]);+const TAIL_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024;function activityPath(): string {const env = process.env.OS_MCP_ACTIVITY_LOG;- if (env && env.trim()) return env.replace(/^~(?=$|\/)/, os.homedir());- return path.join(os.homedir(), ".mso", "mcp-activity.log");-}--function trunc(v: string | undefined, max = 180): string | undefined {- if (!v) return undefined;- return v.length > max ? v.slice(0, max) + "…" : v;+ return env?.trim() ? env.replace(/^~(?=$|\/)/, os.homedir()) : path.join(os.homedir(), ".mso", "mcp-activity.log");}-function safeActivityText(value: string): string {- return value+ return value.replace(/[\u0000-\u001f\u007f]/gu, " ").replace(/([?&](?:token|key|secret|password|code)=)[^&\s]+/gi, "$1[redacted]").replace(/\b(password|token|secret|api[_-]?key)\s*[:=]\s*\S+/gi, "$1=[redacted]").replace(/\b(?:bearer\s+)?(?:sk|pk|ghp|mso_mcp)_[a-z0-9_-]{8,}\b/gi, "[redacted]").replace(/\b[a-f0-9]{48,}\b/gi, "[opaque-id]");}--let chain: Promise<void> = Promise.resolve();--export function newActivityId(): string {- return randomUUID();+function text(value: unknown, limit = 180): string | undefined {+ if (value == null || value === "") return undefined;+ if (typeof value !== "string") throw new Error("Activity metadata must be text");+ const safe = safeActivityText(value);+ return safe.length > limit ? safe.slice(0, limit) + "…" : safe;}-+function normalized(entry: Omit<CapabilityActivityEntry, "ts"> & { ts?: string }): CapabilityActivityEntry {+ if (typeof entry.id !== "string" || !/^[A-Za-z0-9_.:-]{1,180}$/.test(entry.id)+ || typeof entry.tool !== "string" || !/^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_.:-]{0,119}$/.test(entry.tool)+ || !STATES.has(entry.state)) throw new Error("Invalid activity identity or state");+ if (entry.scope != null && !["read", "write", "exec"].includes(entry.scope)) throw new Error("Invalid activity scope");+ if (entry.durationMs != null && (!Number.isFinite(entry.durationMs) || entry.durationMs < 0)) throw new Error("Invalid activity duration");+ if (entry.ts != null && (!Number.isFinite(Date.parse(entry.ts)) || entry.ts.length > 40)) throw new Error("Invalid activity timestamp");+ // Never spread a caller's object: request bodies/unknown keys must not reach disk.+ return {+ id: entry.id, tool: entry.tool, state: entry.state, ts: entry.ts ?? new Date().toISOString(),+ actor: text(entry.actor), scope: entry.scope, workflowId: text(entry.workflowId),+ workflowIntent: text(entry.workflowIntent, 500), workflowProject: text(entry.workflowProject, 240),+ target: text(entry.target), detail: text(entry.detail, 220), durationMs: entry.durationMs,+ };+}+let chain: Promise<void> = Promise.resolve();+export function newActivityId(): string { return randomUUID(); }export function activityTarget(args: Record<string, unknown>): string | undefined {- // Never serialize fs_write.content or arbitrary payloads. Prefer the one field- // that explains what the tool is acting on without leaking the body.for (const key of ["path", "id", "target", "query", "intent", "project", "from", "command", "on", "workflow_id"] as const) {- const v = args[key];- if (typeof v === "string" && v) return trunc(safeActivityText(v));- if (typeof v === "boolean") return String(v);+ const value = args[key];+ if (typeof value === "string" && value) return text(value);+ if (typeof value === "boolean") return String(value);}return undefined;}-export function recordCapabilityActivity(entry: Omit<CapabilityActivityEntry, "ts"> & { ts?: string }): Promise<void> {if (process.env.VITEST && !process.env.OS_MCP_ACTIVITY_LOG) return Promise.resolve();- const line = JSON.stringify({- ...entry,- ts: entry.ts ?? new Date().toISOString(),- workflowIntent: trunc(entry.workflowIntent ? safeActivityText(entry.workflowIntent) : undefined, 500),- workflowProject: trunc(entry.workflowProject ? safeActivityText(entry.workflowProject) : undefined, 240),- target: trunc(entry.target),- detail: trunc(entry.detail, 220),- }) + "\n";- chain = chain.then(async () => {- const file = activityPath();+ const line = JSON.stringify(normalized(entry)) + "\n";+ if (Buffer.byteLength(line) > 8192) return Promise.reject(new Error("Activity record exceeds limit"));+ chain = chain.catch(() => undefined).then(async () => {+ const pinned = await pinSecurityStorePath(activityPath());+ let handle;try {- await fs.mkdir(path.dirname(file), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });- await fs.appendFile(file, line, { mode: 0o600 });- } catch (e) {- console.error("[capability-activity] write failed:", e instanceof Error ? e.message : e);- }+ handle = await fs.open(pinned.file, constants.O_WRONLY | constants.O_APPEND | constants.O_CREAT | constants.O_NOFOLLOW | constants.O_NONBLOCK, 0o600);+ const stat = await handle.stat();+ if (!stat.isFile() || stat.uid !== process.getuid?.() || stat.nlink !== 1 || (stat.mode & 0o077)) throw new Error("Unsafe activity log");+ await handle.writeFile(line, "utf8");+ } finally { await handle?.close(); await pinned.directory.close(); }});- return chain;+ // Activity is diagnostic metadata, not the mandatory security audit trail.+ // Record failures without crashing an otherwise authorized tool call.+ return chain.catch(() => { console.error("[capability-activity] bounded private log write failed"); });}-export async function readCapabilityActivity(limit = 80): Promise<CapabilityActivityEntry[]> {- const raw = await fs.readFile(activityPath(), "utf8").catch(() => "");- return raw- .split("\n")- .filter(Boolean)- .slice(-800)- .map((line) => {- try { return JSON.parse(line) as CapabilityActivityEntry; } catch { return null; }- })- .filter((v): v is CapabilityActivityEntry => Boolean(v?.id && v?.tool && v?.state))- .slice(-Math.min(Math.max(limit, 1), 200))- .reverse();+ const pinned = await pinSecurityStorePath(activityPath());+ let handle;+ try {+ handle = await fs.open(pinned.file, constants.O_RDONLY | constants.O_NOFOLLOW | constants.O_NONBLOCK);+ const stat = await handle.stat();+ if (!stat.isFile() || stat.uid !== process.getuid?.() || stat.nlink !== 1 || (stat.mode & 0o077)) throw new Error("Unsafe activity log");+ const start = Math.max(0, Number(stat.size) - TAIL_BYTES), buffer = Buffer.alloc(Math.min(Number(stat.size), TAIL_BYTES));+ let offset = 0;+ while (offset < buffer.length) {+ const { bytesRead } = await handle.read(buffer, offset, buffer.length - offset, start + offset);+ if (!bytesRead) break;+ offset += bytesRead;+ }+ const lines = buffer.subarray(0, offset).toString("utf8").split("\n");+ if (start) lines.shift(); // the first tail fragment may start inside a JSON string+ return lines.filter(Boolean).slice(-800).map((line) => {+ try { return normalized(JSON.parse(line)); } catch { return null; }+ }).filter((value): value is CapabilityActivityEntry => value !== null)+ .slice(-Math.min(Math.max(Math.floor(limit) || 80, 1), 200)).reverse();+ } catch (error) {+ if ((error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === "ENOENT") return [];+ throw error;+ } finally { await handle?.close(); await pinned.directory.close(); }}diff --git a/lib/forge/evaluate.ts b/lib/forge/evaluate.tsindex 3f54d261..eee29ed4 100644--- a/lib/forge/evaluate.ts+++ b/lib/forge/evaluate.ts@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@+import { forgeTargetHash } from "./target-hash";import { createHash } from "node:crypto";import { promises as fs } from "node:fs";import path from "node:path";@@ -34,10 +35,7 @@ async function currentTargetHash(candidate: ForgeCandidate): Promise<string> {const target = candidate.kind === "skill"? path.join(candidate.projectPath, ".mso", "skills", candidate.skill!.name, "SKILL.md"): path.join(candidate.projectPath, ".mso", "functions.json");- const stat = await fs.lstat(target).catch(() => null);- if (!stat) return "absent";- if (!stat.isFile() || stat.isSymbolicLink() || stat.size > 512 * 1024) return "invalid";- return createHash("sha256").update(await fs.readFile(target)).digest("hex");+ return forgeTargetHash(target);}function recipeChecks(candidate: ForgeCandidate, checks: ForgeCheck[]): void {diff --git a/lib/forge/promote.ts b/lib/forge/promote.tsindex a70226ba..401d3013 100644--- a/lib/forge/promote.ts+++ b/lib/forge/promote.ts@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@+import { forgeTargetHash } from "./target-hash";import { createHash } from "node:crypto";import { promises as fs } from "node:fs";import path from "node:path";@@ -22,12 +23,6 @@ async function safeMsoDir(projectPath: string): Promise<string> {return real;}-async function targetHash(file: string): Promise<string> {- const stat = await fs.lstat(file).catch(() => null);- if (!stat) return "absent";- if (!stat.isFile() || stat.isSymbolicLink() || stat.size > 512 * 1024) return "invalid";- return hash(await fs.readFile(file));-}function assertEvaluated(candidate: ForgeCandidate): void {const evaluation = candidate.evaluation;@@ -57,7 +52,7 @@ async function promoteFunction(candidate: ForgeCandidate): Promise<ForgePromotioif (!candidate.evaluation?.sourceHash || candidate.evaluation.sourceHash !== sourceHash) throw new Error("project function source changed after evaluation; evaluate again");const mso = await safeMsoDir(candidate.projectPath), file = path.join(mso, "functions.json");const expected = candidate.evaluation?.targetHash ?? "";- if (await targetHash(file) !== expected) throw new Error("project functions manifest changed after evaluation; evaluate again");+ if (await forgeTargetHash(file) !== expected) throw new Error("project functions manifest changed after evaluation; evaluate again");const current = await readProjectFunctionsManifest(candidate.projectPath);if (current.found && !current.functions) throw new Error(current.error ?? "existing functions manifest is invalid");const functions = current.found ? (current.functions ?? []) : [];diff --git a/lib/forge/store.ts b/lib/forge/store.tsindex 3ab594f4..6fd0d7b7 100644--- a/lib/forge/store.ts+++ b/lib/forge/store.ts@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@+import { readBoundedRegularBufferOrThrow } from "@/lib/host/bounded-read";import { createHash, randomUUID } from "node:crypto";import { promises as fs } from "node:fs";import os from "node:os";@@ -34,10 +35,14 @@ async function ensureRoot(): Promise<void> {}async function readCandidateFile(file: string): Promise<ForgeCandidate | null> {- const stat = await fs.lstat(file).catch(() => null);- if (!stat) return null;- if (!stat.isFile() || stat.isSymbolicLink() || stat.size <= 0 || stat.size > 256 * 1024) throw new Error("invalid forge candidate file");- return JSON.parse(await fs.readFile(file, "utf8")) as ForgeCandidate;+ try {+ const data = await readBoundedRegularBufferOrThrow(file, 256 * 1024);+ if (!data.length) throw new Error("invalid forge candidate file");+ return JSON.parse(data.toString("utf8")) as ForgeCandidate;+ } catch (error) {+ if ((error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === "ENOENT") return null;+ throw new Error("invalid forge candidate file", { cause: error });+ }}async function writeCandidateFile(file: string, candidate: ForgeCandidate): Promise<void> {diff --git a/lib/forge/target-hash.ts b/lib/forge/target-hash.tsnew file mode 100644index 00000000..11f58207--- /dev/null+++ b/lib/forge/target-hash.ts@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@+import { createHash } from "node:crypto";+import { readBoundedRegularBufferOrThrow } from "@/lib/host/bounded-read";++export async function forgeTargetHash(file: string): Promise<string> {+ try {+ const data = await readBoundedRegularBufferOrThrow(file, 512 * 1024);+ return createHash("sha256").update(data).digest("hex");+ } catch (error) {+ return (error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === "ENOENT" ? "absent" : "invalid";+ }+}diff --git a/lib/host/bounded-read.ts b/lib/host/bounded-read.tsindex 894593bc..2dde020e 100644--- a/lib/host/bounded-read.ts+++ b/lib/host/bounded-read.ts@@ -28,29 +28,28 @@ export const BOUNDED_READ = {projectMcpConfig: 256 * 1024,} as const;-export async function readBoundedRegularBuffer(file: string, maxBytes: number): Promise<Buffer | null> {- let handle: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof fs.open>>;- try {- // O_NOFOLLOW: ELOOP if `file` itself is a symlink. Intermediate directories are- // the caller's problem — they are realpath-contained before we get here.- handle = await fs.open(file, constants.O_RDONLY | constants.O_NOFOLLOW);- } catch {- return null;- }+export async function readBoundedRegularBufferOrThrow(file: string, maxBytes: number): Promise<Buffer> {+ if (!Number.isSafeInteger(maxBytes) || maxBytes < 0 || maxBytes > 64 * 1024 * 1024) throw new Error("invalid bounded-read limit");+ const handle = await fs.open(file, constants.O_RDONLY | constants.O_NOFOLLOW | constants.O_NONBLOCK);try {- const stat = await handle.stat();- if (!stat.isFile()) return null;- if (stat.size > maxBytes) return null;- const size = Number(stat.size);- if (size === 0) return Buffer.alloc(0);- const buffer = Buffer.allocUnsafe(size);- const { bytesRead } = await handle.read(buffer, 0, size, 0);- return buffer.subarray(0, bytesRead);- } catch {- return null;- } finally {- await handle.close().catch(() => undefined);- }+ const before = await handle.stat();+ if (!before.isFile() || before.size > maxBytes) throw new Error("not a bounded regular file");+ const buffer = Buffer.alloc(Number(before.size));+ let offset = 0;+ while (offset < buffer.length) {+ const { bytesRead } = await handle.read(buffer, offset, buffer.length - offset, offset);+ if (!bytesRead) throw new Error("file changed during bounded read");+ offset += bytesRead;+ }+ const after = await handle.stat();+ if (after.size !== before.size || after.mtimeMs !== before.mtimeMs) throw new Error("file changed during bounded read");+ return buffer;+ } finally { await handle.close(); }+}++export async function readBoundedRegularBuffer(file: string, maxBytes: number): Promise<Buffer | null> {+ try { return await readBoundedRegularBufferOrThrow(file, maxBytes); }+ catch { return null; }}export async function readBoundedRegularFile(file: string, maxBytes: number): Promise<string | null> {diff --git a/lib/infra/setup-capability.test.ts b/lib/infra/setup-capability.test.tsindex 0ceedf37..03c6a9b5 100644--- a/lib/infra/setup-capability.test.ts+++ b/lib/infra/setup-capability.test.ts@@ -20,8 +20,11 @@ describe("native integration setup capabilities", () => {const grant = await api.openIntegrationSetup("composio", "test-owner", "project");expect(grant.token).toMatch(/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/);const file = path.join(root, "integration-setup", createHash("sha256").update(grant.token).digest("hex") + ".json");- expect((await fs.stat(file)).mode & 0o777).toBe(0o600);- const stored = await fs.readFile(file, "utf8"); expect(stored).not.toContain(grant.token); expect(stored).toContain("test-owner");+ const handle = await fs.open(file, "r");+ try {+ expect((await handle.stat()).mode & 0o777).toBe(0o600);+ const stored = await handle.readFile("utf8"); expect(stored).not.toContain(grant.token); expect(stored).toContain("test-owner");+ } finally { await handle.close(); }expect(grant.setup.fields.map(f => f.key)).toEqual(["apiKey"]);expect(grant.setup.expiresAt - Date.now()).toBeLessThanOrEqual(600000);await expect(api.consumeIntegrationSetup(grant.token, { orgApiKey: KEY })).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: "invalid_fields" });diff --git a/lib/infra/setup-hub.test.ts b/lib/infra/setup-hub.test.tsindex c1c9a367..3f58d102 100644--- a/lib/infra/setup-hub.test.ts+++ b/lib/infra/setup-hub.test.ts@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@+import { inlineScripts } from "../../scripts/test-support/inline-scripts";import { expect, it } from "vitest";import { integrationCatalog } from "./setup-catalog";import { INTEGRATION_PICKER_SCRIPT } from "./setup-picker";@@ -10,7 +11,7 @@ it("derives the complete native setup catalog from the same provider registry",});it("keeps guidance before login and preserves explicit role/expiry recovery", () => {const page = integrationSetupPage();- expect(() => new Function(page.html.match(/<script[^>]*>([\s\S]*?)<\/script>/)![1])).not.toThrow();+ expect(() => new Function(inlineScripts(page.html)[0])).not.toThrow();for (const marker of ['"/api/auth/me"', 'session.role!=="owner"', '"visibilitychange"', '"How to get this credential"', 'Open a new setup session']) expect(page.html).toContain(marker);expect(INTEGRATION_PICKER_SCRIPT).not.toContain('localStorage'); expect(page.csp).toContain("form-action 'none'");});diff --git a/lib/mcp/ui-page-lifecycle.test.ts b/lib/mcp/ui-page-lifecycle.test.tsindex 2f8f2df0..cf73a8d9 100644--- a/lib/mcp/ui-page-lifecycle.test.ts+++ b/lib/mcp/ui-page-lifecycle.test.ts@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@+import { inlineScripts } from "../../scripts/test-support/inline-scripts";import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";import { LEGACY_PAGE_V2_URI, LEGACY_PAGE_V3_URI, MSO_PAGE_URI, listUiResources, readUiResource } from "./ui-resources";@@ -11,7 +12,7 @@ describe("MCP Page lifecycle and cached resource migration", () => {});it("includes the Apps handshake and readiness contract in valid self-contained JavaScript", () => {const html = readUiResource(MSO_PAGE_URI)?.text ?? "";- const script = html.match(/<script>([\s\S]*)<\/script>/)?.[1];+ const script = inlineScripts(html)[0];expect(script).toBeTruthy();expect(() => new Function(script ?? "")).not.toThrow();for (const marker of [diff --git a/lib/mcp/ui-resources.test.ts b/lib/mcp/ui-resources.test.tsindex 8bfafa8e..0927a076 100644--- a/lib/mcp/ui-resources.test.ts+++ b/lib/mcp/ui-resources.test.ts@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@+import { inlineScripts } from "../../scripts/test-support/inline-scripts";import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";vi.mock("server-only", () => ({}));@@ -111,7 +112,7 @@ describe("MCP Apps Block and Page contract", () => {expect(content.text).toContain("slice(0,12000)");expect(content.text).toContain("MSO block submission");expect(content.text).toContain("workflowFallback");- const script = content.text.match(/<script>([\s\S]*)<\/script>/)?.[1];+ const script = inlineScripts(content.text)[0];expect(script).toBeTruthy();expect(() => new Function(script!)).not.toThrow();expect(content.text).not.toContain("fetch(");diff --git a/lib/orchestration/repo-memory-artifacts.ts b/lib/orchestration/repo-memory-artifacts.tsindex 50d21cde..732f0c49 100644--- a/lib/orchestration/repo-memory-artifacts.ts+++ b/lib/orchestration/repo-memory-artifacts.ts@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@+import { readBoundedRegularFile } from "@/lib/host/bounded-read";import { promises as fs } from "node:fs";import path from "node:path";import {@@ -40,10 +41,10 @@ export async function readAutomationScript(projectPath: string, id: string): Proconst safeId = safeArtifactId(id);for (const name of [`${safeId}.json`, `${safeId}.candidate.json`]) {const file = path.join(agent, "scripts", name);- const stat = await fs.lstat(file).catch(() => null);- if (!stat?.isFile() || stat.isSymbolicLink() || stat.size <= 0 || stat.size > MAX_RECORD_BYTES) continue;+ const raw = await readBoundedRegularFile(file, MAX_RECORD_BYTES);+ if (!raw) continue;try {- const parsed = JSON.parse(await fs.readFile(file, "utf8")) as AutomationScriptManifest;+ const parsed = JSON.parse(raw) as AutomationScriptManifest;if (parsed?.schemaVersion !== 1 || parsed.id !== id || !Array.isArray(parsed.steps) || !parsed.steps.length) continue;if (parsed.status !== "candidate" && parsed.status !== "tested") continue;return parsed;diff --git a/lib/orchestration/repo-memory-storage.ts b/lib/orchestration/repo-memory-storage.tsindex 445e3d30..302c048f 100644--- a/lib/orchestration/repo-memory-storage.ts+++ b/lib/orchestration/repo-memory-storage.ts@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@+import { readBoundedRegularFile } from "@/lib/host/bounded-read";import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";import { promises as fs } from "node:fs";import path from "node:path";@@ -72,10 +73,10 @@ export async function atomicWriteJson(file: string, value: unknown): Promise<voi}export async function readRecordFile(file: string): Promise<RepoMemoryRecord | null> {- const stat = await fs.lstat(file).catch(() => null);- if (!stat?.isFile() || stat.isSymbolicLink() || stat.size <= 0 || stat.size > MAX_RECORD_BYTES) return null;+ const raw = await readBoundedRegularFile(file, MAX_RECORD_BYTES);+ if (!raw) return null;try {- const parsed = JSON.parse(await fs.readFile(file, "utf8")) as RepoMemoryRecord;+ const parsed = JSON.parse(raw) as RepoMemoryRecord;if (parsed?.schemaVersion !== 1 || typeof parsed.id !== "string" || !KIND_DIR[parsed.kind]) return null;return parsed;} catch {diff --git a/lib/security-store-lock.ts b/lib/security-store-lock.tsindex 6586d044..f9d3793a 100644--- a/lib/security-store-lock.ts+++ b/lib/security-store-lock.ts@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";import { promises as fs, constants as fsConstants } from "node:fs";-import path from "node:path";+import { pinSecurityStorePath } from "./security-store-path";// Cross-process lock for the tiny JSON files that carry security decisions.// Atomic rename protects one write, but not a whole read-modify-write transaction.@@ -32,9 +32,9 @@ function pidIsGone(pid: number): boolean {async function abandoned(lockPath: string, staleMs: number): Promise<boolean> {let handle;try {- handle = await fs.open(lockPath, fsConstants.O_RDONLY | fsConstants.O_NOFOLLOW);+ handle = await fs.open(lockPath, fsConstants.O_RDONLY | fsConstants.O_NOFOLLOW | fsConstants.O_NONBLOCK);const stat = await handle.stat();- if (!stat.isFile()) return false; // fail closed: never auto-break an unexpected object+ if (!stat.isFile() || stat.size > 256 || stat.uid !== process.getuid?.() || (stat.mode & 0o077)) return false; // fail closed: never auto-break an unexpected objectconst owner = await handle.readFile("utf8");const pid = Number(owner.split(":", 1)[0]);// A valid, live PID wins over age: never break mutual exclusion merely because@@ -86,13 +86,19 @@ async function openRecoveryGuard(lockPath: string, token: string): Promise<HeldL}async function release(lockPath: string, held: HeldLock): Promise<void> {- const owner = await fs.readFile(lockPath, "utf8").catch(() => "");- // Never remove a lock that a recovery path may have handed to another process.- if (owner === held.token) await fs.unlink(lockPath).catch(() => undefined);+ let handle;+ try {+ handle = await fs.open(lockPath, fsConstants.O_RDONLY | fsConstants.O_NOFOLLOW | fsConstants.O_NONBLOCK);+ const stat = await handle.stat();+ if (!stat.isFile() || stat.size > 256 || stat.uid !== process.getuid?.() || (stat.mode & 0o077)) return;+ const owner = await handle.readFile("utf8");+ // All supported lock publishers serialize under the recovery gate.+ if (owner === held.token) await fs.unlink(lockPath).catch(() => undefined);+ } catch { /* never remove an unreadable or replaced lock */ }+ finally { await handle?.close().catch(() => undefined); }}async function acquire(lockPath: string, timings: Required<SecurityStoreLockTimings>): Promise<HeldLock> {- await fs.mkdir(path.dirname(lockPath), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });const token = `${process.pid}:${randomUUID()}`;const recoveryPath = `${lockPath}.recovery`;const deadline = Date.now() + timings.busyTimeoutMs;@@ -158,11 +164,11 @@ export async function withSecurityStoreLock<T>(busyTimeoutMs: options.busyTimeoutMs ?? DEFAULTS.busyTimeoutMs,staleMs: options.staleMs ?? DEFAULTS.staleMs,};- const lockPath = `${storePath}.lock`;- const held = await acquire(lockPath, timings);+ const pinned = await pinSecurityStorePath(storePath);+ const lockPath = `${pinned.file}.lock`;try {- return await fn();- } finally {- await release(lockPath, held);- }+ const held = await acquire(lockPath, timings);+ try { return await fn(); }+ finally { await release(lockPath, held); }+ } finally { await pinned.directory.close(); }}diff --git a/lib/security-store-path.test.ts b/lib/security-store-path.test.tsnew file mode 100644index 00000000..680dec71--- /dev/null+++ b/lib/security-store-path.test.ts@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@+import { constants, promises as fs } from "node:fs";+import os from "node:os";+import path from "node:path";+import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";+import { pinSecurityStorePath } from "./security-store-path";+import { withSecurityStoreLock } from "./security-store-lock";++const roots: string[] = [];+async function fixture() { const root = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "mso-pinned-store-")); roots.push(root); return root; }+afterEach(async () => { for (const root of roots.splice(0)) await fs.rm(root, { recursive: true, force: true }); });++describe("pinned owner security-store paths", () => {+ it("rejects traversal and non-canonical symlink ancestors before creating a target", async () => {+ const root = await fixture(), outside = await fixture();+ await fs.symlink(outside, path.join(root, "alias"));+ await expect(pinSecurityStorePath(path.join(root, "alias/new/store.json"))).rejects.toThrow();+ await expect(fs.stat(path.join(outside, "new"))).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: "ENOENT" });+ await expect(pinSecurityStorePath("../../etc/store.json")).rejects.toThrow(/absolute path/);+ await expect(pinSecurityStorePath("/etc/unauthorized-store.json")).rejects.toThrow(/outside configured/);+ });+ it("refuses shared writable store parents", async () => {+ const root = await fixture(); await fs.chmod(root, 0o777);+ await expect(pinSecurityStorePath(path.join(root, "store.json"))).rejects.toThrow(/not writable by others/);+ });+ it("keeps operations on the pinned inode after the pathname is replaced", async () => {+ const root = await fixture(), original = path.join(root, "original"), moved = path.join(root, "moved");+ await fs.mkdir(original, { mode: 0o700 });+ const pinned = await pinSecurityStorePath(path.join(original, "store.json"));+ try {+ await fs.rename(original, moved); await fs.mkdir(original, { mode: 0o700 });+ const handle = await fs.open(pinned.file, constants.O_WRONLY | constants.O_CREAT | constants.O_EXCL, 0o600);+ try { await handle.writeFile("owned"); } finally { await handle.close(); }+ expect(await fs.readFile(path.join(moved, "store.json"), "utf8")).toBe("owned");+ await expect(fs.stat(path.join(original, "store.json"))).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: "ENOENT" });+ } finally { await pinned.directory.close(); }+ });+ it("will not follow a malicious lock symlink or enter the transaction", async () => {+ const root = await fixture(), store = path.join(root, "store.json"), external = path.join(root, "untouched");+ await fs.writeFile(external, "private", { mode: 0o600 }); await fs.symlink(external, `${store}.lock`);+ let entered = false;+ await expect(withSecurityStoreLock(store, async () => { entered = true; }, { waitMs: 1, busyTimeoutMs: 15 })).rejects.toThrow(/busy/);+ expect(entered).toBe(false); expect(await fs.readFile(external, "utf8")).toBe("private");+ expect((await fs.lstat(`${store}.lock`)).isSymbolicLink()).toBe(true);+ });+});diff --git a/lib/security-store-path.ts b/lib/security-store-path.tsnew file mode 100644index 00000000..9d5c7bb9--- /dev/null+++ b/lib/security-store-path.ts@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@+import { constants, promises as fs } from "node:fs";+import os from "node:os";+import path from "node:path";++// A kernel-pinned parent keeps lock/file operations on one directory even if its+// pathname is replaced. Linux /proc/self/fd is the supported VPS/WSL runtime.+// Store filenames remain adjacent and compatible with the independent device CLI.+const STORE_ENV = [+ "OS_DEVICE_STORE", "OS_MCP_STORE", "OS_INFRA_STORE", "OS_MEMORY_STORE", "OS_MCP_ACTIVITY_LOG",+ "OS_A2A_STORE", "OS_A2A_TASK_STORE", "OS_A2A_CREDENTIAL_STORE", "OS_A2A_INBOUND_TOKEN_STORE",+ "OS_A2A_LOCAL_AUTH_STORE", "OS_LOCAL_AGENT_MESSAGE_STORE", "OS_LOCAL_AGENT_PRESENCE_STORE",+ "OS_CONFIG_STORE", "OS_PREFS_PATH", "OS_SKILL_MEMORY_STORE",+] as const;+const DIRECTORY_ENV = ["OS_TOOL_FORGE_DIR", "OS_AGENT_MEMORY_DIR", "OS_AGENT_SESSIONS_DIR", "OS_PROJECT_AGENT_TASKS_DIR"] as const;+const expand = (value: string) => path.resolve(value.replace(/^~(?=$|\/)/, os.homedir()));++export async function pinSecurityStorePath(storePath: string) {+ if (process.platform !== "linux") throw new Error("Pinned security-store operations require Linux or WSL");+ if (typeof storePath !== "string" || storePath.includes("\0") || !path.isAbsolute(storePath)) throw new Error("Security store needs an absolute path");+ const absolute = path.resolve(storePath);+ const name = path.basename(absolute);+ if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9_][A-Za-z0-9_.-]{0,220}$/.test(name)) throw new Error("Invalid security-store filename");+ const allowed = [os.homedir(), ...(process.env.OS_FS_WRITE_ROOTS ?? "").split(":").filter(Boolean),+ ...STORE_ENV.flatMap((key) => process.env[key] ? [path.dirname(expand(process.env[key]!))] : []),+ ...DIRECTORY_ENV.flatMap((key) => process.env[key] ? [expand(process.env[key]!)] : []),+ // Test sandboxes are private mkdtemp directories, never the shared temp root itself.+ ...(process.env.VITEST ? [os.tmpdir()] : [])];+ if (!allowed.some((root) => absolute.startsWith(`${expand(root)}${path.sep}`))) throw new Error("Security store is outside configured owner roots");+ const parent = path.dirname(absolute);+ const directory = await openDirectoryChain(parent);+ try {+ const stat = await directory.stat();+ if (!stat.isDirectory() || stat.uid !== process.getuid?.() || (stat.mode & 0o022)) throw new Error("Security-store parent must be owned and not writable by others");+ const pinnedRoot = `/proc/self/fd/${directory.fd}`;+ // Reject all symlinked ancestor spellings as well as a swapped parent inode.+ if (await fs.realpath(pinnedRoot) !== parent) throw new Error("Security-store parent is not canonical");+ return { file: `${pinnedRoot}/${name}`, directory, absolute };+ } catch (error) {+ await directory.close();+ throw error;+ }+}++// Walk from a stable descriptor, opening one basename at a time with O_NOFOLLOW.+// Creating a missing parent must not follow an attacker-controlled intermediate link.+async function openDirectoryChain(parent: string) {+ let directory = await fs.open("/", constants.O_RDONLY | constants.O_DIRECTORY);+ try {+ const parts = parent.split(path.sep).filter(Boolean);+ if (parts.length > 128) throw new Error("Security-store path is too deep");+ for (const part of parts) {+ if (!part || part === "." || part === ".." || /[/\\\0]/.test(part)) throw new Error("Invalid store directory component");+ const child = `/proc/self/fd/${directory.fd}/${path.basename(part)}`;+ let next;+ try { next = await fs.open(child, constants.O_RDONLY | constants.O_DIRECTORY | constants.O_NOFOLLOW); }+ catch (error) {+ if ((error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code !== "ENOENT") throw error;+ await fs.mkdir(child, { mode: 0o700 }).catch((cause: NodeJS.ErrnoException) => { if (cause.code !== "EEXIST") throw cause; });+ next = await fs.open(child, constants.O_RDONLY | constants.O_DIRECTORY | constants.O_NOFOLLOW);+ }+ await directory.close();+ directory = next;+ }+ return directory;+ } catch (error) { await directory.close(); throw error; }+}diff --git a/package.json b/package.jsonindex 7be2af34..4548e0a7 100644--- a/package.json+++ b/package.json@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@"eslint": "^9.39.4","eslint-config-next": "^16.3.2","fast-check": "^4.9.0",+ "parse5": "8.0.1","postcss": "^8.5.26","tailwindcss": "^4.3.0","typescript": "^5.9.3",diff --git a/scripts/codeql-report.mjs b/scripts/codeql-report.mjsnew file mode 100644index 00000000..0cbf0b80--- /dev/null+++ b/scripts/codeql-report.mjs@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@+#!/usr/bin/env node+// Read-only evidence: report every SARIF result without filtering/deleting diagnostics.+import fs from "node:fs";+import path from "node:path";+const directory = process.argv[2];+if (!directory) throw new Error("usage: node scripts/codeql-report.mjs <SARIF directory>");+const files = fs.readdirSync(directory).filter((name) => name.endsWith(".sarif"));+if (!files.length) throw new Error("CodeQL produced no SARIF file");+let count = 0;+for (const name of files) {+ const data = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(directory, name), "utf8"));+ if (!Array.isArray(data.runs) || !data.runs.length) throw new Error("Missing CodeQL run");+ for (const run of data.runs) {+ if (run.tool?.driver?.name !== "CodeQL" || !Array.isArray(run.results)) throw new Error("Unexpected SARIF tool/result shape");+ for (const row of run.results) {+ const rule = run.tool.driver.rules?.find((rule) => rule.id === row.ruleId);+ const locations = (row.locations ?? []).map(({ physicalLocation: p }) => ({ path: p?.artifactLocation?.uri, line: p?.region?.startLine }));+ console.log(`CODEQL_FINDING ${JSON.stringify({ rule: row.ruleId, severity: rule?.properties?.["security-severity"], message: row.message?.text, locations })}`);+ count++;+ }+ }+}+console.log(`CODEQL_RESULT_COUNT ${count}`);+console.log("This is a diagnostic inventory, not a clearance decision; GitHub open-alert checks are separate.");diff --git a/scripts/mso-tui-select.mjs b/scripts/mso-tui-select.mjsindex 0b4e1db4..07c32439 100755--- a/scripts/mso-tui-select.mjs+++ b/scripts/mso-tui-select.mjs@@ -83,10 +83,10 @@ async function run() {const items = parsePickerItems(fs.readFileSync(0, "utf8"));if (!items.length) process.exit(2);- const inFd = fs.openSync("/dev/tty", "r");- const outFd = fs.openSync("/dev/tty", "w");- const input = new tty.ReadStream(inFd);- const output = new tty.WriteStream(outFd);+ // One read/write descriptor: no separate pathname check/open or truncating open.+ const terminalFd = fs.openSync("/dev/tty", fs.constants.O_RDWR);+ const input = new tty.ReadStream(terminalFd);+ const output = new tty.WriteStream(terminalFd);readline.emitKeypressEvents(input);const wasRaw = Boolean(input.isRaw);let query = "";diff --git a/scripts/test-support/inline-scripts.ts b/scripts/test-support/inline-scripts.tsnew file mode 100644index 00000000..c4df7a70--- /dev/null+++ b/scripts/test-support/inline-scripts.ts@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@+import { parse, type DefaultTreeAdapterTypes } from "parse5";++// Parse generated HTML as a browser does. This is test extraction, not an HTML sanitizer.+export function inlineScripts(html: string): string[] {+ const scripts: string[] = [];+ const walk = (node: DefaultTreeAdapterTypes.Node): void => {+ if ("tagName" in node && node.tagName === "script" && !node.attrs.some((attr) => attr.name === "src")) {+ scripts.push(node.childNodes.map((child) => "value" in child ? child.value : "").join(""));+ }+ if ("childNodes" in node) node.childNodes.forEach(walk);+ };+ walk(parse(html));+ return scripts;+}