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fix: allow git commands in workspace subdirectories

Haisambfe5b6402240
diff --git a/nanobot/agent/tools/shell.py b/nanobot/agent/tools/shell.py
index 808beaf09..4da7895d6 100644
--- a/nanobot/agent/tools/shell.py
+++ b/nanobot/agent/tools/shell.py
@@ -397,6 +397,7 @@ class ExecTool(Tool):
command,
cwd,
restrict_to_workspace=access.restrict_to_workspace,
+ workspace_root=workspace_root,
)
if guard_error:
return guard_error
@@ -591,6 +592,7 @@ class ExecTool(Tool):
cwd: str,
*,
restrict_to_workspace: bool | None = None,
+ workspace_root: str | None = None,
) -> str | None:
"""Best-effort safety guard for potentially destructive commands."""
cmd = command.strip()
@@ -629,6 +631,11 @@ class ExecTool(Tool):
)
cwd_path = Path(cwd).resolve()
+ resolved_workspace = (
+ Path(workspace_root).expanduser().resolve()
+ if workspace_root
+ else None
+ )
for raw in self._extract_absolute_paths(cmd):
try:
@@ -646,10 +653,13 @@ class ExecTool(Tool):
continue
media_path = get_media_dir().resolve()
- if p.is_absolute() and not (
+ allowed = (
is_path_within(p, cwd_path)
or is_path_within(p, media_path)
- ):
+ )
+ if not allowed and resolved_workspace is not None:
+ allowed = is_path_within(p, resolved_workspace)
+ if p.is_absolute() and not allowed:
return (
"Error: Command blocked by safety guard (path outside working dir)"
+ _WORKSPACE_BOUNDARY_NOTE
diff --git a/tests/tools/test_exec_security.py b/tests/tools/test_exec_security.py
index 7540f87b8..722636001 100644
--- a/tests/tools/test_exec_security.py
+++ b/tests/tools/test_exec_security.py
@@ -349,3 +349,49 @@ def test_exec_allows_format_in_url_and_args(command):
tool = ExecTool()
result = tool._guard_command(command, "/tmp")
assert result is None
+
+
+# --- workspace_root allows paths inside workspace but outside cwd ----------
+
+
+def test_exec_allows_workspace_paths_from_subdirectory(tmp_path):
+ """Absolute paths inside the workspace root must be allowed even when cwd
+ is a subdirectory. This is the scenario reported in the issue: git
+ commands in ``~/.nanobot/workspace/obsidian_notes`` reference paths
+ under the broader workspace that are outside the subdirectory cwd."""
+ workspace = tmp_path / "workspace"
+ subdir = workspace / "obsidian_notes"
+ subdir.mkdir(parents=True)
+ sibling = workspace / "other_project"
+ sibling.mkdir()
+
+ tool = ExecTool(working_dir=str(workspace), restrict_to_workspace=True)
+
+ # A command run from the subdirectory that references a sibling path
+ # inside the workspace should be allowed.
+ result = tool._guard_command(
+ f"git clone {sibling}",
+ str(subdir),
+ workspace_root=str(workspace),
+ )
+ assert result is None
+
+
+def test_exec_blocks_outside_paths_from_subdirectory(tmp_path):
+ """Paths truly outside the workspace must still be blocked even when
+ workspace_root is provided."""
+ workspace = tmp_path / "workspace"
+ subdir = workspace / "project"
+ subdir.mkdir(parents=True)
+ outside = tmp_path / "secrets"
+ outside.mkdir()
+
+ tool = ExecTool(working_dir=str(workspace), restrict_to_workspace=True)
+
+ result = tool._guard_command(
+ f"cat {outside / 'key.pem'}",
+ str(subdir),
+ workspace_root=str(workspace),
+ )
+ assert result is not None
+ assert "path outside working dir" in result