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fix(hire): replace flag denylist with default-deny allowlist (close the class)
Chaitanya Giri6cb5fe3f0157
diff --git a/src/shared/hire.ts b/src/shared/hire.tsindex df79d49d..7f0b6597 100644--- a/src/shared/hire.ts+++ b/src/shared/hire.ts@@ -40,8 +40,9 @@ export interface HireManifest {provider?: HireProvider;/** Model id/label for that provider (e.g. 'claude-sonnet-4-6'). */model?: string;- /** Extra flag-shaped args appended to the locally-built spawn command.- * Each must look like a flag or a flag value (no shell metacharacters). */+ /** Extra flag-shaped args appended to the locally-built spawn command. Each flag+ * must be in the safe-flag allowlist (see SAFE_FLAG_NAMES) and shell-metachar-free;+ * anything else rejects the manifest (the command stays editable post-import). */commandFlags?: string[];/** Capability tags for the hive registry (routing hints). */capabilities?: string[];@@ -81,56 +82,45 @@ const FLAG_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9._\/=:,@+-]{1,100}$/;* stays editable, so a legitimate exotic value can still be typed by hand.) */const MODEL_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9 ._()[\]\/:@+-]{1,80}$/;-/** Flags a manifest may NEVER request. These are shell-metachar-free and so pass- * FLAG_RE, but they reach the CLI's argv verbatim and would let a *shared*- * manifest silently turn an imported agent into a no-prompt / full-filesystem /- * no-sandbox / attacker-controlled-config-or-MCP / injected-system-prompt agent.- * The human review gate is too soft for these (auto-mode legitimately uses a- * bypass flag, so a malicious one blends in), so we reject the manifest outright.+/** Flags a manifest is ALLOWED to append — a default-deny ALLOWLIST.*- * PROVIDER-AGNOSTIC SUPERSET: a manifest's `provider` is attacker-chosen, so the- * check is NOT provider-conditional — a token is denied if ANY supported CLI- * (claude / antigravity·agy / codex) treats it as dangerous. The dangerous- * capabilities are mined from the provider presets (agentProvider.ts autoFlag)- * and command references (claudeCommands.ts / codexCommands.ts).+ * WHY AN ALLOWLIST: a manifest's `provider` is attacker-chosen and each CLI keeps+ * adding flags, so a denylist of "dangerous" flags drifts and leaks (three rounds+ * of re-review each found one more spelling that escaped — codex `-a`/`-s`, then+ * `-c model_providers.*.base_url=…` backend-redirect credential exfil, then+ * `--provider`). Default-deny closes the CLASS: only flags that PROVABLY cannot+ * escalate permissions, redirect the backend / exfil credentials, read/write+ * arbitrary files, inject prompt/config/MCP, or run commands may pass; every+ * other flag-shaped token rejects the manifest outright.*- * Matched case-insensitively against the flag NAME (the part before any `=`),- * covering both `--flag value` and `--flag=value` spellings, plus codex's short- * `-a` / `-s`. NOTE: a hardcoded per-CLI denylist will drift as providers add- * flags; an allowlist of known-safe flags (or provider-aware validation) is the- * durable direction for a later pass. */-const DENIED_FLAG_NAMES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([- // Claude / agy (antigravity) — permissions, filesystem, config, MCP, prompt.- '--dangerously-skip-permissions',- '--permission-mode',- '--permission-prompt-tool',- '--disallowedtools', // claude --disallowedTools (lower-cased for compare)- '--add-dir',- '--additional-directories', // long alias of --add-dir- '--mcp-config',- '--mcp-server',- '--append-system-prompt',- '--system-prompt',- '--settings',- '--config',- // Codex — approval policy + OS sandbox + full-bypass overrides.- '--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox',- '--dangerously-bypass-hook-trust',- '--full-auto',- '--yolo',- '--ask-for-approval',- '-a', // codex short: approval policy (-a never)- '--sandbox',- '-s' // codex short: sandbox scope (-s danger-full-access)+ * These names are the curated SAFE set, mined from the provider command+ * references (claudeCommands.ts / codexCommands.ts) and presets+ * (agentProvider.ts). The list is deliberately tiny — biased hard to EXCLUDE,+ * because the spawn command stays editable after import, so a user who needs an+ * exotic flag can add it by hand. Each is behavioral / output / a safety-cap+ * only, with a single non-escalating value (or none):+ * --model select the model id (claude/codex/agy modelFlag)+ * --max-turns cap agentic turns (runaway guard, strictly safety-↑)+ * --output-format headless output shape: text / json / stream-json+ * --verbose logging verbosity only+ * Matched case-insensitively against the flag NAME (part before any `=`), so both+ * `--flag value` and `--flag=value` are covered. NOTHING permission / sandbox /+ * approval / dir / config (incl. codex `-c`) / mcp / provider / base-url /+ * system-prompt / settings related is ever allowlisted. */+const SAFE_FLAG_NAMES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([+ '--model',+ '--max-turns',+ '--output-format',+ '--verbose']);-/** True if a commandFlags token is (or names) a denied flag. Handles `--x`,- * `--x=value`, and the short `-x` forms; the `--x value` / `-x value` value-token- * spellings are caught via the leading flag token. */-function isDeniedFlag(token: string): boolean {+/** True if a commandFlags token is an allowed flag. Handles `--x` and `--x=value`+ * (matches the NAME before `=`, case-insensitive); short `-x` forms are not in+ * the allowlist and so are rejected by default. */+function isSafeFlag(token: string): boolean {if (!token.startsWith('-')) return false;const name = token.split('=', 1)[0].toLowerCase();- return DENIED_FLAG_NAMES.has(name);+ return SAFE_FLAG_NAMES.has(name);}function str(v: unknown): v is string { return typeof v === 'string'; }@@ -184,15 +174,39 @@ export function validateHireManifest(raw: unknown): HireValidation {errors.push('"commandFlags" must be an array of at most 16 items');} else {commandFlags = [];- for (const f of o.commandFlags) {- if (!str(f) || !FLAG_RE.test(f)) { errors.push(`commandFlags entry ${JSON.stringify(f)} is not a safe flag token`); continue; }- if (isDeniedFlag(f)) { errors.push(`commandFlags entry ${JSON.stringify(f)} is not allowed (it can grant elevated permissions, extra filesystem access, or load an external config / MCP server / system prompt)`); continue; }- commandFlags.push(f);- }- // The FIRST entry must actually be flag-shaped; later bare tokens are- // allowed as values for a preceding flag.- if (commandFlags.length > 0 && !commandFlags[0].startsWith('-')) {- errors.push('"commandFlags" must start with a flag (e.g. "--max-turns")');+ // DEFAULT-DENY: every flag-shaped token must name an allowlisted safe flag;+ // a bare token is allowed only as the value immediately following an allowed+ // `--flag` (so a value can never smuggle in a second, unknown flag).+ let valueAllowed = false; // previous token was an allowed `--flag` (no inline =)+ for (let i = 0; i < o.commandFlags.length; i++) {+ const f = o.commandFlags[i];+ if (!str(f) || !FLAG_RE.test(f)) {+ errors.push(`commandFlags entry ${JSON.stringify(f)} is not a safe flag token`);+ valueAllowed = false;+ continue;+ }+ // The FIRST entry must be flag-shaped (defense in depth; kept explicit).+ if (i === 0 && !f.startsWith('-')) {+ errors.push('"commandFlags" must start with a flag (e.g. "--model")');+ valueAllowed = false;+ continue;+ }+ if (f.startsWith('-')) {+ if (!isSafeFlag(f)) {+ errors.push(`commandFlags entry ${JSON.stringify(f)} is not in the shared-hire safe-flag list — for safety a shared hire may only embed known-harmless flags (${[...SAFE_FLAG_NAMES].join(', ')}). If you need this flag, add it by hand in the command field after importing.`);+ valueAllowed = false;+ continue;+ }+ commandFlags.push(f);+ valueAllowed = !f.includes('='); // a `--flag value` form may take one value next+ } else {+ if (!valueAllowed) {+ errors.push(`commandFlags entry ${JSON.stringify(f)} is not allowed here (a value may only follow an allowed flag such as "--model")`);+ continue;+ }+ commandFlags.push(f);+ valueAllowed = false; // consume the value; no chained second value+ }}if (commandFlags.length === 0) commandFlags = undefined;}