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fix(exec): guard bare and named-user home paths
yorkhellend3382d7e579c
diff --git a/nanobot/agent/tools/shell.py b/nanobot/agent/tools/shell.pyindex b19c0de86..001be5897 100644--- a/nanobot/agent/tools/shell.py+++ b/nanobot/agent/tools/shell.py@@ -890,12 +890,27 @@ class ExecTool(Tool):for raw in self._extract_absolute_paths(cmd):try:expanded = os.path.expandvars(raw.strip())+ # Python's expanduser() intentionally does not implement+ # shell directory-stack forms. ``~+`` is the active cwd,+ # while ``~-`` and indexed forms can resolve outside it;+ # normalize the former and fail closed on the latter.+ if expanded == "~+":+ p = cwd_path+ elif expanded.startswith("~+/"):+ p = (cwd_path / expanded[3:]).resolve()+ elif re.match(r"^~(?:-|[+-]\d+)(?:/|$)", expanded):+ return ToolResult.error(+ "Error: Command blocked by safety guard "+ "(path outside working dir)"+ + _WORKSPACE_BOUNDARY_NOTE+ )+ else:+ p = Path(expanded).expanduser().resolve()# Match against the un-resolved path first. On Linux,# /dev/stderr is a symlink to /proc/self/fd/2 and# ``Path.resolve()`` would mask the device-file intent.if self._is_benign_device_path(expanded):continue- p = Path(expanded).expanduser().resolve()except Exception:continue@@ -1043,8 +1058,10 @@ class ExecTool(Tool):``shlex`` separates real grouping/redirection operators while preservingparentheses and spaces that were quoted or escaped as part of a path.Embedded scripts (for example ``sh -c \"cat /tmp/x\"``) still need a- small boundary scan. Colons are deliberately not boundaries: treating- them as such misclassifies URLs, ``host:/remote`` and ``C:/Windows``.+ small boundary scan. Colons are not general boundaries: treating them+ as such misclassifies URLs, ``host:/remote`` and ``C:/Windows``. They+ are considered only inside a syntactically valid assignment, where+ shells expand each colon-delimited tilde component."""paths: list[str] = []for match in re.finditer(@@ -1065,25 +1082,42 @@ class ExecTool(Tool):i = 0while i < len(token):is_posix = token[i] == "/"- is_home = token.startswith("~/", i) or token.startswith("~+/", i)+ home_match = re.match(+ r"~(?:[+-](?:\d+)?|[A-Za-z0-9_.@-]+)?(?=/|:|$)",+ token[i:],+ )+ is_home = home_match is not Noneif not is_posix and not is_home:i += 1continueprefix = token[:i]- at_boundary = i == 0 or token[i - 1] in boundary_charsparameter_default = (i >= 2 and token[i - 2] == ":" and token[i - 1] in "-+?=")- if not at_boundary and not parameter_default:- i += 1- continue-word_start = max((prefix.rfind(char) for char in " \t\r\n<>|;&"),default=-1,) + 1word_prefix = prefix[word_start:]+ assignment_component = bool(+ re.fullmatch(+ r"(?:[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*|--?[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)="+ r"(?:[^:=\s]*:)*",+ word_prefix,+ )+ )+ at_boundary = i == 0 or token[i - 1] in boundary_chars+ if is_home:+ # A shell word beginning with ``~`` is a separate shlex token.+ # Mid-token expansion is valid only after ``=`` or a colon in+ # an assignment. This avoids PromQL/Loki ``=~`` and ``|~``+ # match operators while covering PATH-like values.+ at_boundary = i == 0 or assignment_component+ if not at_boundary and not parameter_default:+ i += 1+ continue+if re.search(r"[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9+.-]*://", word_prefix) or re.match(r"(?:[^/:=\s]+@)?[^/:=\s]+:$",word_prefix,@@ -1095,11 +1129,13 @@ class ExecTool(Tool):i += 1continue- assignment_value = i > 0 and token[i - 1] == "=" and not any(- char.isspace() for char in prefix- )+ assignment_value = assignment_componentif i == 0 or assignment_value:end = len(token)+ if assignment_value:+ separator = token.find(":", i)+ if separator >= 0:+ end = separatorelif token[i - 1] in {"'", '"'}:quote = token[i - 1]closing = token.find(quote, i)diff --git a/tests/tools/test_tool_validation.py b/tests/tools/test_tool_validation.pyindex f461ccf3b..68c1908fa 100644--- a/tests/tools/test_tool_validation.py+++ b/tests/tools/test_tool_validation.py@@ -290,10 +290,11 @@ def test_exec_extract_absolute_paths_captures_home_paths() -> None:def test_exec_extract_absolute_paths_captures_paths_after_equals() -> None:- cmd = "curl --output=/etc/passwd --config=~/.nanobot/config.json"+ cmd = "curl --output=/etc/passwd --config=~/.nanobot/config.json --user-home=~root"paths = ExecTool._extract_absolute_paths(cmd)assert "/etc/passwd" in pathsassert "~/.nanobot/config.json" in paths+ assert "~root" in pathsdef test_exec_extract_absolute_paths_does_not_capture_query_tilde() -> None:@@ -302,6 +303,29 @@ def test_exec_extract_absolute_paths_does_not_capture_query_tilde() -> None:assert not any(p.startswith("~") for p in paths)+def test_exec_extract_absolute_paths_captures_bare_and_named_user_home_paths() -> None:+ paths = ExecTool._extract_absolute_paths("cd ~ && cat ~root/.bashrc")+ assert "~" in paths+ assert "~root/.bashrc" in paths+++def test_exec_extract_absolute_paths_captures_tilde_after_shell_operators() -> None:+ paths = ExecTool._extract_absolute_paths(+ "cat <~root/.bashrc;~root/bin/tool|~daemon/bin/tool"+ )+ assert "~root/.bashrc" in paths+ assert paths.count("~root/bin/tool") == 1+ assert "~daemon/bin/tool" in paths+++def test_exec_extract_absolute_paths_captures_tilde_assignment_components() -> None:+ paths = ExecTool._extract_absolute_paths(+ "HOME=~ PATH=bin:~root/bin curl --config=~"+ )+ assert "~" in paths+ assert "~root/bin" in paths++def test_exec_extract_absolute_paths_captures_quoted_paths() -> None:cmd = 'cat "/tmp/data.txt" "~/.nanobot/config.json"'paths = ExecTool._extract_absolute_paths(cmd)@@ -319,6 +343,48 @@ def test_exec_guard_blocks_home_path_outside_workspace(tmp_path) -> None:assert "hard policy boundary" in error+def test_exec_guard_blocks_bare_tilde_cwd_escape(tmp_path) -> None:+ tool = ExecTool(restrict_to_workspace=True)+ error = tool._guard_command("cd ~ && cat secret.txt", str(tmp_path))+ assert error is not None+ assert error.startswith(+ "Error: Command blocked by safety guard (path outside working dir)"+ )+++def test_exec_guard_blocks_named_user_home_path(tmp_path) -> None:+ tool = ExecTool(restrict_to_workspace=True)+ error = tool._guard_command("cat ~root/.bashrc", str(tmp_path))+ assert error is not None+ assert error.startswith(+ "Error: Command blocked by safety guard (path outside working dir)"+ )+++ "command",+ [+ "cat <~root/.bashrc",+ "cat ~-/.bashrc",+ "cat ~+1/.bashrc",+ "cat ~-1/.bashrc",+ ],+)+def test_exec_guard_blocks_home_paths_with_special_shell_contexts(+ tmp_path, command: str+) -> None:+ error = ExecTool(restrict_to_workspace=True)._guard_command(command, str(tmp_path))+ assert error is not None+ assert error.startswith(+ "Error: Command blocked by safety guard (path outside working dir)"+ )+++def test_exec_guard_allows_current_directory_tilde(tmp_path) -> None:+ tool = ExecTool(restrict_to_workspace=True)+ assert tool._guard_command("cat ~+/file.txt", str(tmp_path)) is None++def test_exec_guard_blocks_equals_home_path_outside_workspace(tmp_path) -> None:tool = ExecTool(restrict_to_workspace=True)error = tool._guard_command("cat --config=~/.nanobot/config.json", str(tmp_path))@@ -328,6 +394,15 @@ def test_exec_guard_blocks_equals_home_path_outside_workspace(tmp_path) -> None:)+def test_exec_guard_blocks_equals_named_user_home_path(tmp_path) -> None:+ tool = ExecTool(restrict_to_workspace=True)+ error = tool._guard_command("cat --config=~root/.bashrc", str(tmp_path))+ assert error is not None+ assert error.startswith(+ "Error: Command blocked by safety guard (path outside working dir)"+ )++def test_exec_guard_blocks_quoted_home_path_outside_workspace(tmp_path) -> None:tool = ExecTool(restrict_to_workspace=True)error = tool._guard_command('cat "~/.nanobot/config.json"', str(tmp_path))