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fix(review): preserve session and surface store invariants
Rahman6d5cace73144
diff --git a/docs/CHANGELOG.md b/docs/CHANGELOG.mdindex 03863fd6..eb745385 100644--- a/docs/CHANGELOG.md+++ b/docs/CHANGELOG.md@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ this is the *what*, and it is what Settings → About shows as “What's new”.**Fixed**+- `review` preserve session and surface store invariants- `auth` permanently revoke retired cookie sessions- `workflows` preserve explicit empty sandbox- `auth` bind sessions to cookie scopediff --git a/docs/PROGRESS.md b/docs/PROGRESS.mdindex bc85ed76..1c7461c5 100644--- a/docs/PROGRESS.md+++ b/docs/PROGRESS.md@@ -1,3 +1,16 @@+## 2026-09-18 — Close external-editor review around durable session policy and owner stores++The latest PR review found four boundary issues after the cookie-policy epoch landed. CLI device+approve/role/revoke writes now preserve the durable `sessionPolicy` record instead of rewriting+the auth store without it. Repeated session validation uses a read-only fast path when the stored+scope already matches and acquires the cross-process mutation lock only for an actual rotation,+with a locked recheck before writing. Workflow-only surface updates preserve MCP Page placement+only from an existing row that itself normalizes as a valid reviewed app, so malformed legacy+bytes cannot create Page approval. `MSO_SURFACE_APPS_FILE` is now one of the explicitly allowed+owner security-store paths, so a configured registry outside the home directory remains writable+without a duplicate filesystem-write-root declaration. Existing validated Page auth query metadata+is preserved unchanged. Targeted regressions cover all four boundaries.+## 2026-09-18 — Permanently revoke prior cookie-policy generationsA follow-up security review found that a deterministic scope label could revive an old signed session if configuration later returned to the same cookie Domain. The private auth-device store now keeps one durable cookie-policy epoch and rotates it on every actual scope transition, including A to host-only to A. Signed browser sessions carry both scope and epoch; route and middleware/WebSocket authorization require both. Existing approved devices and roles are preserved, but pre-epoch sessions require a one-time sign-in. Workflow edits also preserve an existing reviewed MCP Page auth path with query parameters without allowing the Workflow endpoint to create or change that Page-owned metadata.diff --git a/lib/auth/device-store.test.ts b/lib/auth/device-store.test.tsindex 5c7f87b4..196d3be8 100644--- a/lib/auth/device-store.test.ts+++ b/lib/auth/device-store.test.ts@@ -110,6 +110,13 @@ describe("device-store — an unreadable file must never look like an empty one"expect((await listDevices()).sessionPolicy).toEqual(returned);});+ it("reads an unchanged session policy without taking the mutation lock", async () => {+ const { currentSessionPolicy } = await load();+ const first = await currentSessionPolicy("host");+ await fs.writeFile(`${store}.lock.recovery`, `${process.pid}:fixture`, { mode: 0o600 });+ await expect(currentSessionPolicy("host")).resolves.toEqual(first);+ });+it("writes the store 0600 inside a 0700 dir", async () => {const { approveDevice } = await load();await approveDevice(DEV, "my laptop");diff --git a/lib/auth/device-store.ts b/lib/auth/device-store.tsindex 95e34118..9c77eb2c 100644--- a/lib/auth/device-store.ts+++ b/lib/auth/device-store.ts@@ -153,9 +153,14 @@ function ownerCount(store: DeviceStore): number {* transition rotates the epoch, so A → host → A can never revive a token minted* during the earlier A generation even if the browser retained that cookie.*/-export function currentSessionPolicy(scope: string): Promise<SessionPolicy> {- if (!COOKIE_SCOPE_RE.test(scope)) return Promise.reject(new Error("invalid_session_cookie_scope"));+export async function currentSessionPolicy(scope: string): Promise<SessionPolicy> {+ if (!COOKIE_SCOPE_RE.test(scope)) throw new Error("invalid_session_cookie_scope");+ // Session validation is read-heavy. Avoid taking the cross-process mutation+ // lock when the durable policy already matches this process configuration.+ const current = await read();+ if (current.sessionPolicy?.scope === scope) return current.sessionPolicy;return mutate(async () => {+ // Recheck under the lock so only one contender rotates a scope transition.const store = await read();if (store.sessionPolicy?.scope === scope) return store.sessionPolicy;const sessionPolicy = { scope, epoch: randomUUID(), changedAt: Date.now() };diff --git a/lib/security-store-path.test.ts b/lib/security-store-path.test.tsindex 2ea436f1..9a80fd98 100644--- a/lib/security-store-path.test.ts+++ b/lib/security-store-path.test.ts@@ -1,13 +1,16 @@import { constants, promises as fs } from "node:fs";import os from "node:os";import path from "node:path";-import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";+import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";import { pinSecurityStorePath } from "./security-store-path";import { withSecurityStoreLock } from "./security-store-lock";const roots: string[] = [];async function fixture() { const root = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "mso-pinned-store-")); roots.push(root); return root; }-afterEach(async () => { for (const root of roots.splice(0)) await fs.rm(root, { recursive: true, force: true }); });+afterEach(async () => {+ vi.unstubAllEnvs();+ for (const root of roots.splice(0)) await fs.rm(root, { recursive: true, force: true });+});describe("pinned owner security-store paths", () => {it("supports the existing hidden artifact-lock basename", async () => {@@ -27,6 +30,15 @@ describe("pinned owner security-store paths", () => {const root = await fixture(); await fs.chmod(root, 0o777);await expect(pinSecurityStorePath(path.join(root, "store.json"))).rejects.toThrow(/not writable by others/);});+ it("authorizes the configured owner surface registry without another write-root entry", async () => {+ const root = await fixture(), file = path.join(root, "surface-apps.json");+ vi.stubEnv("VITEST", "");+ vi.stubEnv("MSO_SURFACE_APPS_FILE", file);+ const pinned = await pinSecurityStorePath(file);+ try { expect(pinned.absolute).toBe(file); }+ finally { await pinned.directory.close(); }+ });+it("keeps operations on the pinned inode after the pathname is replaced", async () => {const root = await fixture(), original = path.join(root, "original"), moved = path.join(root, "moved");await fs.mkdir(original, { mode: 0o700 });diff --git a/lib/security-store-path.ts b/lib/security-store-path.tsindex 35da79a5..c3735daa 100644--- a/lib/security-store-path.ts+++ b/lib/security-store-path.ts@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ const STORE_ENV = ["OS_DEVICE_STORE", "OS_MCP_STORE", "OS_INFRA_STORE", "OS_MEMORY_STORE", "OS_MCP_ACTIVITY_LOG","OS_A2A_STORE", "OS_A2A_TASK_STORE", "OS_A2A_CREDENTIAL_STORE", "OS_A2A_INBOUND_TOKEN_STORE","OS_A2A_LOCAL_AUTH_STORE", "OS_LOCAL_AGENT_MESSAGE_STORE", "OS_LOCAL_AGENT_PRESENCE_STORE",- "OS_CONFIG_STORE", "OS_PREFS_PATH", "OS_SKILL_MEMORY_STORE",+ "OS_CONFIG_STORE", "OS_PREFS_PATH", "OS_SKILL_MEMORY_STORE", "MSO_SURFACE_APPS_FILE",] as const;const DIRECTORY_ENV = ["OS_TOOL_FORGE_DIR", "OS_AGENT_MEMORY_DIR", "OS_AGENT_SESSIONS_DIR", "OS_PROJECT_AGENT_TASKS_DIR"] as const;const expand = (value: string) => path.resolve(expandOwnerStorePath(value));diff --git a/lib/surfaces/manage.test.ts b/lib/surfaces/manage.test.tsindex fdf62fb0..59e1799b 100644--- a/lib/surfaces/manage.test.ts+++ b/lib/surfaces/manage.test.ts@@ -40,6 +40,14 @@ describe("owner-reviewed workflow surface configuration", () => {expect(saved.externalAuthPath).toBe(pageAuth);await expect(save({ ...app, externalAuthPath: "/?auth=other" })).rejects.toThrow("workflow_login_path_must_not_contain_query");});+ it("does not inherit legacy Page approval from an invalid existing row", async () => {+ await fs.writeFile(file, JSON.stringify([{ ...app, title: "", placements: undefined }]));+ await save({ ...app, title: "Recovered workflow editor" });+ const saved = (await surfaceRegistrySnapshot()).apps[0];+ expect(saved.title).toBe("Recovered workflow editor");+ expect(saved.placements).toEqual(["workflows"]);+ });+it("never adds Page approval to new or workflow-only entries", async () => {await save();expect((await surfaceRegistrySnapshot()).apps[0].placements).toEqual(["workflows"]);diff --git a/lib/surfaces/manage.ts b/lib/surfaces/manage.tsindex aed07426..0d2ece9a 100644--- a/lib/surfaces/manage.ts+++ b/lib/surfaces/manage.ts@@ -47,12 +47,12 @@ export async function saveWorkflowSurface(input: Record<string, unknown>) {const matches = entries.filter((entry) => entry.id === selected.id);if (matches.length > 1) throw new SurfaceConfigError("duplicate_surface_identity", 409);const replacement = { ...selected };- // Missing placements is legacy Page approval; this workflow-only operation- // may preserve that grant but cannot create or mutate Page-only auth metadata.+ // Missing placements is legacy Page approval only when the existing row is+ // itself a valid reviewed app. Invalid historical bytes cannot grant Page.const existing = matches[0];- const sharesPage = Boolean(existing && (existing.placements === undefined ||- (Array.isArray(existing.placements) && existing.placements.includes("mcp-page"))));const existingNormalized = existing ? (await configuredSurfaceApps(JSON.stringify([existing])))[0] : undefined;+ const sharesPage = Boolean(existingNormalized && (existingNormalized.placements === undefined ||+ existingNormalized.placements?.includes("mcp-page")));if (selected.externalAuthPath?.includes("?") && (!sharesPage ||selected.externalAuthPath !== existingNormalized?.externalAuthPath)) {throw new SurfaceConfigError("workflow_login_path_must_not_contain_query");diff --git a/scripts/approve-device-lock.test.ts b/scripts/approve-device-lock.test.tsindex 8bf5f289..86b95ff7 100644--- a/scripts/approve-device-lock.test.ts+++ b/scripts/approve-device-lock.test.ts@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";-import { mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync } from "node:fs";+import { mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";import os from "node:os";import path from "node:path";import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";@@ -18,6 +18,32 @@ describe("approve-device cross-process lock protocol", () => {expect(source).not.toContain("function recoverAbandonedLock");});+ it("preserves the durable session epoch across CLI approve, role and revoke writes", () => {+ const root = mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "mso-approve-policy-"));+ const store = path.join(root, "devices.json");+ const owner = "a".repeat(32), device = "b".repeat(32);+ const policy = { scope: "host", epoch: "epoch-1234567890abcdef", changedAt: 1 };+ writeFileSync(store, JSON.stringify({+ approved: { [owner]: { label: "owner", approvedAt: 1, role: "owner" } },+ pending: { [device]: { label: "phone", firstSeen: 1, lastSeen: 1, ip: "127.0.0.1", attempts: 1 } },+ sessionPolicy: policy,+ }));+ const run = (args: string[]) => spawnSync(process.execPath, [SCRIPT, ...args], {+ env: { ...process.env, OS_DEVICE_STORE: store, MSO_SYSTEMCTL_BIN: "/bin/true" }, encoding: "utf8",+ });+ const savedPolicy = () => JSON.parse(readFileSync(store, "utf8")).sessionPolicy;+ try {+ expect(run([device, "phone", "--role", "viewer"]).status).toBe(0);+ expect(savedPolicy()).toEqual(policy);+ expect(run(["--set-role", device, "operator"]).status).toBe(0);+ expect(savedPolicy()).toEqual(policy);+ expect(run(["--revoke", device]).status).toBe(0);+ expect(savedPolicy()).toEqual(policy);+ } finally {+ rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });+ }+ });+it("refuses approval as a role-change bypass for an existing device", () => {const root = mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "mso-approve-role-"));const store = path.join(root, "devices.json");diff --git a/scripts/approve-device.js b/scripts/approve-device.jsindex 32c28e54..ee03e5ce 100755--- a/scripts/approve-device.js+++ b/scripts/approve-device.js@@ -20,7 +20,13 @@ function read() {try {const p = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(STORE, "utf8"));const approved = normalizeApproved(p.approved);- return { approved, pending: p.pending || {} };+ return {+ approved,+ pending: p.pending || {},+ ...(p.sessionPolicy && typeof p.sessionPolicy === "object" && !Array.isArray(p.sessionPolicy)+ ? { sessionPolicy: p.sessionPolicy }+ : {}),+ };} catch (error) {if (error && error.code === "ENOENT") return { approved: {}, pending: {} };throw error;