Browser-based graphical shell and control plane for a Linux server you own — real terminal, file manager, live metrics and BYOK AI in one mobile-first workspace. Next.js 16 · React 19 · node-pty · Tailwind v4 · shadcn/ui. Public alpha, self-hosted.
TypeScript browser-shellcontrol-planefile-managerhomelabmobile-firstnextjsptyreactself-hostedserver-managementshadcn-uisysadmintailwindcssterminaltypescriptvpsweb-desktopweb-terminal
merge: reconcile Camoufox follow-up with security main
Rahmancfc1323d80a3
diff --cc docs/CHANGELOG.mdindex 81ba797b,75699b12..b768a09e--- a/docs/CHANGELOG.md+++ b/docs/CHANGELOG.md@@@ -12,8 -12,9 +12,11 @@@ this is the *what*, and it is what Sett**Fixed**+ - `security` bind Convex snapshot path identity+- `browser` derive isolated Camoufox viewer origin+- `browser` probe cache-isolated Camoufox path+ - `security` pin Convex snapshot import bytes+ - `security` keep macOS installer fully parseable- `mcp` keep architecture ratchet and bootstrap tests green- `browser` route Camoufox websocket through viewer namespace- `browser` isolate Camoufox viewer cachediff --cc docs/PROGRESS.mdindex 7abade75,225aff51..c2970f20--- a/docs/PROGRESS.md+++ b/docs/PROGRESS.md@@@ -1,26 -1,45 +1,68 @@@+## 2026-09-19 — Derive an isolated Camoufox sibling instead of assuming the managed-app namespace++Camoufox viewer authentication no longer needs the cockpit Domain cookie, so tying its hostname+to `{id}.mso.example.com` unnecessarily inherited deeper wildcard-certificate and cookie-scope+constraints. The viewer now prefers an explicit `CAMOUFOX_VIEWER_ORIGIN`, otherwise derives a+sibling outside the configured cookie namespace (`mso.example.com` → `camoufox.example.com`) or+from a host-only cockpit origin. Overrides that share the cockpit host/cookie Domain, contain+credentials, paths, queries, fragments or non-default ports fail closed. A broad two-label Domain+has no safely inferable sibling and requires an explicit separate viewer origin. Managed-app host+templates remain independent. A deployment shaped as `mso.operator.test` therefore resolves to+`camoufox.operator.test` without any maintainer-specific source literal.++## 2026-09-19 — Probe the cache-isolated Camoufox viewer entry path++The viewer cache boundary moved noVNC under `/_mso-camoufox`, while the authenticated+transport diagnostic still probed legacy `/vnc.html` with redirects forbidden. A healthy+viewer therefore returned 307 and the Browser UI rejected it before requesting its viewer+ticket. The public viewer prefix and entry path now live in one lightweight contract used by+the gate, session metadata and server-side transport probe. The probe still sends no cockpit+credentials, follows no redirects, requires HTTPS and keeps the existing SSRF/TLS checks.+Targeted regressions verify the exact namespaced HEAD request, viewer gate, service route and+client connection behavior.++ ## 2026-09-19 — Bind Convex snapshot authorization to the opened descriptor++ The prior staging hardening consumed bytes through one open descriptor but still authorized the+ caller path before opening it. `O_NOFOLLOW` protects only the final component, so a parent-path+ rename/symlink swap could otherwise redirect the later open outside the reviewed read root. Snapshot+ staging now re-runs `resolveReadable()` immediately after open, requires the caller-visible canonical+ path to be unchanged, and compares the named file's `dev`/`ino` to the descriptor `fstat`. The same+ identity check runs again after the private descriptor-only copy. An adversarial regression replaces+ the path after `open()` and proves the import is rejected rather than staging the old descriptor bytes+ under a now-different pathname.++ ## 2026-09-19 — Pin Convex snapshot imports to validated bytes++ The security inventory exposed CodeQL alert #139: snapshot metadata was checked by+ pathname, then the same pathname was reopened for hashing and later passed to the+ Convex CLI. Snapshot validation now opens the source once, performs ownership/size/+ ZIP checks and hashing through that descriptor, copies those exact bytes into a private+ 0700/0600 staging location, verifies the descriptor did not change during the copy,+ and imports only the staged file. The private copy is removed in a final cleanup path,+ while result metadata continues to identify the caller's original source path. Regression+ coverage changes the source after validation and proves the CLI still receives the+ validated staged bytes.++ ## 2026-09-19 — Keep strict Semgrep coverage complete on the macOS installer++ Hosted Semgrep reported zero findings but exited 3 under `--strict` because its Bash parser+ partially parsed the heredoc nested inside `persist_path` in `scripts/install-macos.sh`. The+ installer now emits the exact same shell-profile block with literal `printf` arguments instead+ of that heredoc. `--strict` and `--error` remain enabled, the public dispatcher checksum is+ updated, `bash -n` stays clean and platform/install regressions pass. This fixes parser coverage+ rather than suppressing or downgrading the security scanner.++ ## 2026-09-18 — Include the remaining reviewed public asset variants++ The first exact-main run of the path-scoped validator correctly failed because the live+ asset graph also contains content-hashed CSS chunks and Next's versioned SVG app icon.+ The raw report showed rule 10050 only on public cacheable assets. Header checks confirmed+ CSS is public/immutable for one year and the icon is public for one week. Extend the+ validator narrowly to CSS chunks and only the exact ?icon.<hash>.svg icon query shape;+ arbitrary queries, API/login paths, cross-origin URLs and all otherwise-unreviewed alerts+ still fail closed.+## 2026-09-19 — MCP agent bootstrap and capability-parity mapMCP clients were skipping `workflow_start` / `skills_search` and jumping to `exec_run` because