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'use strict';
/**
* Images in the IDE.
*
* Opening a .png used to produce a tab that said "binary file (not displayable)"
* — the text reader rejects anything containing a null byte, and it was the only
* reader the renderer had. Images now travel as raw bytes over a separate,
* root-confined, size-capped read and become a blob URL in the renderer.
*
* The three things worth pinning down are the ones that are silent when they
* break: the extension→mime table (three call sites depend on agreeing about
* it), the path-traversal guard on the new binary read, and the size cap that
* keeps a huge file from being pulled into the renderer whole.
*/
const test = require('node:test');
const assert = require('node:assert/strict');
const fs = require('node:fs');
const os = require('node:os');
const path = require('node:path');
const loadTs = require('./load-ts.cjs');
const { extensionOf, imageMimeForPath, isImagePath, isSvgPath, formatBytes } = loadTs('src/shared/imageTypes.ts');
const { readFileBinary } = loadTs('src/main/fs.ts');
const { resolveLocalImageRel, resolveRel } = loadTs('src/renderer/src/markdown/mdLinks.ts');
// ─── extension → mime ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
test('detects the image formats agents actually produce', () => {
assert.equal(imageMimeForPath('shot.png'), 'image/png');
assert.equal(imageMimeForPath('photo.jpg'), 'image/jpeg');
assert.equal(imageMimeForPath('photo.jpeg'), 'image/jpeg');
assert.equal(imageMimeForPath('anim.gif'), 'image/gif');
assert.equal(imageMimeForPath('modern.webp'), 'image/webp');
assert.equal(imageMimeForPath('icon.svg'), 'image/svg+xml');
assert.equal(imageMimeForPath('old.bmp'), 'image/bmp');
assert.equal(imageMimeForPath('fav.ico'), 'image/x-icon');
assert.equal(imageMimeForPath('new.avif'), 'image/avif');
});
test('extension matching is case-insensitive', () => {
// macOS screenshots and camera exports both ship upper-case extensions.
assert.equal(imageMimeForPath('Screenshot.PNG'), 'image/png');
assert.equal(imageMimeForPath('IMG_0001.JPG'), 'image/jpeg');
assert.ok(isImagePath('/abs/path/A.WebP'));
});
test('non-images are not images', () => {
for (const p of ['notes.md', 'index.ts', 'Makefile', 'archive.tar.gz', 'a.png.bak', '']) {
assert.equal(imageMimeForPath(p), null, `${p} must not be treated as an image`);
assert.equal(isImagePath(p), false);
}
});
test('query strings and hashes do not hide the extension', () => {
// Agent-written markdown carries cache-busters; treating `png?v=2` as the
// extension would silently drop exactly the screenshots we want to render.
assert.equal(extensionOf('shot.png?v=2'), 'png');
assert.equal(extensionOf('shot.png#fig1'), 'png');
assert.ok(isImagePath('./out/shot.png?v=2'));
});
test('a dotted DIRECTORY name cannot masquerade as an extension', () => {
assert.equal(extensionOf('v1.2/report'), '');
assert.equal(isImagePath('release-1.png/report'), false);
});
test('svg is flagged separately — it is the one image that is also source', () => {
assert.ok(isSvgPath('logo.svg'));
assert.ok(isSvgPath('a/b/LOGO.SVG'));
assert.equal(isSvgPath('logo.png'), false);
});
test('formatBytes reads like a status line', () => {
assert.equal(formatBytes(0), '0 B');
assert.equal(formatBytes(864), '864 B');
assert.equal(formatBytes(1536), '1.5 KB');
assert.equal(formatBytes(3 * 1024 * 1024), '3.0 MB');
assert.equal(formatBytes(-1), '—');
});
// ─── markdown <img src> resolution ──────────────────────────────────────────
test('local markdown images resolve against the document directory', () => {
assert.equal(resolveLocalImageRel('docs/report.md', './img/shot.png'), 'docs/img/shot.png');
assert.equal(resolveLocalImageRel('docs/report.md', 'shot.png'), 'docs/shot.png');
assert.equal(resolveLocalImageRel('docs/deep/report.md', '../shot.png'), 'docs/shot.png');
assert.equal(resolveLocalImageRel('report.md', 'out/shot.png?v=3'), 'out/shot.png');
});
test('a leading slash means the WORKSPACE root, not the filesystem root', () => {
assert.equal(resolveLocalImageRel('docs/report.md', '/assets/shot.png'), 'assets/shot.png');
// Worst case it names a path that simply does not exist inside the workspace.
assert.equal(resolveLocalImageRel('docs/report.md', '/etc/secret.png'), 'etc/secret.png');
});
test('anything with a URI scheme is refused', () => {
// Remote URLs are dead under the CSP anyway; proxying them through the main
// process would turn a rendered report into a beacon for whoever wrote it.
for (const src of [
'https://evil.example/track.png',
'http://evil.example/track.png',
'',
'file:///etc/passwd.png',
'javascript:alert(1)'
]) {
assert.equal(resolveLocalImageRel('docs/report.md', src), null, `${src} must not resolve`);
}
});
test('non-image sources are refused even when local', () => {
assert.equal(resolveLocalImageRel('docs/report.md', './secrets.env'), null);
assert.equal(resolveLocalImageRel('docs/report.md', '../../.ssh/id_rsa'), null);
assert.equal(resolveLocalImageRel('docs/report.md', undefined), null);
assert.equal(resolveLocalImageRel('docs/report.md', ' '), null);
});
test('`..` can never climb above the workspace root textually', () => {
// Not the security boundary (safeResolve is), but it must not even try.
assert.equal(resolveRel('a/b/c.md', '../../../../../etc/passwd'), 'etc/passwd');
assert.equal(resolveLocalImageRel('a/b.md', '../../../../x.png'), 'x.png');
});
// ─── the binary read itself ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
/** A 1×1 PNG — a real file with a null byte in its header, i.e. exactly what the
* text reader refuses. */
const ONE_PIXEL_PNG = Buffer.from(
'iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAYAAAAfFcSJAAAADUlEQVR42mP8z8BQDwAEhQGAhKmMIQAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==',
'base64'
);
function makeWorkspace() {
const dir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'cth-img-'));
const root = path.join(dir, 'workspace');
fs.mkdirSync(path.join(root, 'docs'), { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(root, 'docs', 'shot.png'), ONE_PIXEL_PNG);
// A sibling of the root, i.e. the thing traversal would be reaching for.
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, 'outside.png'), ONE_PIXEL_PNG);
return { dir, root };
}
test('reads an image the text reader refuses, with its mime and size', async () => {
const { dir, root } = makeWorkspace();
try {
const res = await readFileBinary(root, 'docs/shot.png');
assert.equal(res.ok, true, res.ok ? '' : res.error);
assert.equal(res.mime, 'image/png');
assert.equal(res.size, ONE_PIXEL_PNG.length);
assert.ok(Buffer.from(res.bytes).equals(ONE_PIXEL_PNG), 'bytes must round-trip exactly');
assert.ok(res.bytes.includes(0), 'the null byte is the whole reason this path exists');
assert.equal(
res.bytes.byteLength, res.bytes.buffer.byteLength,
'bytes must be COPIED into their own buffer — a pooled Buffer would ship unrelated file data across IPC'
);
} finally {
fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
test('path traversal out of the root is rejected', async () => {
const { dir, root } = makeWorkspace();
try {
for (const rel of [
'../outside.png',
'docs/../../outside.png',
path.join(dir, 'outside.png'), // absolute, outside the root
'/etc/hosts'
]) {
const res = await readFileBinary(root, rel);
assert.equal(res.ok, false, `${rel} must not be readable`);
assert.equal(res.error, 'path escapes root');
}
// …while an absolute path INSIDE the root is still fine (safeResolve's rule).
const inside = await readFileBinary(root, path.join(root, 'docs', 'shot.png'));
assert.equal(inside.ok, true);
} finally {
fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
test('the size cap is enforced before any bytes are read', async () => {
const { dir, root } = makeWorkspace();
try {
const res = await readFileBinary(root, 'docs/shot.png', 8);
assert.equal(res.ok, false);
assert.match(res.error, /too large/);
} finally {
fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
test('the default cap clears a retina screenshot (the 2 MB text cap did not)', async () => {
const { dir, root } = makeWorkspace();
try {
// 2.5 MB: over the text reader's MAX_READ_BYTES, comfortably under this one.
const big = path.join(root, 'docs', 'big.png');
fs.writeFileSync(big, Buffer.concat([ONE_PIXEL_PNG, Buffer.alloc(2.5 * 1024 * 1024)]));
const res = await readFileBinary(root, 'docs/big.png');
assert.equal(res.ok, true, res.ok ? '' : res.error);
assert.ok(res.size > 2 * 1024 * 1024);
} finally {
fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
test('non-regular files are refused rather than opened', async () => {
const { dir, root } = makeWorkspace();
try {
// A directory read would throw; a FIFO would BLOCK FOREVER with no size to
// check, hanging the IPC call and the renderer's loading state with it.
const res = await readFileBinary(root, 'docs');
assert.equal(res.ok, false);
assert.equal(res.error, 'not a regular file');
} finally {
fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
test('a missing file reports an error instead of throwing', async () => {
const { dir, root } = makeWorkspace();
try {
const res = await readFileBinary(root, 'docs/nope.png');
assert.equal(res.ok, false);
assert.match(res.error, /ENOENT/);
} finally {
fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
test('unknown binary types still read, labelled octet-stream', async () => {
const { dir, root } = makeWorkspace();
try {
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(root, 'blob.bin'), Buffer.from([0, 1, 2, 3]));
const res = await readFileBinary(root, 'blob.bin');
assert.equal(res.ok, true);
assert.equal(res.mime, 'application/octet-stream', 'never guess an image mime for an unknown extension');
} finally {
fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});