Node-based terminal manager for AI coding agents — tmux-backed terminals and parallel agent sessions as draggable nodes on an infinite pan/zoom canvas. macOS, Linux, and a browser Server Edition.
TypeScript adhdagent-orchestrationai-agentscanvasclaude-codecodexcoding-agentsdeveloper-toolselectrongeminilinuxmacosmultiplexeropencodeparallel-agentsterminalterminal-emulatorterminal-multiplexertmuxworkspace-manager
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest'
import { createHmac, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto'
import {
isSafeNodeId,
nodeAuthKid,
nodeAuthToken,
verifyNodeToken
} from './node-auth-token'
const secret = randomBytes(32)
const other = randomBytes(32)
describe('node auth token', () => {
it('is kid.mac, domain-separated, and stable for a given secret+node', () => {
const t = nodeAuthToken(secret, 'node-1')
expect(t).toMatch(/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/)
expect(t.split('.')[0]).toBe(nodeAuthKid(secret))
expect(nodeAuthToken(secret, 'node-1')).toBe(t)
// Domain separation: the bare-nodeId HMAC #167 shipped must NOT be a valid mac here.
const bareMac = createHmac('sha256', secret).update('node-1').digest('base64url')
expect(t.split('.')[1]).not.toBe(bareMac)
})
it("verifies our kid + right node, and 403s our kid + another node's mac", () => {
expect(verifyNodeToken(secret, 'node-1', nodeAuthToken(secret, 'node-1'))).toBe('verified')
expect(verifyNodeToken(secret, 'node-1', nodeAuthToken(secret, 'node-2'))).toBe('forged')
})
it('403s a mutated mac in every shape (flipped, truncated, padded, empty-mac)', () => {
const t = nodeAuthToken(secret, 'node-1')
const [kid, mac] = t.split('.')
const flipped = `${kid}.${mac.slice(0, -1)}${mac.endsWith('A') ? 'B' : 'A'}`
for (const bad of [flipped, `${kid}.${mac.slice(0, 20)}`, `${kid}.${mac} `, `${kid}.`]) {
expect(verifyNodeToken(secret, 'node-1', bad), bad).toBe('forged')
}
})
it('treats a FOREIGN kid as legacy, never as forgery (the failover path)', () => {
expect(verifyNodeToken(secret, 'node-1', nodeAuthToken(other, 'node-1'))).toBe('legacy')
})
it('treats absent / empty / shapeless / non-string tokens as legacy', () => {
for (const p of [undefined, '', 'not-a-token', ['a', 'b']] as const) {
expect(verifyNodeToken(secret, 'node-1', p as never)).toBe('legacy')
}
// A leading dot is not our shape (dot at index 0).
expect(verifyNodeToken(secret, 'node-1', '.mac')).toBe('legacy')
})
it('is legacy when the server has no secret at all (mixed-version machines)', () => {
expect(verifyNodeToken(null, 'node-1', nodeAuthToken(secret, 'node-1'))).toBe('legacy')
})
it('refuses unsafe node ids before hashing — including bare dot segments', () => {
for (const bad of ['..', '.', '../x', 'a b', 'a/b', '', 'x'.repeat(300)]) {
expect(isSafeNodeId(bad), bad).toBe(false)
}
for (const good of ['node-1', 'term_abc.9', 'A.B-C_d']) {
expect(isSafeNodeId(good), good).toBe(true)
}
expect(nodeAuthToken(secret, '../etc')).toBe('')
// An unsafe id UNDER our kid is forgery, not legacy — the id can never be a real token.
expect(verifyNodeToken(secret, '..', `${nodeAuthKid(secret)}.whatever`)).toBe('forged')
})
it('does not throw on unequal-length compares', () => {
expect(() => verifyNodeToken(secret, 'node-1', `${nodeAuthKid(secret)}.x`)).not.toThrow()
})
it('handles an enormous presented string without throwing or stalling', () => {
const huge = `${nodeAuthKid(secret)}.${'A'.repeat(10000)}`
expect(verifyNodeToken(secret, 'node-1', huge)).toBe('forged')
})
})