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fix(windows): write the folder-trust key under the path Claude Code reads (#607)
himeshram75845a5bef30
diff --git a/src/main/config.ts b/src/main/config.tsindex c1092988..f66c854c 100644--- a/src/main/config.ts+++ b/src/main/config.ts@@ -831,9 +831,23 @@ function ensureClaudeProjectTrust(home: string, cwd: string): void {if (parsed === null || typeof parsed !== 'object' || Array.isArray(parsed)) return;c = parsed as ClaudeConfig;}- if (c.projects?.[cwd]?.hasTrustDialogAccepted !== true) {+ // Claude Code looks this entry up under a path normalised to FORWARD+ // slashes — its own lookup walks parents with `o.startsWith(r + "/")`, and+ // the entries it writes on Windows are keyed "C:/Users/…". Writing only the+ // raw Windows path ("C:\Users\…") puts the flag somewhere Claude never+ // reads, so the agent still hits the interactive "Accessing workspace /+ // Quick safety check" dialog, which it cannot answer: god exits 1 and every+ // message to it sits at "waiting".+ //+ // Both spellings are written — the normalised one is what current Claude+ // reads, the raw one keeps older builds working. On macOS and Linux the two+ // are identical, the Set collapses to one key, and this is a no-op.+ const keys = Array.from(new Set([cwd.replace(/\\/g, '/'), cwd]));+ if (keys.some((k) => c.projects?.[k]?.hasTrustDialogAccepted !== true)) {c.projects = c.projects ?? {};- c.projects[cwd] = { ...(c.projects[cwd] ?? {}), hasTrustDialogAccepted: true };+ for (const k of keys) {+ c.projects[k] = { ...(c.projects[k] ?? {}), hasTrustDialogAccepted: true };+ }writeFileSync(p, JSON.stringify(c, null, 2), 'utf8');}} catch (error) {diff --git a/test/claude-permissions-config.test.cjs b/test/claude-permissions-config.test.cjsindex d6f294a3..499ecec2 100644--- a/test/claude-permissions-config.test.cjs+++ b/test/claude-permissions-config.test.cjs@@ -32,6 +32,14 @@ const settingsPath = path.join(settingsDir, 'settings.json');const projectConfigPath = path.join(home, '.claude.json');const cwd = path.join(home, 'workspace', 'project');+// Claude Code reads projects[] under a path normalised to forward slashes, so+// the trust flag is written under every spelling it might look up. On Windows+// that is two keys; on macOS and Linux the two are the same string and this+// collapses to the single key these tests have always asserted.+const cwdKeys = Array.from(new Set([cwd.replace(/\\/g, '/'), cwd]));+const trustedCwd = (entry = { hasTrustDialogAccepted: true }) =>+ Object.fromEntries(cwdKeys.map((k) => [k, k === cwd ? entry : { hasTrustDialogAccepted: true }]));+function writeSettings(contents) {fs.mkdirSync(settingsDir, { recursive: true });fs.writeFileSync(settingsPath, contents, 'utf8');@@ -98,11 +106,11 @@ test('merges required fields into valid configs without losing unrelated data',assert.deepEqual(JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(projectConfigPath, 'utf8')), {numStartups: 7,projects: {- [cwd]: {+ ...trustedCwd({allowedTools: ['Read'],custom: 'keep',hasTrustDialogAccepted: true- },+ }),'/another/project': { hasTrustDialogAccepted: false }}});@@ -116,7 +124,7 @@ test('creates minimal config files when they are missing', () => {skipAutoPermissionPrompt: true});assert.deepEqual(JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(projectConfigPath, 'utf8')), {- projects: { [cwd]: { hasTrustDialogAccepted: true } }+ projects: trustedCwd()});});@@ -130,15 +138,13 @@ test('a malformed settings file does not prevent safe project trust updates', ()assert.equal(fs.readFileSync(settingsPath, 'utf8'), malformedSettings);assert.deepEqual(JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(projectConfigPath, 'utf8')), {custom: 'keep',- projects: { [cwd]: { hasTrustDialogAccepted: true } }+ projects: trustedCwd()});});test('does not rewrite configs that already contain every required field', () => {const settings = '{"skipDangerousModePermissionPrompt":true,"skipAutoPermissionPrompt":true}\n';- const projectConfig = JSON.stringify({- projects: { [cwd]: { hasTrustDialogAccepted: true } }- }) + '\n';+ const projectConfig = JSON.stringify({ projects: trustedCwd() }) + '\n';writeSettings(settings);fs.writeFileSync(projectConfigPath, projectConfig, 'utf8');@@ -158,3 +164,19 @@ test('preserves existing config files with unsafe JSON root shapes', () => {assert.equal(fs.readFileSync(settingsPath, 'utf8'), 'null\n');assert.equal(fs.readFileSync(projectConfigPath, 'utf8'), '["keep"]\n');});++test('repairs a config trusted only under the raw path spelling', () => {+ // The bug this guards: on Windows the raw path is "C:\…" while Claude Code+ // looks the entry up as "C:/…". A config trusted only under the raw spelling+ // left the folder untrusted as far as Claude was concerned, so the agent hit+ // the interactive trust dialog it cannot answer and exited 1.+ fs.writeFileSync(projectConfigPath, JSON.stringify({+ projects: { [cwd]: { hasTrustDialogAccepted: true } }+ }), 'utf8');++ ensureClaudePermissionsAccepted(cwd);++ const projects = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(projectConfigPath, 'utf8')).projects;+ assert.equal(projects[cwd.replace(/\\/g, '/')]?.hasTrustDialogAccepted, true);+ assert.equal(projects[cwd]?.hasTrustDialogAccepted, true);+});