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fix(security): validate each shell segment against exec.allowPatterns
michaelxerbbca32fea9a3
diff --git a/nanobot/agent/tools/shell.py b/nanobot/agent/tools/shell.pyindex 9fac8725b..26fb9fa90 100644--- a/nanobot/agent/tools/shell.py+++ b/nanobot/agent/tools/shell.py@@ -755,9 +755,12 @@ class ExecTool(Tool):# allow_patterns take priority over deny_patterns so that users can# exempt specific commands (e.g. "rm -rf" inside a build directory)- # from the hardcoded deny list via configuration.- explicitly_allowed = bool(self.allow_patterns) and any(- re.fullmatch(p, lower) for p in self.allow_patterns+ # from the hardcoded deny list via configuration. A chained command is+ # only explicitly allowed when every top-level shell segment matches.+ segments = self._split_shell_segments(lower)+ explicitly_allowed = bool(self.allow_patterns) and bool(segments) and all(+ any(re.search(pattern, segment) for pattern in self.allow_patterns)+ for segment in segments)if not explicitly_allowed:for pattern in self.deny_patterns:@@ -822,6 +825,79 @@ class ExecTool(Tool):return None+ @staticmethod+ def _split_shell_segments(command: str) -> list[str]:+ """Split shell commands on top-level chaining operators."""+ segments: list[str] = []+ current: list[str] = []+ quote: str | None = None+ escaped = False+ paren_depth = 0+ i = 0++ while i < len(command):+ ch = command[i]++ if escaped:+ current.append(ch)+ escaped = False+ i += 1+ continue++ if ch == "\\" and quote != "'":+ current.append(ch)+ escaped = True+ i += 1+ continue++ if quote is not None:+ current.append(ch)+ if ch == quote:+ quote = None+ i += 1+ continue++ if ch in {"'", '"', "`"}:+ current.append(ch)+ quote = ch+ i += 1+ continue++ if ch == "(":+ paren_depth += 1+ current.append(ch)+ i += 1+ continue++ if ch == ")" and paren_depth > 0:+ paren_depth -= 1+ current.append(ch)+ i += 1+ continue++ operator_len = 0+ if paren_depth == 0:+ if command.startswith(("&&", "||"), i):+ operator_len = 2+ elif ch in {";", "|"}:+ operator_len = 1++ if operator_len:+ segment = "".join(current).strip()+ if segment:+ segments.append(segment)+ current = []+ i += operator_len+ continue++ current.append(ch)+ i += 1++ segment = "".join(current).strip()+ if segment:+ segments.append(segment)+ return segments+@classmethoddef _is_benign_device_path(cls, path: str) -> bool:"""Return True for kernel device files that should never be workspace-blocked."""diff --git a/tests/tools/test_exec_allow_patterns.py b/tests/tools/test_exec_allow_patterns.pyindex cfd59f2b6..9700d29c6 100644--- a/tests/tools/test_exec_allow_patterns.py+++ b/tests/tools/test_exec_allow_patterns.py@@ -58,18 +58,11 @@ def test_allow_patterns_is_whitelist_only():assert "allowlist" in result.lower()-def test_allow_patterns_do_not_allow_chained_command_bypass():- """A partial allowlist match must not bypass deny patterns in chained commands."""- tool = ExecTool(allow_patterns=[r"\becho\b"])- result = tool._guard_command("echo hello; rm -rf /", "/tmp")- assert result is not None- assert "deny pattern filter" in result.lower()-+def test_guard_allow_patterns_block_non_matching_chained_segment():+ """Every top-level shell segment must match an allow pattern."""+ tool = ExecTool(allow_patterns=[r"\becho\s+allowlisted\b"])-def test_allow_patterns_do_not_allow_comment_tail_bypass():- """Comment tails must not make a non-allowlisted command match."""- tool = ExecTool(allow_patterns=[r"echo allowlisted"])- result = tool._guard_command("touch canary # echo allowlisted", "/tmp")+ result = tool._guard_command("echo allowlisted && touch /tmp/evil", "/tmp")assert result is not Noneassert "allowlist" in result.lower()@@ -87,3 +80,32 @@ def test_allow_patterns_fullmatch_allows_exact_command():tool = ExecTool(allow_patterns=[r"rm\s+-rf\s+/tmp/build"])result = tool._guard_command("rm -rf /tmp/build", "/tmp")assert result is None+++def test_guard_allow_patterns_allow_single_matching_segment():+ tool = ExecTool(allow_patterns=[r"\becho\s+allowlisted\b"])++ result = tool._guard_command("echo allowlisted", "/tmp")++ assert result is None+++def test_guard_allow_patterns_allow_multiple_matching_segments():+ tool = ExecTool(+ allow_patterns=[+ r"\becho\s+allowlisted\b",+ r"\becho\s+also_allowed\b",+ ]+ )++ result = tool._guard_command("echo allowlisted && echo also_allowed", "/tmp")++ assert result is None+++def test_guard_allow_patterns_keep_fullmatch_style_compatibility():+ tool = ExecTool(allow_patterns=[r"^echo\s+allowlisted$"])++ result = tool._guard_command("echo allowlisted", "/tmp")++ assert result is None