Browser-based graphical shell and control plane for a Linux server you own — real terminal, file manager, live metrics and BYOK AI in one mobile-first workspace. Next.js 16 · React 19 · node-pty · Tailwind v4 · shadcn/ui. Public alpha, self-hosted.
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docs(progress): preserve merged release order
Rahman02379c75ddc9
diff --git a/docs/PROGRESS.md b/docs/PROGRESS.mdindex d9e32ce4..aab2f719 100644--- a/docs/PROGRESS.md+++ b/docs/PROGRESS.md@@ -8,16 +8,91 @@ validator narrowly to CSS chunks and only the exact ?icon.<hash>.svg icon queryarbitrary queries, API/login paths, cross-origin URLs and all otherwise-unreviewed alertsstill fail closed.+## 2026-09-18 — Close external-editor review around durable session policy and owner stores++The latest PR review found four boundary issues after the cookie-policy epoch landed. CLI device+approve/role/revoke writes now preserve the durable `sessionPolicy` record instead of rewriting+the auth store without it. Repeated session validation uses a read-only fast path when the stored+scope already matches and acquires the cross-process mutation lock only for an actual rotation,+with a locked recheck before writing. Workflow-only surface updates preserve MCP Page placement+only from an existing row that itself normalizes as a valid reviewed app, so malformed legacy+bytes cannot create Page approval. `MSO_SURFACE_APPS_FILE` is now one of the explicitly allowed+owner security-store paths, so a configured registry outside the home directory remains writable+without a duplicate filesystem-write-root declaration. Existing validated Page auth query metadata+is preserved unchanged. Targeted regressions cover all four boundaries.++## 2026-09-18 — Permanently revoke prior cookie-policy generations++A follow-up security review found that a deterministic scope label could revive an old signed session if configuration later returned to the same cookie Domain. The private auth-device store now keeps one durable cookie-policy epoch and rotates it on every actual scope transition, including A to host-only to A. Signed browser sessions carry both scope and epoch; route and middleware/WebSocket authorization require both. Existing approved devices and roles are preserved, but pre-epoch sessions require a one-time sign-in. Workflow edits also preserve an existing reviewed MCP Page auth path with query parameters without allowing the Workflow endpoint to create or change that Page-owned metadata.++## 2026-09-18 — Preserve the strictest reviewed external-editor sandbox++PR review found that an explicit empty iframe sandbox was normalized as if the owner had+omitted the field, causing the runtime default to add scripts, same-origin and forms.+The surface registry now distinguishes omitted sandbox policy from an explicitly empty+policy. Empty remains a valid, strict sandbox; non-empty values still use the same+allowlist and byte bound. No permission token is added or broadened.++## 2026-09-18 — Bind signed sessions to their cookie policy++The external-editor security review found a migration edge case: after a broad Domain cookie+is narrowed or unset, the browser can retain the old cookie until its original expiry even+though logout no longer knows its former Domain. Session payloads now carry the normalized+cookie policy that minted them, and both route authorization and middleware/WebSocket gates+reject a valid HMAC when that policy no longer matches current configuration. Legacy tokens+without a scope are intentionally invalidated once. This preserves safe host-only sibling+editors such as a separately hosted n8n while making a retained broader Owner cookie unusable+against MSO after a scope change. No cookie is widened, no secret is rotated, and current+domain-match/host collision checks remain in place.++## 2026-09-18 — Remount reviewed workflow editors when sandbox policy changes++A focus refresh can tighten an existing external editor's sandbox without changing its id or origin.+The embedded document must not keep the permissions from the previous navigation. The iframe key now+includes the reviewed sandbox policy, so a policy change remounts the document before it can continue.+Blocked destinations and cookie-isolated origins remain unchanged; no sandbox capability is added.++## 2026-09-18 — Preserve existing MCP Page approval during Workflow metadata edits++The shared registry review found that a Workflow-only save replaced a previously shared+entry with only the Workflows placement. Preserve an existing explicit MCP Page placement,+or the legacy implicit Page approval, while adding/updating the Workflow placement. New+and Workflow-only entries still cannot acquire Page approval through this endpoint. Repeated+saves, prior explicit/legacy grants and refusal of caller-supplied Page escalation are tested;+revision checks, owner review, unrelated entries and cookie-scope rejection remain intact.++## 2026-09-18 — Keep external editor links outside the cockpit session-cookie scope++The pending external-editor review exposed a domain-cookie leak: different origins can+still receive the same session cookie. A new shared surface policy reuses the validated+session-cookie authority and also accounts for host-only cookies across different ports.+External Workflow entries that would receive cockpit credentials now remain visible as+blocked metadata but expose no iframe, editor link or login URL. The same unsafe entries+are omitted from the MCP Page catalogue and cannot be resolved as Page routes. Registry+approval never grants cookie trust; exact cockpit links remain remote-only. No cookie,+TLS, CSP, same-origin or role protection is relaxed and provider sessions are untouched.++Regression tests reproduce the previous unsafe URLs before the fix and cover domain/host+scope, leading-dot/case normalization, suffix lookalikes, remote-only links, runtime policy+refresh and shared readers. The browser journey additionally verifies the blocked panel+and zero unsafe requests rather than interpreting a hidden iframe as sufficient isolation.++## 2026-09-18 — Reviewed workflow provider tabs++- Keep the native automation/session editor unchanged and mounted while switching to external workflow editors such as n8n. The new wrapper consumes explicit workflow placements in the existing owner-reviewed surface registry, not app-store HTML or credential values.+- Share the registry outside the MCP transport without adding another store. Owner-only no-store metadata and revision-checked, explicitly reviewed configuration APIs/CLI preserve exact origins, unrelated entries, safe sandbox permissions and remote-only fallback. Configuration input cannot carry paths or credentials.+- Workflow-only placements never grant an MCP Page nested-frame origin. Load frames only on demand, preserve editor state when switching, expose top-level sign-in/open/reload actions and keyboard-accessible tabs. Browser login remains external-service-owned; framing never means MCP token forwarding or authentication bypass.+- Add registry/access tests and a mandatory isolated browser journey with synthetic stores. Live n8n frame checks wait for actual nonblank paint as well as visible controls; keep the synthetic approved parent and signed-out proof distinct from authenticated editor claims.+- The strict release build caught project-wide tracing of the dynamic registry path. Mark that owner-local runtime read as a non-build input, matching other private stores; the warning-fatal release gate remains unchanged.+## 2026-09-18 — Scope cache retrieval review to immutable asset pathsPR review caught that a rule-wide 10050 INFO entry would also downgrade a futureshared-cache exposure on an authenticated or user-specific URL. Rule 10050 is thereforeremoved from the rule-wide ZAP policy. Hosted and local DAST now validate the raw ZAP-JSON: only same-origin immutable public assets are accepted for that rule:-query-free /_next/static/chunks/*.js, /_next/static/chunks/*.css and-/_next/static/media/*.woff2, plus /icon.svg only with Next's bounded-?icon.<hash>.svg cache-busting shape. Every other 10050 instance and every otherwise-unreviewed alert remains a failing condition.+JSON: only same-origin, query-free /_next/static/chunks/*.js and+/_next/static/media/*.woff2 instances are accepted for that rule; every other 10050+instance and every otherwise-unreviewed alert remains a failing condition.## 2026-09-18 — Classify cache retrieval only for immutable public assets@@ -25,9 +100,8 @@ The first post-merge passive ZAP run against main produced one new default warnirule 10050 (Retrieved from Cache) on five content-hashed _next/static JavaScript/fontassets carrying an Age header. The report contained no authenticated, personal, oruser-specific URL for that rule. Keep the signal visible as INFO for those intentionally-cacheable public assets through path-scoped raw-report validation; do not add a-rule-wide INFO or IGNORE, do not alter authenticated response caching, and leave every-other unreviewed ZAP rule at its default warning/failure behavior.+cacheable public assets; do not use IGNORE, do not alter authenticated response caching,+and leave every other unreviewed ZAP rule at its default warning/failure behavior.## 2026-09-18 — Require executed passive security scan evidence@@ -292,6 +366,7 @@ Refactored the gateway reliability boundary without removing the existing Cloudf## 2026-09-17 — GitHub reference audit and optional app-binding compatibility+## 2026-09-17 — VPS-backed Store MCP/Skills and explicit host MCP harnessThe former custom plugin registry lived only in browser storage while actual project@@ -328,7 +403,6 @@ Added `render_mso_list` + `ui://mso/list-v1.html` as the lightweight collection- WHY: make routing, target, source-of-truth, validation, confirmation, concurrency, and OpenAI presentation machine-readable without replacing MSO's stronger trust/provenance, bounded scopes, CAS/revision guards, workflow isolation, evidence receipts, dynamic project MCP boundaries, explicit confirmations, or shell escape hatch.- Kept all 112 ChatGPT actions and the 97,350-byte compact action profile; per-tool action contracts stay on the full MCP descriptor while OpenAI receives the structured workflow policy through skill resources, preserving the scanner budget without hiding capabilities.- Re-reviewed the refreshed Shopify reference implementation: adopted its offline/local schema-validation and per-skill OpenAI descriptor ideas, but did not copy external prompt/code telemetry. The live OAuth `/mcp` app remains a separate connection from the skill-only Codex/OpenAI plugin package.-## 2026-09-15 — Workflow edges and Directory close the remaining n8n-style interaction gapsWorkflow Graph v2 already had the real server-native pieces—schedule/webhook triggers, cache, memory, sessions, capability tools, project functions/MCP, organization-seat agent routing, run history, versions and variables—but two editor gaps still made the surface feel incomplete. Connections now persist an explicit **Auto / Solid / Dashed** presentation, an **Active** execution toggle, directional arrows and a guarded reverse-direction action. A disabled connection stays visible for documentation/debugging and is recorded as disabled in run receipts, but it cannot be re-enabled by source execution, affect cycle/tidy topology, or accidentally promote its target into a new executable root.@@ -378,6 +452,7 @@ Batonly joins SI-Coder as a first-class reviewed project plugin. Its project binThis preserves three separate layers: host MCP access, reusable MSO Integrations credentials, and project-local plugin bindings. Installing or removing a plugin from one project changes neither standalone SI-Coder nor Batonly data nor another project.+## 2026-09-14 — Original-byte MCP file export + explicit ChatGPT import matrixThe upstream MSO file-transfer audit is now implemented instead of remaining a read-only finding.@@ -401,6 +476,7 @@ The concurrent `/integrations/embed` fix is retained as a same-service alias aloThe shell keeps the tested loading/retry implementation and `/connections` deep link.Standalone setup/API routes remain compatible and keep their default deny-framing policy.+## 2026-09-14 — Reconcile parallel Integrations workThe two concurrent implementations are consolidated into one `integrations` feature slice,@@ -776,6 +852,7 @@ The actual GitHub alert inventory exposed 22 default-branch findings, unlike the## 2026-09-05 — MCP Page preview lifecycle+## 2026-09-05 — Deliberate JSON portability between independent credential storesUsers appearing in SC but not MSO were a data-transfer gap, not a Git clone issue.@@ -792,6 +869,7 @@ and each project's CLI use their own core. Other project receivers still need anadapter and tenant/role checks. Tests cover both encryption failures and actualSC→MSO→SC roundtrip plus browser upload/download using isolated synthetic stores.+## 2026-09-05 — Native named-connection identity, not parallel credential formsThe provider-only Integrations store could not represent multiple deployments or@@ -818,6 +896,7 @@ No real upstream OAuth success is inferred from these tests.- **Reviewed-app Google sign-in leaves the iframe (2026-09-05):** Page v6 adds an explicit host-side Google-login action using a code-owned same-origin path. A nested app may only highlight this action, never trigger navigation, supply a URL or transfer session data. The host opens through `ui/open-link`/`openExternal` after a real button click; sandbox popup restrictions remain unchanged. Play Together finishes sign-in in the browser tab; this does not promise shared login with storage-partitioned embeds. v5 resource requests remain compatible.+## 2026-09-05 — Repair native Integrations delivery and full credential catalogThe initial temporary form was too narrow and could arrive without its UI-only@@ -851,6 +930,7 @@ both standard MCP and legacy ChatGPT host paths. Toolset: `2026.09.05.1`.- **PR integration validation (2026-09-05):** preserve the reviewed PR36/PR37 ancestry while repairing PR38 glob escaping/native Bun audit checks and PR37 code-generating visual-test fixtures. Direct-image boundary tests now cover malformed content and size/type limits. MCP server 1.11.0 / toolset 2026.09.05.1 records the compatible restricted-service-token/direct-image contract; widget resources and ordinary OAuth token behavior are unchanged. Publication still requires complete current-head local and remote gates, including late CodeQL findings—not only the workflow completion status.- **Reviewed 9Router network boundary (PR36, 2026-09-05):** reuse the configured internal proxy network only when it already exists; Docker host publishing remains loopback-only unless explicitly enabled. This supports a containerized reverse proxy without opening the application port to the public interface. The update adds no automatic network creation or DNS mutation. The old PR lifecycle-test failure must be rechecked against the combined current baseline before publication.+## 2026-09-05 — Integration setup recovery and complete browser navigationThe previous setup document exposed a clickable setup button before Owner sign-in,@@ -924,7 +1004,6 @@ Selected project context is persisted as an `alfa.*` preference and sent per tur- **Vector and graph complexity remain evidence-blocked:** realistic retrieval calibration is **4/6 lexical**, with objective misses only for `IDE`↔`editor` synonym and Indonesian `kantor`↔English `office`. P10D compares the existing local `mso-local-hybrid-v1` semantic encoder against the same rows: it is deterministic but only **3/6**, fails the same two semantic cases and regresses the exact-domain rollback case. The candidate runs ephemerally with zero network calls / zero persisted memory vectors, so this is a direct architecture gate rather than an infrastructure limitation: adding a memory vector index now would make retrieval more complex without improving recall. Relationship calibration remains **3/3 two-hop**, so current keyed retrieval still does not justify graph storage.- **P9 privacy semantics preserved:** 200-correction `bench:memory:calibration` remains 6/6 and future-scheduled claims still cannot resurrect after `forget`. Cache remains observation-only, cost remains attribution-blocked, OpenClaw remains unranked without a legitimate matched provider/model path, and five-run reliability remains descriptive.- **MCP Apps navigation hardening (2026-09-03):** server `1.8.2` / toolset `2026.09.03.7` bumps all four UI resources to v2 and makes `Open in MSO` self-diagnosing: official `openExternal` + `setOpenInAppUrl`, visible success/failure feedback, and a user-clickable direct-link fallback. No tool count or security-scope changes.-## 2026-09-03 — Cognitive Runtime P9 memory calibration- **Repeated-correction calibration instead of graph expansion:** added `bench:memory:calibration`, which runs only against an isolated temporary agent-memory root and exercises explicit authority, confidence/recency, future replacement, forget semantics, finished-history integrity and deep repeated corrections.@@ -1182,7 +1261,6 @@ commit-only release. A commit-only update now says `N new commits on mso CLI X``X -> X`; a true CLI bump still shows an explicit `mso CLI X -> Y`. Up-to-date status labels both CLI andbuild identity. Regression tests cover version-change, commit-only, active-service build matching and CLIversion output so the ambiguity cannot silently return.-## 2026-09-01 — Terminal banner geometry + stable slash navigation — SHIPPEDMSO Agent now uses the compact canonical folder + `MSO` ASCII geometry from the terminal logger instead of the oversized 12-row title. The seven title rows render as a cool blue → cyan → teal/emerald gradient with no purple. The slash palette also reserves its physical terminal rows only when it opens or grows; subsequent `↑/↓` selection redraws use ANSI cursor movement only, and the input prompt no longer embeds a leading newline that would be replayed on every redraw. A real PTY regression verifies both arrow directions emit zero LF/CRLF while still moving selection, so terminal scrollback stays stable. CLI patch version: **1.5.4**.@@ -3533,80 +3611,3 @@ Screenshot evidence previously lived in unrelated scratch directories or only in- The browser route and embedded MCP Page now share a responsive service rail, real connection-readiness summary, compact account cards, and contextual setup/actions. Setup guides and maintenance controls use progressive disclosure; account switching remains explicit.- Integration snapshots no longer repeat the complete provider catalog, which is already embedded in the shared manager. The explicit catalog query remains available; compact snapshots prevent bounded MCP responses from truncating the Page.- Validation: 26 browser assertions at 320/390/768/1440/1920 px in light/dark themes, account isolation, service search, setup focus, auto identifiers and Verify feedback; full verify passes.--## 2026-09-18 — Close external-editor review around durable session policy and owner stores--The latest PR review found four boundary issues after the cookie-policy epoch landed. CLI device-approve/role/revoke writes now preserve the durable `sessionPolicy` record instead of rewriting-the auth store without it. Repeated session validation uses a read-only fast path when the stored-scope already matches and acquires the cross-process mutation lock only for an actual rotation,-with a locked recheck before writing. Workflow-only surface updates preserve MCP Page placement-only from an existing row that itself normalizes as a valid reviewed app, so malformed legacy-bytes cannot create Page approval. `MSO_SURFACE_APPS_FILE` is now one of the explicitly allowed-owner security-store paths, so a configured registry outside the home directory remains writable-without a duplicate filesystem-write-root declaration. Existing validated Page auth query metadata-is preserved unchanged. Targeted regressions cover all four boundaries.--## 2026-09-18 — Permanently revoke prior cookie-policy generations--A follow-up security review found that a deterministic scope label could revive an old signed session if configuration later returned to the same cookie Domain. The private auth-device store now keeps one durable cookie-policy epoch and rotates it on every actual scope transition, including A to host-only to A. Signed browser sessions carry both scope and epoch; route and middleware/WebSocket authorization require both. Existing approved devices and roles are preserved, but pre-epoch sessions require a one-time sign-in. Workflow edits also preserve an existing reviewed MCP Page auth path with query parameters without allowing the Workflow endpoint to create or change that Page-owned metadata.--## 2026-09-18 — Preserve the strictest reviewed external-editor sandbox--PR review found that an explicit empty iframe sandbox was normalized as if the owner had-omitted the field, causing the runtime default to add scripts, same-origin and forms.-The surface registry now distinguishes omitted sandbox policy from an explicitly empty-policy. Empty remains a valid, strict sandbox; non-empty values still use the same-allowlist and byte bound. No permission token is added or broadened.--## 2026-09-18 — Bind signed sessions to their cookie policy--The external-editor security review found a migration edge case: after a broad Domain cookie-is narrowed or unset, the browser can retain the old cookie until its original expiry even-though logout no longer knows its former Domain. Session payloads now carry the normalized-cookie policy that minted them, and both route authorization and middleware/WebSocket gates-reject a valid HMAC when that policy no longer matches current configuration. Legacy tokens-without a scope are intentionally invalidated once. This preserves safe host-only sibling-editors such as a separately hosted n8n while making a retained broader Owner cookie unusable-against MSO after a scope change. No cookie is widened, no secret is rotated, and current-domain-match/host collision checks remain in place.--## 2026-09-18 — Remount reviewed workflow editors when sandbox policy changes--A focus refresh can tighten an existing external editor's sandbox without changing its id or origin.-The embedded document must not keep the permissions from the previous navigation. The iframe key now-includes the reviewed sandbox policy, so a policy change remounts the document before it can continue.-Blocked destinations and cookie-isolated origins remain unchanged; no sandbox capability is added.--## 2026-09-18 — Preserve existing MCP Page approval during Workflow metadata edits--The shared registry review found that a Workflow-only save replaced a previously shared-entry with only the Workflows placement. Preserve an existing explicit MCP Page placement,-or the legacy implicit Page approval, while adding/updating the Workflow placement. New-and Workflow-only entries still cannot acquire Page approval through this endpoint. Repeated-saves, prior explicit/legacy grants and refusal of caller-supplied Page escalation are tested;-revision checks, owner review, unrelated entries and cookie-scope rejection remain intact.--## 2026-09-18 — Keep external editor links outside the cockpit session-cookie scope--The pending external-editor review exposed a domain-cookie leak: different origins can-still receive the same session cookie. A new shared surface policy reuses the validated-session-cookie authority and also accounts for host-only cookies across different ports.-External Workflow entries that would receive cockpit credentials now remain visible as-blocked metadata but expose no iframe, editor link or login URL. The same unsafe entries-are omitted from the MCP Page catalogue and cannot be resolved as Page routes. Registry-approval never grants cookie trust; exact cockpit links remain remote-only. No cookie,-TLS, CSP, same-origin or role protection is relaxed and provider sessions are untouched.--Regression tests reproduce the previous unsafe URLs before the fix and cover domain/host-scope, leading-dot/case normalization, suffix lookalikes, remote-only links, runtime policy-refresh and shared readers. The browser journey additionally verifies the blocked panel-and zero unsafe requests rather than interpreting a hidden iframe as sufficient isolation.--## 2026-09-18 — Reviewed workflow provider tabs--- Keep the native automation/session editor unchanged and mounted while switching to external workflow editors such as n8n. The new wrapper consumes explicit workflow placements in the existing owner-reviewed surface registry, not app-store HTML or credential values.-- Share the registry outside the MCP transport without adding another store. Owner-only no-store metadata and revision-checked, explicitly reviewed configuration APIs/CLI preserve exact origins, unrelated entries, safe sandbox permissions and remote-only fallback. Configuration input cannot carry paths or credentials.-- Workflow-only placements never grant an MCP Page nested-frame origin. Load frames only on demand, preserve editor state when switching, expose top-level sign-in/open/reload actions and keyboard-accessible tabs. Browser login remains external-service-owned; framing never means MCP token forwarding or authentication bypass.-- Add registry/access tests and a mandatory isolated browser journey with synthetic stores. Live n8n frame checks wait for actual nonblank paint as well as visible controls; keep the synthetic approved parent and signed-out proof distinct from authenticated editor claims.-- The strict release build caught project-wide tracing of the dynamic registry path. Mark that owner-local runtime read as a non-build input, matching other private stores; the warning-fatal release gate remains unchanged.