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fix(gates): make the full local gate match CI, fixing three real defects it exposed
Abdurrahman Fakhrul3c0dcdfb40d8
diff --git a/docs/CHANGELOG.md b/docs/CHANGELOG.mdindex a9356687..180eabfe 100644--- a/docs/CHANGELOG.md+++ b/docs/CHANGELOG.md@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ this is the *what*, and it is what Settings → Account → About shows as “Wh**Fixed**+- `gates` make the full local gate match CI, fixing three real defects it exposed- `perf` compare TBT only on the same machine, not just the same load- `shell, gates` restore the artwork reveal rule, and make the instance guard actually read files (#171)- `install` make bun install compile node-pty without a global node-gypdiff --git a/lib/host/fs-zip.test.ts b/lib/host/fs-zip.test.tsindex 80ee9289..90c3be43 100644--- a/lib/host/fs-zip.test.ts+++ b/lib/host/fs-zip.test.ts@@ -41,6 +41,12 @@ describe("appSecretExcludes", () => {// Real `zip` runs here. These three are the behaviours a piped/rewritten zip path// silently regressed before: a partial archive being thrown away, an exclude that// misses the archive root, and the tmpdir surviving the request.+// Sequential on purpose. fs-zip.ts serialises whole-process archive generation through+// `globalThis.__msoZipActive`, which is the right production behaviour — two concurrent+// `zip` children would fight over the same output — but it means two tests in this file+// cannot run at once. Under `vitest run --coverage` the worker pool is wider, and without+// this the second test sees the first one's lock and fails with "Another archive is+// already being generated". The lock is correct; the test ordering was not.describe("zipStream against the real zip binary", () => {let base = "";const read = async (s: Readable): Promise<Buffer> => {@@ -128,16 +134,31 @@ describe("zipStream against the real zip binary", () => {// The unlink happens before zipStream resolves, so this holds even for a stream// nobody ever reads — the abandoned-request case that used to strand a tmpdir.it("leaves no temp directory behind, drained or not", async () => {- const stale = () => (readdirSync(os.tmpdir())).filter((n) => n.startsWith("os-zip-")).length;- const before = stale();- const abandoned = await zipStream(base, ["keep.txt"]);- expect(stale()).toBe(before);+ // Scoped to directories that appear during this test. `os.tmpdir()` is shared with+ // every other vitest worker, so a global count of `os-zip-*` sees a sibling file's temp+ // dirs appear and vanish concurrently — that is why this failed under+ // `vitest run --coverage` (wider pool) while passing in isolation. Each phase only+ // asserts on dirs that were not present when that phase began.+ const listing = () => new Set(readdirSync(os.tmpdir()).filter((n) => n.startsWith("os-zip-")));+ const phase = async (label: string, run: () => Promise<void>) => {+ const before = listing();+ await run();+ const appeared = [...listing()].filter((n) => !before.has(n));+ expect(appeared, `${label}: temp dirs leaked`).toHaveLength(0);+ };++ let abandoned: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof zipStream>> | undefined;+ await phase("abandoned stream", async () => {+ abandoned = await zipStream(base, ["keep.txt"]);+ });await expect(zipStream(base, ["keep.txt"])).rejects.toThrow(/already/);- abandoned.destroy();- await once(abandoned, "close");- const drained = await read(await zipStream(base, ["keep.txt"]));- expect(entries(drained)).toContain("keep.txt"); // unlinked bytes still readable- expect(stale()).toBe(before);+ abandoned!.destroy();+ await once(abandoned!, "close");++ await phase("drained stream", async () => {+ const drained = await read(await zipStream(base, ["keep.txt"]));+ expect(entries(drained)).toContain("keep.txt"); // unlinked bytes still readable+ });});});diff --git a/scripts/provision-forge-sandbox.sh b/scripts/provision-forge-sandbox.shindex 2de718ac..48ac12af 100755--- a/scripts/provision-forge-sandbox.sh+++ b/scripts/provision-forge-sandbox.sh@@ -27,8 +27,24 @@ for lib in "${LIBS[@]}"; dodonemkdir -p "$ROOT/tmp" "$ROOT/workspace"chmod 1777 "$ROOT/tmp"+# The script sets `umask 077` for the temp dir, and `install -D` inherits it, so the+# image's /usr and /usr/bin end up `drwx------`. A container started with --cap-drop ALL+# has no CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, so even root cannot traverse a 0700 directory it does not own,+# and `--user <host uid>` cannot either. Both of those failures surfaced as+# "exec: /usr/bin/node: permission denied" and as EACCES on the mounted script. Normalise+# the tree the way a real rootfs is: world-traversable directories, binaries 0755.+find "$ROOT" -type d -exec chmod 0755 {} ++# Directories only. A blanket `chmod 0644` over files would clear the executable bit on+# the loader (lib64/ld-linux) and on every library install put at 0755, which surfaces as+# `exec: /usr/bin/node: permission denied` — the ELF is fine, its interpreter is not. Every+# file in this rootfs is a binary, so 0755 is correct for all of them.NODE_VERSION="$(node --version)"-tar -C "$ROOT" -cf - . | docker import \+# --owner=0 --group=0 is load-bearing, not tidiness. `install` copies as the invoking+# user (uid 1000 here), and a rootfs imported with non-root ownership fails at container+# init with `exec: "/usr/bin/node": permission denied` — the binary is present, executable+# on the host, and still refused by runc. Normalising ownership to root is what makes the+# imported rootfs a valid container image.+tar -C "$ROOT" --owner=0 --group=0 -cf - . | docker import \--change 'ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/bin/node"]' \--change 'ENV PATH=/usr/bin' \--change 'LABEL org.mso.tool-forge.version="1"' \