Your Android phone and your Windows PC, working as one. Local-first, end-to-end encrypted, no account.
NectarLink Security Review
Review Date: 2026-10-10
Scope: End-to-end audit of every network, local IPC, elevated privilege, shared-memory, and filesystem surface in NectarLink (nectarlink-protocol, nectarlink-core, nectarlink-adb, nectarlink-desktop, nectarlink-vcam, Android app, and nectarlink-shell helper).
Executive Summary
NectarLink follows a strict zero-trust, local-first security architecture:
- Mutual Ed25519 + TLS 1.3 / QUIC Authentication: Every peer has a persistent 256-bit Ed25519 identity key (
iroh::SecretKey). Post-pairing sessions (ALPN = "nectarlink/0") enforce mutual certificate verification and immediately drop any connection whose remoteEndpointIdis not present in the local SQLitepeerstable (store.is_paired(&peer)). - Out-of-Band / Mutual-Consent Pairing: Pairing (
ALPN = "nectarlink/pair/0") requires either scanning a QR code containing a one-time 128-bit cryptographic token (tok) with a 5-minute TTL, or explicit user confirmation of a 6-digit Short Authentication String (SAS) derived via BLAKE3 from the TLS exporter key (EXPORTER-nectarlink-pair-v0) and both peers' Ed25519 public keys (derive_sasincore/nectarlink-protocol/src/sas.rs). - Strict Wire & Filesystem Boundaries: Every incoming CBOR/JSON envelope is size-capped BEFORE allocation (
MAX_FRAME_LEN = 1 MiB), validated via.is_valid()and.sanitized(), and gated by per-peer feature permissions (PeerPermissions). All incoming file and storage paths reject.., root prefixes, drive letters, and NUL bytes.
Surface 1: iroh QUIC Sessions, Pairing & USB Transport
Code Locations:
core/nectarlink-core/src/pairing.rscore/nectarlink-core/src/session.rscore/nectarlink-core/src/usb.rscore/nectarlink-adb/src/lib.rscore/nectarlink-protocol/src/sas.rscore/nectarlink-protocol/src/frame.rscore/nectarlink-core/src/store.rs
Threat Model
- MITM / Impersonation on untrusted LAN or Guest Wi-Fi: An active attacker on the same Wi-Fi subnet attempts to intercept pairing or impersonate a paired device.
- Unattended USB Auto-Pair Hijack: A rogue host or phone connected over USB attempts to pair silently without user consent on one side.
- Memory Exhaustion / Malformed Frame DoS: A peer or attacker sends oversized frame length prefixes (
u32::MAX) or deeply nested/invalid CBOR payloads. - Privilege Escalation Across Paired Devices: A paired device (e.g., secondary tablet) attempts to invoke features (
clipboard,sms,mirror,files,storage) that the user disabled for that peer in per-device permissions.
Security Controls in Place
- SAS Bound to TLS Session Exporter (
sas.rs):- The 6-digit SAS code is derived from
conn.export_keying_material(b"EXPORTER-nectarlink-pair-v0", b"", 32)combined with both peers' 32-byte Ed25519 public keys in role order (initiator_pk || responder_pk). An active MITM terminates two distinct TLS 1.3 sessions with different exporter secrets, producing non-matching 6-digit codes with probability $1 - 10^{-6}$.
- The 6-digit SAS code is derived from
- One-Time QR Token & Constant-Time Verification (
pairing.rs):- QR pairing requires a 128-bit random token (
tok), expires after 300 seconds (QR_LIFETIME), and is invalidated on first use (lock(&shared.qr_host).take()).
- QR pairing requires a 128-bit random token (
- Mutual Consent on USB Auto-Pair (
pairing.rs,usb.rs):- When an unpaired phone is connected via USB with ADB debugging active,
usb.rsestablishes a loopback UDP-over-TCP bridge (127.0.0.1) and initiates a standardstart_nearbypairing ceremony (method: "nearby"). Both the PC and the phone display the 6-digit SAS code and require explicit user approval (Codes match) on both devices before storing the peer inpeers. - Furthermore, the USB transport tunnel simply carries encrypted QUIC (
iroh) packets over loopback UDP; all confidentiality, integrity, and Ed25519 peer authentication remain enforced by QUIC TLS 1.3.
- When an unpaired phone is connected via USB with ADB debugging active,
- Hard ADB Serial Blocklist (
core/nectarlink-adb/src/lib.rs):nectarlink-adbenforcesis_serial_allowed(serial)acrossparse_devices_l,forward_tcp, andkill_forward_tcp, hard-blockingBLOCKED_SERIALSand honoringNECTARLINK_ADB_ONLY_SERIAL.
- Pre-Allocation Frame Size Cap (
frame.rs):read_frameinspects the 4-byte big-endian length prefix and rejects any frame $> 1\text{ MiB}$ (MAX_FRAME_LEN = 1_048_576) withProtocolError::FrameTooLargebefore allocating buffer memory.
- Per-Device Feature Permissions (
session.rs):session.rschecksshared.peer_allows(&peer, |p| ...)before processing incoming notifications, clipboard offers, file transfers, SMS commands, media control, camera, or mirror streams.
- At-Rest Key & History Encryption (
store.rs,clipboard_history.rs):- Clipboard history (
clipboard_history.enc) is encrypted at rest using XChaCha20-Poly1305 (chacha20poly1305) with a 256-bit key derived via BLAKE3 (derive_key("nectarlink clipboard history v1", secret_key.as_bytes())) and fresh 192-bit random nonces per save.
- Clipboard history (
Audit Fixes Applied
- Eliminated a potential
.expect()instore.rs:594when readingsecret_keybytes from SQLite (<[u8; 32]>::try_from), returning a cleanrusqlite::Error::InvalidColumnTypeif a database file is corrupted on disk. - Added 10,000-iteration fuzz suites for
frame::read_frame,Envelope::from_cbor_bytes, and all message body types incore/nectarlink-protocol.
Surface 2: LocalSend HTTP Server (core/nectarlink-core/src/localsend.rs)
Code Locations:
core/nectarlink-core/src/localsend.rs
Threat Model
- Unauthenticated LAN Attacker: Because LocalSend v2.1 is an open LAN protocol (UDP multicast
224.0.0.167:53317+ HTTP/HTTPS on TCP port53317), any host on the same LAN can connect to53317. - HTTP Header / Body Memory Exhaustion (Slowloris / Giant Upload): An attacker sends an unbounded HTTP header or claims a multi-terabyte
Content-Length. - Directory Traversal via Malicious Filename (
../../AppData/Roaming/Microsoft/Windows/Start Menu/Programs/Startup/evil.exe): A LAN sender supplies path traversal components, Windows reserved device names (CON,NUL,COM1), or alternate data streams (file.txt:zone). - Session / Token Guessing: A second LAN host attempts to upload bytes into an accepted
sessionIdbefore the legitimate sender uploads.
Security Controls in Place
- Strict Header & Metadata Caps:
MAX_HEADER_BYTES = 16 * 1024(16 KiB) andMAX_JSON_BODY_BYTES = 256 * 1024(256 KiB) cap HTTP request headers and JSON bodies before parsing.MAX_FILES_PER_OFFER = 256caps the number of files in a singleprepare-uploadoffer.
- Explicit User Consent Before Any File Bytes Are Written:
handle_prepare_uploademits aTransferState::Requestedevent and blocks until the user explicitly accepts (accept_transfer) or rejects/cancels (cancel_transfer) within 120 seconds.
- Per-File Cryptographic Upload Tokens:
- Only after acceptance does the server generate random 128-bit hex tokens per file (
tokens.insert(file_id, token)) and a random 128-bitsession_id.handle_uploadverifiessessionIdand the per-filetokenbefore reading body bytes.
- Only after acceptance does the server generate random 128-bit hex tokens per file (
- Filename Sanitization & Atomic Staging (
sanitize_file_name,unique_destination):sanitize_file_namesplits on both/and\, takes only the final component, strips control characters and Windows-forbidden characters (<>:"/\|?*), rejects.and.., prefixes Windows reserved device names (CON,PRN,AUX,NUL,COM1..9,LPT1..9) with_, and truncates to 200 UTF-8 characters.- Incoming bytes are streamed to a
.partfile inside<data_dir>/incoming/localsend/<session_id>/and strictly capped at the declaredentry.size(io::AsyncReadExt::take(stream, remaining)). Only whenwritten == entry.sizeis the file moved to the user's Downloads directory viaunique_destination(which never overwrites existing files).
Audit Fixes Applied
- Replaced two
.expect("checked non-empty")calls inlocalsend.rs(lines 1701 and 1762) with safeif let Some(last) = entries.last_mut()bindings. - Added a 10,000-iteration fuzz suite (
fuzz_localsend_http_parser_and_dtos_10k) testingread_http_head,parse_content_length,parse_query,sanitize_file_name, and DTO deserialization against arbitrary/adversarial inputs.
Surface 3: Local Authenticated API (desktop/app/src/local_api.rs)
Code Locations:
desktop/app/src/local_api.rsdesktop/app/src/settings.rsdocs/api.md
Threat Model
- Cross-Site Request Forgery / Drive-By Browser Attack (
localhostSSRF): A malicious website open in the user's web browser attemptsfetch("http://127.0.0.1:53320/v1/send", ...)or DNS rebinding to exfiltrate clipboard history or send files. - Unauthorized Local Process: Another unprivileged account or untrusted sandboxed process attempts to call the API without reading the user's profile directory.
Security Controls in Place
- Off by Default (
local_api_enabled: false):- The Local API server does not bind or listen unless the user explicitly enables Local automation API in Settings.
- Loopback-Only Binding (
127.0.0.1):- Bound strictly to
Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST(127.0.0.1), never0.0.0.0or::.
- Bound strictly to
- 256-Bit Random Bearer Token in
<data_dir>/api-token.json:- Generated using 32 bytes from OS CSPRNG (
BCryptGenRandom), stored inside the user's private<data_dir>/api-token.json. - Every HTTP request must supply
Authorization: Bearer <token>, verified using constant-time byte comparison (constant_time_eq). Missing or invalid tokens immediately receive401 Unauthorized.
- Generated using 32 bytes from OS CSPRNG (
- Browser
Origin/Sec-Fetch-SiteRejection:- Any HTTP request carrying an
Originheader orSec-Fetch-Mode: cors/no-corsis rejected with403 Forbiddenbefore inspecting the route, and noAccess-Control-Allow-Originheader is ever emitted.
- Any HTTP request carrying an
- Bounded Request Size:
- Request buffers are capped at 64 KiB (
MAX_REQUEST_BYTES = 65_536) with a 5-second read timeout.
- Request buffers are capped at 64 KiB (
Audit Fixes Applied
- Designed and implemented from scratch with constant-time Bearer token comparison,
Originheader rejection (403 Forbidden), and automated unit tests covering401 Unauthorized,403 Forbidden, and authenticated/v1/*endpoints.
Surface 4: Single-Instance IPC & Launch Queue (desktop/app/src/launch.rs)
Code Locations:
desktop/app/src/launch.rsdesktop/app/src/send_to.rsdesktop/app/src/main.rs
Threat Model
- Cross-Session / Multi-User Local Spoofing: On a multi-user Windows machine, another logged-in user attempts to signal NectarLink's Win32 event or write a malicious
Requestinto the launch queue. - Malformed / Oversized Launch Queue File: Corrupted or adversarial JSON in
<data_dir>/launch/attempts to crash the running tray process.
Security Controls in Place
- Per-Data-Dir Scoped Win32 Event & Mutex (
Local\namespace):- Both the single-instance mutex (
Local\Nectarlink.SingleInstance.<fnv1a64>) and the wake event (Local\Nectarlink.Launch.<fnv1a64>) are created in the WindowsLocal\session namespace (isolated to the current logon session) and keyed by the FNV-1a hash of the canonicalized--data-dirpath.
- Both the single-instance mutex (
- Filesystem ACL Isolation in
<data_dir>/launch:- Queue files (
<nanos>-<pid>.json) live inside<data_dir>/launch/, which inherits the user profile's%LOCALAPPDATA%NTFS DACL (accessible only toSYSTEM,Administrators, and the owning user SID).
- Queue files (
- Resilient Drain & Deserialization (
launch::drain):drain()unlinks each.jsonfile before parsing (fs::remove_file(&path)) so a malformed file can never cause an infinite retry loop, and ignores any invalid JSON cleanly without panicking.
Audit Fixes Applied
- Verified
launch::drainandsend_to::handlehave zero.unwrap()/.expect()calls on runtime paths and handleRequest::SendTo,Request::Share, andRequest::Tasksafely.
Surface 5: Elevated Shell Helper (nectarlink-shell / UID 2000)
Code Locations:
android/shell-helper/src/main/kotlin/app/nectarlink/shell/InputServer.ktandroid/app/src/main/kotlin/app/nectarlink/android/elevated/Elevated.kt
Threat Model
- Local Untrusted App Connecting to
@nectarlink.shell.v1: Any unprivileged Android app on the same device can attempt to connect to the abstract UNIX domain socket\0nectarlink.shell.v1and inject touch/keystrokes, read the clipboard, toggle Wi-Fi/Bluetooth, or capture internal audio if peer credentials are not checked. - Command Injection / Unbounded Input on Socket: A malformed command line sent over the local socket could crash the helper or execute unintended shell commands.
Security Controls in Place
- Mandatory Kernel
SO_PEERCREDUID Verification (isAllowedPeerinInputServer.kt):- Immediately upon
server.accept(),handleClientreads the kernel-verifiedStructUcred(client.peerCredentials) and callsisAllowedPeer(cred.uid, allowedUid):private fun isAllowedPeer(peerUid: Int, appUid: Int): Boolean { if (peerUid == Process.ROOT_UID || peerUid == Process.SHELL_UID) return true val appId = peerUid % PER_USER_RANGE return appUid > 0 && appId == (appUid % PER_USER_RANGE) } allowedUidis resolved at startup frompm.getApplicationInfo("app.nectarlink", 0).uid. Any connection from any other app UID is immediately closed and rejected before reading a single byte.
- Immediately upon
- No Shell Evaluation on Socket Commands:
- Socket commands (
T,S,K,KD,KU,G,TEXT,BACK,HOME,RECENTS,LOCK,NOTIF,QS,SHOT,CLIPGET,CLIPWAIT,WIFI,BT,DND,PANEL,ROTATE,A) are parsed as fixed verbs with typed numeric arguments (toFloatOrNull(),toIntOrNull()) and dispatched directly to Android Binder APIs (IInputManager,IClipboard,IStatusBarService,ConnectivityManager,AudioRecord,/dev/uhid). No command ever passes user strings toRuntime.exec("sh -c ...").
- Socket commands (
- Sensitive Clipboard & Notification Redaction:
readPrimaryClipLineinspectsClipDescription.EXTRA_IS_SENSITIVE; if the user copied a password from a credential manager that marks the clip sensitive,InputServerreturnsSENSITIVEwithout reading or transmitting the text.- Neither
InputServer.ktnorNotificationListener.ktever logs notification bodies or clipboard text tologcat.
Audit Fixes Applied
- Eliminated the remaining
!!inInputServer.kt:402(getClip!!) by capturing the localMethodreference safely. - Added authenticated command
"A"(48 kHz stereo PCM audio capture viaREMOTE_SUBMIX/ internal capture) and"G"(UHID /InputManagergamepad injection), both gated behind the sameSO_PEERCREDcheck.
Surface 6: Virtual Camera Shared Memory (desktop/vcam/src/shm.rs, source.rs)
Code Locations:
desktop/vcam/src/shm.rsdesktop/vcam/src/source.rsdesktop/app/src/webcam.rs
Threat Model
- Buffer Overflow / Out-of-Bounds Read in Host Apps (Teams, Zoom, OBS, Chrome): The Media Foundation virtual camera DLL (
nectarlink_vcam.dll) is loaded into third-party camera consumer processes. Ifnectarlink-desktop.exe(or a local process writing toLocal\NectarlinkVirtualCamera_v2) writes corruptwidth,height,stride, oractive_slotheaders in shared memory, the reader innectarlink_vcam.dllcould panic or read out of bounds inside the host application process. - Torn Frame Reads: Concurrent reader/writer access without synchronization could read half of a 1080p frame and half of a 4K frame.
Security Controls in Place
- Strict Bounds Validation on Every Read (
ShmReader::read_intoinshm.rs):ShmReader::read_intoreadsmagic,version,active_slot,width,height,stride, andsequsing atomicOrdering::Acquireloads, and validates:magic == MAGIC(0x4E4C_5643) andversion == VERSION(1),width > 0 && width <= MAX_WIDTH(3840) andheight > 0 && height <= MAX_HEIGHT(2160),stride >= width * 4,needed = (stride as usize).checked_mul(height as usize)fits withinMAX_FRAME_BYTES(3840 * 2160 * 4 = 33,177,600bytes),slot_idx = (slot as usize) & 1(masked to0or1, preventing out-of-bounds slot indexing).
- Double-Buffered Optimistic Concurrency Check:
- The writer writes to the inactive slot (
1 - (active_slot & 1)), performs anOrdering::Releasestore toactive_slotandseq, and never mutates the active slot in place. - The reader checks
seq_before == seq_after(Ordering::Acquire) after copying the frame and discards the read if the writer flipped slots mid-copy.
- The writer writes to the inactive slot (
- Logon-Session Scoped Mapping (
Local\NectarlinkVirtualCamera_v2):- Uses the
Local\kernel object namespace so processes in other Windows logon sessions cannot access the mapping.
- Uses the
Audit Fixes Applied
- Upgraded
MAX_WIDTH = 3840andMAX_HEIGHT = 2160for 4K support and bumped mapping name toLocal\NectarlinkVirtualCamera_v2so older v1 DLLs and v2 writers cannot misinterpret slot offsets.
Surface 7: Storage Provider & Remote File Browser (storage.rs, files.rs, StorageHandler.kt)
Code Locations:
core/nectarlink-core/src/storage.rscore/nectarlink-protocol/src/messages.rsdesktop/app/src/files.rsandroid/app/src/main/kotlin/app/nectarlink/android/storage/StorageHandler.kt
Threat Model
- Path Traversal Outside Shared Root (
/sdcardon Android or Cloud Files Sync Root on PC): A peer sendsstorage.read,storage.write,storage.list,storage.mkdir, orstorage.deletewith"../../data/data/app.nectarlink/databases/nectarlink.db"or symlinks pointing outside/sdcard. - Cloud Files Hydration Abuse on Windows (
cfapi): A malicious filename or relative path inStorageEntryattempts to hydrate or overwrite files outside%USERPROFILE%\Nectarlink (<Phone>).
Security Controls in Place
- Protocol-Level Path Validation (
is_valid_storage_pathinmessages.rs):- Rejects paths $> 1024$ bytes, paths containing
\0or\, and anyPath::components()containingComponent::ParentDir(..) orComponent::Prefix(C:).
- Rejects paths $> 1024$ bytes, paths containing
- Canonical Path Sandboxing on Android (
StorageHandler.resolveinStorageHandler.kt):StorageHandler.resolve(rawPath)resolves the targetFileagainstEnvironment.getExternalStorageDirectory().canonicalFile(root) and enforces:val canonical = target.canonicalFile if (canonical != root && !canonical.path.startsWith(root.path + File.separator)) { return null }- Because
canonicalFileresolves all symlinks and..segments on the Android filesystem before checking the prefix, symlink escape from/sdcardinto/data/data/app.nectarlinkis impossible.
- Chunk Size & Offset Bounds (
MAX_STORAGE_CHUNK = 256 KiB):StorageReadRequest::is_valid()andStorageWriteChunk::is_valid()cap every read/write chunk to262,144bytes (256 KiB), preventing memory exhaustion on either side.
- Per-Device Permission Enforcement:
- Every
storage.*message insession.rschecksshared.peer_allows(&peer, |p| p.files)before invoking the storage handler.
- Every
Audit Fixes Applied
- Verified
is_valid_storage_pathandStorageHandler.resolvecanonical path checks across allstorage.list,storage.read,storage.write,storage.mkdir, andstorage.deleteoperations, and includedStorageListResponse/StorageReadRequest/StorageWriteChunkin the 10,000-iteration protocol fuzz suite. - Enforced
REMOTE_FILES_TOGGLE("remote_files", off by default) on both PC and phone incore/nectarlink-core/src/storage.rswheneversession.path() == ConnectionPath::Relay, so away-mode / relay sessions cannot browse or mutate storage unlessremote_filesis explicitly enabled in addition tostorage.
Surface 8: PC-Side Continuity Capabilities & Reverse Mirroring Consent
Code Locations:
core/nectarlink-core/src/features.rscore/nectarlink-core/src/mirror.rscore/nectarlink-core/src/remote.rscore/nectarlink-core/src/storage.rscore/nectarlink-ffi/src/lib.rsdesktop/app/src/core_host.rsdesktop/app/src/pc_mirror.rsdesktop/app/src/pc_audio_stream.rsdesktop/app/src/pc_notifications.rsdesktop/app/src/pc_storage.rsdesktop/app/src/input_share.rsdesktop/app/qml/MainWindow.qml
Threat Model
- Unattended PC Screen Capture or Input Injection from Paired Phone: A paired phone (which could be unlocked or used by someone else in another room) attempts to silently stream the PC's desktop (
mirror.startagainst a Desktop/Laptop node) or inject mouse/keyboard events (mirror.input/remote.input) without the PC user's knowledge or consent. - Silent Toggle Escalation from FFI: A phone client attempts to flip per-device toggles on silently inside
nectarlink-ffibefore issuing an RPC. - Over-Broad Capability Advertisement: The PC advertises
mirror.capture,mirror.input, orinput.injectin itsHello/HelloUpdatecapability list when those features are disabled for all paired devices.
Security Controls Across All PC-Side Capabilities
- Reverse Mirroring (
pc_mirror/desktop/app/src/pc_mirror.rs):- Dedicated Toggle, Off by Default:
PC_MIRROR_TOGGLE = "pc_mirror"is registered inDEVICE_TOGGLES(core/nectarlink-core/src/features.rs) with defaultfalse, separate from phone-to-PCmirroring. - No Silent Auto-Enable:
start_pc_mirrorincore/nectarlink-ffi/src/lib.rsnever mutates device toggles; it only sendsmirror_start. - PC Consent Prompt: When a phone calls
mirror_startagainst a PC whilepc_mirroris off (and no one-time session allowance is active),mirror::handledenies the request withError::Deniedand emitsNodeEvent::PcMirrorRequested { device, options }. The PC shows a modal consent sheet (pcMirrorPromptSheetinMainWindow.qml) with "Not now", "Allow" (one-time session consent viaNode::set_pc_mirror_session_allowed, automatically cleared on disconnect), and "Allow for this device" (enablespc_mirrorfor that phone). - Persistent Sharing Banner with One-Click Stop: Whenever
pc_mirror::is_active()is true,MainWindow.qmldisplays a persistent top banner ("Sharing this PC's screen with <Phone>") with a one-click "Stop sharing" button (AppController.stopPcMirror()). - Input Injection Gated on
remote_input: Bothcore/nectarlink-core/src/mirror.rs(MIRROR_INPUT,input()) anddesktop/app/src/pc_mirror.rs(handle_input()) require theremote_inputper-device toggle (falseby default) to be enabled in addition to an active reverse-mirror session before any touch, scroll, key, or text event is injected on a PC. - Conditional Capability Advertisement:
core_host::compute_capabilitiesonly advertisesmirror.capturewhenpc_mirroris enabled for at least one paired device (or actively sharing), and only advertisesmirror.inputandinput.injectwhenremote_inputis enabled for at least one paired device.
- Dedicated Toggle, Off by Default:
- Cross-Device Mouse & Keyboard Flow (
desktop/app/src/input_share.rs):- PC-to-phone edge cursor/keyboard flow is off by default (
Settings::edge_flow_enabled = false) and initiates outbound from the PC when the PC user moves the physical mouse across the configured screen edge. Incoming remote input from the phone to the PC (remote.rs) is strictly gated onremote_input(falseby default) with a one-time consent prompt (RemoteInputRequested).
- PC-to-phone edge cursor/keyboard flow is off by default (
- PC Audio Streaming to Phone (
desktop/app/src/pc_audio_stream.rs):- Off by default (
Settings::pc_audio_to_phone = false). Audio loopback capture (WASAPI) can only be enabled locally from the PC's Settings UI (Camera & Audio -> Stream PC audio to phone) and only streams to connected phones that have themediatoggle enabled.
- Off by default (
- PC Storage Provider (
desktop/app/src/pc_storage.rs,core/nectarlink-core/src/storage.rs):- Gated by the
storagetoggle (falseby default), plusremote_files(falseby default) when connected over a non-LANConnectionPath::Relaypath. Sandboxed to the user's non-sensitiveNectarLink Sharedfolder viaFolderStorage(which rejects.., absolute paths, and symlink escapes).
- Gated by the
- PC Notifications to Phone (
desktop/app/src/pc_notifications.rs):- Off by default (
Settings::forward_pc_notifications = false). Only forwards when explicitly enabled by the PC user in Settings AND WindowsUserNotificationListeneraccess is granted AND the per-devicenotificationstoggle is on.
- Off by default (