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fix(security): close follow-up CodeQL flows
Rahman88847f862440
diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.mdindex afee2a7a..dd322384 100644--- a/SECURITY.md+++ b/SECURITY.md@@ -74,8 +74,10 @@ following source-level controls in addition to route authorization:- provider/config/OAuth maps accept validated provider identifiers and rebuild records from entrylists rather than assigning or deleting attacker-selected object properties;-- thread identifiers are accepted or rejected as a whole and are never rewritten into colliding- filesystem names;+- login-secret equality uses a fixed-width constant-time byte comparison; no fast password hash+ or reusable password verifier is created, and over-limit UTF-8 input fails closed;+- thread identifiers are accepted or rejected as a whole, then pass an explicit `path.relative`+ containment check before any filesystem operation; they are never rewritten into colliding names;- bounded host reads, lock recovery, skill/catalog reads and model-cache reads bind metadata andcontent to the same `O_NOFOLLOW` file descriptor where the platform supports it;- read/write root policy performs lexical containment before filesystem resolution and canonical@@ -85,10 +87,19 @@ following source-level controls in addition to route authorization:- external widget embeds allow only credential-free external HTTPS URLs, omit `allow-same-origin`,and send no referrer; local image previews accept a raster MIME allowlist and revoke object URLs;- uploaded files use random exclusive temporary names, revalidate the destination after directory- creation, reject traversal instead of normalizing it away, and remove partial files on every exit.+ creation, reject traversal instead of normalizing it away, and remove partial files on every exit;+- the intentional ChatGPT-to-VPS file bridge is write-scope only, accepts temporary URLs only from+ reviewed OpenAI content/storage hosts, revalidates every redirect, streams with a 20 MiB hard cap,+ checks response MIME and PNG/JPEG/WebP signatures, then enters the same write-root, credential,+ exclusive-temporary-file and atomic-rename path as an ordinary authenticated upload. Generic+ `application/octet-stream` remains deliberately content-agnostic because this is a file-transfer+ surface, not an executable installer; transferred bytes are never executed automatically by MSO.These controls reduce known classes of path race, prototype-pollution, DOM trust, and unbounded-network-to-disk issues. They do not turn automated static analysis into a proof of complete security.+network-to-disk issues. CodeQL can still correctly describe the last bridge as network data written+to disk: that data flow is the feature itself, so any GitHub dismissal must use the narrow+`won't fix` classification with this control rationale—not `false positive`. None of these controls+turn automated static analysis into a proof of complete security.## Service and package operationsdiff --git a/app/api/auth/login/route.ts b/app/api/auth/login/route.tsindex 2755e73a..47eee666 100644--- a/app/api/auth/login/route.ts+++ b/app/api/auth/login/route.ts@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from "next/server";-import { constantTimeEq, MIN_SECRET_LEN, signSession, type SessionPayload } from "@/lib/auth/session";+import { constantTimeEq, MAX_COMPARE_BYTES, MIN_SECRET_LEN, signSession, type SessionPayload } from "@/lib/auth/session";import { SESSION_COOKIE } from "@/lib/auth/require-session";import { sessionCookieAttrs } from "@/lib/auth/session-cookie";import { isApproved, isValidDeviceId, recordPending, touchApproved } from "@/lib/auth/device-store";@@ -98,8 +98,13 @@ export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {const sessionSecret = process.env.OS_SESSION_SECRET ?? "";const password = process.env.OS_LOGIN_PASSWORD ?? "";- // Signing key must be strong. Fail-closed if either secret is unset/too weak.- if (sessionSecret.length < MIN_SECRET_LEN || password.length < 6) {+ // Signing key must be strong and the configured login secret must fit the+ // fixed-width comparator. Fail closed on an unusable server configuration.+ if (+ sessionSecret.length < MIN_SECRET_LEN ||+ password.length < 6 ||+ Buffer.byteLength(password, "utf8") > MAX_COMPARE_BYTES+ ) {return NextResponse.json({ error: "not_configured" }, { status: 500 });}@@ -117,7 +122,11 @@ export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {}const { password: provided, deviceId } = body;- if (typeof provided !== "string" || provided.length === 0) {+ if (+ typeof provided !== "string" ||+ provided.length === 0 ||+ Buffer.byteLength(provided, "utf8") > MAX_COMPARE_BYTES+ ) {return NextResponse.json({ error: "bad_password" }, { status: 401 });}if (!isValidDeviceId(deviceId)) {@@ -125,8 +134,7 @@ export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {}const label = typeof body.deviceLabel === "string" ? body.deviceLabel.slice(0, 80) : "unknown device";- // Length-safe: constantTimeEq hashes both sides to a fixed 32-byte digest- // before comparing, so the compare time does NOT reveal the secret's length.+ // Length-safe fixed-width comparison; no reusable password hash is created.if (!constantTimeEq(password, provided)) {audit({ action: "auth.denied", actor: deviceId, ip, ok: false, detail: "bad password" });// Charge the process-wide budget HERE, not in rateLimited(), so only a genuinelydiff --git a/docs/CHATGPT-PLUGIN.md b/docs/CHATGPT-PLUGIN.mdindex c4cb92bb..07863500 100644--- a/docs/CHATGPT-PLUGIN.md+++ b/docs/CHATGPT-PLUGIN.md@@ -246,12 +246,15 @@ flowchart LRCurrent guardrails:-- maximum 20 MiB;+- write scope is required;+- maximum 20 MiB, enforced while streaming even without a trustworthy `Content-Length`;- PNG, WebP, JPEG or generic octet-stream only;+- response MIME is allowlisted; PNG/JPEG/WebP bytes must match their declared signature;- temporary URL must be from an allowed OpenAI content/storage host;- up to three redirects, and each redirect target is revalidated;-- destination still has to be inside `OS_FS_WRITE_ROOTS`;-- filename is sanitized;+- destination still has to be inside `OS_FS_WRITE_ROOTS` and pass the credential/path jail;+- filename is sanitized and the write uses an exclusive random temporary file plus atomic rename;+- transferred bytes are never executed automatically by MSO;- an existing same-name file can be replaced, so treat this as a write/destructive action;- result includes byte count and SHA-256.diff --git a/docs/MCP.md b/docs/MCP.mdindex 6f042956..8c8f556b 100644--- a/docs/MCP.md+++ b/docs/MCP.md@@ -415,13 +415,16 @@ replaces it: ask the client to generate the image with its own capability.Importing the result is unchanged and deliberately preserved: **`fs_upload_file`** takesone ChatGPT conversation/generated file through `openai/fileParams`, downloads its-temporary OpenAI HTTPS URL immediately, re-validates up to three redirects, caps the file-at **20 MiB**, accepts PNG/WebP/JPEG or generic octet-stream, and writes inside-`OS_FS_WRITE_ROOTS`. Allowed download hosts are OpenAI `*.oaiusercontent.com` content hosts-or the explicitly matched `oaisdmntpr<region>.blob.core.windows.net` storage-account-family—not arbitrary Azure Blob hosts. The result returns path, bytes and SHA-256. An-existing same-name file may be replaced, so the tool is classified as a write/destructive-action. See `CHATGPT-PLUGIN.md` for the end-to-end diagram.+temporary OpenAI HTTPS URL immediately, re-validates up to three redirects, and consumes the+body incrementally with a hard **20 MiB** ceiling even when `Content-Length` is absent or false.+It accepts PNG/WebP/JPEG or generic octet-stream, rejects a conflicting response MIME, validates+PNG/JPEG/WebP magic bytes, and writes only inside `OS_FS_WRITE_ROOTS`. Allowed download hosts are+OpenAI `*.oaiusercontent.com` content hosts or the explicitly matched+`oaisdmntpr<region>.blob.core.windows.net` storage-account family—not arbitrary Azure Blob hosts.+The final write uses the normal credential/path jail, an exclusive random temporary file and an+atomic rename; MSO never executes the transferred bytes automatically. The result returns path,+bytes and SHA-256. An existing same-name file may be replaced, so the tool is classified as a+write/destructive action. See `CHATGPT-PLUGIN.md` for the end-to-end diagram.`OS_CODEX_BUILTIN_TOOLS` still exists and still takes an allowlisted list, but itsdefault is now EMPTY and `image_generation` is no longer an accepted value — naming itdiff --git a/docs/PROGRESS.md b/docs/PROGRESS.mdindex 3e6ed611..b861152b 100644--- a/docs/PROGRESS.md+++ b/docs/PROGRESS.md@@ -28,9 +28,18 @@ explicit bounded operational surfaces are Operator.A hosted CodeQL follow-up on the first release candidate was not treated as cosmetic backlog.The release was reopened to harden validated config maps, strict thread identifiers, external iframepolicy, descriptor-bound file reads, dual root containment, private collision fixtures, bounded-models.dev cache writes, exclusive upload staging, and immutable CodeQL workflow pins. Regression-tests accompany each changed boundary; the replacement SHA must repeat the full repository,-build, hosted-analysis, deploy and ultimate-assurance gates before the branch is considered closed.+models.dev cache writes, exclusive upload staging, and immutable CodeQL workflow pins. The first+PR rescan then reported eight changed-line alerts rather than being called green because the+analyzer process exited successfully: a password-comparison model, five path/race flows, one test+TOCTOU and the intentional ChatGPT file-transfer sink. The comparator now uses fixed-width bytes+without creating a stored/fast password hash; thread and host paths use analyzer-recognized+`path.relative` containment adjacent to the sink; the cache test binds mode and read to one file+descriptor; and the ChatGPT bridge now streams under 20 MiB, validates redirect host, MIME and raster+signatures, then enters the guarded atomic upload path. Its remaining network-to-disk data flow is+the documented purpose of `fs_upload_file`; it may be classified only as reviewed `won't fix`, never+as a false positive or by weakening CodeQL. Regression tests accompany each changed boundary; the+replacement SHA must repeat the full repository, build, hosted-analysis, deploy and+ultimate-assurance gates before the branch is considered closed.The same release reconciles all ten open Dependabot PRs instead of merging them blindly. Sevenminor/patch or action updates with green hosted checks are integrated, and Lucide 1.x is migrateddiff --git a/lib/ai/threads.ts b/lib/ai/threads.tsindex 982bfafa..20100b3f 100644--- a/lib/ai/threads.ts+++ b/lib/ai/threads.ts@@ -18,13 +18,22 @@ export interface ChatThread {export type ThreadSummary = Pick<ChatThread, "id" | "title" | "createdAt" | "updatedAt">;-const DIR = process.env.OS_THREADS_DIR || path.join(os.homedir(), ".mso", "threads");-// ids are app-generated but jail them anyway (path-traversal guard): alnum + -_ only.-const safeId = (id: string) => {- if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,64}$/.test(id)) throw new Error("invalid thread id");- return id;-};-const fileFor = (id: string) => path.join(DIR, `${safeId(id)}.yml`);+const DIR = path.resolve(process.env.OS_THREADS_DIR || path.join(os.homedir(), ".mso", "threads"));+const THREAD_ID = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,64}$/;++// ids are app-generated but still arrive over HTTP. Keep the allowlist, then use+// an explicit path.relative containment guard before a filesystem sink. The+// latter is both symlink-independent lexical defence and a pattern CodeQL can+// verify rather than having to trust a project-specific sanitizer helper.+function fileFor(id: string): string {+ if (!THREAD_ID.test(id)) throw new Error("invalid thread id");+ const candidate = path.resolve(DIR, `${id}.yml`);+ const relative = path.relative(DIR, candidate);+ if (relative === ".." || relative.startsWith(".." + path.sep) || path.isAbsolute(relative)) {+ throw new Error("invalid thread id");+ }+ return candidate;+}export async function listThreads(): Promise<ThreadSummary[]> {let names: string[];diff --git a/lib/auth/session.test.ts b/lib/auth/session.test.tsindex d0a87c5b..02f0cced 100644--- a/lib/auth/session.test.ts+++ b/lib/auth/session.test.ts@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@import crypto from "node:crypto";import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";-import { MIN_SECRET_LEN, signSession, verifySession, type SessionPayload } from "./session";+import { constantTimeEq, MAX_COMPARE_BYTES, MIN_SECRET_LEN, signSession, verifySession, type SessionPayload } from "./session";const SECRET = "s".repeat(MIN_SECRET_LEN);@@ -21,6 +21,20 @@ function forgeToken(encodedPayload: string, secret: string): string {return `${encodedPayload}.${b64url(hmac.digest())}`;}+describe("constantTimeEq fixed-width comparison", () => {+ it("compares equal and unequal values without creating a password hash", () => {+ expect(constantTimeEq("correct-horse", "correct-horse")).toBe(true);+ expect(constantTimeEq("correct-horse", "correct-house")).toBe(false);+ expect(constantTimeEq("short", "shorter")).toBe(false);+ });++ it("fails closed when either UTF-8 value exceeds the fixed-width ceiling", () => {+ const oversized = "a".repeat(MAX_COMPARE_BYTES + 1);+ expect(constantTimeEq(oversized, oversized)).toBe(false);+ expect(constantTimeEq("a", oversized)).toBe(false);+ });+});+describe("signSession / verifySession roundtrip", () => {it("verifies a token it signed and returns the exact payload", () => {const payload = freshPayload();diff --git a/lib/auth/session.ts b/lib/auth/session.tsindex dd858908..231fd9c6 100644--- a/lib/auth/session.ts+++ b/lib/auth/session.ts@@ -6,15 +6,29 @@ import crypto from "crypto";/** Minimum length for the signing secret. A short/empty key is forgeable. */export const MIN_SECRET_LEN = 32;+/** Maximum UTF-8 size accepted by the fixed-width secret comparator. */+export const MAX_COMPARE_BYTES = 1024;+/**- * Length-safe constant-time string compare. A domain-separated HMAC maps both- * values to a fixed width before `timingSafeEqual`; it is not password storage- * and no verifier is persisted. A naive length early-exit would leak metadata.+ * Length-safe constant-time string compare. This is comparison, not password+ * storage: both cleartext inputs are copied into fixed-width buffers and their+ * byte lengths are included in the compared bytes. No fast password verifier is+ * created or persisted, and unequal lengths do not take an early-return path.+ * Callers reject over-limit network input before invoking it.*/-const COMPARE_DOMAIN_KEY = Buffer.from("mso.constant-time-compare.v1", "utf8");+function fixedCompareBuffer(value: string): { buffer: Buffer; valid: boolean } {+ const bytes = Buffer.from(value, "utf8");+ const out = Buffer.alloc(MAX_COMPARE_BYTES + 4);+ bytes.copy(out, 0, 0, Math.min(bytes.length, MAX_COMPARE_BYTES));+ out.writeUInt32BE(Math.min(bytes.length, MAX_COMPARE_BYTES + 1), MAX_COMPARE_BYTES);+ return { buffer: out, valid: bytes.length <= MAX_COMPARE_BYTES };+}+export function constantTimeEq(a: string, b: string): boolean {- const digest = (value: string) => crypto.createHmac("sha256", COMPARE_DOMAIN_KEY).update(value).digest();- return crypto.timingSafeEqual(digest(a), digest(b));+ const left = fixedCompareBuffer(a);+ const right = fixedCompareBuffer(b);+ const same = crypto.timingSafeEqual(left.buffer, right.buffer);+ return left.valid && right.valid && same;}export interface SessionPayload {diff --git a/lib/host/paths.ts b/lib/host/paths.tsindex 77db83cc..49e2e523 100644--- a/lib/host/paths.ts+++ b/lib/host/paths.ts@@ -305,10 +305,6 @@ function lexicalRoots(list: string[]): string[] {return list.map((root) => path.resolve(root));}-function assertLexicalContainment(target: string, roots: string[], message: string): void {- if (!roots.some((root) => isUnderRoot(target, root))) throw new HostError(message);-}-// Realpath-resolved WRITE roots — shared by safeWritePath/assertNotRoot here and// exec.ts's cwd bounds, so the realpath-fallback strategy lives in one place.export async function resolveWriteRoots(): Promise<string[]> {@@ -325,10 +321,25 @@ export async function resolveReadable(requested: string): Promise<string> {else absolute = path.resolve(requested);const normalized = path.resolve(absolute);const configured = lexicalRoots(readRootList());- assertLexicalContainment(normalized, configured, "Path outside readable roots");++ // Select one configured root with the canonical path.relative escape test.+ // This guard intentionally stays next to the tainted path and realpath sink so+ // both reviewers and CodeQL can prove the path cannot lexically leave a root.+ let lexicalRoot: string | null = null;+ for (const root of configured) {+ const relative = path.relative(root, normalized);+ if (relative === ".." || relative.startsWith(".." + path.sep) || path.isAbsolute(relative)) continue;+ lexicalRoot = root;+ break;+ }+ if (!lexicalRoot) throw new HostError("Path outside readable roots");+const real = await fs.realpath(normalized);- const rr = await realRoots(configured);- if (!rr.some((r) => isUnderRoot(real, r))) throw new HostError("Path outside readable roots");+ const realRoot = await fs.realpath(lexicalRoot).catch(() => path.resolve(lexicalRoot));+ const realRelative = path.relative(realRoot, real);+ if (realRelative === ".." || realRelative.startsWith(".." + path.sep) || path.isAbsolute(realRelative)) {+ throw new HostError("Path outside readable roots");+ }assertNotCredential(real);return real;}@@ -344,16 +355,31 @@ export async function safeWritePath(requested: string, mustExist: boolean): Promconst normalized = path.resolve(absolute);const configured = lexicalRoots(writeRootList());const lexicalTarget = mustExist ? normalized : path.dirname(normalized);- assertLexicalContainment(lexicalTarget, configured, "Path outside writable roots");- const rr = await realRoots(configured);++ let lexicalRoot: string | null = null;+ for (const root of configured) {+ const relative = path.relative(root, lexicalTarget);+ if (relative === ".." || relative.startsWith(".." + path.sep) || path.isAbsolute(relative)) continue;+ lexicalRoot = root;+ break;+ }+ if (!lexicalRoot) throw new HostError("Path outside writable roots");++ const realRoot = await fs.realpath(lexicalRoot).catch(() => path.resolve(lexicalRoot));if (mustExist) {const real = await fs.realpath(normalized);- if (!rr.some((r) => isUnderRoot(real, r))) throw new HostError("Path outside writable roots");+ const realRelative = path.relative(realRoot, real);+ if (realRelative === ".." || realRelative.startsWith(".." + path.sep) || path.isAbsolute(realRelative)) {+ throw new HostError("Path outside writable roots");+ }assertNotCredential(real);return real;}const parent = await fs.realpath(path.dirname(normalized));- if (!rr.some((r) => isUnderRoot(parent, r))) throw new HostError("Path outside writable roots");+ const parentRelative = path.relative(realRoot, parent);+ if (parentRelative === ".." || parentRelative.startsWith(".." + path.sep) || path.isAbsolute(parentRelative)) {+ throw new HostError("Path outside writable roots");+ }const joined = path.join(parent, path.basename(normalized));assertNotCredential(joined);return joined;diff --git a/lib/mcp/openai-file-upload.test.ts b/lib/mcp/openai-file-upload.test.tsindex 67d0451a..748504fb 100644--- a/lib/mcp/openai-file-upload.test.ts+++ b/lib/mcp/openai-file-upload.test.ts@@ -11,9 +11,9 @@ const { importOpenAiProvidedFile } = await import("./openai-file-upload");beforeEach(() => {uploadInto.mockClear();- vi.stubGlobal("fetch", vi.fn(async () => new Response(Uint8Array.from([137, 80, 78, 71]), {+ vi.stubGlobal("fetch", vi.fn(async () => new Response(Uint8Array.from([137, 80, 78, 71, 13, 10, 26, 10]), {status: 200,- headers: { "content-type": "image/png", "content-length": "4" },+ headers: { "content-type": "image/png", "content-length": "8" },})));});@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ describe("ChatGPT file host allowlist", () => {file_id,mime_type: "image/png",file_name: "file.png",- size: 4,+ size: 8,},dest: "/home/antinrml/generated-images",filename: "file.png",@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ describe("ChatGPT file host allowlist", () => {"oaisdmntprfuture123.blob.core.windows.net",])("accepts OpenAI regional Azure storage account %s", async (host) => {const result = await importUrl(`https://${host}/container/file.png?sig=redacted`);- expect(result.bytes).toBe(4);+ expect(result.bytes).toBe(8);expect(uploadInto).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);});@@ -69,14 +69,56 @@ describe("ChatGPT file host allowlist", () => {status: 302,headers: { location: "https://oaisdmntprfuture123.blob.core.windows.net/container/file.png?sig=next" },}))- .mockResolvedValueOnce(new Response(Uint8Array.from([137, 80, 78, 71]), {+ .mockResolvedValueOnce(new Response(Uint8Array.from([137, 80, 78, 71, 13, 10, 26, 10]), {status: 200,- headers: { "content-type": "image/png", "content-length": "4" },+ headers: { "content-type": "image/png", "content-length": "8" },}));vi.stubGlobal("fetch", fetchMock);const result = await importUrl("https://files.oaiusercontent.com/start/file.png");- expect(result.bytes).toBe(4);+ expect(result.bytes).toBe(8);expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);expect(uploadInto).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);});++ it("rejects an image whose bytes do not match its declared MIME", async () => {+ vi.stubGlobal("fetch", vi.fn(async () => new Response(new TextEncoder().encode("not a png"), {+ status: 200,+ headers: { "content-type": "image/png" },+ })));+ await expect(importUrl("https://files.oaiusercontent.com/file.png")).rejects.toThrow("signature does not match image/png");+ expect(uploadInto).not.toHaveBeenCalled();+ });++ it("rejects a conflicting trusted response MIME", async () => {+ vi.stubGlobal("fetch", vi.fn(async () => new Response(Uint8Array.from([0xff, 0xd8, 0xff]), {+ status: 200,+ headers: { "content-type": "image/jpeg" },+ })));+ await expect(importUrl("https://files.oaiusercontent.com/file.png")).rejects.toThrow("does not match image/png");+ expect(uploadInto).not.toHaveBeenCalled();+ });++ it("stops a chunked response at 20 MiB even without Content-Length", async () => {+ const chunk = new Uint8Array(1024 * 1024);+ const body = new ReadableStream<Uint8Array>({+ start(controller) {+ for (let i = 0; i < 21; i += 1) controller.enqueue(chunk);+ controller.close();+ },+ });+ vi.stubGlobal("fetch", vi.fn(async () => new Response(body, {+ status: 200,+ headers: { "content-type": "application/octet-stream" },+ })));+ await expect(importOpenAiProvidedFile({+ file: {+ download_url: "https://files.oaiusercontent.com/file.bin",+ file_id: "file_large",+ mime_type: "application/octet-stream",+ file_name: "file.bin",+ },+ dest: "/home/antinrml/generated-images",+ })).rejects.toThrow("exceeds the 20 MiB MCP import limit");+ expect(uploadInto).not.toHaveBeenCalled();+ });});diff --git a/lib/mcp/openai-file-upload.ts b/lib/mcp/openai-file-upload.tsindex 0f8b7c2e..6f3c9269 100644--- a/lib/mcp/openai-file-upload.ts+++ b/lib/mcp/openai-file-upload.ts@@ -58,6 +58,53 @@ async function fetchTrustedFile(initialUrl: URL): Promise<Response> {throw new HostError("OpenAI file download exceeded the redirect limit");}+async function readBoundedBody(response: Response): Promise<Buffer> {+ const rawLength = response.headers.get("content-length");+ if (rawLength !== null) {+ const declared = Number(rawLength);+ if (!Number.isFinite(declared) || declared < 0 || declared > MAX_FILE_BYTES) {+ throw new HostError("file exceeds the 20 MiB MCP import limit");+ }+ }+ if (!response.body) throw new HostError("OpenAI file download was empty");++ const reader = response.body.getReader();+ const chunks: Uint8Array[] = [];+ let bytes = 0;+ try {+ for (;;) {+ const { done, value } = await reader.read();+ if (done) break;+ bytes += value.byteLength;+ if (bytes > MAX_FILE_BYTES) {+ await reader.cancel("MCP import size limit exceeded").catch(() => {});+ throw new HostError("file exceeds the 20 MiB MCP import limit");+ }+ chunks.push(value);+ }+ } finally {+ reader.releaseLock();+ }+ if (bytes === 0) throw new HostError("OpenAI file download was empty");+ return Buffer.concat(chunks.map((chunk) => Buffer.from(chunk)), bytes);+}++function responseMime(response: Response): string | null {+ const value = response.headers.get("content-type")?.split(";", 1)[0]?.trim().toLowerCase();+ if (!value) return null;+ if (!ALLOWED_MIME.has(value)) throw new HostError(`unsupported response file type: ${value}`);+ return value;+}++function hasExpectedSignature(data: Buffer, mimeType: string): boolean {+ if (mimeType === "image/png") {+ return data.length >= 8 && data.subarray(0, 8).equals(Buffer.from([0x89, 0x50, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x0d, 0x0a, 0x1a, 0x0a]));+ }+ if (mimeType === "image/jpeg") return data.length >= 3 && data[0] === 0xff && data[1] === 0xd8 && data[2] === 0xff;+ if (mimeType === "image/webp") return data.length >= 12 && data.subarray(0, 4).toString("ascii") === "RIFF" && data.subarray(8, 12).toString("ascii") === "WEBP";+ return true; // application/octet-stream is intentionally a generic file bridge.+}+function safeFilename(input: string | undefined, fallback: string): string {const value = path.basename((input || fallback).trim());if (!value || value === "." || value === ".." || value.length > 200) throw new HostError("filename is invalid");@@ -88,11 +135,18 @@ export async function importOpenAiProvidedFile(opts: {const response = await fetchTrustedFile(url);if (!response.ok) throw new HostError(`OpenAI file download failed (${response.status})`);- const declared = Number(response.headers.get("content-length") || 0);- if (declared > MAX_FILE_BYTES) throw new HostError("file exceeds the 20 MiB MCP import limit");- const data = Buffer.from(await response.arrayBuffer());- if (data.byteLength === 0) throw new HostError("OpenAI file download was empty");- if (data.byteLength > MAX_FILE_BYTES) throw new HostError("file exceeds the 20 MiB MCP import limit");+ const wireMime = responseMime(response);+ if (+ mimeType !== "application/octet-stream" &&+ wireMime &&+ wireMime !== "application/octet-stream" &&+ wireMime !== mimeType+ ) {+ throw new HostError(`response file type ${wireMime} does not match ${mimeType}`);+ }+ const data = await readBoundedBody(response);+ const effectiveMime = mimeType === "application/octet-stream" ? (wireMime || mimeType) : mimeType;+ if (!hasExpectedSignature(data, effectiveMime)) throw new HostError(`file signature does not match ${effectiveMime}`);const fallback = file.file_name || file.name || `${file.file_id}.bin`;const filename = safeFilename(opts.filename, fallback);diff --git a/lib/models/catalog.test.ts b/lib/models/catalog.test.tsindex e9832036..222bb560 100644--- a/lib/models/catalog.test.ts+++ b/lib/models/catalog.test.ts@@ -35,8 +35,13 @@ describe("bounded models.dev catalog cache", () => {await expect(mod.getCatalog({ force: true })).resolves.toMatchObject({ openai: { models: { "gpt-test": {} } } });expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith("https://models.dev/api.json", expect.objectContaining({ redirect: "error" }));expect(fs.statSync(root).mode & 0o777).toBe(0o700);- expect(fs.statSync(cache).mode & 0o777).toBe(0o600);- expect(JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(cache, "utf8")).data.openai.models).toHaveProperty("gpt-test");+ const handle = fs.openSync(cache, "r");+ try {+ expect(fs.fstatSync(handle).mode & 0o777).toBe(0o600);+ expect(JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(handle, "utf8")).data.openai.models).toHaveProperty("gpt-test");+ } finally {+ fs.closeSync(handle);+ }expect(fs.readdirSync(root).filter((name) => name.endsWith(".tmp"))).toEqual([]);});