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fix(runtime): fold native execution into shared containment (ODY-152)

Alexandre Teixeira9bb2424e6548
diff --git a/core/platform_compat.py b/core/platform_compat.py
index e667c1e96..be6d30b87 100644
--- a/core/platform_compat.py
+++ b/core/platform_compat.py
@@ -107,51 +107,42 @@ def pid_alive(pid: Optional[int]) -> bool:
PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION, False, int(pid)
)
if not handle:
- return False
+ return kernel32.GetLastError() != 87 # ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER: PID absent
try:
code = wintypes.DWORD()
if kernel32.GetExitCodeProcess(handle, ctypes.byref(code)):
return code.value == STILL_ACTIVE
- return False
+ return True # A failed probe does not establish death.
finally:
kernel32.CloseHandle(handle)
try:
os.kill(pid, 0)
return True
- except (OSError, ProcessLookupError):
+ except ProcessLookupError:
return False
+ except OSError:
+ return True # EPERM and other inspection failures are not ESRCH.
-def kill_process_tree(pid: Optional[int]) -> None:
- """Terminate ``pid`` and all of its descendants.
+def kill_process_tree(pid: Optional[int]):
+ """Use the runtime's shared escalating teardown and return verified death.
- POSIX: signal the whole process group (``killpg``), falling back to a plain
- ``kill`` if the pid isn't a group leader.
- Windows: ``taskkill /T /F`` walks and kills the child tree (there is no
- process-group signalling).
+ Callers retaining durable PIDs must validate their recorded identity before
+ calling this compatibility entry point. Native grants retain identity at
+ spawn and use containment.release directly.
"""
- if not pid:
- return
- if IS_WINDOWS:
- try:
- subprocess.run(
- ["taskkill", "/F", "/T", "/PID", str(pid)],
- stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
- stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
- creationflags=getattr(subprocess, "CREATE_NO_WINDOW", 0),
- )
- except Exception:
- pass
- return
- import signal
-
- try:
- os.killpg(os.getpgid(pid), signal.SIGTERM)
- except Exception:
- try:
- os.kill(pid, signal.SIGTERM)
- except Exception:
- pass
+ from src import containment
+ if not pid or int(pid) <= 0:
+ return containment.ReleaseOutcome(dead=True, escalated=False)
+ spec = containment.ContainmentSpec(workspace=os.getcwd(), env={}, wall_clock_s=1,
+ required=frozenset())
+ grant = containment.ContainmentGrant(
+ id="", mechanism="windows_tree" if IS_WINDOWS else "process_group",
+ workspace=spec.workspace, enforced=frozenset(), degraded=(),
+ unenforced_required=(), owner="compatibility", mode=containment.CONTAINMENT_MODE,
+ spec=spec, pid=int(pid), pgid=containment._pgid_of(int(pid)),
+ )
+ return containment.release(grant)
# ── Shell / executable resolution ───────────────────────────────────────────
diff --git a/src/agent_tools/subprocess_tools.py b/src/agent_tools/subprocess_tools.py
index bb587858f..1b7178d13 100644
--- a/src/agent_tools/subprocess_tools.py
+++ b/src/agent_tools/subprocess_tools.py
@@ -811,6 +811,66 @@ async def _run_subprocess_streaming(
timed_out,
)
+def _owned_spec(cwd: str, env: Optional[dict], timeout: int) -> containment.ContainmentSpec:
+ """Server-defined boundary shared by the native execution tools."""
+ readonly = []
+ for prefix in (sys.prefix, sys.base_prefix):
+ prefix = os.path.realpath(prefix)
+ if not _namespace_visible_without_bind(prefix) and prefix not in _NAMESPACE_RESERVED_DESTS:
+ readonly.append(prefix)
+ return containment.agent_spec(
+ cwd, dict(os.environ if env is None else env), timeout,
+ readonly_extra=tuple(dict.fromkeys(readonly)),
+ )
+
+
+async def _run_owned_command(command, ctx: dict, *, tool: str, timeout: int, argv: bool = False) -> dict:
+ from src.tool_execution import agent_cwd, _truncate
+
+ grant = None
+ try:
+ grant = containment.acquire(
+ _owned_spec(agent_cwd(), ctx.get("subproc_env"), timeout),
+ owner=str(ctx.get("session_id") or ctx.get("owner") or tool),
+ )
+ if containment.FILESYSTEM not in grant.enforced:
+ if argv:
+ command = [*command[:-1], _replace_workspace_alias(command[-1], grant.workspace)]
+ else:
+ command = _replace_workspace_alias(command, grant.workspace)
+ result = await containment.run(grant, command, argv=argv, progress_cb=ctx.get("progress_cb"))
+ except containment.ContainmentUnavailable as exc:
+ return containment.unavailable_tool_result(exc, tool=tool)
+ except (OSError, RuntimeError, ValueError) as exc:
+ return {"error": f"{tool}: execution failed: {exc}", "exit_code": 1,
+ "containment": grant.to_dict() if grant else {"contained": False, "executed": False}}
+
+ boundary = result.grant.to_dict()
+ boundary["executed"] = True
+ teardown = result.release.to_dict() if result.release else {"dead": False}
+ output = result.stdout.rstrip()
+ if result.stderr.rstrip():
+ output = (output + "\nSTDERR: " + result.stderr.rstrip()).strip()
+ truncated = result.output_truncated or len(output) > MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS
+ common = {"containment": boundary, "teardown": teardown, "output_truncated": truncated}
+ if not teardown["dead"]:
+ return {**common, "error": f"{tool}: process teardown could not verify death",
+ "failure_kind": "process_teardown_failed", "exit_code": 1,
+ "stdout": _truncate(result.stdout, MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS),
+ "stderr": _truncate(result.stderr, MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS)}
+ if result.timed_out:
+ return {**common, "error": f"{tool}: timed out after {timeout}s; process tree terminated",
+ "exit_code": 124, "stdout": _truncate(result.stdout, MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS),
+ "stderr": _truncate(result.stderr, MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS)}
+ if tool == "python":
+ child_failure = _python_child_runtime_failure(result.stdout, result.stderr, result.exit_code)
+ if child_failure:
+ return {**common, "error": _truncate("python: a child operation failed despite a zero Python exit status:\n" + child_failure, MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS),
+ "exit_code": 1, "stderr": _truncate(result.stderr, MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS)}
+ return {**common, "output": _truncate(output, MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS) or "(no output)",
+ "exit_code": result.exit_code if result.exit_code is not None else 1}
+
+
class BashTool:
async def execute(self, content: str, ctx: dict) -> dict:
from src.tool_execution import agent_cwd, _truncate
@@ -861,14 +921,14 @@ class BashTool:
if "/tmp/" in content:
isolated_tmp = _isolated_tmp_dir(agent_cwd())
content = content.replace("/tmp/", isolated_tmp.rstrip("/") + "/")
- try:
- content, boundary, _confined = _contained_command(content, agent_cwd())
- except containment.ContainmentUnavailable as exc:
- return containment.unavailable_tool_result(exc, tool="bash")
progress_cb = ctx.get("progress_cb")
_subproc_env = ctx.get("subproc_env")
session_id = ctx.get("session_id")
if not IS_WINDOWS and session_id and shutil.which("tmux"):
+ try:
+ content, boundary, _confined = _contained_command(content, agent_cwd())
+ except containment.ContainmentUnavailable as exc:
+ return containment.unavailable_tool_result(exc, tool="bash")
stdout, stderr, rc, timed_out = await _run_tmux_bash(
content,
session_id=str(session_id),
@@ -897,40 +957,7 @@ class BashTool:
"containment": boundary,
}
- try:
- if IS_WINDOWS:
- proc = await _create_bash_subprocess(
- content,
- cwd=agent_cwd(),
- env=_subproc_env,
- )
- else:
- # Preserve the existing captured POSIX path; the structural
- # helper is primarily needed to avoid cmd.exe on Windows.
- proc = await asyncio.create_subprocess_shell(
- content,
- stdin=asyncio.subprocess.DEVNULL,
- stdout=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
- stderr=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
- env=_subproc_env,
- cwd=agent_cwd(),
- )
- except RuntimeError as exc:
- return {"error": str(exc), "exit_code": 1, "containment": boundary}
- mark_operation_started('subprocess', pid=proc.pid)
- stdout, stderr, rc, timed_out = await _run_subprocess_streaming(
- proc,
- timeout=DEFAULT_BASH_TIMEOUT,
- progress_cb=progress_cb,
- )
- if timed_out:
- return {"error": f"bash: timed out after {DEFAULT_BASH_TIMEOUT}s — process killed", "exit_code": 124, "stdout": _truncate(stdout, MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS), "stderr": _truncate(stderr, MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS), "containment": boundary}
- output = stdout.rstrip()
- err = stderr.rstrip()
- if err:
- output = (output + "\nSTDERR: " + err).strip() if output else "STDERR: " + err
- output = _truncate(output, MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS)
- return {"output": output or "(no output)", "exit_code": rc or 0, "containment": boundary}
+ return await _run_owned_command(content, ctx, tool="bash", timeout=DEFAULT_BASH_TIMEOUT)
class HostShellTool:
async def execute(self, content: str, ctx: dict) -> dict:
diff --git a/src/containment.py b/src/containment.py
index 3584cdee2..b7213b173 100644
--- a/src/containment.py
+++ b/src/containment.py
@@ -238,6 +238,8 @@ class ContainmentGrant:
"unenforced_required": list(self.unenforced_required),
"contained": self.contained,
"external": self.external,
+ "requested": sorted(self.spec.requested),
+ "network": self.spec.network,
}
@@ -815,6 +817,12 @@ def _bwrap_prefix(spec: ContainmentSpec) -> list[str]:
"--dev-bind", "/dev", "/dev", "--proc", "/proc",
"--dir", WORKSPACE_MOUNT, "--bind", spec.workspace, WORKSPACE_MOUNT,
]
+ # Preserve absolute workspace paths in generated scripts without exposing
+ # a writable parent directory.
+ workspace = os.path.realpath(spec.workspace)
+ if workspace not in _RESERVED_BIND_DESTS and workspace not in {"/usr", "/etc"}:
+ args.extend(_dir_chain(workspace))
+ args.extend(("--bind", workspace, workspace))
for path in spec.readonly_extra:
args.extend(_dir_chain(path))
args.extend(("--ro-bind", path, path))
@@ -873,6 +881,8 @@ def _launch_argv(grant: ContainmentGrant, command: Any, *, argv: bool) -> list[s
else:
shell = find_bash()
if not shell:
+ if IS_WINDOWS:
+ raise RuntimeError("Git Bash is required for the Bash tool on Windows; install Git for Windows.")
raise RuntimeError(
"containment: no POSIX shell available to run a shell command"
)
@@ -912,7 +922,7 @@ async def _drain(stream, buffer: list[str], budget: list[int]) -> None:
if stream is None:
return
while True:
- line = await stream.readline()
+ line = await stream.read(65536)
if not line:
break
if budget[0] < 0:
@@ -956,15 +966,23 @@ async def run(
spec = grant.spec
launch = _launch_argv(grant, command, argv=argv)
- proc = await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec(
- *launch,
- stdin=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE if stdin is not None else asyncio.subprocess.DEVNULL,
- stdout=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
- stderr=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
- cwd=spec.workspace,
- env=dict(spec.env),
- **_spawn_kwargs(grant),
- )
+ try:
+ proc = await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec(
+ *launch,
+ stdin=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE if stdin is not None else asyncio.subprocess.DEVNULL,
+ stdout=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
+ stderr=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
+ cwd=spec.workspace,
+ env=dict(spec.env),
+ **_spawn_kwargs(grant),
+ )
+ except BaseException:
+ # Acquisition can precede a failed or cancelled spawn. A grant without
+ # a child must not become a permanent restart orphan.
+ release(grant, grace_s=0)
+ raise
+ from src.agent_runtime.journal import mark_operation_started
+ mark_operation_started("subprocess", pid=proc.pid)
# start_new_session makes the child its own group leader, so the group id
# is the child's pid. Captured here rather than at teardown: once the leader
# exits, getpgid can no longer tell us which group its children are in.
@@ -991,16 +1009,18 @@ async def run(
asyncio.create_task(_drain(proc.stdout, out_buf, out_budget)),
asyncio.create_task(_drain(proc.stderr, err_buf, err_budget)),
]
- if stdin is not None and proc.stdin is not None:
- try:
- proc.stdin.write(stdin)
- await proc.stdin.drain()
- except Exception:
- pass
- try:
- proc.stdin.close()
- except Exception:
- pass
+ async def _wait() -> None:
+ # Pipe backpressure is execution time too. Feeding a child that never
+ # reads stdin must remain inside the same timeout/cancellation scope.
+ if stdin is not None and proc.stdin is not None:
+ try:
+ proc.stdin.write(stdin)
+ await proc.stdin.drain()
+ except (BrokenPipeError, ConnectionResetError):
+ pass
+ finally:
+ proc.stdin.close()
+ await proc.wait()
async def _progress() -> None:
while True:
@@ -1016,7 +1036,7 @@ async def run(
outcome: Optional[ReleaseOutcome] = None
try:
try:
- await asyncio.wait_for(proc.wait(), timeout=spec.wall_clock_s)
+ await asyncio.wait_for(_wait(), timeout=spec.wall_clock_s)
except asyncio.TimeoutError:
timed_out = True
outcome = await _release_awaited(live, proc)
@@ -1056,12 +1076,8 @@ async def run(
# ── release ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# These primitives duplicate the escalating teardown that PR #46 adds to
-# core/platform_compat.kill_process_tree. They are here because this branch is
-# cut from a lab SHA that predates it, and containment cannot ship a teardown
-# that only sends SIGTERM. When #46 lands, release() should delegate to that
-# function and the helpers below should go — carrying two copies of a
-# process-group kill is exactly the divergence this module exists to end.
+# core.platform_compat.kill_process_tree delegates here as well. Native tools,
+# detached jobs and compatibility callers share escalation and death probes.
def _own_pgid() -> int:
try:
return os.getpgid(0)
@@ -1097,8 +1113,10 @@ def _group_present(pgid: Optional[int]) -> bool:
try:
os.killpg(pgid, 0)
return True
- except (OSError, ProcessLookupError):
+ except ProcessLookupError:
return False
+ except OSError:
+ return True # EPERM is a live group we cannot signal, not verified death.
def _signal_tree(pid: Optional[int], pgid: Optional[int], sig: int) -> None:
@@ -1188,7 +1206,11 @@ def _ownership_gate(
"""
verdict = process_ownership.verify(pid, token)
if verdict == process_ownership.OWNED:
- return None
+ if IS_WINDOWS or not pgid or _pgid_of(pid) == pgid:
+ return None
+ # A valid leader identity does not establish ownership of an arbitrary
+ # recorded process group. Refuse a stale or inconsistent PGID.
+ verdict = process_ownership.UNVERIFIABLE
if verdict == process_ownership.GONE:
# The leader is gone. Its group may still hold processes it
@@ -1268,6 +1290,10 @@ def release(grant: ContainmentGrant, *, grace_s: float = 2.0) -> ReleaseOutcome:
pgid = int(pgid) if pgid else None
except (TypeError, ValueError):
pgid = None
+ if pid <= 0:
+ pid = 0
+ if pgid is not None and pgid <= 0:
+ pgid = None
grant = replace(grant, pid=pid or None, pgid=pgid)
if not pid and not _group_present(pgid):
diff --git a/src/process_reaper.py b/src/process_reaper.py
index 63a2dbff7..8eddf5db2 100644
--- a/src/process_reaper.py
+++ b/src/process_reaper.py
@@ -73,6 +73,12 @@ def reap_containment_grants() -> Dict[str, Any]:
continue
verdict = process_ownership.verify_record(record)
if verdict == process_ownership.GONE:
+ if containment._group_present(record.get("pgid")):
+ # Leader death does not prove tree death. Without a surviving
+ # identity we cannot signal the group, so retain the evidence.
+ report["failed"] += 1
+ logger.error("process_reaper: grant %s leader is gone but group survives", grant_id)
+ continue
containment.forget(grant_id)
report["already_gone"] += 1
continue
diff --git a/tests/containment_helpers.py b/tests/containment_helpers.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a816a194c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/containment_helpers.py
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+"""Captured spawns exercise the production runner without signalling fake PIDs."""
+import asyncio
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+
+from src import containment
+
+
+def capture_owned_spawn(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
+ captured = {}
+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "CONTAINMENT_MODE", containment.MODE_REPORT_ONLY)
+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "_store_path", lambda: tmp_path / "grants.json")
+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "_pgid_of", lambda pid: pid)
+
+ async def fake_exec(*argv, **kwargs):
+ captured.update(argv=argv, kwargs=kwargs, command=argv[-1])
+ stdout = asyncio.StreamReader()
+ stdout.feed_data(b"ok")
+ stdout.feed_eof()
+ stderr = asyncio.StreamReader()
+ stderr.feed_eof()
+ async def wait():
+ return 0
+ return SimpleNamespace(pid=99999999, stdout=stdout, stderr=stderr,
+ returncode=0, wait=wait)
+
+ async def release(*args, **kwargs):
+ return containment.ReleaseOutcome(dead=True, escalated=False)
+
+ monkeypatch.setattr(asyncio, "create_subprocess_exec", fake_exec)
+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "_release_awaited", release)
+ return captured
diff --git a/tests/test_agent_bash_tmux_env.py b/tests/test_agent_bash_tmux_env.py
index cd90445ff..44fb9562e 100644
--- a/tests/test_agent_bash_tmux_env.py
+++ b/tests/test_agent_bash_tmux_env.py
@@ -188,25 +188,14 @@ def test_direct_bash_subprocess_has_closed_stdin(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
from src.agent_tools import subprocess_tools
from src import tool_execution
- captured = {}
- sentinel = SimpleNamespace(pid=12345)
-
- async def fake_create(command, **kwargs):
- captured.update(kwargs)
- return sentinel
-
- async def fake_stream(proc, **_kwargs):
- assert proc is sentinel
- return "ok", "", 0, False
-
- monkeypatch.setattr(asyncio, "create_subprocess_shell", fake_create)
- monkeypatch.setattr(subprocess_tools, "_run_subprocess_streaming", fake_stream)
+ from tests.containment_helpers import capture_owned_spawn
+ captured = capture_owned_spawn(monkeypatch, tmp_path)
monkeypatch.setattr(tool_execution, "agent_cwd", lambda: str(tmp_path))
result = asyncio.run(subprocess_tools.BashTool().execute("echo ok", {}))
assert result["exit_code"] == 0
- assert captured["stdin"] is asyncio.subprocess.DEVNULL
+ assert captured["kwargs"]["stdin"] is asyncio.subprocess.DEVNULL
assert not (tmp_path / ".tmp").exists()
@@ -258,19 +247,8 @@ def test_bash_allows_unicode_ffmpeg_drawtext_with_explicit_fontfile(monkeypatch,
from src.agent_tools import subprocess_tools
from src import tool_execution
- captured = {}
- sentinel = SimpleNamespace(pid=12345)
-
- async def fake_create(command, **kwargs):
- captured["command"] = command
- return sentinel
-
- async def fake_stream(proc, **_kwargs):
- assert proc is sentinel
- return "ok", "", 0, False
-
- monkeypatch.setattr(asyncio, "create_subprocess_shell", fake_create)
- monkeypatch.setattr(subprocess_tools, "_run_subprocess_streaming", fake_stream)
+ from tests.containment_helpers import capture_owned_spawn
+ captured = capture_owned_spawn(monkeypatch, tmp_path)
monkeypatch.setattr(tool_execution, "agent_cwd", lambda: str(tmp_path))
command = (
diff --git a/tests/test_agent_bash_windows.py b/tests/test_agent_bash_windows.py
index cf9742379..99ab918c1 100644
--- a/tests/test_agent_bash_windows.py
+++ b/tests/test_agent_bash_windows.py
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ import pytest
from types import SimpleNamespace
from src.agent_tools import subprocess_tools
+from src import containment
+from tests.containment_helpers import capture_owned_spawn
@pytest.mark.asyncio
@@ -84,26 +86,17 @@ async def test_windows_bash_applies_the_subprocess_env(monkeypatch):
@pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_windows_bash_tool_passes_ctx_env_through_to_the_child(monkeypatch):
- captured = {}
+async def test_windows_bash_tool_passes_ctx_env_through_to_the_child(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
+ captured = capture_owned_spawn(monkeypatch, tmp_path)
env = {"PATH": r"C:\Odysseus\venv\Scripts", "VIRTUAL_ENV": r"C:\Odysseus\venv"}
monkeypatch.setattr(subprocess_tools, "IS_WINDOWS", True)
monkeypatch.setattr(
subprocess_tools, "find_bash", lambda: r"C:\Program Files\Git\bin\bash.exe"
)
- monkeypatch.setattr("src.tool_execution.agent_cwd", lambda: r"D:\Workspaces\Project")
-
- async def fake_exec(*argv, **kwargs):
- captured["argv"] = argv
- captured["kwargs"] = kwargs
- return SimpleNamespace(pid=4242)
-
- async def fake_stream(_process, **_kwargs):
- return "ok", "", 0, False
-
- monkeypatch.setattr(subprocess_tools.asyncio, "create_subprocess_exec", fake_exec)
- monkeypatch.setattr(subprocess_tools, "_run_subprocess_streaming", fake_stream)
+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "IS_WINDOWS", True)
+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "find_bash", lambda: r"C:\Program Files\Git\bin\bash.exe")
+ monkeypatch.setattr("src.tool_execution.agent_cwd", lambda: str(tmp_path))
result = await subprocess_tools.BashTool().execute(
"pwd",
@@ -134,9 +127,13 @@ async def test_windows_bash_without_git_bash_fails_clearly(monkeypatch):
@pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_bash_tool_returns_install_hint_when_git_bash_is_missing(monkeypatch):
+async def test_bash_tool_returns_install_hint_when_git_bash_is_missing(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
+ capture_owned_spawn(monkeypatch, tmp_path)
monkeypatch.setattr(subprocess_tools, "IS_WINDOWS", True)
monkeypatch.setattr(subprocess_tools, "find_bash", lambda: None)
+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "IS_WINDOWS", True)
+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "find_bash", lambda: None)
+ monkeypatch.setattr("src.tool_execution.agent_cwd", lambda: str(tmp_path))
result = await subprocess_tools.BashTool().execute(
"pwd",
@@ -148,11 +145,13 @@ async def test_bash_tool_returns_install_hint_when_git_bash_is_missing(monkeypat
@pytest.mark.asyncio
-async def test_windows_bash_does_not_use_a_stray_tmux_executable(monkeypatch):
- captured = {}
- workspace = r"D:\Workspaces\Project with spaces"
+async def test_windows_bash_does_not_use_a_stray_tmux_executable(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
+ captured = capture_owned_spawn(monkeypatch, tmp_path)
+ workspace = str(tmp_path)
monkeypatch.setattr(subprocess_tools, "IS_WINDOWS", True)
+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "IS_WINDOWS", True)
+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "find_bash", lambda: r"C:\Program Files\Git\bin\bash.exe")
monkeypatch.setattr(
subprocess_tools.shutil,
"which",
@@ -163,17 +162,7 @@ async def test_windows_bash_does_not_use_a_stray_tmux_executable(monkeypatch):
async def fail_tmux(*_args, **_kwargs):
pytest.fail("native Windows must not enter the POSIX tmux path")
- async def fake_create(command, **kwargs):
- captured["command"] = command
- captured["kwargs"] = kwargs
- return SimpleNamespace(pid=12345)
-
- async def fake_stream(_process, **_kwargs):
- return "ok", "", 0, False
-
monkeypatch.setattr(subprocess_tools, "_run_tmux_bash", fail_tmux)
- monkeypatch.setattr(subprocess_tools, "_create_bash_subprocess", fake_create)
- monkeypatch.setattr(subprocess_tools, "_run_subprocess_streaming", fake_stream)
result = await subprocess_tools.BashTool().execute(
"pwd",
@@ -185,7 +174,7 @@ async def test_windows_bash_does_not_use_a_stray_tmux_executable(monkeypatch):
# Every bash result now carries the execution boundary it actually got.
# Asserting dict equality here would make that field impossible to add
# without touching a test about tmux, so the shape is asserted instead.
- assert result["containment"]["reported_dimensions"] == ["filesystem"]
+ assert result["containment"]["network"] == "inherit"
assert captured["command"] == "pwd"
assert captured["kwargs"]["cwd"] == workspace
diff --git a/tests/test_native_execution_containment.py b/tests/test_native_execution_containment.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..095addeb1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/test_native_execution_containment.py
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+"""Native execution must use the shared boundary and report actual teardown."""
+import asyncio
+import os
+import sys
+
+import pytest
+
+from src import containment, tool_execution
+from src.agent_tools import subprocess_tools
+
+
[email protected](autouse=True)
+def native_boundary(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+ monkeypatch.setattr(tool_execution, "agent_cwd", lambda: str(tmp_path))
+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "_store_path", lambda: tmp_path / "grants.json")
+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "CONTAINMENT_MODE", containment.MODE_REPORT_ONLY)
+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "MECHANISMS", tuple(
+ m for m in containment.MECHANISMS if m.name == "process_group"
+ ))
+ return tmp_path
+
+
[email protected](os.name == "nt", reason="real POSIX group teardown")
+async def test_native_bash_owns_and_releases_its_child(native_boundary):
+ result = await subprocess_tools.BashTool().execute(
+ "if read answer; then echo unexpected; else printf '%s' \"$ODY_TEST_ENV\"; fi",
+ {"subproc_env": {"PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin", "ODY_TEST_ENV": "captured"}},
+ )
+ assert result["output"] == "captured"
+ assert result["exit_code"] == 0
+ assert result["teardown"]["dead"] is True
+ assert result["containment"]["enforced"] == ["process_tree", "wall_clock"]
+ assert result["containment"]["unenforced_required"] == ["filesystem"]
+ assert result["containment"]["network"] == "inherit"
+ assert containment.active_grants() == []
+
+
+async def test_native_bash_refuses_before_spawn_when_required_boundary_missing(monkeypatch):
+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "CONTAINMENT_MODE", containment.MODE_ENFORCING)
+ async def forbidden(*args, **kwargs):
+ pytest.fail("refused command reached spawn")
+ monkeypatch.setattr(asyncio, "create_subprocess_exec", forbidden)
+ result = await subprocess_tools.BashTool().execute("echo hello", {})
+ assert result["containment"]["executed"] is False
+ assert result["containment"]["unenforced_required"] == ["filesystem"]
+
+
+async def test_failed_spawn_releases_unstarted_grant(native_boundary, monkeypatch):
+ async def fail(*args, **kwargs):
+ raise OSError("spawn failed")
+ monkeypatch.setattr(asyncio, "create_subprocess_exec", fail)
+ result = await subprocess_tools.BashTool().execute("echo hello", {})
+ assert result["exit_code"] == 1
+ assert containment.active_grants() == []
+
+
[email protected](os.name == "nt", reason="real POSIX process")
+async def test_long_line_is_drained_and_truncation_reported(native_boundary):
+ spec = containment.ContainmentSpec(
+ workspace=str(native_boundary), env=dict(os.environ), wall_clock_s=5,
+ required=frozenset({containment.PROCESS_TREE, containment.WALL_CLOCK}),
+ max_output_bytes=100,
+ )
+ result = await containment.run(containment.acquire(spec, owner="long-line"),
+ [sys.executable, "-c", "print('x' * 200000)"], argv=True)
+ assert result.exit_code == 0
+ assert result.stdout == "x" * 100
+ assert result.output_truncated is True
+ assert result.release.dead is True
+
+
[email protected](os.name == "nt", reason="real POSIX process")
+async def test_output_exactly_at_cap_is_complete(native_boundary):
+ spec = containment.ContainmentSpec(
+ workspace=str(native_boundary), env=dict(os.environ), wall_clock_s=5,
+ required=frozenset({containment.PROCESS_TREE, containment.WALL_CLOCK}), max_output_bytes=100,
+ )
+ result = await containment.run(containment.acquire(spec, owner="exact-cap"),
+ [sys.executable, "-c", "import sys; sys.stdout.write('x' * 100)"], argv=True)
+ assert len(result.stdout) == 100
+ assert result.output_truncated is False
+
+
+def test_permission_denied_is_not_verified_death(monkeypatch):
+ from core import platform_compat
+ def denied(*args):
+ raise PermissionError("EPERM")
+ monkeypatch.setattr(platform_compat, "IS_WINDOWS", False)
+ monkeypatch.setattr(os, "kill", denied)
+ monkeypatch.setattr(os, "killpg", denied)
+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "_own_pgid", lambda: 1)
+ assert platform_compat.pid_alive(987654) is True
+ assert containment._group_present(987654) is True
+
+
[email protected](os.name == "nt", reason="real POSIX process")
+async def test_blocked_stdin_is_inside_wall_clock(native_boundary):
+ spec = containment.ContainmentSpec(
+ workspace=str(native_boundary), env=dict(os.environ), wall_clock_s=1,
+ required=frozenset({containment.PROCESS_TREE, containment.WALL_CLOCK}),
+ )
+ result = await asyncio.wait_for(containment.run(
+ containment.acquire(spec, owner="blocked-stdin"), "sleep 60", stdin=b"x" * 2000000,
+ ), timeout=8)
+ assert result.timed_out is True
+ assert result.release.dead is True
diff --git a/tests/test_orphan_reaping.py b/tests/test_orphan_reaping.py
index d89b45810..38eca2e51 100644
--- a/tests/test_orphan_reaping.py
+++ b/tests/test_orphan_reaping.py
@@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ def test_a_gone_leader_with_a_live_group_is_reported_not_killed(
def test_a_verified_grant_is_torn_down_normally(grant_store, monkeypatch):
seed_grant()
verdicts(monkeypatch, {4242: process_ownership.OWNED})
+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "_pgid_of", lambda pid: 4242)
signals = []
monkeypatch.setattr(
containment, "_signal_tree",
@@ -179,6 +180,28 @@ def test_a_verified_grant_is_torn_down_normally(grant_store, monkeypatch):
assert outcome.ownership == ""
+def test_verified_leader_does_not_authorize_a_different_group(grant_store, monkeypatch):
+ seed_grant(pgid=9999)
+ verdicts(monkeypatch, {4242: process_ownership.OWNED})
+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "_pgid_of", lambda pid: 4242)
+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "_signal_tree", lambda *args: pytest.fail("foreign group signalled"))
+ outcome = containment.reap_record(grant_store()["grant-1"])
+ assert outcome.dead is False
+ assert outcome.ownership == process_ownership.UNVERIFIABLE
+
+
+def test_reaper_retains_a_group_after_its_leader_dies(grant_store, monkeypatch):
+ from src import process_reaper
+ seed_grant()
+ verdicts(monkeypatch, {4242: process_ownership.GONE})
+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "_group_present", lambda pgid: True)
+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "_signal_tree", lambda *args: pytest.fail("unidentified group signalled"))
+ report = process_reaper.reap_containment_grants()
+ assert report["failed"] == 1
+ assert report["already_gone"] == 0
+ assert "grant-1" in grant_store()
+
+
def test_an_in_process_grant_is_not_subjected_to_the_gate(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
"""A grant carrying its own pid belongs to the caller holding it.
diff --git a/website/configuration-reference.md b/website/configuration-reference.md
index 53dbf4351..bb0474604 100644
--- a/website/configuration-reference.md
+++ b/website/configuration-reference.md
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ The source tree reads **108** `ODYSSEUS_*` variables: 78 an operator may want to
| `ODYSSEUS_MAX_VISUAL_EVIDENCE_FRAMES` | `'3'` | `src/agent_loop.py:15361` | How many video frames one tool result may contribute. Clamped to 1-8. |
| `ODYSSEUS_MAX_VISUAL_EVIDENCE_IMAGES` | `'1'` | `src/agent_loop.py:15329` | How many images one tool result may contribute to the model turn. Clamped to 1-8. |
| `ODYSSEUS_MCP_ALLOWED_COMMANDS` | `''` | `src/agent_tools/admin_tools.py:140` | Security-relevant. Comma-separated allowlist of MCP launcher basenames the agent may start. Empty by default, and the deny list still wins. |
-| `ODYSSEUS_PYTHON_TOOL_SITE_PACKAGES` | `''` | `src/agent_tools/subprocess_tools.py:1153` | Security-relevant. Absolute package roots, separated by the platform path separator, exposed to the sandboxed Python tool. Empty exposes none. |
+| `ODYSSEUS_PYTHON_TOOL_SITE_PACKAGES` | `''` | `src/agent_tools/subprocess_tools.py:1180` | Security-relevant. Absolute package roots, separated by the platform path separator, exposed to the sandboxed Python tool. Empty exposes none. |
| `ODYSSEUS_SCRIPT_HOST` | `'localhost'` | `src/builtin_actions.py:919` | Default host for the run-script action. `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, `local` and empty run locally; any other value runs over SSH. |
| `ODYSSEUS_TOOL_APPROVAL_GATE` | `'0'` | `src/tool_capabilities.py:645` | Security-relevant. Truthy makes tool calls pass through the approval gate. Off by default. |