Browser-based graphical shell and control plane for a Linux server you own — real terminal, file manager, live metrics and BYOK AI in one mobile-first workspace. Next.js 16 · React 19 · node-pty · Tailwind v4 · shadcn/ui. Public alpha, self-hosted.
TypeScript browser-shellcontrol-planefile-managerhomelabmobile-firstnextjsptyreactself-hostedserver-managementshadcn-uisysadmintailwindcssterminaltypescriptvpsweb-desktopweb-terminal
fix(security): keep path sinks in validated branches
Rahmanbbb725e76e9b
diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.mdindex e5dc84dc..44dc93a4 100644--- a/SECURITY.md+++ b/SECURITY.md@@ -76,8 +76,8 @@ following source-level controls in addition to route authorization:lists rather than assigning or deleting attacker-selected object properties;- login-secret equality uses a fixed-width constant-time byte comparison; no fast password hashor reusable password verifier is created, and over-limit UTF-8 input fails closed;-- thread identifiers are accepted or rejected as a whole, then pass an explicit normalized exact-or-root-prefix- containment check before any filesystem operation; they are never rewritten into colliding names;+- thread identifiers are accepted or rejected as a whole, then pass an explicit `path.relative`+ containment check whose filesystem sink stays inside the proven-safe branch before any filesystem operation; they are never rewritten into colliding names;- bounded host reads, lock recovery, skill/catalog reads and model-cache reads bind metadata andcontent to the same `O_NOFOLLOW` file descriptor where the platform supports it;- read/write root policy performs lexical containment before filesystem resolution and canonicaldiff --git a/docs/PROGRESS.md b/docs/PROGRESS.mdindex 3ed97138..ec50e3b1 100644--- a/docs/PROGRESS.md+++ b/docs/PROGRESS.md@@ -32,8 +32,8 @@ models.dev cache writes, exclusive upload staging, and immutable CodeQL workflowPR rescan then reported eight changed-line alerts rather than being called green because theanalyzer process exited successfully: a password-comparison model, five path/race flows, one testTOCTOU and the intentional ChatGPT file-transfer sink. The comparator now uses fixed-width bytes-without creating a stored/fast password hash; thread IDs use explicit `path.relative` containment, while host paths use normalized-exact-or-separator-bound root-prefix checks immediately before each filesystem sink; the cache test binds mode and read to one file+without creating a stored/fast password hash; thread IDs and host paths use explicit `path.relative` containment, with every host+filesystem sink kept inside the analyzer-recognized safe branch; the cache test binds mode and read to one filedescriptor; and the ChatGPT bridge now streams under 20 MiB, validates redirect host, MIME and rastersignatures, then enters the guarded atomic upload path. Its remaining network-to-disk data flow isthe documented purpose of `fs_upload_file`; it may be classified only as reviewed `won't fix`, neverdiff --git a/lib/host/paths.test.ts b/lib/host/paths.test.tsindex 9aba15ff..f09585cc 100644--- a/lib/host/paths.test.ts+++ b/lib/host/paths.test.ts@@ -19,12 +19,8 @@ import { assertNotRoot, assertUploadTarget, isUnderRoot, resolveReadable, safeWr// base/read/write/ ← write root (narrower than read)// base/read/write/wlink → symlink to base/outside/secret.txt// base/outside/secret.txt-let base = "";-let readRoot = "";-let writeRoot = "";-let readPrefixSibling = "";-let writePrefixSibling = "";-let outside = "";+let base = "", readRoot = "", writeRoot = "";+let readPrefixSibling = "", writePrefixSibling = "", outside = "";beforeAll(() => {base = realpathSync(mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "mso-paths-")));diff --git a/lib/host/paths.ts b/lib/host/paths.tsindex 0186b99c..da1727da 100644--- a/lib/host/paths.ts+++ b/lib/host/paths.ts@@ -322,28 +322,29 @@ export async function resolveReadable(requested: string): Promise<string> {const normalized = path.resolve(absolute);const configured = lexicalRoots(readRootList());- // Select one configured root with an exact-or-separator-bound prefix after- // path.resolve normalization. `/safe/root-two` must never satisfy `/safe/root`.- // Keep this recognized containment guard immediately before fs.realpath: the- // realpath call itself touches the filesystem and must not receive an unchecked- // arbitrary path even though a second symlink-aware containment check follows.- let lexicalRoot: string | null = null;+ // Keep each filesystem sink inside the SAFE branch of CodeQL's documented+ // path.relative sanitizer. Runtime-equivalent flags/helpers hide the proof from+ // the analyzer. The second check uses real paths, so symlinks cannot escape.for (const root of configured) {- const rootPrefix = root.endsWith(path.sep) ? root : root + path.sep;- if (normalized !== root && !normalized.startsWith(rootPrefix)) continue;- lexicalRoot = root;- break;- }- if (!lexicalRoot) throw new HostError("Path outside readable roots");-- const real = await fs.realpath(normalized);- const realRoot = await fs.realpath(lexicalRoot).catch(() => path.resolve(lexicalRoot));- const realRootPrefix = realRoot.endsWith(path.sep) ? realRoot : realRoot + path.sep;- if (real !== realRoot && !real.startsWith(realRootPrefix)) {- throw new HostError("Path outside readable roots");+ const relative = path.relative(root, normalized);+ if (relative === ".." || relative.startsWith(".." + path.sep) || path.isAbsolute(relative)) {+ continue;+ } else {+ const real = await fs.realpath(normalized);+ const realRoot = await fs.realpath(root).catch(() => path.resolve(root));+ const realRelative = path.relative(realRoot, real);+ if (+ realRelative === ".." ||+ realRelative.startsWith(".." + path.sep) ||+ path.isAbsolute(realRelative)+ ) {+ throw new HostError("Path outside readable roots");+ }+ assertNotCredential(real);+ return real;+ }}- assertNotCredential(real);- return real;+ throw new HostError("Path outside readable roots");}// WRITE: "/" collapses to home (never the FS root). When !mustExist the parent@@ -358,32 +359,41 @@ export async function safeWritePath(requested: string, mustExist: boolean): Promconst configured = lexicalRoots(writeRootList());const lexicalTarget = mustExist ? normalized : path.dirname(normalized);- let lexicalRoot: string | null = null;for (const root of configured) {- const rootPrefix = root.endsWith(path.sep) ? root : root + path.sep;- if (lexicalTarget !== root && !lexicalTarget.startsWith(rootPrefix)) continue;- lexicalRoot = root;- break;- }- if (!lexicalRoot) throw new HostError("Path outside writable roots");-- const realRoot = await fs.realpath(lexicalRoot).catch(() => path.resolve(lexicalRoot));- const realRootPrefix = realRoot.endsWith(path.sep) ? realRoot : realRoot + path.sep;- if (mustExist) {- const real = await fs.realpath(normalized);- if (real !== realRoot && !real.startsWith(realRootPrefix)) {- throw new HostError("Path outside writable roots");+ const relative = path.relative(root, lexicalTarget);+ if (relative === ".." || relative.startsWith(".." + path.sep) || path.isAbsolute(relative)) {+ continue;+ } else {+ const realRoot = await fs.realpath(root).catch(() => path.resolve(root));+ if (mustExist) {+ const real = await fs.realpath(normalized);+ const realRelative = path.relative(realRoot, real);+ if (+ realRelative === ".." ||+ realRelative.startsWith(".." + path.sep) ||+ path.isAbsolute(realRelative)+ ) {+ throw new HostError("Path outside writable roots");+ }+ assertNotCredential(real);+ return real;+ }++ const parent = await fs.realpath(lexicalTarget);+ const parentRelative = path.relative(realRoot, parent);+ if (+ parentRelative === ".." ||+ parentRelative.startsWith(".." + path.sep) ||+ path.isAbsolute(parentRelative)+ ) {+ throw new HostError("Path outside writable roots");+ }+ const joined = path.join(parent, path.basename(normalized));+ assertNotCredential(joined);+ return joined;}- assertNotCredential(real);- return real;- }- const parent = await fs.realpath(path.dirname(normalized));- if (parent !== realRoot && !parent.startsWith(realRootPrefix)) {- throw new HostError("Path outside writable roots");}- const joined = path.join(parent, path.basename(normalized));- assertNotCredential(joined);- return joined;+ throw new HostError("Path outside writable roots");}export async function assertNotRoot(p: string): Promise<void> {