Browser-based graphical shell and control plane for a Linux server you own — real terminal, file manager, live metrics and BYOK AI in one mobile-first workspace. Next.js 16 · React 19 · node-pty · Tailwind v4 · shadcn/ui. Public alpha, self-hosted.
TypeScript browser-shellcontrol-planefile-managerhomelabmobile-firstnextjsptyreactself-hostedserver-managementshadcn-uisysadmintailwindcssterminaltypescriptvpsweb-desktopweb-terminal
docs(progress): log the MCP server and what was verified live
Rahmanf63c953bde0f
diff --git a/docs/PROGRESS.md b/docs/PROGRESS.mdindex c1f5a234..be81c08b 100644--- a/docs/PROGRESS.md+++ b/docs/PROGRESS.md@@ -8,6 +8,48 @@ Running log of what shipped each phase. Newest at top.> Read those phases as history. **This file is the source of truth for what exists** —> `ARCHITECTURE.md` is no longer maintained and carries a stale-warning banner.+## 2026-08-10 (mcp) — the VPS is drivable from ChatGPT, off by default (DONE)++An MCP server: OAuth 2.1 + PKCE in front of a hand-rolled JSON-RPC endpoint, so+ChatGPT / Claude.ai / Cursor can call the same host operations the web UI does.+Ported from the `models-rahmanef-com` implementation (read `web/convex/mcp*.ts` and+`web/app/{mcp,oauth,.well-known}` for the original) — but that one is Convex-backed+and mso has no database, so clients, codes and tokens live in `~/.mso/mcp.json` under+the same atomic-write + fail-loud-on-corrupt rules as `lib/auth/device-store.ts`.++**The kill switch is real.** Without `OS_MCP_ENABLED=1` every route 404s — `/mcp`,+both `.well-known` documents, all three `/oauth` endpoints. Not an unauthenticated+surface: no surface. Demo mode forces it off regardless.++**Tools are thin calls into `lib/host`, and that is the whole security design.** The+MCP surface inherits `OS_FS_*_ROOTS`, the credential denylist (`~/.ssh`, cloud and AI+tokens, and `~/.mso` itself), the realpath escape checks and `exec.ts`'s destructive+filter for free. Verified live on prod: a read-scope token asking for+`~/.mso/config.json` gets `Access to credential/sensitive files is blocked`, so it+cannot exfiltrate the BYOK key or the device allowlist. `browser_status` withholds the+Camoufox viewer URL and VNC password on purpose — that profile holds a live Google+session, and a tool result is a thing that leaves the box.++Scope ladder `read < write < exec`, chosen per token on the consent screen and capped+by `OS_MCP_MAX_SCOPE`. `tools/list` filters by it AND `tools/call` re-checks it, because+a client can call a name it was never shown.++`/mcp` is deliberately NOT under `/api`: `proxy.ts` blocks mutating `/api` that cannot+prove same-origin and an MCP client is cross-origin by definition. The bearer is the+control, not the CSRF gate. `proxy.ts` exempts `/mcp`, `/oauth/token`, `/oauth/register`+and `/.well-known/oauth-*` from that gate and the document CSP; `/oauth/authorize` is+NOT exempt — it is a real page and keeps its nonce.++**Verified end to end on the live :4005 build**, not just in tests: discovery returns+the right origin, a bearer-less POST 401s with `WWW-Authenticate` + `resource_metadata`,+DCR mints a client and rejects a plaintext redirect_uri, the token endpoint answers a+bogus code with `invalid_grant`, a read token lists exactly 8 read tools and gets real+`sys_stats` back, the same token is refused `exec_run` with a message that says how to+fix it, and `mso mcp revoke` kills it mid-flight. 53 unit tests alongside.++Shipped ON with `OS_MCP_MAX_SCOPE=exec` at the owner's request — the ceiling, not the+default; every token still starts at `read` on the consent screen.+## 2026-08-10 — audit follow-up: −4.4k lines, two eager chains off first load (DONE)A 13-agent audit (6 dimension scanners, each with an adversarial verifier that had to