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fix(hire): close codex/agy denylist gap — provider-agnostic flag superset

Chaitanya Giri949bb5c4cb62
diff --git a/src/shared/hire.ts b/src/shared/hire.ts
index ed39c73d..df79d49d 100644
--- a/src/shared/hire.ts
+++ b/src/shared/hire.ts
@@ -84,25 +84,49 @@ const MODEL_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9 ._()[\]\/:@+-]{1,80}$/;
/** Flags a manifest may NEVER request. These are shell-metachar-free and so pass
* FLAG_RE, but they reach the CLI's argv verbatim and would let a *shared*
* manifest silently turn an imported agent into a no-prompt / full-filesystem /
- * attacker-controlled-config-or-MCP / injected-system-prompt agent. The human
- * review gate is too soft for these (auto-mode legitimately uses a bypass flag,
- * so a malicious one blends in), so we reject the manifest outright. Compared
- * case-insensitively against the flag NAME (the part before any `=`), which
- * covers both `--flag value` and `--flag=value` spellings. */
+ * no-sandbox / attacker-controlled-config-or-MCP / injected-system-prompt agent.
+ * The human review gate is too soft for these (auto-mode legitimately uses a
+ * bypass flag, so a malicious one blends in), so we reject the manifest outright.
+ *
+ * PROVIDER-AGNOSTIC SUPERSET: a manifest's `provider` is attacker-chosen, so the
+ * check is NOT provider-conditional — a token is denied if ANY supported CLI
+ * (claude / antigravity·agy / codex) treats it as dangerous. The dangerous
+ * capabilities are mined from the provider presets (agentProvider.ts autoFlag)
+ * and command references (claudeCommands.ts / codexCommands.ts).
+ *
+ * Matched case-insensitively against the flag NAME (the part before any `=`),
+ * covering both `--flag value` and `--flag=value` spellings, plus codex's short
+ * `-a` / `-s`. NOTE: a hardcoded per-CLI denylist will drift as providers add
+ * flags; an allowlist of known-safe flags (or provider-aware validation) is the
+ * durable direction for a later pass. */
const DENIED_FLAG_NAMES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([
+ // Claude / agy (antigravity) — permissions, filesystem, config, MCP, prompt.
'--dangerously-skip-permissions',
'--permission-mode',
+ '--permission-prompt-tool',
+ '--disallowedtools', // claude --disallowedTools (lower-cased for compare)
'--add-dir',
+ '--additional-directories', // long alias of --add-dir
'--mcp-config',
'--mcp-server',
'--append-system-prompt',
'--system-prompt',
'--settings',
- '--config'
+ '--config',
+ // Codex — approval policy + OS sandbox + full-bypass overrides.
+ '--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox',
+ '--dangerously-bypass-hook-trust',
+ '--full-auto',
+ '--yolo',
+ '--ask-for-approval',
+ '-a', // codex short: approval policy (-a never)
+ '--sandbox',
+ '-s' // codex short: sandbox scope (-s danger-full-access)
]);
/** True if a commandFlags token is (or names) a denied flag. Handles `--x`,
- * `--x=value`; the matching `--x value` value-token form is caught via `--x`. */
+ * `--x=value`, and the short `-x` forms; the `--x value` / `-x value` value-token
+ * spellings are caught via the leading flag token. */
function isDeniedFlag(token: string): boolean {
if (!token.startsWith('-')) return false;
const name = token.split('=', 1)[0].toLowerCase();