Skip to content

armgit / mso

Public Imported from GitHub
0

Browser-based graphical shell and control plane for a Linux server you own — real terminal, file manager, live metrics and BYOK AI in one mobile-first workspace. Next.js 16 · React 19 · node-pty · Tailwind v4 · shadcn/ui. Public alpha, self-hosted.

merge: reconcile Camoufox follow-up with security main

Rahmancfc1323d80a3
diff --cc docs/CHANGELOG.md
index 81ba797b,75699b12..b768a09e
--- a/docs/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/docs/CHANGELOG.md
@@@ -12,8 -12,9 +12,11 @@@ this is the *what*, and it is what Sett
**Fixed**
+ - `security` bind Convex snapshot path identity
+- `browser` derive isolated Camoufox viewer origin
+- `browser` probe cache-isolated Camoufox path
+ - `security` pin Convex snapshot import bytes
+ - `security` keep macOS installer fully parseable
- `mcp` keep architecture ratchet and bootstrap tests green
- `browser` route Camoufox websocket through viewer namespace
- `browser` isolate Camoufox viewer cache
diff --cc docs/PROGRESS.md
index 7abade75,225aff51..c2970f20
--- a/docs/PROGRESS.md
+++ b/docs/PROGRESS.md
@@@ -1,26 -1,45 +1,68 @@@
+## 2026-09-19 — Derive an isolated Camoufox sibling instead of assuming the managed-app namespace
+
+Camoufox viewer authentication no longer needs the cockpit Domain cookie, so tying its hostname
+to `{id}.mso.example.com` unnecessarily inherited deeper wildcard-certificate and cookie-scope
+constraints. The viewer now prefers an explicit `CAMOUFOX_VIEWER_ORIGIN`, otherwise derives a
+sibling outside the configured cookie namespace (`mso.example.com` → `camoufox.example.com`) or
+from a host-only cockpit origin. Overrides that share the cockpit host/cookie Domain, contain
+credentials, paths, queries, fragments or non-default ports fail closed. A broad two-label Domain
+has no safely inferable sibling and requires an explicit separate viewer origin. Managed-app host
+templates remain independent. A deployment shaped as `mso.operator.test` therefore resolves to
+`camoufox.operator.test` without any maintainer-specific source literal.
+
+## 2026-09-19 — Probe the cache-isolated Camoufox viewer entry path
+
+The viewer cache boundary moved noVNC under `/_mso-camoufox`, while the authenticated
+transport diagnostic still probed legacy `/vnc.html` with redirects forbidden. A healthy
+viewer therefore returned 307 and the Browser UI rejected it before requesting its viewer
+ticket. The public viewer prefix and entry path now live in one lightweight contract used by
+the gate, session metadata and server-side transport probe. The probe still sends no cockpit
+credentials, follows no redirects, requires HTTPS and keeps the existing SSRF/TLS checks.
+Targeted regressions verify the exact namespaced HEAD request, viewer gate, service route and
+client connection behavior.
+
+ ## 2026-09-19 — Bind Convex snapshot authorization to the opened descriptor
+
+ The prior staging hardening consumed bytes through one open descriptor but still authorized the
+ caller path before opening it. `O_NOFOLLOW` protects only the final component, so a parent-path
+ rename/symlink swap could otherwise redirect the later open outside the reviewed read root. Snapshot
+ staging now re-runs `resolveReadable()` immediately after open, requires the caller-visible canonical
+ path to be unchanged, and compares the named file's `dev`/`ino` to the descriptor `fstat`. The same
+ identity check runs again after the private descriptor-only copy. An adversarial regression replaces
+ the path after `open()` and proves the import is rejected rather than staging the old descriptor bytes
+ under a now-different pathname.
+
+ ## 2026-09-19 — Pin Convex snapshot imports to validated bytes
+
+ The security inventory exposed CodeQL alert #139: snapshot metadata was checked by
+ pathname, then the same pathname was reopened for hashing and later passed to the
+ Convex CLI. Snapshot validation now opens the source once, performs ownership/size/
+ ZIP checks and hashing through that descriptor, copies those exact bytes into a private
+ 0700/0600 staging location, verifies the descriptor did not change during the copy,
+ and imports only the staged file. The private copy is removed in a final cleanup path,
+ while result metadata continues to identify the caller's original source path. Regression
+ coverage changes the source after validation and proves the CLI still receives the
+ validated staged bytes.
+
+ ## 2026-09-19 — Keep strict Semgrep coverage complete on the macOS installer
+
+ Hosted Semgrep reported zero findings but exited 3 under `--strict` because its Bash parser
+ partially parsed the heredoc nested inside `persist_path` in `scripts/install-macos.sh`. The
+ installer now emits the exact same shell-profile block with literal `printf` arguments instead
+ of that heredoc. `--strict` and `--error` remain enabled, the public dispatcher checksum is
+ updated, `bash -n` stays clean and platform/install regressions pass. This fixes parser coverage
+ rather than suppressing or downgrading the security scanner.
+
+ ## 2026-09-18 — Include the remaining reviewed public asset variants
+
+ The first exact-main run of the path-scoped validator correctly failed because the live
+ asset graph also contains content-hashed CSS chunks and Next's versioned SVG app icon.
+ The raw report showed rule 10050 only on public cacheable assets. Header checks confirmed
+ CSS is public/immutable for one year and the icon is public for one week. Extend the
+ validator narrowly to CSS chunks and only the exact ?icon.<hash>.svg icon query shape;
+ arbitrary queries, API/login paths, cross-origin URLs and all otherwise-unreviewed alerts
+ still fail closed.
+
## 2026-09-19 — MCP agent bootstrap and capability-parity map
MCP clients were skipping `workflow_start` / `skills_search` and jumping to `exec_run` because