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fix(security): pin bounded MCP store reads to one descriptor
Abdurrahman Fakhrulb2f4f607000b
diff --git a/app/api/models/test/route.test.ts b/app/api/models/test/route.test.tsindex 3a39497c..6b90119f 100644--- a/app/api/models/test/route.test.ts+++ b/app/api/models/test/route.test.ts@@ -25,6 +25,29 @@ vi.mock("@/lib/models", () => ({ resolveModel: vi.fn() }));vi.mock("@/lib/host/ssrf", () => ({ safeProviderFetch: vi.fn() }));describe("/api/models/test OpenAI Codex OAuth", () => {+ it("requires Owner before reading configuration or sending an inference request", async () => {+ const { requireSession } = await import("@/lib/auth/require-session");+ vi.mocked(requireSession).mockResolvedValueOnce(false);+ const fetch = vi.fn(); vi.stubGlobal("fetch", fetch);+ const { POST } = await import("./route");+ expect((await POST()).status).toBe(401);+ expect(requireSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith("owner");+ expect(resolveModelRef).not.toHaveBeenCalled(); expect(fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();+ });+ it("sends only the selected model and static ping through the custom-provider guard", async () => {+ resolveModelRef.mockResolvedValue("fixture/model");+ const { selectedCustomConn } = await import("@/lib/config/store");+ vi.mocked(selectedCustomConn).mockResolvedValueOnce({ baseUrl: "https://fixture.invalid/v1" });+ const { resolveModel } = await import("@/lib/models");+ vi.mocked(resolveModel).mockResolvedValue({ protocol: "openai", baseUrl: "https://fixture.invalid/v1", apiKey: "synthetic", provider: "fixture", model: "model", privateFileData: "must stay local" } as never);+ const { safeProviderFetch } = await import("@/lib/host/ssrf");+ vi.mocked(safeProviderFetch).mockResolvedValueOnce(new Response());+ const { POST } = await import("./route");+ expect((await (await POST()).json()).ok).toBe(true);+ const [url, request] = vi.mocked(safeProviderFetch).mock.calls.at(-1)!;+ expect(url).toBe("https://fixture.invalid/v1/chat/completions");+ expect(JSON.parse(request!.body as string)).toEqual({ model: "model", max_tokens: 1, messages: [{ role: "user", content: "ping" }] });+ });it("bounds custom-provider error bodies and applies a deadline before fetching", async () => {resolveModelRef.mockResolvedValue("fixture/model");const { resolveModel } = await import("@/lib/models");diff --git a/docs/CHANGELOG.md b/docs/CHANGELOG.mdindex 4e59730a..2b00f216 100644--- a/docs/CHANGELOG.md+++ b/docs/CHANGELOG.md@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ this is the *what*, and it is what Settings → Account → About shows as “Wh**Fixed**+- `security` pin bounded MCP store reads to one descriptor- `oauth` keep registered consent within narrow viewports- `security` enforce live delegated grants and bound provider and OAuth state- `security` close remaining repository scan trust boundariesdiff --git a/docs/PROGRESS.md b/docs/PROGRESS.mdindex ffef58e6..c8d5874a 100644--- a/docs/PROGRESS.md+++ b/docs/PROGRESS.md@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@+## 2026-10-09: Pin the bounded MCP store read and review the inference-test alert++Post-release CodeQL found a check/reopen race in the new store byte limit. The reader now opens once with no-follow/nonblocking flags, checks and reads that descriptor into a size-bounded buffer, rejects growth/content changes and closes it on every path. Real-file regressions replace the pathname after open and grow the file after the size check. Atomic replacement still permits reading the original consistent snapshot.++CodeQL alert #159 traces the selected model name from config.json into the Owner-only inference test's `model` field. That transmission is intentional: the request has a static ping, one-token budget, registry-selected built-in endpoint or the existing custom-provider SSRF guard, and no arbitrary file payload. It repeats the previously reviewed alert #22. Regression tests prove the Owner boundary and exact custom-provider request body. Only this specific false positive is reviewed; scanners, rules, inventory enforcement and real findings remain enabled.+## 2026-10-09: Close the eight findings from the independent security rescanThe completed rescan of `dac56bdf` found six Medium and two Low issues, with no High findings. Named MCP integrations now reuse the private endpoint-bound transport and recursive credential redaction rather than embedding bearer headers in an unbound server. OAuth consent accepts only server-generated registered client identities and their exact callbacks, preventing manual/pruned client IDs from aliasing another principal. The obsolete manual Client ID guidance is removed; clients must register and reconnect for new consent. The browser proof also exposed the consent grid's minimum-content width overflowing a 390px viewport; its card now permits shrinking, retaining readable content and the desktop/mobile reflow assertion.diff --git a/lib/mcp/store-security.test.ts b/lib/mcp/store-security.test.tsindex 1d758ce0..496b83e4 100644--- a/lib/mcp/store-security.test.ts+++ b/lib/mcp/store-security.test.ts@@ -18,6 +18,38 @@ afterEach(() => vi.restoreAllMocks());describe("durable MCP credential isolation", () => {+ it("reads the size-checked descriptor when the store pathname is replaced", async () => {+ const state = await import("./store-state");+ await state.commitMcpStore({ clients: { original: { name: "fixture", redirectUris: [], createdAt: Date.now() } }, codes: {}, tokens: {}, refreshTokens: {}, spentRefreshTokens: {} });+ const open = fs.open.bind(fs);+ vi.spyOn(fs, "open").mockImplementation(async (...args: Parameters<typeof fs.open>) => {+ const handle = await open(...args);+ if (args[0] === process.env.OS_MCP_STORE) {+ await fs.rename(process.env.OS_MCP_STORE!, path.join(DIR, "previous.json"));+ await fs.writeFile(process.env.OS_MCP_STORE!, "x".repeat(4 * 1024 * 1024 + 1), { mode: 0o600 });+ }+ return handle;+ });+ expect(Object.keys((await state.readMcpStore()).clients)).toEqual(["original"]);+ });+ it("rejects growth after the descriptor size check without reading an unbounded body", async () => {+ const state = await import("./store-state");+ await state.commitMcpStore(await state.readMcpStore());+ const open = fs.open.bind(fs);+ vi.spyOn(fs, "open").mockImplementation(async (...args: Parameters<typeof fs.open>) => {+ const handle = await open(...args);+ if (args[0] === process.env.OS_MCP_STORE) {+ const stat = handle.stat.bind(handle);+ vi.spyOn(handle, "stat").mockImplementationOnce(async () => {+ const before = await stat();+ await fs.appendFile(process.env.OS_MCP_STORE!, "x".repeat(4 * 1024 * 1024));+ return before;+ });+ }+ return handle;+ });+ await expect(state.readMcpStore()).rejects.toThrow(/changed while reading/);+ });it("bounds many rotations, prunes expired access, preserves absolute expiry and rate limits the authenticated family", async () => {const clock = vi.spyOn(Date, "now").mockReturnValue(1_800_000_000_000);await store.storeOAuthGrant({ accessToken: "a0", refreshToken: "r0", clientId: "bounded", label: "fixture", scope: "exec", resource: "https://fixture.invalid/mcp", grantId: "bounded" });diff --git a/lib/mcp/store-state.ts b/lib/mcp/store-state.tsindex 6c9490ba..2ed302ca 100644--- a/lib/mcp/store-state.ts+++ b/lib/mcp/store-state.ts@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@import { expandOwnerStorePath } from "@/lib/owner-store-path.js";import { withSecurityStoreLock } from "@/lib/security-store-lock";-import { promises as fs } from "node:fs";+import { constants, promises as fs } from "node:fs";import os from "node:os";import path from "node:path";import type { McpStore } from "./store-types";@@ -12,13 +12,25 @@ const empty = (): McpStore => ({ clients: {}, codes: {}, tokens: {}, refreshTokeexport async function readMcpStore(): Promise<McpStore> {let raw: string;+ let handle: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof fs.open>> | undefined;try {- if ((await fs.stat(STORE_PATH)).size > MAX_STORE_BYTES) throw new Error("MCP credential store size limit reached");- raw = await fs.readFile(STORE_PATH, "utf8");+ handle = await fs.open(STORE_PATH, constants.O_RDONLY | constants.O_NOFOLLOW | constants.O_NONBLOCK);+ const before = await handle.stat();+ if (!before.isFile() || before.size > MAX_STORE_BYTES) throw new Error("MCP credential store size limit reached");+ const bytes = Buffer.alloc(before.size + 1);+ let used = 0;+ while (used < bytes.length) {+ const { bytesRead } = await handle.read(bytes, used, bytes.length - used, used);+ if (!bytesRead) break;+ used += bytesRead;+ }+ const after = await handle.stat();+ if (used !== before.size || after.size !== before.size || after.mtimeMs !== before.mtimeMs) throw new Error("MCP credential store changed while reading");+ raw = bytes.subarray(0, used).toString("utf8");} catch (error) {if ((error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === "ENOENT") return empty();throw error;- }+ } finally { await handle?.close(); }const parsed = JSON.parse(raw) as Partial<McpStore>;return {clients: parsed.clients ?? {},