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fix(runtime): contain every native Python execution (ODY-143)

Alexandre Teixeirabf0623a77b99
diff --git a/src/agent_tools/subprocess_tools.py b/src/agent_tools/subprocess_tools.py
index 1b7178d13..2daf4e2fd 100644
--- a/src/agent_tools/subprocess_tools.py
+++ b/src/agent_tools/subprocess_tools.py
@@ -811,7 +811,7 @@ async def _run_subprocess_streaming(
timed_out,
)
-def _owned_spec(cwd: str, env: Optional[dict], timeout: int) -> containment.ContainmentSpec:
+def _owned_spec(cwd: str, env: Optional[dict], timeout: int, readonly_extra: tuple = ()) -> containment.ContainmentSpec:
"""Server-defined boundary shared by the native execution tools."""
readonly = []
for prefix in (sys.prefix, sys.base_prefix):
@@ -820,17 +820,18 @@ def _owned_spec(cwd: str, env: Optional[dict], timeout: int) -> containment.Cont
readonly.append(prefix)
return containment.agent_spec(
cwd, dict(os.environ if env is None else env), timeout,
- readonly_extra=tuple(dict.fromkeys(readonly)),
+ readonly_extra=tuple(dict.fromkeys([*readonly, *readonly_extra])),
)
-async def _run_owned_command(command, ctx: dict, *, tool: str, timeout: int, argv: bool = False) -> dict:
+async def _run_owned_command(command, ctx: dict, *, tool: str, timeout: int, argv: bool = False,
+ readonly_extra: tuple = ()) -> dict:
from src.tool_execution import agent_cwd, _truncate
grant = None
try:
grant = containment.acquire(
- _owned_spec(agent_cwd(), ctx.get("subproc_env"), timeout),
+ _owned_spec(agent_cwd(), ctx.get("subproc_env"), timeout, readonly_extra),
owner=str(ctx.get("session_id") or ctx.get("owner") or tool),
)
if containment.FILESYSTEM not in grant.enforced:
@@ -1206,119 +1207,18 @@ class PythonTool:
),
"exit_code": 1,
}
- # Only create a mount namespace when the submitted code actually
- # relies on the public virtual path. Ordinary Python probes and
- # scripts should retain the real workspace as os.getcwd(); wrapping
- # every invocation would make that stable contract appear as
- # ``/workspace`` instead.
- needs_virtual_namespace = bool(
- WORKSPACE_MOUNT in content
- or re.search(r"\b(?:runpy\.run_path|exec\s*\(|importlib\.)", content)
- )
if "/tmp/" in content:
isolated_tmp = _isolated_tmp_dir(agent_cwd())
content = content.replace("/tmp/", isolated_tmp.rstrip("/") + "/")
- progress_cb = ctx.get("progress_cb")
_subproc_env = ctx.get("subproc_env")
- # Generated scripts commonly contain the public `/workspace/...`
- # paths shown in the tool contract. Rewriting the inline `-c` body
- # cannot repair paths embedded in a script loaded via `runpy`, and a
- # process-global `/workspace` symlink would break concurrent tasks.
- # Give Python the same per-task namespace Bash receives so both inline
- # code and loaded scripts see the stable virtual workspace root.
- namespaced_content = _python_with_configured_import_paths(
+ content = _python_with_configured_import_paths(
_python_with_visible_final_expression(content), _subproc_env
)
- python_command = shlex.join((sys.executable or "python", "-I", "-c", namespaced_content))
- # Code that explicitly uses the public /workspace path runs inside a
- # namespace whose stable cwd is that same bind. Host workspaces under
- # /tmp or another unbound parent are intentionally invisible by their
- # real path inside the namespace; trying to chdir there makes otherwise
- # valid native Python fail before execution.
- namespaced = (
- _wrap_workspace_namespace(
- python_command,
- agent_cwd(),
- chdir=WORKSPACE_MOUNT,
- interpreter_prefix=sys.prefix,
- )
- if needs_virtual_namespace
- else None
- )
- # The boundary this call actually got, reported either way. Note what
- # the gate above means: code that does not mention /workspace and is
- # not dynamic gets NO namespace, on every platform including a Linux
- # host with working bubblewrap. That is deliberate -- it keeps
- # os.getcwd() the real workspace -- but it is also a filesystem
- # containment gap wider than the macOS one, and until now nothing said
- # so. Reporting it is in scope here; closing it is not: it changes the
- # Linux Python path for every call and cannot be verified on a host
- # without bwrap. It is the reason enforcing mode cannot be switched on
- # yet, because enforcing it as written would refuse ordinary Python on
- # a correctly configured host.
- boundary_probe = _execution_boundary(
- agent_cwd(), wall_clock_s=DEFAULT_PYTHON_TIMEOUT,
- )
- confined = namespaced is not None
- if not confined and boundary_probe.mode == containment.MODE_ENFORCING:
- return containment.unavailable_tool_result(
- containment.ContainmentUnavailable(
- frozenset({containment.FILESYSTEM}), ALIAS_REWRITE_MECHANISM,
- ),
- tool="python",
- )
- boundary = _filesystem_boundary_block(
- boundary_probe.mechanism if confined else ALIAS_REWRITE_MECHANISM,
- boundary_probe.mode,
- confined=confined,
- )
- if namespaced:
- proc = await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec(
- "/bin/bash", "-lc", namespaced,
- stdout=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
- stderr=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
- env=_subproc_env,
- cwd=agent_cwd(),
- )
- else:
- # Platforms without a usable namespace still receive the same
- # alias contract through a conservative source rewrite.
- content = _python_with_configured_import_paths(
- _python_with_visible_final_expression(
- _replace_workspace_alias(content, agent_cwd())
- ),
- _subproc_env,
- )
- proc = await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec(
- (sys.executable or "python"), "-I", "-c", content,
- stdout=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
- stderr=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
- env=_subproc_env,
- cwd=agent_cwd(),
- )
- mark_operation_started('subprocess', pid=proc.pid)
- stdout, stderr, rc, timed_out = await _run_subprocess_streaming(
- proc,
- timeout=DEFAULT_PYTHON_TIMEOUT,
- progress_cb=progress_cb,
+ # All Python code acquires the same server-defined boundary, including
+ # arithmetic and ordinary imports. Source text never selects a scope.
+ raw_paths = str((_subproc_env or {}).get("ODYSSEUS_PYTHON_TOOL_SITE_PACKAGES", ""))
+ roots = tuple(path for path in raw_paths.split(os.pathsep) if path and os.path.isabs(path))
+ return await _run_owned_command(
+ [sys.executable or "python", "-I", "-c", content], ctx,
+ tool="python", timeout=DEFAULT_PYTHON_TIMEOUT, argv=True, readonly_extra=roots,
)
- if timed_out:
- return {"error": f"python: timed out after {DEFAULT_PYTHON_TIMEOUT}s — process killed", "exit_code": 124, "stdout": _truncate(stdout, MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS), "stderr": _truncate(stderr, MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS), "containment": boundary}
- child_failure = _python_child_runtime_failure(stdout, stderr, rc)
- if child_failure:
- return {
- "error": _truncate(
- "python: a child operation failed despite a zero Python exit "
- "status:\n" + child_failure,
- MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS,
- ),
- "exit_code": 1,
- "stderr": _truncate(stderr, MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS),
- "containment": boundary,
- }
- output = stdout.rstrip()
- err = stderr.rstrip()
- if err:
- output = (output + "\nSTDERR: " + err).strip() if output else "STDERR: " + err
- output = _truncate(output, MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS)
- return {"output": output or "(no output)", "exit_code": rc or 0, "containment": boundary}
diff --git a/tests/test_native_execution_containment.py b/tests/test_native_execution_containment.py
index 095addeb1..9c86401f0 100644
--- a/tests/test_native_execution_containment.py
+++ b/tests/test_native_execution_containment.py
@@ -104,3 +104,39 @@ async def test_blocked_stdin_is_inside_wall_clock(native_boundary):
), timeout=8)
assert result.timed_out is True
assert result.release.dead is True
+
+
[email protected]("source", ["print(1 + 1)", "import os; print(os.getcwd())",
+ "exec('print(2)')", "print('/workspace')"])
+async def test_python_namespace_is_independent_of_content(source, native_boundary, monkeypatch):
+ from tests.containment_helpers import capture_owned_spawn
+ captured = capture_owned_spawn(monkeypatch, native_boundary)
+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "MECHANISMS", (containment.Mechanism(
+ "bubblewrap", 30, lambda: True, lambda spec: containment.DEFAULT_REQUIRED,
+ ),))
+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "CONTAINMENT_MODE", containment.MODE_ENFORCING)
+ result = await subprocess_tools.PythonTool().execute(source, {})
+ assert captured["argv"][0] == "bwrap"
+ assert "--bind" in captured["argv"]
+ assert result["containment"]["enforced"] == sorted(containment.DEFAULT_REQUIRED)
+ assert "-I" in captured["argv"]
+
+
+async def test_ordinary_python_cannot_bypass_unavailable_containment(monkeypatch):
+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "CONTAINMENT_MODE", containment.MODE_ENFORCING)
+ async def forbidden(*args, **kwargs):
+ pytest.fail("ordinary Python bypassed required containment")
+ monkeypatch.setattr(asyncio, "create_subprocess_exec", forbidden)
+ result = await subprocess_tools.PythonTool().execute("print(1 + 1)", {})
+ assert result["containment"]["executed"] is False
+
+
+async def test_python_final_expression_and_opt_in_imports(native_boundary):
+ package = native_boundary / "packages"
+ package.mkdir()
+ (package / "demo.py").write_text("value = 42\n")
+ result = await subprocess_tools.PythonTool().execute("import demo; demo.value", {
+ "subproc_env": {**os.environ, "ODYSSEUS_PYTHON_TOOL_SITE_PACKAGES": str(package)},
+ })
+ assert result["output"] == "42"
+ assert result["teardown"]["dead"] is True
diff --git a/tests/test_workspace_artifact_tool_floor.py b/tests/test_workspace_artifact_tool_floor.py
index 897ce541e..447c7b46a 100644
--- a/tests/test_workspace_artifact_tool_floor.py
+++ b/tests/test_workspace_artifact_tool_floor.py
@@ -2210,6 +2210,7 @@ def test_python_loaded_code_sees_virtual_workspace_alias(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
venv.EnvBuilder(with_pip=False).create(environment)
monkeypatch.setattr(subprocess_tools, "sys", SimpleNamespace(
prefix=str(environment),
+ base_prefix=sys.base_prefix,
executable=str(environment / "bin" / "python"),
version_info=sys.version_info,
))
diff --git a/tests/test_workspace_confine.py b/tests/test_workspace_confine.py
index d033b6481..059366520 100644
--- a/tests/test_workspace_confine.py
+++ b/tests/test_workspace_confine.py
@@ -287,7 +287,8 @@ async def test_subprocess_cwd_is_workspace_e2e(ws, admin):
"""python tool runs with cwd = workspace (OS-agnostic probe)."""
_, r = await execute_tool_block(_block("python", "import os; print(os.getcwd())"), owner="a", workspace=ws)
assert r["exit_code"] == 0
- assert os.path.realpath(r["output"].strip()) == os.path.realpath(ws)
+ expected_cwd = "/workspace" if "filesystem" in r["containment"]["enforced"] else ws
+ assert os.path.realpath(r["output"].strip()) == os.path.realpath(expected_cwd)
@pytest.mark.asyncio
diff --git a/website/configuration-reference.md b/website/configuration-reference.md
index bb0474604..dc38e2abd 100644
--- a/website/configuration-reference.md
+++ b/website/configuration-reference.md
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ The source tree reads **108** `ODYSSEUS_*` variables: 78 an operator may want to
| `ODYSSEUS_MAX_VISUAL_EVIDENCE_FRAMES` | `'3'` | `src/agent_loop.py:15361` | How many video frames one tool result may contribute. Clamped to 1-8. |
| `ODYSSEUS_MAX_VISUAL_EVIDENCE_IMAGES` | `'1'` | `src/agent_loop.py:15329` | How many images one tool result may contribute to the model turn. Clamped to 1-8. |
| `ODYSSEUS_MCP_ALLOWED_COMMANDS` | `''` | `src/agent_tools/admin_tools.py:140` | Security-relevant. Comma-separated allowlist of MCP launcher basenames the agent may start. Empty by default, and the deny list still wins. |
-| `ODYSSEUS_PYTHON_TOOL_SITE_PACKAGES` | `''` | `src/agent_tools/subprocess_tools.py:1180` | Security-relevant. Absolute package roots, separated by the platform path separator, exposed to the sandboxed Python tool. Empty exposes none. |
+| `ODYSSEUS_PYTHON_TOOL_SITE_PACKAGES` | `''` | `src/agent_tools/subprocess_tools.py:1181` (+1 more) | Security-relevant. Absolute package roots, separated by the platform path separator, exposed to the sandboxed Python tool. Empty exposes none. |
| `ODYSSEUS_SCRIPT_HOST` | `'localhost'` | `src/builtin_actions.py:919` | Default host for the run-script action. `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, `local` and empty run locally; any other value runs over SSH. |
| `ODYSSEUS_TOOL_APPROVAL_GATE` | `'0'` | `src/tool_capabilities.py:645` | Security-relevant. Truthy makes tool calls pass through the approval gate. Off by default. |