Browser-based graphical shell and control plane for a Linux server you own — real terminal, file manager, live metrics and BYOK AI in one mobile-first workspace. Next.js 16 · React 19 · node-pty · Tailwind v4 · shadcn/ui. Public alpha, self-hosted.
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fix(security): require executed passive scan evidence
Rahmanb5bda8c94bf0
diff --git a/.github/workflows/dast.yml b/.github/workflows/dast.ymlindex 22667599..a3f356c3 100644--- a/.github/workflows/dast.yml+++ b/.github/workflows/dast.yml@@ -23,8 +23,17 @@ jobs:with:persist-credentials: false+ - name: Setup Node+ uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7.0.0+ with:+ node-version: 22++ - name: Require an explicit passive scan target+ run: node scripts/check-dast-target.mjs+ env:+ MSO_DAST_URL: ${{ vars.MSO_DAST_URL }}+- name: Run passive ZAP baseline against configured live instance- if: ${{ vars.MSO_DAST_URL != '' }}uses: zaproxy/action-baseline@de8ad967d3548d44ef623df22cf95c3b0baf8b25 # v0.15.0with:target: ${{ vars.MSO_DAST_URL }}diff --git a/docs/CHANGELOG.md b/docs/CHANGELOG.mdindex 68441db4..36a9cfb9 100644--- a/docs/CHANGELOG.md+++ b/docs/CHANGELOG.md@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ this is the *what*, and it is what Settings → About shows as “What's new”.**Fixed**+- `security` require executed passive scan evidence- `browser` retain private viewer connectivity without server access- `release` align Node support and read-only browser reconnects- `extensions` lock project controls until initial inspectiondiff --git a/docs/PROGRESS.md b/docs/PROGRESS.mdindex dab0f247..371e20b4 100644--- a/docs/PROGRESS.md+++ b/docs/PROGRESS.md@@ -1,3 +1,14 @@+## 2026-09-18 — Require executed passive security scan evidence++The security closeout found that the scheduled hosted ZAP workflow could report+success while its only scan step was skipped when no target was configured. Add a+dependency-free target guard before an unconditional passive scan. Missing, unsafe+or credential-bearing targets fail without echoing their contents; existing scanner+pins, passive scope, rule classifications and alert failures remain unchanged.+Tests exercise the CLI refusal and workflow wiring. Security assurance guidance now+separates successful code/dependency/secret checks from historical alert dismissals+and passive-scan execution; no dismissal or badge attestation is performed.+## 2026-09-18 — Keep private viewer routing client-verifiableThe PR review reproduced a deployment-compatibility regression: a hostname resolvingdiff --git a/docs/SECURITY-ASSURANCE.md b/docs/SECURITY-ASSURANCE.mdindex e955b747..c705057b 100644--- a/docs/SECURITY-ASSURANCE.md+++ b/docs/SECURITY-ASSURANCE.md@@ -36,6 +36,16 @@ API denial, malformed evidence, analysis failure, branch movement and open findifail closed. The CLI remains immediate unless `--wait-seconds` is explicitly supplied,and `--commit` prevents a newer branch tip from being reported as the requested revision.+## Passive baseline execution evidence++The hosted baseline requires the repository variable `MSO_DAST_URL` to identify an+explicit approved HTTPS instance without credentials, query parameters or fragments.+A missing target fails before ZAP starts; it must never produce a green workflow by+skipping the scanner. An accepted target alone is not a pass: inspect the completed+ZAP step, its findings and the report artifact. The existing rule classifications and+warning/failure behavior remain unchanged. Baseline coverage is unauthenticated and+passive, not an authenticated penetration test or proof about every host service.+## GitHub security controlsThe public repository enables:@@ -92,12 +102,12 @@ Automation cannot establish every ASVS requirement. Deployment architecture, hos## Current OpenSSF posture gaps-OpenSSF Scorecard is deliberately treated as external posture evidence rather than a scanner whose score MSO can self-declare. Two current findings remain open and must not be hidden or dismissed just to make the security tab look green:+OpenSSF Scorecard is deliberately treated as external posture evidence rather than a scanner whose score MSO can self-declare. Two repository-process gaps require separate disclosure even when the open-alert count is zero. The September 18 audit confirmed that the corresponding historical alerts were already dismissed by the maintainer on August 31; dismissal is not evidence that the gap was fixed:-- **Code-Review — High.** The repository currently has one human collaborator, so recent changes do not have independent human approvals. Scorecard explicitly does not count bot/AI reviews as human code review. This closes only after a second human maintainer participates in real review history; enabling a one-approval rule without a second reviewer would only lock the repository and would not create legitimate review evidence.-- **CII / OpenSSF Best Practices — Low.** The project is not yet enrolled in the OpenSSF Best Practices program. Enrollment and its questionnaire are maintainer-attested work and must not be faked by adding a badge image without registering the project.+- **Code-Review — High, historical alert #64 dismissed as `won't fix`.** The recorded maintainer rationale is a solo-maintainer workflow without a second active reviewer. Scorecard explicitly does not count bot/AI reviews as human code review. This closes only after a second human maintainer participates in real review history; enabling a one-approval rule without a second reviewer would only lock the repository and would not create legitimate review evidence.+- **CII / OpenSSF Best Practices — Low, historical alert #65 dismissed as `won't fix`.** The recorded rationale excludes badge enrollment from the release scope. Enrollment and its questionnaire are maintainer-attested work and must not be faked by adding a badge image without registering the project.-These are repository-process posture findings, not detected application CVEs or leaked secrets. They remain part of the public security evidence.+These are repository-process posture findings, not detected application CVEs or leaked secrets. They remain part of the public security evidence. The audit also observed thirteen other historical CodeQL/Scorecard dismissals classified as false positives or test usage. Re-read their recorded rationale before relying on them; this audit did not dismiss, delete or reopen any alert. Counts are dated evidence, not a permanent clean-state guarantee.## What is safe to say publicly@@ -105,4 +115,4 @@ When the latest `main` workflows and the latest full assurance run are green, th> MSO is continuously tested with CodeQL, Semgrep, Trivy, OSV-Scanner, Gitleaks, ShellCheck and Dependency Review, with a passive OWASP ZAP production baseline and a separate component-partitioned Codex Security review covering the tracked repository. The public repository has private vulnerability reporting, secret scanning/push protection, dependency alerts, an SBOM workflow and MSO-specific security regression tests. OpenSSF Scorecard is published separately as repository-process posture evidence, and any open Scorecard findings are disclosed rather than folded into a zero-finding claim.-Do **not** claim “no unresolved High/Critical findings across all gates” while a High Scorecard posture finding is open. Also do **not** shorten the evidence into “certified secure”, “OWASP certified”, “penetration-tested by OWASP”, “100% secure”, or “third-party audited”. Those claims are not established by this process.+Do **not** claim “no unresolved High/Critical findings across all gates” while a High Scorecard posture gap remains unresolved, even when its GitHub alert has been dismissed. Also do **not** shorten the evidence into “certified secure”, “OWASP certified”, “penetration-tested by OWASP”, “100% secure”, or “third-party audited”. Those claims are not established by this process.diff --git a/scripts/check-dast-target.mjs b/scripts/check-dast-target.mjsnew file mode 100644index 00000000..2aa04bb9--- /dev/null+++ b/scripts/check-dast-target.mjs@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@+#!/usr/bin/env node+// A configured passive scan must execute; an absent target is not security evidence.+import { pathToFileURL } from "node:url";++export function requireDastTarget(value) {+ if (typeof value !== "string" || !value.trim()) {+ throw new Error("MSO_DAST_URL is required. Configure the approved HTTPS instance before running the passive baseline.");+ }+ if (value.length > 2048 || value !== value.trim() || /[\u0000-\u0020\u007f]/.test(value)) {+ throw new Error("MSO_DAST_URL must be a bounded URL without whitespace or control characters.");+ }+ let url;+ try { url = new URL(value); } catch { throw new Error("MSO_DAST_URL must be an absolute HTTPS URL."); }+ if (url.protocol !== "https:" || !url.hostname || url.username || url.password || url.search || url.hash) {+ throw new Error("MSO_DAST_URL must use HTTPS without credentials, query parameters or a fragment.");+ }+ return url.href;+}++if (process.argv[1] && import.meta.url === pathToFileURL(process.argv[1]).href) {+ try { requireDastTarget(process.env.MSO_DAST_URL); console.log("DAST target validated; the passive scan must still complete."); }+ catch (error) { console.error(error.message); process.exitCode = 1; }+}diff --git a/scripts/dast-target.test.ts b/scripts/dast-target.test.tsnew file mode 100644index 00000000..c8ae7ab3--- /dev/null+++ b/scripts/dast-target.test.ts@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";+import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";+import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";+import { requireDastTarget } from "./check-dast-target.mjs";++describe("passive DAST requires an explicit safe target", () => {+ it.each([undefined, "", " ", "not-a-url", "http://scan.example.com", "https://user:[email protected]", "https://scan.example.com/?token=secret", "https://scan.example.com/#secret", "https://scan.example.com\n", "https://scan.example.com/" + "a".repeat(2048)])("rejects an absent or inappropriate target (%#)", value => {+ expect(() => requireDastTarget(value)).toThrow(/MSO_DAST_URL/);+ });+ it("accepts explicit deployment-owned HTTPS roots and paths without making requests", () => {+ expect(requireDastTarget("https://scan.example.com")).toBe("https://scan.example.com/");+ expect(requireDastTarget("https://scan.example.com:8443/app")).toBe("https://scan.example.com:8443/app");+ });+ it("fails the actual command on missing configuration without echoing secrets", () => {+ for (const value of ["", "https://user:[email protected]"]) {+ const result = spawnSync(process.execPath, ["scripts/check-dast-target.mjs"], { encoding: "utf8", env: { ...process.env, MSO_DAST_URL: value } });+ expect(result.status).toBe(1);+ expect(result.stderr).toContain("MSO_DAST_URL");+ expect(result.stderr).not.toContain("private-value");+ }+ });+ it("runs the target guard before an unconditional passive scanner with unchanged alert policy", () => {+ const workflow = readFileSync(".github/workflows/dast.yml", "utf8");+ const guard = workflow.indexOf("run: node scripts/check-dast-target.mjs");+ const scan = workflow.indexOf("uses: zaproxy/action-baseline@");+ expect(guard).toBeGreaterThan(0); expect(scan).toBeGreaterThan(guard);+ expect(workflow).not.toMatch(/^\s*if:/m);+ expect(workflow).toContain("MSO_DAST_URL: ${{ vars.MSO_DAST_URL }}");+ expect(workflow).toContain("fail_action: true");+ expect(workflow).toContain("allow_issue_writing: false");+ expect(workflow).toContain("rules_file_name: security/zap-baseline.conf");+ expect(workflow).not.toContain("-I");+ });+});