Node-based terminal manager for AI coding agents — tmux-backed terminals and parallel agent sessions as draggable nodes on an infinite pan/zoom canvas. macOS, Linux, and a browser Server Edition.
TypeScript adhdagent-orchestrationai-agentscanvasclaude-codecodexcoding-agentsdeveloper-toolselectrongeminilinuxmacosmultiplexeropencodeparallel-agentsterminalterminal-emulatorterminal-multiplexertmuxworkspace-manager
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into HEAD
reviewc85081618078
diff --cc src/main/index.tsindex c9428005e,bd1afba7d..460218170--- a/src/main/index.ts+++ b/src/main/index.ts@@@ -4267,18 -4311,8 +4311,18 @@@ app.whenReady().then(async () =>// NEW interactive relay host (Stage 4): a connecting peer desktop becomes a first-class// CorePlatform client of this desktop after mutual SAS approval. Runs BESIDE initRemoteHost (the// phone still uses the legacy flow). Inert until `relay:host:start` — a solo user pays nothing.- // Revocation reaches its sessions via `killRelayHostsByPeerKey` (peerRevoker, above).+ // Revocation reaches its sessions via the peer-revoke.ts registry (relay-host.ts registers).- initRelayHost(win, corePlatform, {})+ initRelayHost(win, corePlatform, {+ // A project-scoped seat is judged message by message against THIS core's own records: which+ // projects hold a node (persisted canvases), which node a live session runs, and the project's+ // local folder. Never anything the peer sends. See core/relay/scoped-guest-policy.ts.+ scope: {+ projectsOfNode: (nodeId) => workspaceStore.projectIdsForNode(nodeId),+ nodeOfSession: (sessionId) => ptyManager.nodeOfSession(sessionId),+ projectCwd: (projectId) => workspaceStore.localCwdForProject(projectId),+ hostDataDir: app.getPath('userData')+ }+ })// Standing (phone) relay host: keep a host connection registered so a paired phone can reach// this Mac from anywhere. Honors settings.phoneAccessEnabled internally.const standingHost = initStandingHost(win, ptyManager, () => settingsStore.get(), listProjectsOutput, hostBridge)diff --cc src/main/remote/relay-host-service.tsindex e023f4787,65d8cbd11..c611461b9--- a/src/main/remote/relay-host-service.ts+++ b/src/main/remote/relay-host-service.ts@@@ -36,7 -37,7 +37,8 @@@ import { loadOrCreatePeerKeyPair } froimport { isPremium as licenseIsPremium, getStoredEntitlement, licensedSeats as licenseSeats } from '../../core/license'import { RELAY_URL, relayAllowed as hostRelayAllowed, mintPairingToken } from './host-service'import { canAcceptSeat } from './seat-cap'+import type { ScopedGuestDeps } from '../../core/relay/scoped-guest-policy'+ import { revokePeerKey } from './peer-revoke'/** Thrown (as an Error message) when a new invite would exceed the licensed seat cap. The renderer* maps it to "All seats in use — add a seat." Host-side/UX enforcement only (see below). */diff --cc src/main/remote/relay-host.test.tsindex 86f2e48f7,32104f3ba..624cb8f91--- a/src/main/remote/relay-host.test.ts+++ b/src/main/remote/relay-host.test.ts@@@ -648,43 -654,18 +671,57 @@@ describe('relay host — teardown mirro// A stranger's key cuts nothing.killRelayHostsByPeerKey('some-other-key')})++ it('the shared revoke primitive (peer-revoke.ts) reaches Team Access sessions and unpins the guest', async () => {+ const s = openHostAgainstFakeRelay()+ await s.openMutually()+ const id = s.session.clientId()!+ await vi.waitFor(() => expect(disk.pubkeys).toEqual([s.peerKeyB64])) // pinned as a GUEST+ expect(otherPins.phone?.pubkeys ?? []).toEqual([]) // never as a phone++ expect(await revokePeerKey(s.peerKeyB64, ['guest'])).toEqual({ persisted: true, killed: true })++ expect(disk.pubkeys).toEqual([])+ expect(peerRegistry().ids()).not.toContain(id)+ expect(gone).toEqual([id])+ })})++describe('relay host — a project-scoped session is a boundary (scoped-guest-policy)', () => {+ it('refuses to open a scoped session with no scope policy', () => {+ expect(() =>+ connectRelayHost({+ url: 'wss://relay.example', token: 'tok', ourKeys: genKeyPair(), platform,+ transport: { bufferedAmount: 0, send: () => {}, close: () => {}, onMessage: () => {}, onClose: () => {} },+ sharedProjectId: 'proj-1',+ onPeerPending: () => {}, onOpen: () => {}, onClose: () => {}+ })+ ).toThrow(/scope policy/)+ })++ it('refuses files outside the shared folder, settings:save and an unknown channel before dispatch', async () => {+ const reached: string[] = []+ for (const m of [IPC.fsRead, IPC.settingsSave, 'brand:new-channel']) {+ platform.handle(m, async () => { reached.push(m); return 'x' })+ }+ const s = openHostAgainstFakeRelay({ sharedProjectId: 'proj-1' })+ await s.openMutually()+ s.peerSendsTunnelText(JSON.stringify({ t: 'req', id: 401, method: IPC.fsRead, args: ['/etc/hosts'] }))+ s.peerSendsTunnelText(JSON.stringify({ t: 'req', id: 402, method: IPC.settingsSave, args: [{}] }))+ s.peerSendsTunnelText(JSON.stringify({ t: 'req', id: 403, method: 'brand:new-channel', args: [] }))+ await vi.waitFor(() =>+ expect(s.textFrames.map((f) => JSON.parse(f)).filter((m) => m.id >= 401 && m.ok === false)).toHaveLength(3)+ )+ expect(reached).toEqual([])+ })++ it('an unscoped session still reaches files (full access, as its invite copy says)', async () => {+ platform.handle(IPC.fsRead, async () => 'contents')+ const s = openHostAgainstFakeRelay()+ await s.openMutually()+ s.peerSendsTunnelText(JSON.stringify({ t: 'req', id: 404, method: IPC.fsRead, args: ['/etc/hosts'] }))+ await vi.waitFor(() =>+ expect(s.textFrames.map((f) => JSON.parse(f)).find((m) => m.id === 404)).toMatchObject({ ok: true, result: 'contents' })+ )+ })+})diff --cc src/main/remote/relay-host.tsindex cc8ea9561,086720f3a..cbe981e78--- a/src/main/remote/relay-host.ts+++ b/src/main/remote/relay-host.ts@@@ -42,8 -41,8 +43,9 @@@ import { recordApproval } from '../../cimport type { ElectronPlatform } from '../platform-electron'import { registerPeerSink, unregisterPeerSink } from '../peer-registry'import { allocateRelayClientId, presenceHub } from '../../core/presence/hub'- import { updateApprovedDevices } from './approved-devices'+ import { guestPins } from './approved-devices'+ import { registerPeerSessionKiller } from './peer-revoke'+import { scopedGuestHooks, type ScopedGuestDeps } from '../../core/relay/scoped-guest-policy'export { killRelayHostsByPeerKey }diff --cc src/shared/host-control.tsindex 925a34601,4e7dfce9f..25ada496c--- a/src/shared/host-control.ts+++ b/src/shared/host-control.ts@@@ -74,20 -55,9 +74,23 @@@ export const HOST_ONLY_CHANNELS: ReadonIPC.agentBoardCommentDeliver,IPC.stationNoticeDropped,IPC.stationNoticeList,+ // Unscoped: every project's station outcomes and their notes. A relay guest bound to one project+ // must not read another's, and a relay tab's launch loop is refused anyway (its stub is inert).- IPC.stationOutcomeList++ IPC.stationOutcomeList,+ // The host's settings. `settings:save` is the dangerous half: `modelGateway.baseUrl` is the TRUST+ // ANCHOR `agent:discover-models` uses to decide whether it may resolve the stored+ // `${secret:model-gateway-api-key}` (core/agent-env-ipc.ts), so a peer that could save settings+ // and then ask for discovery would have the keychain-held key sent to a URL of its choosing.+ // `settings:load` goes too: settings.json carries custom agents' launch env (API keys), and a+ // relay tab keeps its settings LOCAL (relay-api.ts), so no legitimate peer reads the host's.+ IPC.settingsLoad,+ IPC.settingsSave,+ // Model-gateway discovery and the write-only gateway credential. Discovery resolves host-side+ // secrets against the saved gateway; the credential verbs write/clear the keychain-held key.+ IPC.agentDiscoverModels,+ IPC.agentGatewayCredentialStatus,+ IPC.agentGatewayCredentialSave,+ IPC.agentGatewayCredentialClear])/** What a refused peer is told. One wording, so the two shells answer identically. */