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fix(security): close resource and launcher gaps and repair gates
rahmanef3550458b453a
diff --git a/docs/CHANGELOG.md b/docs/CHANGELOG.mdindex 7bd4e889..77770618 100644--- a/docs/CHANGELOG.md+++ b/docs/CHANGELOG.md@@ -4,6 +4,40 @@Newest first. `docs/PROGRESS.md` is the source of truth for *why* a change was made;this is the *what*, and it is what Settings → Account → About shows as “What's new”.+## 2026-10-08++**Fixed**++- `security` close resource and launcher gaps and repair gates+- `security` inspect ZIP output through pinned descriptor+- `ci` close gateway typing and audit file races+- `security` pin NodeSource bootstrap bytes+- `security` bound managed-app backup retention+- `security` bound audit growth and tail reads+- `security` bind gateway tunnels to proven local runtime+- `security` fail closed on mutable managed-app updates+- `security` keep OpenClaw provider keys out of argv+- `security` serialize managed-app lifecycle cross-process+- `security` bound archive generation resources+- `security` serialize bounded image imports+- `security` require exec for A2A loopback discovery+- `security` isolate PAT principals and revoke refresh replay+- `ci` clear typecheck, OSV, and reviewed history gates+- `security` require authenticated workflow webhooks+- `security` block delegated writes to control plane++## 2026-10-07++**Fixed**++- `security` bound public ingress bodies+- `security` enforce live workflow authority+- `security` harden credential and A2A boundaries++**Docs**++- `security` record scan hardening boundaries+## 2026-10-06**Added**diff --git a/docs/PROGRESS.md b/docs/PROGRESS.mdindex 86168a06..ef8425ec 100644--- a/docs/PROGRESS.md+++ b/docs/PROGRESS.md@@ -1,3 +1,11 @@+## 2026-10-08: Complete the scan hardening audit and repair verification++The three Codex Security Cloud scans overlap across authority, credentials, ingress, resource ceilings and installation provenance. The security branch now includes webhook authentication, distinct PAT principals, refresh-family replay revocation, explicit exec authority for loopback discovery, immutable managed-app update targets, provider environment SecretRefs, proven gateway ownership, bounded audit tails, backup retention and pinned NodeSource bootstrap bytes.++Independent verification additionally found that archive admission ended before its unlinked output descriptor closed, temporary-directory failure could strand admission, and delegated write could replace user-local launchers or their parent directories. The shared guards now cover those paths and managed-runtime trees; archive admission lasts until stream closure with a bounded lifetime. Backups recheck file/byte limits during copying and remove incomplete snapshots on failure. Installer bootstrap checksums were refreshed after the core hardening. Gateway test launchers now emit valid JavaScript, and the equivalent listener-port comparison parses correctly under strict Semgrep. OAuth and workflow fixtures explicitly exercise replay revocation and live approved-device authority.++These are source and verification changes. Production deployment and scan closure require the verified main revision and live runtime evidence; local tests alone do not establish either.+## 2026-10-07: Harden delegated workflow, ingress and credential boundariesTwo repository security scans (October 2 and October 7) exposed overlapping authority and ingress gaps. Project dotenv files are now credential material everywhere, recursive archives exclude them, exact-loopback A2A is opt-in, and pre-auth A2A traffic cannot evict authenticated rate-limit state. Project ingress requires bounded framing and forwards only protocol headers, not cockpit cookies or Authorization.diff --git a/docs/WORKFLOW-GRAPH.md b/docs/WORKFLOW-GRAPH.mdindex 2dfa8f52..8809c4a9 100644--- a/docs/WORKFLOW-GRAPH.md+++ b/docs/WORKFLOW-GRAPH.md@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ It is additive: existing deterministic project flows, RASMIC scripts and learnedGraphs, versions, variables and execution receipts are private per authenticated principal. Source and builtin templates contain no operator-specific user, credential, path or seeded workflow.+Delegated write authority excludes the live MSO checkout, Git control files, user-systemd units, user-local CLI launchers, Hermes/OpenClaw runtime trees and parent directories that could replace them. These control-plane mutations require exec authority; canonical symlink targets are checked as well.+## Node catalog### Triggersdiff --git a/lib/host/audit.ts b/lib/host/audit.tsindex aa17c68e..555234b1 100644--- a/lib/host/audit.ts+++ b/lib/host/audit.ts@@ -1,11 +1,6 @@// Host-owned runtime data is not a build asset; tracing exclusions preserve runtime guards.-// SERVER-ONLY. Append-only audit trail for privileged actions (shell exec, file-// mutations, cleanup runs, auth events). Single-owner tool that can run shell-// commands MUST keep a tamper-evident record — if something goes wrong, this is-// the only forensic trail. JSONL, one event per line, flushed best-effort.-//-// Location: $OS_AUDIT_LOG, else ~/.mso/audit.log. Reads are NOT audited-// (bounded + high-volume); only state-changing actions are.+// SERVER-ONLY. Bounded best-effort JSONL trail for privileged mutations.+// Location: $OS_AUDIT_LOG, else ~/.mso/audit.log; reads are not audited.import { constants, promises as fs } from "fs";import os from "os";import path from "path";@@ -42,10 +37,7 @@ function trunc(s: string | undefined, max = 512): string | undefined {return s.length > max ? s.slice(0, max) + "…" : s;}-// Clamp meta values defensively: a caller could pass an unbounded string (a-// user-supplied URL, a stack-trace fragment), and one bloated meta would-// torpedo the whole forensic line. Scalars pass through; strings cap at 256;-// anything else is dropped (the type already forbids it, but defense in depth).+// Keep caller-supplied metadata bounded and scalar-only.function clampMeta(meta: Record<string, string | number | boolean> | undefined,): Record<string, string | number | boolean> | undefined {@@ -102,10 +94,7 @@ export async function readAuditTail(opts?: {.reverse();}-// Internal: serialize writes onto a single chained promise so bursty parallel-// callers land in submission order. The chain NEVER rejects (each link-// swallows + logs its own failure), otherwise one bad write would poison every-// subsequent audit call for the lifetime of the process.+// Preserve submission order; a failed write must not poison later writes.let _writeChain: Promise<void> = Promise.resolve();const AUDIT_MAX_BYTES = 8 * 1024 * 1024;const AUDIT_READ_TAIL_BYTES = 256 * 1024;@@ -163,11 +152,7 @@ async function copyHandle(source: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof fs.open>>, dest: Awa}async function writeLine(line: string): Promise<void> {- // A test run must never append to the OWNER's forensic trail. This is not- // hypothetical: on 2026-08-10 two `mcp.denied` lines from lib/mcp/dispatch.test.ts- // landed in a real ~/.mso/audit.log, because that suite exercises the dispatcher- // and the dispatcher audits. audit.test.ts always stubs OS_AUDIT_LOG at a temp- // path, so this only silences the callers that forgot to.+ // Tests require an explicit synthetic trail; never append to the owner's log.if (process.env.VITEST && !process.env.OS_AUDIT_LOG) return;const file = auditPath();let handle: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof fs.open>> | undefined;@@ -206,10 +191,7 @@ async function writeLine(line: string): Promise<void> {}}-// Append an audit entry. Returns a promise that resolves AFTER this entry's-// write completes (or fails — failures are swallowed; the trail is best-effort-// and must never break the caller). Callers may fire-and-forget the returned-// promise; ordering across concurrent callers is preserved via _writeChain.+// Resolves after the best-effort write; failures never break the caller.export function audit(entry: AuditEntry): Promise<void> {if (!allowRateLimitAudit(entry.action)) return Promise.resolve();// Drop `meta` from the serialized line when it's empty so existing greps thatdiff --git a/lib/host/delegated-write.test.ts b/lib/host/delegated-write.test.tsindex 86e68d0e..577eb255 100644--- a/lib/host/delegated-write.test.ts+++ b/lib/host/delegated-write.test.ts@@ -19,4 +19,10 @@ describe("delegated write control-plane guard", () => {it("allows ordinary project content", async () => {await expect(assertDelegatedWritePath(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "project", "src", "index.ts"))).resolves.toBeUndefined();});+ it("blocks CLI launchers used by managed-app probes", async () => {+ for (const dir of [".local/bin", ".bun/bin", ".hermes", ".openclaw"]) {+ await expect(assertDelegatedWritePath(path.join(os.homedir(), dir, "hermes"))).rejects.toThrow(/control-plane/);+ }+ await expect(assertDelegatedWritePath(path.join(os.homedir(), ".local"))).rejects.toThrow(/control-plane/);+ });});diff --git a/lib/host/delegated-write.ts b/lib/host/delegated-write.tsindex fa2d2752..89c5eb7c 100644--- a/lib/host/delegated-write.ts+++ b/lib/host/delegated-write.ts@@ -34,15 +34,15 @@ function containsGitControl(target: string): boolean {}export async function assertDelegatedWritePath(raw: string): Promise<void> {+ const requested = absolute(raw);const target = await canonicalProspective(raw);- const app = appDir();- const systemdUser = path.join(os.homedir(), ".config", "systemd", "user");+ const controls = [appDir(), ...[".config/systemd/user", ".local/bin", ".bun/bin", ".hermes", ".openclaw"].map(dir => path.join(os.homedir(), dir))];+ const canonical = await Promise.all(controls.map(canonicalProspective));if (- target === app ||- isUnderRoot(target, app) ||containsGitControl(target) ||- target === systemdUser ||- isUnderRoot(target, systemdUser)+ containsGitControl(requested) ||+ [...controls, ...canonical].some(control =>+ [requested, target].some(candidate => isUnderRoot(candidate, control) || isUnderRoot(control, candidate)))) {throw new HostError("write scope cannot modify executable control-plane inputs; exec authority required");}diff --git a/lib/host/fs-zip.test.ts b/lib/host/fs-zip.test.tsindex c16aa8d3..eda43712 100644--- a/lib/host/fs-zip.test.ts+++ b/lib/host/fs-zip.test.ts@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@import path from "path";import os from "os";-import { chmodSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readdirSync, realpathSync, rmSync, truncateSync, writeFileSync } from "fs";+import { chmodSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, promises as fsp, readdirSync, realpathSync, rmSync, truncateSync, writeFileSync } from "fs";import type { Readable } from "stream";-import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";+import { once } from "node:events";+import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";import { appSecretExcludes, assertSafeName, zipStream } from "./fs-zip";describe("assertSafeName", () => {@@ -78,6 +79,13 @@ describe("zipStream against the real zip binary", () => {expect(names).toContain("keep.txt");expect(names).toContain("proj/src.txt");});+ it("releases admission when temporary directory creation fails", async () => {+ const temporary = vi.spyOn(fsp, "mkdtemp").mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error("disk unavailable"));+ try {+ await expect(zipStream(base, ["keep.txt"])).rejects.toThrow(/disk unavailable/);+ expect(entries(await read(await zipStream(base, ["keep.txt"])))).toContain("keep.txt");+ } finally { temporary.mockRestore(); }+ });it("force-strips nested loose private keys from recursive archives", async () => {const dir = path.join(base, "secrets-fixture");@@ -119,10 +127,12 @@ describe("zipStream against the real zip binary", () => {const before = stale();const abandoned = await zipStream(base, ["keep.txt"]);expect(stale()).toBe(before);+ await expect(zipStream(base, ["keep.txt"])).rejects.toThrow(/already/);+ abandoned.destroy();+ await once(abandoned, "close");const drained = await read(await zipStream(base, ["keep.txt"]));expect(entries(drained)).toContain("keep.txt"); // unlinked bytes still readableexpect(stale()).toBe(before);- abandoned.destroy();});});@@ -132,6 +142,7 @@ describe("zip resource ceilings", () => {const root = realpathSync(mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "mso-zip-budget-")));process.env.OS_FS_READ_ROOTS = root;const huge = path.join(root, "huge.bin");+ writeFileSync(huge, "");truncateSync(huge, 513 * 1024 * 1024);try {await expect(zipStream(root, ["huge.bin"])).rejects.toThrow(/512 MiB input limit/);diff --git a/lib/host/fs-zip.ts b/lib/host/fs-zip.tsindex e8f9c15c..c2d72696 100644--- a/lib/host/fs-zip.ts+++ b/lib/host/fs-zip.ts@@ -92,13 +92,14 @@ export async function zipStream(for (const n of exclude) assertSafeName(n);if (zipGate.__msoZipActive) throw new HostError("Another archive is already being generated");zipGate.__msoZipActive = true;+ let tmpDir: string;try {await assertArchiveBudget(real, names, exclude);+ tmpDir = await fsp.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "os-zip-"));} catch (error) {zipGate.__msoZipActive = false;throw error;}- const tmpDir = await fsp.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "os-zip-"));const out = path.join(tmpDir, "archive.zip");// `-y` = store symlinks AS links, never follow. Without it `zip -r` archives a// link's TARGET content, escaping the realpath/credential bounds checked above@@ -167,13 +168,14 @@ export async function zipStream(throw new HostError("Generated archive exceeds the 600 MiB output limit");}- zipGate.__msoZipActive = false;// ponytail: staged on disk, not streamed as zip runs — correctness over the// buffer-free ideal, since a piped zip won't extract. Opened, then unlinked// BEFORE the stream is handed back: the open fd keeps bytes readable while the// directory entry is already gone, so abandoned responses cannot strand /tmp.await fsp.rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });const stream = handle.createReadStream({ autoClose: true });+ const timer = setTimeout(() => stream.destroy(), ZIP_PROCESS_TIMEOUT_MS).unref();+ stream.once("close", () => { clearTimeout(timer); zipGate.__msoZipActive = false; });handle = undefined; // stream now owns the descriptorreturn stream;} catch (error) {diff --git a/lib/managed-apps/backups-quota.test.ts b/lib/managed-apps/backups-quota.test.tsindex 6434c6ca..0beda54e 100644--- a/lib/managed-apps/backups-quota.test.ts+++ b/lib/managed-apps/backups-quota.test.ts@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import path from "node:path";import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";import type { ManagedAppDefinition } from "./types";import { createBackup, listBackups } from "./backups";+vi.mock("server-only", () => ({}));const roots: string[] = [];function definition(root: string): ManagedAppDefinition {@@ -15,6 +16,20 @@ afterEach(async () => {});describe("managed-app backup quotas", () => {+ it("rejects growth after preflight and removes the incomplete snapshot", async () => {+ const root = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "mso-backup-growth-")); roots.push(root);+ vi.spyOn(os, "homedir").mockReturnValue(root);+ await fs.mkdir(path.join(root, "state"));+ await fs.writeFile(path.join(root, "state", "config.json"), "{}");+ const copy = fs.cp;+ vi.spyOn(fs, "cp").mockImplementationOnce(async (source, target, options) => {+ const huge = await fs.open(path.join(root, "state", "huge.bin"), "w");+ try { await huge.truncate(513 * 1024 * 1024); } finally { await huge.close(); }+ return copy(source, target, options);+ });+ await expect(createBackup(definition(root), "pre-update")).rejects.toThrow(/backup changed/);+ expect(await listBackups("openclaw")).toEqual([]);+ });it("rate-limits manual snapshots", async () => {const root = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "mso-backup-quota-")); roots.push(root);vi.spyOn(os, "homedir").mockReturnValue(root);diff --git a/lib/managed-apps/backups.ts b/lib/managed-apps/backups.tsindex f9845282..8eb620d8 100644--- a/lib/managed-apps/backups.ts+++ b/lib/managed-apps/backups.ts@@ -117,10 +117,11 @@ export async function createBackup(definition: ManagedAppDefinition, reason: Manif (stat.isFile()) {files += 1;bytes += stat.size;+ if (files > BACKUP_MAX_FILES || bytes > BACKUP_MAX_BYTES) throw new Error("backup changed beyond the 512 MiB/100000 file limit");}return true;},- });+ }).catch(async error => { await fs.rm(target, { recursive: true, force: true }); throw error; });const manifest: ManagedAppBackup = {id,applicationId: definition.id,diff --git a/lib/managed-apps/install-secret-argv.test.ts b/lib/managed-apps/install-secret-argv.test.tsnew file mode 100644index 00000000..30b6c1a8--- /dev/null+++ b/lib/managed-apps/install-secret-argv.test.ts@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@+import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";+import path from "node:path";+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";++describe("OpenClaw provider secrets stay out of child argv", () => {+ const script = readFileSync(path.join(process.cwd(), "scripts", "managed-app-install"), "utf8");+ it("uses provider env SecretRefs instead of provider key flags", () => {+ const openclaw = script.slice(script.indexOf("install_openclaw() {"), script.indexOf("openclaw_bin() {"));+ expect(openclaw).toContain("--secret-input-mode ref");+ expect(openclaw).not.toMatch(/--(?:anthropic|openai|openrouter|gemini|groq|xai|deepseek)-api-key/);+ expect(openclaw.slice(openclaw.indexOf('"$openclaw" onboard'))).not.toContain('"$KEY"');+ });+});diff --git a/lib/managed-apps/install.test.ts b/lib/managed-apps/install.test.tsindex 1854f925..6510ce02 100644--- a/lib/managed-apps/install.test.ts+++ b/lib/managed-apps/install.test.ts@@ -217,14 +217,3 @@ describe("the provider table and the install script agree", () => {expect(script).not.toMatch(/\bread -[rp]\b/);});});---describe("OpenClaw provider secrets stay out of child argv", () => {- const script = readFileSync(path.join(process.cwd(), "scripts", "managed-app-install"), "utf8");- it("uses provider env SecretRefs instead of provider key flags", () => {- const openclaw = script.slice(script.indexOf("install_openclaw() {"), script.indexOf("openclaw_bin() {"));- expect(openclaw).toContain("--secret-input-mode ref");- expect(openclaw).not.toMatch(/--(?:anthropic|openai|openrouter|gemini|groq|xai|deepseek)-api-key/);- expect(openclaw).not.toContain('"$KEY"');- });-});diff --git a/lib/managed-apps/jobs.test.ts b/lib/managed-apps/jobs.test.tsindex 7350e99c..cdc3441e 100644--- a/lib/managed-apps/jobs.test.ts+++ b/lib/managed-apps/jobs.test.ts@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ vi.mock("server-only", () => ({}));const { startManagedAppJob, readManagedAppJob, listManagedAppJobs } = await import("./jobs");const { MANAGED_APP_JOB_LOG_CAP, liveRecord } = await import("./job-runner");const { performManagedAppAction } = await import("./manager");-const { withManagedAppOperationLease } = await import("./lock");import type { ManagedAppJob } from "./types";let home: string;@@ -217,18 +216,3 @@ describe("what never reaches a shell, and what never spawns", () => {expect(latest).not.toHaveProperty("log"); // history rows carry no transcript});});---describe("cross-process managed-app operation lease", () => {- it("refuses a second contender while the durable lease is held", async () => {- let entered!: () => void, release!: () => void;- const inside = new Promise<void>((resolve) => { entered = resolve; });- const hold = new Promise<void>((resolve) => { release = resolve; });- const first = withManagedAppOperationLease("hermes", async () => { entered(); await hold; });- await inside;- await expect(withManagedAppOperationLease("hermes", async () => undefined)).rejects.toThrow("another operation is already running");- release();- await first;- await expect(withManagedAppOperationLease("hermes", async () => "ok")).resolves.toBe("ok");- });-});diff --git a/lib/managed-apps/operation-lease.test.ts b/lib/managed-apps/operation-lease.test.tsnew file mode 100644index 00000000..46d2865c--- /dev/null+++ b/lib/managed-apps/operation-lease.test.ts@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@+import { promises as fs } from "node:fs";+import os from "node:os";+import path from "node:path";+import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";+vi.mock("server-only", () => ({}));+const { withManagedAppOperationLease } = await import("./lock");+let home: string;+beforeEach(async () => {+ home = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "mapp-lease-"));+ vi.spyOn(os, "homedir").mockReturnValue(home);+});+afterEach(async () => { vi.restoreAllMocks(); await fs.rm(home, { recursive: true, force: true }); });++describe("cross-process managed-app operation lease", () => {+ it("refuses a second contender while the durable lease is held", async () => {+ let entered!: () => void, release!: () => void;+ const inside = new Promise<void>((resolve) => { entered = resolve; });+ const hold = new Promise<void>((resolve) => { release = resolve; });+ const first = withManagedAppOperationLease("hermes", async () => { entered(); await hold; });+ await inside;+ await expect(withManagedAppOperationLease("hermes", async () => undefined)).rejects.toThrow("another operation is already running");+ release();+ await first;+ await expect(withManagedAppOperationLease("hermes", async () => "ok")).resolves.toBe("ok");+ });+});diff --git a/lib/managed-apps/update.test.ts b/lib/managed-apps/update.test.tsindex 12ff32cb..a5f9d928 100644--- a/lib/managed-apps/update.test.ts+++ b/lib/managed-apps/update.test.ts@@ -130,7 +130,14 @@ describe("mutable upstream updates fail closed", () => {});it("still permits the reviewed 9Router update path", async () => {- await expect(startUpdate("9router")).rejects.not.toThrow(/immutable artifact target and digest/);+ await recorder("9router");+ await fs.mkdir(path.join(home, ".9router"));+ const catalog = await import("./catalog");+ const definition = catalog.getManagedAppDefinition("9router");+ vi.spyOn(catalog, "getManagedAppDefinition").mockReturnValue({ ...definition, command: path.join(bin, "9router") });+ const job = await settle(await startUpdate("9router"));+ expect(job.status).toBe("succeeded");+ expect(await recorded("9router")).toEqual(["update", "--yes"]);});});diff --git a/lib/managed-apps/update.ts b/lib/managed-apps/update.tsindex 6f8174b5..54520b51 100644--- a/lib/managed-apps/update.ts+++ b/lib/managed-apps/update.ts@@ -11,11 +11,7 @@ import type { ManagedAppDefinition, ManagedAppId, ManagedAppJob } from "./types"import { assertChannel, updateAdapter, UNINSTALL_PREVIEW_FLAG } from "./update-cli";import type { ManagedAppBackup, ManagedAppUpdateOptions, ManagedAppUpdateStatus } from "./update-types";-// The update service. Four destructive flows, one shape: validate, take a-// backup INSIDE the operation, then hand a validated argv array to the job-// layer. INSTALL is not one of them — both installers are interactive-// (`hermes setup`, `openclaw update wizard`), so MSO reports the command for a-// human to run and never fakes it (`capabilities.installCommand`).+// Validate, snapshot inside the operation, then submit guarded fixed argv./** OpenClaw's own per-STEP timeout is 1800 s and a run has several steps, so a* 30-minute wall clock would kill a healthy update mid-step. An hour is the@@ -43,14 +39,9 @@ function assertVerifiedUpdatePath(id: ManagedAppId): void {}}-/** Absolute path to the app's CLI. Resolved rather than trusted to PATH so the- * argv the job records is the exact binary that ran, and a missing CLI fails- * here with a readable message instead of as a child-process ENOENT. */+/** Resolve the exact CLI or fail before creating a job. */async function resolveProgram(command: string): Promise<string> {- // Shared with detection (runner.ts) rather than a second `which` of its own:- // under systemd the unit's PATH has no ~/.local/bin, so a bare `which` reported- // "hermes is not installed" for an installed Hermes and disabled the whole- // update centre — the same fault that made the app read as absent.+ // Share detection's fallback for user-local CLIs outside systemd PATH.const resolved = await resolveCommand(command);if (!resolved || !path.isAbsolute(resolved)) throw new Error(`${command} is not installed`);return resolved;@@ -68,12 +59,7 @@ function unavailable(id: ManagedAppId, error: string): ManagedAppUpdateStatus {detail: null,channel: { value: null, kind: null, available: [], switchable: false, reason: null },installKind: null,- // Nothing that needs the CLI can be driven right now; `installCommand`- // survives because it is exactly what the operator needs when the answer is- // "not installed". `rollback` is the deliberate exception, spelled out so- // the omission cannot read as one: a rollback is `restore.ts` copying files- // in-process, so it needs no CLI and stays available precisely when a- // broken install makes it most useful.+ // File-based rollback survives a missing CLI; execution controls do not.capabilities: { ...safeCapabilities(id, capabilities), check: false, apply: false, dryRun: false, channel: false, uninstall: false, rollback: true },checkedAt: new Date().toISOString(),error,@@ -169,10 +155,7 @@ export async function startUpdate(id: ManagedAppId, options: ManagedAppUpdateOpt});}-/** OpenClaw only. Upstream persists a channel ONLY after a successful core- * update (`--channel` is a flag on `update`, not a setting), and MSO will not- * write into ~/.openclaw itself — so switching a channel IS an update run,- * backup and all. The returned job is a normal update job. */+/** A channel switch executes an update, so it needs the same immutable target. */export async function setChannel(id: ManagedAppId, channel: string): Promise<ManagedAppJob> {const adapter = updateAdapter(id);if (!adapter.capabilities.channel) throw new Error(`channel switching is not supported for ${id}`);diff --git a/lib/mcp/store-security.test.ts b/lib/mcp/store-security.test.tsnew file mode 100644index 00000000..8e2180b6--- /dev/null+++ b/lib/mcp/store-security.test.ts@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@+import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, afterAll } from "vitest";+import { promises as fs } from "node:fs";+import os from "node:os";+import path from "node:path";++const DIR = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `mso-mcp-security-test-${process.pid}`);+process.env.OS_MCP_STORE = path.join(DIR, "mcp.json");++const store = await import("./store");++beforeEach(async () => {+ await fs.rm(DIR, { recursive: true, force: true });+});+afterAll(async () => {+ await fs.rm(DIR, { recursive: true, force: true });+});+++describe("durable MCP credential isolation", () => {+ it("assigns every PAT a distinct durable client principal", async () => {+ const first = await store.mintPatToken({ label: "client one", scope: "read", ttlDays: 1 });+ const second = await store.mintPatToken({ label: "client two", scope: "read", ttlDays: 1 });+ const a = await store.validateToken(first.rawToken);+ const b = await store.validateToken(second.rawToken);+ expect(a?.clientId).toMatch(/^manual:pat:[a-f0-9]{24}$/);+ expect(b?.clientId).toMatch(/^manual:pat:[a-f0-9]{24}$/);+ expect(a?.clientId).not.toBe(b?.clientId);+ });++ it("treats refresh-token replay as grant-family compromise", async () => {+ await store.storeOAuthGrant({+ accessToken: "initial-access",+ refreshToken: "initial-refresh",+ label: "oauth",+ clientId: "client-replay",+ scope: "exec",+ resource: "https://mso.example/mcp",+ offlineAccess: true,+ grantId: "grant-replay",+ });+ expect(await store.rotateOAuthGrant({+ oldRefreshToken: "initial-refresh",+ accessToken: "successor-access",+ refreshToken: "successor-refresh",+ label: "oauth",+ clientId: "client-replay",+ resource: "https://mso.example/mcp",+ })).not.toBeNull();+ expect(await store.validateToken("successor-access")).not.toBeNull();++ expect(await store.rotateOAuthGrant({+ oldRefreshToken: "initial-refresh",+ accessToken: "replay-access",+ refreshToken: "replay-refresh",+ label: "oauth",+ clientId: "client-replay",+ resource: "https://mso.example/mcp",+ })).toBeNull();++ expect(await store.validateToken("successor-access")).toBeNull();+ expect(await store.rotateOAuthGrant({+ oldRefreshToken: "successor-refresh",+ accessToken: "after-replay-access",+ refreshToken: "after-replay-refresh",+ label: "oauth",+ clientId: "client-replay",+ resource: "https://mso.example/mcp",+ })).toBeNull();+ });+});diff --git a/lib/mcp/store.test.ts b/lib/mcp/store.test.tsindex 09cd567e..c72ae6e9 100644--- a/lib/mcp/store.test.ts+++ b/lib/mcp/store.test.ts@@ -186,8 +186,9 @@ describe("OAuth refresh grants", () => {const rotated = await store.rotateOAuthGrant({ oldRefreshToken: "refresh-one", accessToken: "access-two", refreshToken: "refresh-two", label: "oauth", clientId: "chatgpt-client", resource: "https://mso.example/mcp" });expect(rotated).toMatchObject({ grantId: "grant-one", scope: "exec", offlineAccess: true });- expect(await store.rotateOAuthGrant({ oldRefreshToken: "refresh-one", accessToken: "replay", refreshToken: "replay-r", label: "oauth", clientId: "chatgpt-client", resource: "https://mso.example/mcp" })).toBeNull();expect(await store.validateToken("access-two")).toMatchObject({ grantId: "grant-one", profile: "chatgpt" });+ expect(await store.rotateOAuthGrant({ oldRefreshToken: "refresh-one", accessToken: "replay", refreshToken: "replay-r", label: "oauth", clientId: "chatgpt-client", resource: "https://mso.example/mcp" })).toBeNull();+ expect(await store.validateToken("access-two")).toBeNull();});it("binds refresh to client/resource and revoking one access token kills the grant family", async () => {@@ -198,57 +199,3 @@ describe("OAuth refresh grants", () => {await expect(store.rotateOAuthGrant({ oldRefreshToken: "family-refresh", accessToken: "after-revoke", refreshToken: "after-revoke-r", label: "oauth", clientId: "client-a", resource: "https://mso.example/mcp" })).resolves.toBeNull();});});---describe("durable MCP credential isolation", () => {- it("assigns every PAT a distinct durable client principal", async () => {- const first = await store.mintPatToken({ label: "client one", scope: "read", ttlDays: 1 });- const second = await store.mintPatToken({ label: "client two", scope: "read", ttlDays: 1 });- const a = await store.validateToken(first.rawToken);- const b = await store.validateToken(second.rawToken);- expect(a?.clientId).toMatch(/^manual:pat:[a-f0-9]{24}$/);- expect(b?.clientId).toMatch(/^manual:pat:[a-f0-9]{24}$/);- expect(a?.clientId).not.toBe(b?.clientId);- });-- it("treats refresh-token replay as grant-family compromise", async () => {- await store.storeOAuthGrant({- accessToken: "initial-access",- refreshToken: "initial-refresh",- label: "oauth",- clientId: "client-replay",- scope: "exec",- resource: "https://mso.example/mcp",- offlineAccess: true,- grantId: "grant-replay",- });- expect(await store.rotateOAuthGrant({- oldRefreshToken: "initial-refresh",- accessToken: "successor-access",- refreshToken: "successor-refresh",- label: "oauth",- clientId: "client-replay",- resource: "https://mso.example/mcp",- })).not.toBeNull();- expect(await store.validateToken("successor-access")).not.toBeNull();-- expect(await store.rotateOAuthGrant({- oldRefreshToken: "initial-refresh",- accessToken: "replay-access",- refreshToken: "replay-refresh",- label: "oauth",- clientId: "client-replay",- resource: "https://mso.example/mcp",- })).toBeNull();-- expect(await store.validateToken("successor-access")).toBeNull();- expect(await store.rotateOAuthGrant({- oldRefreshToken: "successor-refresh",- accessToken: "after-replay-access",- refreshToken: "after-replay-refresh",- label: "oauth",- clientId: "client-replay",- resource: "https://mso.example/mcp",- })).toBeNull();- });-});diff --git a/lib/mcp/tenant-grant-lifecycle.test.ts b/lib/mcp/tenant-grant-lifecycle.test.tsindex 9dfef42c..fcd42123 100644--- a/lib/mcp/tenant-grant-lifecycle.test.ts+++ b/lib/mcp/tenant-grant-lifecycle.test.ts@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ describe("actual OAuth store with synthetic tenant grants", () => {const results = await Promise.all([rotate("fixture-refresh", "one"), rotate("fixture-refresh", "two")]);expect(results.filter(Boolean)).toHaveLength(1);const replacements = await Promise.all(["fixture-access-one", "fixture-access-two"].map(store.validateToken));- expect(replacements.filter(Boolean)).toHaveLength(1);+ expect(replacements.filter(Boolean)).toHaveLength(0); // replay revokes the winning grant family});it("never acquires a tenant marker added after an unbound queued call", async () => {enabled = false;diff --git a/lib/workflow/organization-agent-routing.test.ts b/lib/workflow/organization-agent-routing.test.tsindex 649af5cd..4522e9c5 100644--- a/lib/workflow/organization-agent-routing.test.ts+++ b/lib/workflow/organization-agent-routing.test.ts@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ vi.mock("@/lib/capabilities/execute", () => ({ executeCapabilityCall: async ({ tconst dir = await mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "mso-org-routing-"));process.env.OS_AGENT_SESSIONS_DIR = path.join(dir, "sessions");process.env.OS_ORGANIZATION_STORE = path.join(dir, "organization.json");+process.env.OS_DEVICE_STORE = path.join(dir, "devices.json");+const devices = await import("@/lib/auth/device-store");const org = await import("@/lib/agent/organization-store");const graphs = await import("./graph-store");const engine = await import("./graph-engine");@@ -35,18 +37,19 @@ describe("workflow organization seat routing", () => {expect(done.nodes.find((node) => node.id === "agent")?.logs.join(" ")).toContain("Organization seat CTO routed to project agent");});it("bridges a Web workflow principal to the same device's native Local Agent namespace", async () => {+ await devices.approveDevice("aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899", "fixture", "owner");let chart = await org.getOrganizationChart();chart = await org.upsertOrganizationSeat(chart.revision, { id: "seat_local", unitId: "unit_product", name: "Operator", title: "Operator", role: "operator", state: "active", seatMode: "on_demand", target: { kind: "local-agent", ref: "milo" } });- const graph = await graphs.createWorkflowGraph("web:device-1", { name: "Local route", description: "", status: "draft", inputs: {}, metadata: {}, nodes: [+ const graph = await graphs.createWorkflowGraph("web:aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899", { name: "Local route", description: "", status: "draft", inputs: {}, metadata: {}, nodes: [{ id: "start-local", name: "Start", type: "manual", position: { x: 0, y: 0 }, config: {} },{ id: "agent-local", name: "Operator", type: "agent", position: { x: 120, y: 0 }, config: { orgSeatId: "seat_local", message: "Inspect" } },], edges: [{ id: "local-e", source: "start-local", target: "agent-local" }] });let seenPrincipal = "";const tool: CapabilityTool = { name: "local_agent_request", description: "fixture", scope: "exec", inputSchema: { type: "object", properties: {} }, run: async (_args, ctx) => { seenPrincipal = ctx.principal ?? ""; return { ok: true }; } };- const context = { principal: "web:device-1", actor: "web:device-1", sessionId: "session", scope: "exec" as const };+ const context = { principal: "web:aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899", actor: "web:aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899", sessionId: "session", scope: "exec" as const };const started = await engine.startWorkflowGraph(graph, {}, "org-local-once", context, (name) => name === tool.name ? tool : undefined);- const done = await engine.workflowGraphRunStatus("web:device-1", started.id, 5000);- expect(done.state).toBe("completed"); expect(seenPrincipal).toBe("cli:device-1");+ const done = await engine.workflowGraphRunStatus("web:aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899", started.id, 5000);+ expect(done.state).toBe("completed"); expect(seenPrincipal).toBe("cli:aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899");});});diff --git a/scripts/install-core.sh b/scripts/install-core.shindex 0d5c5d3e..1b37e3dd 100755--- a/scripts/install-core.sh+++ b/scripts/install-core.sh@@ -3,32 +3,17 @@## curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rahmanef63/mso/main/scripts/install.sh | bash#-# Idempotent: re-running updates the checkout, rebuilds, and restarts the-# service. The bootstrap never needs stdin, so curl|bash stays safe. After a-# FRESH install it uses /dev/tty (when present) for guided onboarding; CI/headless-# installs never hang and can run `mso onboard` later. Existing .env.local is preserved.+# Idempotent update; preserves .env.local. Fresh interactive installs use /dev/tty.set -Eeuo pipefail-# ---- config: env override > flag > default ----CANONICAL_REPO_URL="https://github.com/rahmanef63/mso.git"REPO_URL="${MSO_REPO:-$CANONICAL_REPO_URL}"DIR="${MSO_DIR:-$HOME/mso}"DIR_EXPLICIT=0REF="${MSO_REF:-main}"PORT="${MSO_PORT:-4005}"-# Address the server listens on. Loopback by DEFAULT, for two reasons that point-# the same way:-# 1. It cannot log in otherwise. sessionCookieAttrs() sets `secure: true`-# (lib/auth/session-cookie.ts), and a browser only accepts a Secure cookie-# over plain http on a trustworthy origin — localhost / 127.0.0.1 / ::1. So-# http://<lan-or-public-ip>:PORT returns 200 on login and then silently-# drops the cookie: an endless login loop. A 0.0.0.0 bind buys no working-# access it did not already have.-# 2. It is a shell. An authenticated session runs commands as this user, and a-# fresh VPS has ufw installed but disabled — so the old default published-# that shell to the whole internet about two minutes into a curl|bash.-# Reach it over an SSH tunnel, `tailscale serve`, or a reverse proxy on this host-# (all three land the browser on a trustworthy origin, so the cookie sticks).+# Loopback protects the host shell and supports Secure session cookies over HTTP.+# Remote access uses SSH, tailscale serve or a trusted HTTPS reverse proxy.BIND="${MSO_BIND:-127.0.0.1}"SERVICE="mso.service"DO_SERVICE=1diff --git a/scripts/install-termux.sh b/scripts/install-termux.shindex 2f6206ce..6689b82c 100755--- a/scripts/install-termux.sh+++ b/scripts/install-termux.sh@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ DISTRO="${MSO_TERMUX_DISTRO:-mso-ubuntu}"GUEST_USER="${MSO_TERMUX_USER:-mso}"IMAGE="${MSO_TERMUX_IMAGE:-ubuntu:24.04}"GUEST_INSTALL_URL_DEFAULT="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rahmanef63/mso/main/scripts/install-core.sh"-GUEST_INSTALL_SHA256_DEFAULT="d56a6ed0f1330e53d18d796caf272ac47a1b1abc0ee86c92b4eff5cd2a5bb206"+GUEST_INSTALL_SHA256_DEFAULT="d796e29308685f21dcccb3ab72a2e39fde698fdf3f33170940335977e5dee46d"INSTALL_URL="${MSO_TERMUX_INSTALL_URL:-$GUEST_INSTALL_URL_DEFAULT}"INSTALL_SHA256="${MSO_TERMUX_INSTALL_SHA256:-$GUEST_INSTALL_SHA256_DEFAULT}"GUEST_REF="${MSO_TERMUX_REF:-main}"diff --git a/scripts/install.sh b/scripts/install.shindex 6c3344e1..5f6a1174 100755--- a/scripts/install.sh+++ b/scripts/install.sh@@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ umask 077RAW_BASE="${MSO_INSTALL_RAW_BASE:-https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rahmanef63/mso/main/scripts}"CORE_URL="${MSO_INSTALL_CORE_URL:-https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rahmanef63/mso/main/scripts/install-core.sh}"-CORE_SHA256="d56a6ed0f1330e53d18d796caf272ac47a1b1abc0ee86c92b4eff5cd2a5bb206"+CORE_SHA256="d796e29308685f21dcccb3ab72a2e39fde698fdf3f33170940335977e5dee46d"CORE_EOF='# MSO_INSTALLER_CORE_EOF'MACOS_SHA256="668ec3c8bbf3ee36dc2ae70952c3ba43c6f73ebc3acd6956fa4be2f65a076bfe"-TERMUX_SHA256="12a979b6ef9a8dc62253e059e612cd1f6201014b7a4c20f5a6dc3d46d0436f10"+TERMUX_SHA256="eb634d1ec3d5aec0bea6e34243b4b8664ecb2af0df0fd30df196b4a89b0f96f0"TMP_INSTALLER=''TMP_PLATFORM=''diff --git a/scripts/lib/gateway-runtime.sh b/scripts/lib/gateway-runtime.shindex 5311b351..a30a6ea4 100644--- a/scripts/lib/gateway-runtime.sh+++ b/scripts/lib/gateway-runtime.sh@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@#!/usr/bin/env bash# Runtime/state lifecycle used by the public tunnel and local `mso web` fallback.-GATEWAY_EXPECTED_VERSION="$(node -p "require('$ROOT/package.json').version")" || gateway_fail "cannot read MSO version"+GATEWAY_EXPECTED_VERSION="$(node -p 'require(process.argv[1]).version' "$ROOT/package.json")" || gateway_fail "cannot read MSO version"gateway_runtime_from_state() {local state="$1" identity owned instance stored_env@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ NODEset -- $line; [ "$#" -ge 10 ] || continueaddr="${2:-}"; state="${4:-}"[ "$state" = 0A ] || continue- case "$addr" in *:"$hex") inode="${10:-}"; [ -n "$inode" ] && break 2;; esac+ if [[ "$addr" = *:"$hex" ]]; then inode="${10:-}"; [ -n "$inode" ] && break 2; fidone <"$file"done[[ "$inode" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]] || return 1diff --git a/scripts/mso-gateway-test-fixture.ts b/scripts/mso-gateway-test-fixture.tsindex 52e5b22c..649544ce 100644--- a/scripts/mso-gateway-test-fixture.ts+++ b/scripts/mso-gateway-test-fixture.ts@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ export function fixture() {if (process.argv.includes('--version')) { console.log('cloudflared version fixture'); process.exit(0); }if (process.env.OS_SESSION_SECRET || process.env.OS_LOGIN_PASSWORD) require('fs').writeFileSync(process.env.HOME + '/cloudflared-secret-env', 'leaked');if (process.argv.includes('--url')) {- require('fs').appendFileSync(process.env.HOME + '/gateway-fake-starts', 'start\n');+ require('fs').appendFileSync(process.env.HOME + '/gateway-fake-starts', 'start\\n');console.error('INF https://mso-gateway-fixture.trycloudflare.com');}process.on('SIGTERM', () => process.exit(0));