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Node-based terminal manager for AI coding agents — tmux-backed terminals and parallel agent sessions as draggable nodes on an infinite pan/zoom canvas. macOS, Linux, and a browser Server Edition.

test: pin the clock past the strict node-identity cutoff

review98974037b130
diff --git a/src/core/agents/hook-server.request-id.test.ts b/src/core/agents/hook-server.request-id.test.ts
index 4d1e201ba..dedfd1ba6 100644
--- a/src/core/agents/hook-server.request-id.test.ts
+++ b/src/core/agents/hook-server.request-id.test.ts
@@ -11,6 +11,19 @@ import { fakePlatform } from '../platform-fake'
import { hookServer } from './hook-server'
import { nodeAuthToken } from './node-auth-token'
import { REQUEST_ID_HINT_LEAD, REQUEST_ID_REPLAYED_LEAD } from '../control-request-ledger'
+import { NODE_IDENTITY_STRICT_AFTER } from './node-identity-policy'
+
+/**
+ * An UNVERIFIED caller only reaches the ledger inside the dated warning window — past
+ * `NODE_IDENTITY_STRICT_AFTER` the route refuses it (403) before the ledger or the handler run.
+ * The unverified-ledger tests below are about request-id handling, not about the date, so they
+ * stand one millisecond before the cutoff through the hook server's clock seam instead of reading
+ * the machine's clock (which turned them red on 2026-10-13).
+ */
+const inWarningWindow = (): void =>
+ hookServer.setIdentityClockForTests(() => new Date(NODE_IDENTITY_STRICT_AFTER.getTime() - 1))
+const pastCutoff = (): void =>
+ hookServer.setIdentityClockForTests(() => new Date(NODE_IDENTITY_STRICT_AFTER.getTime()))
const secret = Buffer.alloc(32, 7)
let dir: string
@@ -39,12 +52,14 @@ beforeAll(async () => {
})
})
beforeEach(() => {
+ hookServer.setIdentityClockForTests(() => new Date())
handled = []
lateOffered = []
let n = 0
next = async (cmd) => ({ ok: true, message: `opened n${++n}`, result: { ids: [`n${n}`], verb: cmd.verb } })
})
afterAll(() => {
+ hookServer.setIdentityClockForTests(() => new Date())
hookServer.setIdentityStrictOverride(() => undefined)
hookServer.clearNodeAuthSecretForTests()
hookServer.stop()
@@ -182,6 +197,7 @@ describe('control route: --request-id makes a retried open idempotent', () => {
})
it('an unverified caller gets NO dedupe (never a shared bucket) and an explicit id says so', async () => {
+ inWarningWindow()
const node = freshNode()
const args = { 'request-id': 'legacy-1' }
const a = await post('open-terminal', { node, args, verified: false })
@@ -194,6 +210,18 @@ describe('control route: --request-id makes a retried open idempotent', () => {
expect(c.body).not.toMatch(/request id ignored/i)
})
+ it('past the cutoff an unverified caller is refused before the ledger and the handler', async () => {
+ pastCutoff()
+ const node = freshNode()
+ const args = { 'request-id': 'legacy-2' }
+ const a = await post('open-terminal', { node, args, verified: false })
+ const b = await post('open-terminal', { node, args, verified: false })
+ expect(a.status).toBe(403)
+ expect(b.status).toBe(403)
+ // Refused before the ledger: nothing ran, so there is no outcome for it to hold or replay.
+ expect(handled).toHaveLength(0)
+ })
+
it('a dry run bypasses the ledger: the real call with the same id still runs', async () => {
const node = freshNode()
await post('open-agent', { node, args: { agent: 'claude', 'dry-run': '', 'request-id': 'd1' } })
@@ -255,12 +283,15 @@ describe('control route: --request-id makes a retried open idempotent', () => {
})
it('with no claim there is no id to name, and the handler is offered no late-answer path', async () => {
+ inWarningWindow()
next = async () => ({ ok: false, error: 'no answer within 120s — check the canvas', indeterminate: true })
const unverified = await post('open-worktree', {
node: freshNode(),
args: { branch: 'b', 'request-id': 'mine' },
verified: false
})
+ // Reached the handler (the warning window), so the missing hint is a real answer, not a 403.
+ expect(unverified.status).toBe(400)
expect(unverified.body).not.toContain(REQUEST_ID_HINT_LEAD)
const noId = await post('open-worktree', { node: freshNode(), args: { branch: 'b' } })
expect(noId.body).not.toContain(REQUEST_ID_HINT_LEAD)
diff --git a/src/server/control-unsupported.test.ts b/src/server/control-unsupported.test.ts
index 6e48335e3..bf8344ae1 100644
--- a/src/server/control-unsupported.test.ts
+++ b/src/server/control-unsupported.test.ts
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ import { initPlatform, resetPlatformForTests } from '../core/platform'
import { fakePlatform } from '../core/platform-fake'
import { hookServer, MESSAGING_CONTROL_REFUSAL } from '../core/agents/hook-server'
import { nodeAuthToken } from '../core/agents/node-auth-token'
-import { STRICT_CONTROL_REFUSAL } from '../core/agents/node-identity-policy'
+import { NODE_IDENTITY_STRICT_AFTER, STRICT_CONTROL_REFUSAL } from '../core/agents/node-identity-policy'
import {
BROWSER_UNSUPPORTED_CLAUSE,
CONTROL_UNSUPPORTED_ERROR,
@@ -60,8 +60,10 @@ afterAll(() => {
describe('the Server Edition refuses canvas control by name', () => {
it('answers every verb with the same machine-readable error, in JSON', async () => {
+ // Verified, so what is measured is the EDITION's answer on either side of the identity cutoff
+ // (an unverified mutation is refused by identity from 2026-10-13 — covered separately below).
for (const verb of ['list', 'open-terminal', 'write']) {
- const res = await control(verb, 'n-1', 'application/json')
+ const res = await control(verb, 'n-1', 'application/json', nodeAuthToken(SECRET, 'n-1'))
expect(res.status, verb).toBe(400)
const body = (await res.json()) as { ok: boolean; error: string; message: string }
expect(body.ok, verb).toBe(false)
@@ -71,6 +73,34 @@ describe('the Server Edition refuses canvas control by name', () => {
}
})
+ it('an unverified caller hears the edition answer inside the warning window, and identity past the cutoff', async () => {
+ try {
+ // One millisecond before the cutoff: an unverified mutation still reaches the handler, so the
+ // Server Edition's named refusal is what it hears — the pre-2026-10-13 behaviour.
+ hookServer.setIdentityClockForTests(() => new Date(NODE_IDENTITY_STRICT_AFTER.getTime() - 1))
+ for (const verb of ['list', 'open-terminal', 'write']) {
+ const res = await control(verb, 'n-window', 'application/json')
+ expect(res.status, verb).toBe(400)
+ const body = (await res.json()) as { ok: boolean; error: string }
+ expect(body.error, verb).toBe(CONTROL_UNSUPPORTED_ERROR)
+ }
+ // At the cutoff the identity gate answers first for a mutation (403, never the edition's
+ // 400); the tolerant `list` is untouched by the date.
+ hookServer.setIdentityClockForTests(() => new Date(NODE_IDENTITY_STRICT_AFTER.getTime()))
+ for (const verb of ['open-terminal', 'write']) {
+ const res = await control(verb, 'n-strict', 'application/json')
+ expect(res.status, verb).toBe(403)
+ const body = (await res.json()) as { error?: string }
+ expect(body.error, verb).not.toBe(CONTROL_UNSUPPORTED_ERROR)
+ }
+ const list = await control('list', 'n-strict', 'application/json')
+ expect(list.status).toBe(400)
+ expect(((await list.json()) as { error: string }).error).toBe(CONTROL_UNSUPPORTED_ERROR)
+ } finally {
+ hookServer.setIdentityClockForTests(() => new Date())
+ }
+ })
+
it('tells a text/plain caller, in words, not to retry', async () => {
// Verified, so the reply is the refusal alone: an unverified caller inside the warning window
// gets the identity note prefixed on top, which is existing behaviour and not what is measured