Node-based terminal manager for AI coding agents — tmux-backed terminals and parallel agent sessions as draggable nodes on an infinite pan/zoom canvas. macOS, Linux, and a browser Server Edition.
TypeScript adhdagent-orchestrationai-agentscanvasclaude-codecodexcoding-agentsdeveloper-toolselectrongeminilinuxmacosmultiplexeropencodeparallel-agentsterminalterminal-emulatorterminal-multiplexertmuxworkspace-manager
/**
* Predicates for values that cross into a REMOTE SHELL.
*
* Both of these guard the same class of bug: a string that arrived as DATA (a node id read out of
* `.nodeterm/project.json`, a `$HOME` a host printed back at us) ends up inside a command line the
* remote user's shell parses. Quoting at the splice site is the primary defence — see
* `remoteTmuxPtyArgs` and `RemoteHooks.setup` — and these are the second layer, applied where the
* value ENTERS the system so a future splice that forgets to quote is not instantly exploitable.
*
* No node/electron imports: usable from core, main, and the server shell alike.
*/
// `isSafeNodeId` / `NODE_ID_MAX` MOVED to `@shared/safe-id` (re-exported here so no existing
// import path changes): the renderer needs this exact predicate to validate a project id before it
// becomes a session-partition storage key, and the renderer may not import `src/core`. One
// predicate, two consumers — `remote-safety.test.ts` pins that this name and the shared one are
// the same function object, so the two cannot drift.
export { NODE_ID_MAX, isSafeNodeId } from '../shared/safe-id'
/** Generous cap on a host-reported `$HOME`; longer than any real path (PATH_MAX on Linux). */
export const REMOTE_HOME_MAX = 4096
/**
* Every character that is live shell syntax at a `$HOME` interpolation site, plus every control
* character. It is a DENYLIST on purpose — see `isSafeRemoteHome`.
*
* - C0 (u0000-u001f) and C1 (u007f-u009f) controls: \n / \r are command separators, \t is IFS,
* NUL truncates. U+2028/U+2029 are not shell-special but are line breaks everywhere else
* (logs, JSON) and no real path holds one.
* - Expansion characters: `$` and backtick. `$(…)` and backticks are command substitution, and
* `$'` in particular was a live RCE vector through a JS string-replacement splice (see
* `remoteTmuxPtyArgs`) even with the value correctly `posixQuote`d.
* - `\\` — an escape at every double-quoted site.
* - `"` — closes a double-quoted interpolation.
* - `;&|<>(){}` — separators, pipes, redirections, subshells, brace expansion.
* - `*?[]` — globs; a star in the path makes `mkdir -p` reach a directory we never named.
* - `!#` — history expansion and comments.
*
* The class is written with \u ESCAPES, never raw bytes: a source file carrying a literal NUL is
* skipped in silence by git, grep and ripgrep (this repo has lost two files to that).
*
* NOT here, deliberately:
* - every letter on earth. That was the bug (see below).
* - the SINGLE QUOTE. `/home/o'brien` is somebody's actual home, `posixQuote` round-trips it
* byte-for-byte through /bin/sh (`'o'\''brien'`), and every site this value reaches is quoted.
* Refusing it would be a silent total outage for that user in exchange for nothing.
*/
const REMOTE_HOME_UNSAFE = /[\u0000-\u001f\u007f-\u009f\u2028\u2029"`$\\;&|<>(){}[\]*?!#]/
/**
* Is a remote host's answer to `printf %s "$HOME"` usable for building remote paths?
*
* The host's answer is DATA, not truth — a host can set `$HOME` to whatever it likes, and this
* value is interpolated into remote command lines run as the SSH user. Quoting at the splice is the
* primary defence (every site now quotes); this is the second layer, so a future splice that
* forgets is not instantly exploitable.
*
* THE SHAPE MATTERS. This used to be an allowlist — `/^[\w./ -]+$/` — and `\w` in JavaScript is
* `[A-Za-z0-9_]`, always, with or without the `u` flag; there is no switch that widens it. So
* `/home/josé`, `/home/gökhan`, `/Users/山田` and every other home whose owner does not spell their
* name in ASCII was judged "not a plain path", and the consequence was total and silent for those
* users: no status badges, no context meter, no subagent cards, on every SSH host they own. An
* allowlist of LETTERS can only ever be a list of the alphabets its author thought of.
*
* So it enumerates what is DANGEROUS instead (`REMOTE_HOME_UNSAFE`), which is a closed set. Anything
* else — any script's letters, spaces (`/Users/First Last` is ordinary on macOS), dots, dashes,
* underscores, `+`, apostrophes — is just a path.
*
* It must also be ABSOLUTE: a relative answer would build relative remote paths against whatever
* cwd the exec channel lands in, and `../..` stops being interesting the moment `/` is required up
* front.
*
* Like `isSafeRemoteGrokHome` (which delegates here) it judges the EXACT string the caller holds —
* surrounding whitespace is a rejection, not something this quietly strips. Trimming here would
* return `true` about a value whose embedded `\n` the caller is about to interpolate. Remote reads
* trim at the READ site instead.
*/
export function isSafeRemoteHome(p: string | undefined | null): boolean {
return (
typeof p === 'string' &&
p.length > 0 &&
p.length <= REMOTE_HOME_MAX &&
p.startsWith('/') &&
p === p.trim() &&
!REMOTE_HOME_UNSAFE.test(p)
)
}