Node-based terminal manager for AI coding agents — tmux-backed terminals and parallel agent sessions as draggable nodes on an infinite pan/zoom canvas. macOS, Linux, and a browser Server Edition.
TypeScript adhdagent-orchestrationai-agentscanvasclaude-codecodexcoding-agentsdeveloper-toolselectrongeminilinuxmacosmultiplexeropencodeparallel-agentsterminalterminal-emulatorterminal-multiplexertmuxworkspace-manager
import {
projectTrustContent,
type ProjectSettingsDoc,
type ProjectTrustFamily
} from '../shared/project-settings'
import type { ProjectSetupTargetInfo } from './project-setup-runner-local'
import { hashTrustContent, localTrustKey, sshTrustKey, type ProjectTrustStore } from './project-trust-store'
/**
* The ONE trust verdict a consumer of project settings asks for, shared by every consumer so the
* hash rule cannot fork.
*
* Two callers today: `project-settings:launch-info` (the renderer's pre-launch read,
* `project-launch-info-handlers.ts`) and `makeProjectSpawnOverrides` (the spawn's own read,
* `project-spawn-overrides.ts`). They MUST agree — a renderer told "trusted" while the spawn
* silently drops the same value, or the reverse, is a gate that reports one thing and enforces
* another. Keeping the rule here is what makes that impossible rather than merely unlikely.
*
* The rule itself is `ProjectSetupService.run`'s, aimed at a family this process never executes:
* - the hash covers the SHARED document alone — never the merged/effective one, or a local
* override could launder a shared change past the hash,
* - a family with NO shared executable content (`projectTrustContent` → null) is trusted with no
* prompt: there is nothing hostile to gate,
* - trust is keyed by LOCATION, never by project id (ids come out of an attacker-controlled
* `project.json` — hostile-project-json).
*/
/** The LOCATION key for a project's own index entry. A cwd-less inline canvas falls to
* `localTrustKey('')` — inert by construction: such a project has no shared document, so every
* family's `projectTrustContent` returns null before this key is ever consulted. */
export function projectTrustKeyFor(info: ProjectSetupTargetInfo | null | undefined): string {
return info?.ssh
? sshTrustKey({ server: info.ssh.server, remoteCwd: info.ssh.remoteCwd })
: localTrustKey(info?.cwd ?? '')
}
/**
* Is this family's SHARED content trusted at `key` right now? `true` also when the family has no
* shared executable content at all (nothing to gate). A trust store that throws is NOT trusted —
* fail closed on the grant, never on the spawn (callers keep going without the shared value).
*/
export async function projectFamilyTrusted(
trust: Pick<ProjectTrustStore, 'isTrusted'>,
key: string,
family: ProjectTrustFamily,
sharedDoc: ProjectSettingsDoc
): Promise<boolean> {
const content = projectTrustContent(family, sharedDoc)
if (content === null) return true
try {
return await trust.isTrusted(key, family, hashTrustContent(content))
} catch {
return false
}
}