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docs(hosted-team): a join code can take hosting offline; how to recover (I2)
review0200e2e2f8ba
diff --git a/CLAUDE.md b/CLAUDE.mdindex 02ccc4055..56db48d9c 100644--- a/CLAUDE.md+++ b/CLAUDE.md@@ -6239,6 +6239,13 @@ The invariants, each with its reason:the API up and the relay down every mint succeeds and every socket dies, and a reset-on-mintre-minted at round-trip speed (relay log, 2026-09-27). Successful mints are also capped at 200per rolling hour, whatever asks for them (the backend's free limit is 240).+- **A join code is enough to take hosting offline (R44), and only the backend can close that.**+ `POST /v1/relay/host-token` takes the code's `hostDeviceId` + `hostPublicKeyB64` with no proof of+ the host's secret key, and the backend damps host tokens and device mints per that device id. So a+ code holder, a removed teammate included, can spend the host's hourly mints, the team's daily+ device mints and the 16 pending slots. `team rotate-key` alone does not help (it keeps the device+ id); recovery is a fresh `<dataDir>/device-id` + `team rotate-key` + fresh codes (the doc's+ troubleshooting list). Proof-of-possession on that endpoint is a `nodeterm-server` follow-up.- **The joiner never mints a device token it cannot keep.** Device mints are damped per HOST deviceid, so one team shares 10 a day. It probes the bookmarks file before minting and sends a PER-TEAMdevice id (`<machine id>:<hostId>`), because the backend will not re-register one id for a seconddiff --git a/docs/hosted-team-relay.md b/docs/hosted-team-relay.mdindex 3bf18d753..6a3fc9372 100644--- a/docs/hosted-team-relay.md+++ b/docs/hosted-team-relay.md@@ -162,7 +162,9 @@ later connect opens without a prompt.An owner's hosted tab has **Copy team invite code** in the command palette; `team info` prints thesame code. A join code carries public material only (relay endpoint, host id, host public key, host-device id, label). A leaked code lets someone **ask** to join; an owner still approves each device.+device id, label). A leaked code cannot get anyone in, because an owner still approves each device.+It **can** take hosting offline, though, and removing the member who leaked it does not stop that:+see [Threat notes](#threat-notes).The teammate pastes it into New Remote Connection and reads the SAS it shows to an owner (a callor a chat). The owner's desktop shows "A device wants to join" with the same SAS, a device-key@@ -376,6 +378,27 @@ The human `team status` reads `state`, `idle` and `lastError` together:and restarts the service: live tabs drop and reconnect, and pending requests are lost.- **Windows:** the admin channel is a unix socket, so both ends refuse by name. A team cannot becreated on a Windows Server Edition in v1.+- **Hosting knocked offline by a join code** (see [Threat notes](#threat-notes)). `team status`+ shows `rate-limited (429)` as the last error, or teammates read "Too many join attempts … today".+ Give the host a new device id **and** a new key, then new codes:++ ```bash+ systemctl --user stop nodeterm-server # `systemctl stop …` for a root install+ mv ~/.nodeterm-server/device-id ~/.nodeterm-server/device-id.old # <dataDir>/device-id+ systemctl --user start nodeterm-server+ node $APP team rotate-key+ node $APP team info # the new join code+ ```++ The device id is a random id in `<dataDir>/device-id`; the service reads it on first use and keeps+ it for the life of the process, so replace it while the service is stopped. Hosting creates a new+ one when it next mints. The only other thing on the server that depends on that file is a stored+ Pro license (`<dataDir>/license.json`), which is bound to the id it was minted for and stops+ validating. `team rotate-key` gives the team a new address, so every bookmark and old code stops+ working. Members stay in `team.json`: each teammate pastes the new code once and presses OK on+ its prompt (the host approves a known key on its own), and each such rejoin spends one of the new+ device id's 10 daily device mints. Remove the member who leaked the code (`team remove`) if you+ have not.- **Removing a teammate.** Approved devices are pinned with an **empty label**, and `team status`shows no keys. Find the key in `<dataDir>/relay/team.json` (match `addedAt`, or the 8-characterfingerprint the approval dialog showed), then `team remove <key>`.@@ -402,8 +425,26 @@ The human `team status` reads `state`, `idle` and `lastError` together:- **Nothing is served before mutual approval.** A pre-approval request answers `E_UNAUTHORIZED`and never reaches a handler. Frames that arrive between approval and open (while the pin iswritten) are held (at most 256), then served through the same checks.-- **A leaked join code** lets a stranger ask, never enter. At most 16 requests wait at once, one per- device key, each for 10 minutes; the 17th is refused.+- **A leaked join code cannot let anyone in**: every device still needs an owner's approval. At most+ 16 requests wait at once, one per device key, each for 10 minutes; the 17th is refused.+- **A join code is enough to take hosting offline** (ruling R44). The code carries the host's device+ id and public key (`hosted-service.ts` `info()`), and those are exactly what the backend's+ `POST /v1/relay/host-token` takes: `{deviceId, hostPublicKeyB64}` (`host-token.ts`), with no proof+ that the caller holds the host's secret key. Its free-tier limit (240 host tokens an hour, a fixed+ window) is keyed by the `deviceId` sent, and the team's device mints (`POST /v1/relay/device`, 10 a+ day) by the host device id. So anyone holding a code, a teammate you removed included, can:+ - spend the host's hourly host-token budget, so the host's own mints are refused with 429 and+ hosting stays down until the window resets;+ - register listeners under the team's address. A joiner paired with one of them fails its+ handshake (only the real host has the secret key), so nothing is exposed, but that join fails;+ - open join requests with throwaway device keys until the 16 pending slots are full;+ - spend the team's 10 daily device mints, so a new teammate reads "Too many join attempts … today".++ `team remove` does not stop this, and neither does `team rotate-key` on its own: it changes the+ address, not the device id the budgets are keyed by. Recovery: "Hosting knocked offline by a join+ code" under [Status and troubleshooting](#status-and-troubleshooting). The real fix is on the+ backend (proof that the caller holds the host key before `/v1/relay/host-token` mints), a+ follow-up in `nodeterm-server`.- **A pinned device key is a long-lived credential**, like an SSH key: a stolen laptop gets inuntil `team remove`. A removed key's live sessions are cut and told `removed`, and until the killlands a session with no team entry is served nothing.