Self-hosted AI workspace.
Python
feat(runtime): bind process and job resources to authority
Alexandre Teixeiradb41d7e82202
diff --git a/docs/runtime-decomposition/wave-3-checkpoint-a-tests.txt b/docs/runtime-decomposition/wave-3-checkpoint-a-tests.txtnew file mode 100644index 000000000..12d84942d--- /dev/null+++ b/docs/runtime-decomposition/wave-3-checkpoint-a-tests.txt@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@+tests/test_resource_identity.py+tests/test_owned_resource_identity.py+tests/test_remote_resource_identity.py+tests/test_request_authority.py+tests/test_tool_approvals.py+tests/test_tool_approval_single_action_scope.py+tests/test_tool_approval_task_scope.py+tests/test_workspace_confine.py+tests/test_tool_path_confinement.py+tests/test_path_confinement_boundary.py+tests/test_filesystem_tool_argument_validation.py+tests/test_code_nav_tools.py+tests/test_apply_patch_transaction.py+tests/test_execution_bridge.py+tests/test_production_external_bridge.py+tests/test_turn_contract.py+tests/test_turn_contract_read_operations.py+tests/test_turn_contract_integration.py+tests/test_agent_turn_contract_boundaries.py+tests/test_explicit_personal_turn_contract.py+tests/test_nested_invocation_ownership.py+tests/test_containment_contract.py+tests/test_containment_enforcement.py+tests/test_containment_process_tree.py+tests/test_native_execution_containment.py+tests/test_background_containment.py+tests/test_process_ownership.py+tests/test_bg_jobs_store.py+tests/test_bg_job_tools.py+tests/test_execution_filesystem_boundary.py+tests/test_mcp_manager.py+tests/test_mcp_reconnect_args.py+tests/test_mcp_text_error_normalization.py+tests/test_mcp_param_hint_hardening.py+tests/test_mcp_tool_params_in_prompt.py+tests/test_mcp_memory_owner_scope.py+tests/test_mcp_cache_invalidation.py+tests/test_multiple_mcp_servers_timeout.py+tests/test_mcp_dependency_compatibility.py+tests/test_builtin_mcp_bg_tasks.py+tests/test_builtin_mcp_pythonpath.py+tests/test_builtin_mcp_npx_cache.py+tests/test_mcp_add_server_args_validation.py+tests/test_manage_mcp_command_allowlist.py+tests/test_document_tool_owner_scope.py+tests/test_owned_document_query.py+tests/test_document_session_owner_scope.py+tests/test_active_document_mutation_guard.py+tests/test_native_document_stream.py+tests/test_document_followup_integrity.py+tests/test_document_active_restore.py+tests/test_attachment_refs.py+tests/test_upload_handler_atomicity.py+tests/test_upload_handler_cleanup.py+tests/test_upload_handler_rename_owner.py+tests/test_upload_routes_owner_scope.py+tests/test_resolve_upload_path_nondict.py+tests/test_personal_upload_isolation.py+tests/test_personal_upload_privilege.py+tests/test_extract_text_tool.py+tests/test_media_ingress.py+tests/test_session_tools_registry.py+tests/test_session_owner_attribution.py+tests/test_session_list_owner_scope.py+tests/test_session_endpoint_owner_scope.py+tests/test_session_search.py+tests/test_session_search_batch_fetch.py+tests/test_history_topics_owner_scope.py+tests/test_history_order_by_timestamp_regression.py+tests/test_history_db_fallback_hidden.py+tests/test_memory_owner_isolation.py+tests/test_memory_routes_session_owner.py+tests/test_manage_memory_json_contract.py+tests/test_manage_memory_list.py+tests/test_memory_store_unreadable_no_wipe.py+tests/test_manage_notes_search_contract.py+tests/test_notes_fail_closed_auth.py+tests/test_notes_checklist_state.py+tests/test_vault_password_not_in_argv.py+tests/test_vault_routes_shim.py+tests/test_external_context_tool_gate.py+tests/test_chat_route_tool_policy.py+tests/test_product_turn_contract_route.py+tests/test_native_tool_result_threading.py+tests/test_host_shell_polling.py+tests/test_integrations_url_join.py+tests/test_integration_api_call_ssrf.py+tests/test_integrations_api_call_truncation.py+tests/test_process_resource_identity.py+tests/test_background_resource_identity.py+tests/test_runtime_resource_integration.py+tests/test_process_lifecycle.py+tests/test_browser_lifecycle.py+tests/test_private_browser_tool.py+tests/test_browser_transport_recovery.py+tests/test_shell_routes.py+tests/test_agent_tmux_retirement.py+tests/test_cookbook_stop_without_procfs.py+tests/test_cookbook_serve_lifecycle.py+tests/test_task_scheduler_cancel.py+tests/test_task_shell_tools.py+tests/test_runtime_behavior_regressions.py+tests/test_workspace_artifact_tool_floor.py+tests/test_bg_monitor_stream.py+tests/test_orphan_reaping.py+tests/test_cookbook_agent_tool_ssh_validation.py+tests/test_codex_cookbook_admin_gate.py+tests/test_task_cookbook_admin_gate.py+tests/test_builtin_actions_cookbook_serve_state.py+tests/test_cookbook_local_serve_pid_winpid.py+tests/test_scheduler_restart_doublefire.py+tests/test_task_scheduler_session_delivery.py+tests/test_cookbook_cache_scan_isolation.py+tests/test_cookbook_cached_scan_refresh.py+tests/test_cookbook_chat_deeplinks_static.py+tests/test_cookbook_cpu_only_serve.py+tests/test_cookbook_dead_download_status.py+tests/test_cookbook_dependency_completion_regression.py+tests/test_cookbook_deps_recipes.py+tests/test_cookbook_diagnosis.py+tests/test_cookbook_diagnosis_js.py+tests/test_cookbook_docker_access.py+tests/test_cookbook_download_toast_duration.py+tests/test_cookbook_endpoint_registration.py+tests/test_cookbook_error_feedback.py+tests/test_cookbook_error_tail_lines.py+tests/test_cookbook_finished_download_label.py+tests/test_cookbook_gemma4_thinking_template.py+tests/test_cookbook_helpers.py+tests/test_cookbook_hf_token.py+tests/test_cookbook_official_trending_filter.py+tests/test_cookbook_package_detection.py+tests/test_cookbook_port_parsing_js.py+tests/test_cookbook_progress_signal_js.py+tests/test_cookbook_remote_windows_diffusers.py+tests/test_cookbook_same_host_server_profiles_js.py+tests/test_cookbook_tool_dry_run.py+tests/test_cookbook_windows_stop_tree_js.py+tests/test_scheduler_prompt_cache_time.py+tests/test_scheduler_scheduled_time_validation.py+tests/test_task_scheduler_cache.py+tests/test_task_scheduler_fixture_isolation.py+tests/test_tool_task_cancelled_on_disconnect.py+tests/test_background_tool_jobs.py+tests/test_deep_research_browser_fallback.pydiff --git a/docs/runtime-decomposition/wave-3-checkpoint-a.md b/docs/runtime-decomposition/wave-3-checkpoint-a.mdnew file mode 100644index 000000000..1a49fe6a4--- /dev/null+++ b/docs/runtime-decomposition/wave-3-checkpoint-a.md@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@+# Wave 3 Checkpoint A: process and job authority++This checkpoint binds native process creation and background-job operations to+server-owned resources. It consumes the reconciled Wave 5B `ProcessIdentity`+and leaves lifecycle and signalling mechanics unchanged. Browser document+authority remains deferred; no browser session/page adapter is added here.++## Baseline and boundaries++Starting branch: `feature/runtime-resource-authority`.++- HEAD: `d0d1b3697ccd567dad9f812ed9f4f4d4f7d0044f`.+- Tree: `9a8a7fd490d18ab5ad9d627b41ddad81206017f2`.+- Clean worktree, with `4052eecc`, `8ae6ee43` and `c3ad4d0b` as ancestors.+- Unchanged Wave 3 + Wave 5B baseline: 2902 passed, 2 skipped, 2 existing+ xfails across 100 files, using functional bubblewrap.++The new identities add no operations to RequestAuthority or TurnContract.+Transcription, OCR and tasks restrictions remain in force. There is no default+DATA_DIR creation floor, PID grant, job wildcard or automatic descendant grant.+Wave 4 effects, evidence, provenance and egress policy remain outside this+checkpoint. Existing runtime outcome fields continue to report actual execution+and teardown if identity attachment fails after execution.++## Typed contracts++`src/agent_runtime/resources.py` defines three immutable contracts:++| Type | Binding | Source and validation |+| --- | --- | --- |+| `ProcessResource` | Producer namespace, application owner, originating request/thread, one nested Wave 5B `ProcessIdentity`, role, optional job and receipt linkage | Producer observation at spawn, or an already frozen containment lifecycle record. `owned()` and `exited()` validate the OS incarnation; they never establish application ownership. |+| `ProcessLaunchResource` | Native producer, owner/request/thread, server UUID generation, exact normalized tool/input digest, native backend, sealed creation boundary, inherited authority digest | Reservation created during server normalization before spawn. Publication is exclusive for that generation. No PID is predicted or recovered from model text. |+| `BackgroundJobResource` | Exact native store namespace, job ID, launch generation, owner/origin request/thread, containment ID, role-labelled process resources | The native producer registers the frozen supervisor observation before releasing the workload. Store, launch publication, authority sidecar and receipt must agree. |++The admitted process producers are `native:containment` (leader and namespace+init) and `native:bg_jobs` (supervisor). Manager/PTY/service observations are not+silently enrolled; they require their own producer adapter. Leader, supervisor,+namespace init and server manager remain distinct in Wave 5B records. Legacy+flat PID/token fields remain for existing mechanics and are checked against the+nested identity; the new envelope does not duplicate incarnation fields.++`ProcessLaunchScope` binds a native Bash/Python backend, a sealed filesystem+root, required containment dimensions, observed read-only runtime roots,+network selector and maximum runtime. The producer compares its actual spec to+the reservation. Changed roots, broader mounts, longer runtimes and changed+backends fail closed. Credentials and command/environment contents are not+serialized into resource identities.++## Normalization and admission++`src/agent_runtime/process_resources.py` centralizes scope sealing, resolution,+validation, publication and ContextVar binding.++1. RequestAuthority grants the semantic operation and explicitly seals existing+ workspace/backend scope. Without a sealed creation scope, Bash/Python cannot+ fall back to the server's working directory.+2. Launch normalization issues one exact reservation. Job normalization resolves+ the selector only within the immutable set of already admitted jobs.+3. The dispatcher validates the exact resources before the approval claim and+ binds the normalized operation in a ContextVar.+4. Native producers revalidate operation, application binding, roots and spec.+ Native Bash/Python dispatch remains pinned to the native backend and passes+ owner/session context explicitly.+5. Foreground publication precedes containment execution. Resulting process+ envelopes reference the frozen leader/namespace-init records, never a fresh+ capture of their numeric PIDs.+6. Detached launch holds the supervisor on stdin. It observes its incarnation,+ persists job/store/launch/sidecar linkage, then releases the command. The+ worker independently checks those records, the supervisor, receipt and spec.+ Publication failure closes the held worker and uses existing Wave 5B cleanup.++Publication uses the existing atomic file/fsync and store-transaction APIs.+There is no new effect journal or distributed commit protocol. Partial metadata+cannot admit a job or release its workload.++RequestAuthority snapshot version 4 carries explicit process, job and launch+scopes. Older snapshots restore empty scopes; missing identities are never+reconstructed by observing today's processes or jobs.++## Approvals and child ceilings++Proposal capture includes the exact reservation or job resource, including its+nested process, role, producer, ownership, generation and receipt. The approval+digest covers those resources and the existing exact operation/backend binding.+Execution validates before the one-use claim and at producer entry. Restoring an+exact operation restores no general process, job or launch scope. Unsupported+standalone PID controls have no adapter and cannot create an approval identity.++Child process scopes intersect by full identity equality after validating both+parent and child observations. Jobs intersect by full store/ID/generation/+owner/thread/receipt/process equality. Creation scopes may narrow roots, mounts,+runtime or network limits while retaining the backend and parent boundary+requirements. Semantic operation grants are intersected independently. A stale+parent fails before a newly observed child can renew it. Discovering descendants+or siblings adds no authority.++ContextVar binding restores state on success, ordinary exception, cancellation+and nesting. Existing lifecycle tests exercise cancellation during spawn and+repeated cleanup; the new integration test also checks native dispatch context+restoration during cancellation.++## Job history and continuations++`peek()` and resolution do not refresh or reap jobs. Output refresh reconciles+only the selected job, including its owned subprocess handle. Stop/output/ack+require the caller's exact expected resource and revalidate linkage. Results+can update only an explicit result-field whitelist, never identity, owner,+generation, receipt, PID, command, path or authority fields.++Completed generations remain readable if their lifecycle receipt has been+pruned, provided their application publication and sidecar remain exact.+Completed stop is a no-op and cannot signal a reused PID. Active jobs require+the exact native receipt and live supervisor; an existing receipt with changed+producer/owner/incarnation or external semantics is rejected even for history.++The monitor checks sidecar, launch generation, job resource and session owner+before invoking a continuation and acknowledging that same generation. Missing+legacy sidecars do not acquire authority. Service-owned maintenance/reaping+remains independent of model authority; lookup never invokes it for siblings.+Research records in `background_tool_jobs.py` remain records, not OS processes.++## Reachable production seams++| Production call path | Enforcement or explicit boundary |+| --- | --- |+| `agent_loop` / native executor -> `tool_execution.execute_tool_block` -> `BashTool.execute` / `PythonTool.execute` -> `_run_owned_command` | Exact reservation, native backend pin, explicit owner/session context, sealed spec and pre-execution publication. |+| `execute_tool_block` -> `#!bg` -> `bg_jobs.launch` -> `containment_worker.supervise` | Held release until durable linkage; independent worker validation. |+| Dispatcher -> `ManageBgJobsTool.execute` -> `bg_jobs.get` / `kill` | Exact captured job set/selector, owner/thread binding and revalidation; no implicit list refresh. |+| App startup -> `bg_monitor._loop` -> `_run_followup` / `mark_followed_up` | Exact generation and sidecar/owner/thread validation before continuation and ack. |+| `TaskScheduler._execute_action` -> `action_run_local` / `action_run_script` / local `action_ssh_command` -> `_run_subprocess` | Existing scheduler authority must permit the exact operation; new runner consumes a sealed launch ceiling through containment. Missing workspace/legacy creation scope fails closed. |+| Dispatcher -> Cookbook native tools -> `/api/model/download`, `/api/model/serve`, `/api/cookbook/state`, `/api/cookbook/kill-pid` | Internal native mutation is rejected: UI state/session/PID discovery is not an application process registry. |+| Dispatcher -> `stop_served_model` / `cancel_download` -> `_cookbook_kill_session` | Local targets fail closed before OS discovery, signalling or state changes. |+| Generic `app_api` -> loopback shell/model/Cookbook namespaces | Generic private/owned route admission rejects these process-control namespaces. |+| Direct labelled or unlabelled loopback -> shell native controls / local Cookbook launch/control | Internal markers confer no admin floor. Anonymous/auth-disabled native control fails closed, including missing auth-manager configurations. Authenticated human-admin control remains a separate administrative boundary. |+| App startup -> process reaper / `bg_jobs.refresh` / `disown_unverified` / containment reaping | Existing service maintenance and frozen Wave 5B signal mechanics remain unchanged. |++No production caller of `services/shell/service.py` was found; it is unchanged+and not claimed as covered. Browser lifecycle, research/private browsers and+their producer contracts are unchanged and outside Checkpoint A.++## Unsupported paths and deployment consequences++- Local Cookbook agent launch/control has no trustworthy application registry;+ it is disabled instead of enrolling tmux/PID/UI observations.+- Legacy Cookbook scheduled auto-stop uses the rejected internal shell route+ and cannot silently resume control of editable UI-backed sessions. Its+ absence of a trustworthy producer registry is an explicit remaining gap;+ native background-job and containment reapers continue to work.+- Auth-disabled native shell/Cookbook UI controls are unavailable: an anonymous+ human request cannot be distinguished securely from a workload's loopback+ request. No Origin header, browser key or local address substitutes for+ resource authority.+- Legacy tasks without creation scope and jobs without exact generation/sidecar+ linkage do not gain authority during restoration.+- Raw scheduled SSH execution fails closed until an exact external backend+ producer exists. Existing remote Cookbook routes/MCP/bridges remain external;+ a local SSH client is never enrolled as its remote workload.+- Standalone existing-process/PTY/manager control, new producer registration,+ browser session/page/document authority and general outbound-effect policy+ are not implemented by this slice.++## Control state and adversarial verification++`PROCESS_RESOURCES_DIR`, the active launch directory, job store/sidecars and+containment records are protected by central filesystem resource resolution.+Native writable launch boundaries containing control state or existing+symlink/hardlink aliases are rejected. Tests cover direct access, symlinks and+hardlinks to launch records, job stores, authority sidecars and receipt files.+These are pathname/inode observations. They do not claim race freedom against+concurrent link replacement after validation; Wave 3-S containment mechanics+have not been redesigned.++The three new test files are `test_process_resource_identity.py`,+`test_background_resource_identity.py` and `test_runtime_resource_integration.py`.+They cover PID reuse/unverifiable or malformed observations, role/receipt/owner/+request/thread substitution, generation replacement, publication failure and+held release, immutable result fields, historical reads, sidecar mismatch,+side-effect-free lookup, exact approval first use/replay/restoration, child+ceilings, context restoration, external refusal, native routing, scheduler and+anonymous/internal loopback bypasses, and TurnContract exclusions.++The integrated manifest `wave-3-checkpoint-a-tests.txt` contains 145 files,+including every file in the previous exact 88-file Wave 3 gate. It adds relevant+Wave 5B lifecycle, shell, scheduler, Cookbook, background, browser transport and+research fallback regressions. Run in an environment with functional bubblewrap:++```sh+python3 -m pytest -q -rs $(cat docs/runtime-decomposition/wave-3-checkpoint-a-tests.txt)+python3 -m compileall -q app.py core routes services src tests scripts+git diff --check+git grep -n -E '^(<<<<<<< |=======$|>>>>>>> )' || true+git ls-files -u+```++The final pre-commit gate passed 387 focused tests and 3364 integrated tests,+with 3 platform skips and 2 existing xfails. The focused gate spans 12 files;+the integrated gate spans the 145-file manifest. Validation used+`/tmp/odysseus-wave3-validation/bin/python` with functional bubblewrap.+Compileall, diff whitespace, conflict-marker and unmerged-index gates passed.+The post-commit integrated result is recorded in the final checkpoint report.+Platform skips remain+explicit: `/tmp` is not a symlink, RLIMIT_AS can be lowered on this host, and the+Windows-specific Ollama startup guard is not applicable on Linux. No missing+browser dependency is converted into a passing test.++## Remaining review concerns++No known P0 admission bypass remains in the supported process/job paths.+P1 compatibility gaps are the deliberately unsupported local Cookbook registry+and auth-disabled native administration, plus legacy/unscoped scheduled work.+P2 concerns are linear workspace/control-file scans and retention of private+launch publications beyond job/receipt retention; a future server-owned+maintenance policy must preserve exact historical linkage. Existing filesystem+observation races and outbound-effect boundaries remain explicit limitations.+Browser authority still requires the independent producer-contract lane.diff --git a/routes/cookbook_routes.py b/routes/cookbook_routes.pyindex 72b5e7d74..0e733f0e0 100644--- a/routes/cookbook_routes.py+++ b/routes/cookbook_routes.py@@ -405,7 +405,20 @@ def _append_local_ollama_download_command_lines(def setup_cookbook_routes() -> APIRouter:- router = APIRouter(tags=["cookbook"])+ async def protect_native_control(request: Request):+ if request.method in {"GET", "HEAD"}:+ return+ # Cookbook's UI records and session strings are not an application+ # process registry. No loopback caller can use them as local authority.+ path = request.url.path+ from routes.shell_routes import _require_admin+ if path in {"/api/cookbook/kill-pid", "/api/cookbook/state", "/api/cookbook/ssh-key"}:+ _require_admin(request)+ if path in {"/api/model/download", "/api/model/serve"}:+ payload = await request.json()+ if not payload.get("remote_host"):+ _require_admin(request)+ router = APIRouter(tags=["cookbook"], dependencies=[Depends(protect_native_control)])_cookbook_state_path = Path(COOKBOOK_STATE_FILE)_state_get_cache = {"ts": 0.0, "mtime": 0.0, "value": None}_tasks_status_cache = {"ts": 0.0, "value": None}diff --git a/routes/shell_routes.py b/routes/shell_routes.pyindex 6a1c0f583..5d85c6375 100644--- a/routes/shell_routes.py+++ b/routes/shell_routes.py@@ -59,21 +59,17 @@ from core.platform_compat import (def _require_admin(request: Request):"""Reject non-admin callers. Shell exec is admin-only — never expose toregular users; that's RCE-after-signup."""- # In the explicitly single-user, auth-disabled deployment the middleware- # does not attach a current user. AuthManager is still instantiated by the- # app, so checking only for its presence incorrectly returns 403 here.+ # Anonymous loopback is also reachable from an admitted native workload.+ # It cannot be treated as a human admin or as process creation authority.+ from src.agent_runtime.authority import is_internal_tool_request+ if is_internal_tool_request(request):+ raise HTTPException(403, "Internal shell execution requires a dedicated resource-bound producer")if _auth_disabled():- return+ raise HTTPException(403, "Anonymous native process control has no resource authority")auth_manager = getattr(request.app.state, "auth_manager", None)if not auth_manager:- # No auth at all — only safe in fully-trusted localhost dev mode- return+ raise HTTPException(403, "Native process control requires authenticated administration")user = getattr(request.state, "current_user", None)- # In-process tool loopback. The AuthMiddleware already validated the- # internal token + loopback client before setting this marker, so- # honour it here as admin-equivalent.- if user == INTERNAL_TOOL_USER:- returnif not user or user == "api":raise HTTPException(403, "Admin only")if not auth_manager.is_admin(user):diff --git a/src/agent_runtime/authority.py b/src/agent_runtime/authority.pyindex 1ffa9adad..57822c490 100644--- a/src/agent_runtime/authority.py+++ b/src/agent_runtime/authority.py@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ from uuid import uuid4from src.agent_runtime.resources import (FilesystemRoot, ExternalResource, NativeBackendResource, OwnedScope,+ ProcessLaunchScope, ProcessResource, BackgroundJobResource,backend_from_dict, intersect_roots, seal_owned_scopes,)from src.tool_policy import ToolPolicy, build_effective_tool_policy@@ -120,6 +121,9 @@ class RequestAuthority:resource_roots: tuple[FilesystemRoot, ...] | None = Nonebackend_resources: tuple[ExternalResource | NativeBackendResource, ...] | None = Noneowned_scopes: tuple[OwnedScope, ...] | None = None+ launch_scopes: tuple[ProcessLaunchScope, ...] | None = None+ process_resources: tuple[ProcessResource, ...] = ()+ job_resources: tuple[BackgroundJobResource, ...] | None = Nonedef __post_init__(self):if (not isinstance(self.request_id, str) or not self.request_id@@ -156,11 +160,29 @@ class RequestAuthority:or any(not isinstance(s, OwnedScope) or (s.owner, s.thread_id) != (self.owner, self.session_id)for s in self.owned_scopes)):raise ValueError("Malformed backend or owned resource scope")+ from src.agent_runtime.process_resources import seal_launch_scopes, seal_jobs+ if self.launch_scopes is None:+ object.__setattr__(self, "launch_scopes", seal_launch_scopes(self))+ if self.job_resources is None:+ object.__setattr__(self, "job_resources", seal_jobs(self))+ for field, kind in (("launch_scopes", ProcessLaunchScope), ("process_resources", ProcessResource),+ ("job_resources", BackgroundJobResource)):+ values = getattr(self, field)+ if not isinstance(values, tuple) or any(not isinstance(r, kind) for r in values):+ raise ValueError("Malformed process resource scope")+ if any(r.owner != self.owner for r in (*self.process_resources, *self.job_resources)):+ raise ValueError("Process resource owner changed")+ if any(s.root.owner and s.root.owner != self.owner for s in self.launch_scopes):+ raise ValueError("Launch resource owner changed")+ if any(r.thread_id != self.session_id for r in self.job_resources):+ raise ValueError("Job resource thread changed")+ if any(r.thread_id != (self.session_id or "request:" + self.request_id) for r in self.process_resources):+ raise ValueError("Process resource thread changed")@classmethoddef empty(cls, *, owner=None, session_id=None, workspace=None):return cls(uuid4().hex, _owner(owner), str(session_id or ""), str(workspace or ""),- resource_roots=(), backend_resources=(), owned_scopes=())+ resource_roots=(), backend_resources=(), owned_scopes=(), launch_scopes=(), job_resources=())def bound_to(self, *, owner=None, session_id=None, workspace=None):return (self.owner == _owner(owner) and self.session_id == str(session_id or "")@@ -188,6 +210,7 @@ class RequestAuthority:roots = ()backends = ()owned = ()+ launches = processes = jobs = ()if (self.owner, self.session_id, self.workspace) == (child.owner, child.session_id, child.workspace):theirs = {g.tool: g for g in child.grants}grants = [g.intersect(theirs[g.tool]) for g in self.grants if g.tool in theirs]@@ -195,10 +218,15 @@ class RequestAuthority:backends = tuple(r for r in self.backend_resources if r in child.backend_resources)owned = tuple(s for left in self.owned_scopes for right in child.owned_scopesif (s := left.intersect(right)) is not None)+ from src.agent_runtime.process_resources import intersect_observed, intersect_launch_scopes, validate_job+ launches = intersect_launch_scopes(self.launch_scopes, child.launch_scopes)+ processes = intersect_observed(self.process_resources, child.process_resources, lambda r: r.validate())+ jobs = intersect_observed(self.job_resources, child.job_resources, validate_job)return replace(self, grants=tuple(grants), denied=self.denied | child.denied,block_all=self.block_all or child.block_all,disable_mcp=self.disable_mcp or child.disable_mcp, inherited=True,- resource_roots=roots, backend_resources=backends, owned_scopes=owned)+ resource_roots=roots, backend_resources=backends, owned_scopes=owned,+ launch_scopes=launches, process_resources=processes, job_resources=jobs)def continuation(self, *, owner=None, session_id=None):"""A server continuation may rebind a session, never change owner/grants."""@@ -206,10 +234,12 @@ class RequestAuthority:return RequestAuthority.empty(owner=owner, session_id=session_id)rebound = str(session_id or "")return replace(self, session_id=rebound, inherited=True,- owned_scopes=tuple(replace(s, thread_id=rebound) for s in self.owned_scopes) if rebound else ())+ owned_scopes=tuple(replace(s, thread_id=rebound) for s in self.owned_scopes) if rebound else (),+ process_resources=tuple(r for r in self.process_resources if r.thread_id == rebound),+ job_resources=tuple(r for r in self.job_resources if r.thread_id == rebound))def to_dict(self):- return {"version": 3, "request_id": self.request_id, "owner": self.owner,+ return {"version": 4, "request_id": self.request_id, "owner": self.owner,"session_id": self.session_id, "workspace": self.workspace,"grants": [{"tool": g.tool,"actions": None if g.actions is None else sorted(g.actions),@@ -218,12 +248,15 @@ class RequestAuthority:"disable_mcp": self.disable_mcp, "inherited": self.inherited,"resource_roots": [r.to_dict() for r in self.resource_roots],"backend_resources": [r.to_dict() for r in self.backend_resources],- "owned_scopes": [s.to_dict() for s in self.owned_scopes]}+ "owned_scopes": [s.to_dict() for s in self.owned_scopes],+ "launch_scopes": [s.to_dict() for s in self.launch_scopes],+ "process_resources": [r.to_dict() for r in self.process_resources],+ "job_resources": [r.to_dict() for r in self.job_resources]}@classmethoddef from_dict(cls, value):if (not isinstance(value, dict) or type(value.get("version")) is not int- or value["version"] not in {1, 2, 3}):+ or value["version"] not in {1, 2, 3, 4}):raise ValueError("Unsupported authority snapshot")def limits(value):if value is None:@@ -234,8 +267,12 @@ class RequestAuthority:roots = value["resource_roots"] if value["version"] >= 2 else []if not isinstance(roots, list):raise ValueError("Malformed request resource snapshot")- backends = value["backend_resources"] if value["version"] == 3 else []- owned = value["owned_scopes"] if value["version"] == 3 else []+ backends = value["backend_resources"] if value["version"] >= 3 else []+ owned = value["owned_scopes"] if value["version"] >= 3 else []+ process_fields = {name: value[name] if value["version"] >= 4 else []+ for name in ("launch_scopes", "process_resources", "job_resources")}+ if any(not isinstance(v, list) for v in process_fields.values()):+ raise ValueError("Malformed process resource snapshot")if not isinstance(backends, list) or not isinstance(owned, list):raise ValueError("Malformed request resource scope snapshot")return cls(value["request_id"], value["owner"], value["session_id"], value["workspace"],@@ -243,7 +280,10 @@ class RequestAuthority:for g in value["grants"]), limits(value["denied"]),value["block_all"], value["disable_mcp"], value["inherited"],tuple(FilesystemRoot.from_dict(r) for r in roots),- tuple(backend_from_dict(r) for r in backends), tuple(OwnedScope.from_dict(s) for s in owned))+ tuple(backend_from_dict(r) for r in backends), tuple(OwnedScope.from_dict(s) for s in owned),+ tuple(ProcessLaunchScope.from_dict(s) for s in process_fields["launch_scopes"]),+ tuple(ProcessResource.from_dict(r) for r in process_fields["process_resources"]),+ tuple(BackgroundJobResource.from_dict(r) for r in process_fields["job_resources"]))_BROWSER_READ_ACTIONS = frozenset({"open", "navigate", "snapshot", "text", "read", "find",@@ -462,7 +502,10 @@ def seal_task_authority(prompt, task_type, action, *, owner=None, parent_authoriworkspace=parent.workspace,resource_roots=parent.resource_roots,backend_resources=parent.backend_resources,- owned_scopes=parent.owned_scopes))+ owned_scopes=parent.owned_scopes,+ launch_scopes=parent.launch_scopes,+ process_resources=parent.process_resources,+ job_resources=parent.job_resources))return _json({"task_input": [prompt, task_type, action], "authority": authority.to_dict()})@@ -479,18 +522,27 @@ def restore_task_authority(snapshot, prompt, task_type, action, *, owner=None, sdef _background_path(job_id):if not isinstance(job_id, str) or not re.fullmatch(r"[A-Za-z0-9_-]+", job_id):raise ValueError("Invalid background authority identity")- from src.constants import BG_JOBS_DIR- return Path(BG_JOBS_DIR) / (job_id + ".authority.json")+ from src.bg_jobs import _JOBS_DIR+ return Path(_JOBS_DIR) / (job_id + ".authority.json")-def save_background_authority(job_id, authority):+def save_background_authority(job_id, authority, *, resource=None):from core.atomic_io import atomic_write_json- atomic_write_json(_background_path(job_id), authority.to_dict())+ if resource is None or resource.job_id != job_id:+ raise ValueError("Background authority requires exact job linkage")+ atomic_write_json(_background_path(job_id), {"authority": authority.to_dict(), "job": resource.to_dict()})def restore_background_authority(job_id, *, owner=None, session_id=None):try:- authority = RequestAuthority.from_dict(json.loads(_background_path(job_id).read_text()))+ value = json.loads(_background_path(job_id).read_text())+ resource = BackgroundJobResource.from_dict(value["job"])+ from src.agent_runtime.process_resources import validate_job+ validate_job(resource)+ authority = RequestAuthority.from_dict(value["authority"])+ if (resource.job_id, resource.owner, resource.thread_id, resource.request_id) != (+ job_id, authority.owner, authority.session_id, authority.request_id):+ raise ValueError("Background authority linkage changed")if authority.session_id != str(session_id or ""):raise ValueError("Background session changed")return authority.continuation(owner=owner, session_id=session_id)diff --git a/src/agent_runtime/owned_resources.py b/src/agent_runtime/owned_resources.pyindex 676870381..7bb429288 100644--- a/src/agent_runtime/owned_resources.py+++ b/src/agent_runtime/owned_resources.py@@ -257,7 +257,8 @@ def needs_owned_binding(operation):raise ResourceIdentityError("Unresolved internal resource selector")path = posixpath.normpath(urlsplit(path).path)private = {"document", "documents", "session", "sessions", "history", "chat", "chats",- "notes", "memory", "vault", "upload", "uploads", "attachments"}+ "notes", "memory", "vault", "upload", "uploads", "attachments",+ "shell", "model", "cookbook"}segments = path.strip("/").split("/")if len(segments) >= 2 and segments[0] == "api" and segments[1].casefold() in private:raise ResourceIdentityError("Owned records require a dedicated resource-bound tool")diff --git a/src/agent_runtime/process_resources.py b/src/agent_runtime/process_resources.pynew file mode 100644index 000000000..53e90054b--- /dev/null+++ b/src/agent_runtime/process_resources.py@@ -0,0 +1,418 @@+"""Process/job admission. Lifecycle mechanics remain in process_lifecycle.++Only trusted launch producers publish observations. Persisted legacy records+are never enrolled by looking at their PID. Receipts identify boundaries, not+application authority. Resource snapshots contain no command or environment.+"""+from __future__ import annotations++from contextlib import contextmanager+from contextvars import ContextVar+from dataclasses import dataclass+import hashlib+import json+import os+from pathlib import Path+import re+from uuid import uuid4+from core.atomic_io import store_transaction++from src.agent_runtime.resources import (+ BackgroundJobResource, NativeBackendResource, ProcessLaunchResource,+ ProcessLaunchScope, ProcessResource, ResourceIdentityError,+)+from src.constants import PROCESS_RESOURCES_DIR++_LAUNCH_DIR = Path(PROCESS_RESOURCES_DIR)+LAUNCH_TOOLS = frozenset({"bash", "python"})+JOB_TOOL = "manage_bg_jobs"+_ACTIVE = ContextVar("process_resource_operation", default=None)+++def digest(value):+ return hashlib.sha256(value.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()+++def _thread(authority):+ return authority.session_id or "request:" + authority.request_id+++def launch_path(generation):+ if not isinstance(generation, str) or not re.fullmatch(r"[a-f0-9]{32}", generation):+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Malformed launch generation")+ return _LAUNCH_DIR / (generation + ".json")+++def seal_launch_scopes(authority):+ return tuple(seal_launch_scope(backend, root)+ for backend in authority.backend_resources+ if isinstance(backend, NativeBackendResource) and backend.tool_id in LAUNCH_TOOLS+ for root in authority.resource_roots)+++def seal_launch_scope(backend, root, *, env=None):+ from src.agent_tools.subprocess_tools import _owned_spec+ from src.tool_execution import _agent_subprocess_env+ from src.agent_runtime.resources import PathObservation, FileObjectIdentity+ env = _agent_subprocess_env() if env is None else env+ extra = tuple(Path(p).resolve().as_posix() for p in str(env.get("ODYSSEUS_PYTHON_TOOL_SITE_PACKAGES", "")).split(os.pathsep)+ if p and os.path.isabs(p)) if backend.tool_id == "python" else ()+ spec = _owned_spec(root.path, env, 3600, extra)+ return ProcessLaunchScope(backend, root, spec.required,+ tuple(PathObservation(str(Path(p).resolve()), FileObjectIdentity.observe(Path(p).resolve())) for p in spec.readonly_extra),+ spec.network, spec.wall_clock_s)+++def validate_launch_spec(launch, spec):+ scope = launch.scope+ scope.validate()+ if (spec.workspace != scope.root.path or spec.required != scope.required or spec.network != scope.network+ or spec.wall_clock_s > scope.max_runtime_s or spec.writable_extra+ or tuple(spec.readonly_extra) != tuple(r.path for r in scope.runtime_roots)):+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Producer launch boundary exceeds the sealed reservation")+++def job_from_record(record):+ if not isinstance(record, dict):+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Missing authoritative job")+ try:+ resource = BackgroundJobResource.from_dict(record["resource_identity"])+ if (resource.namespace != "native:bg_jobs"+ or (record["id"], record["session_id"], record["containment_id"])+ != (resource.job_id, resource.thread_id, resource.containment_id)):+ raise ValueError("Job linkage changed")+ supervisor = next(p for p in resource.processes if p.role == "supervisor")+ if (record.get("pid"), record.get("start_token"), record.get("pgid")) != (+ supervisor.identity.pid, supervisor.identity.start_token, supervisor.identity.pgid):+ raise ValueError("Supervisor linkage changed")+ launch = ProcessLaunchResource.from_dict(record["launch_resource"])+ if (launch.generation, launch.owner, launch.request_id, launch.thread_id) != (+ resource.generation, resource.owner, resource.request_id, resource.thread_id):+ raise ValueError("Launch/job linkage changed")+ return resource+ except (ValueError, TypeError, KeyError, StopIteration, AttributeError) as error:+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Malformed or unowned background job") from error+++def validate_job(resource, *, mutation=False):+ try:+ return _validate_job(resource, mutation=mutation)+ except ResourceIdentityError:+ raise+ except (ValueError, TypeError, OSError, KeyError, AttributeError) as error:+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Background job linkage is missing or malformed") from error+++def validate_job_receipt(resource, receipt):+ from src import containment+ supervisor = resource.processes[0]+ if (not isinstance(receipt, dict) or receipt.get("id") != resource.containment_id+ or receipt.get("launch_generation") != resource.generation+ or receipt.get("owner") != "bg:" + resource.thread_id+ or (receipt.get("supervisor_pid"), receipt.get("supervisor_token")) !=+ (supervisor.identity.pid, supervisor.identity.start_token)+ or receipt.get("mechanism") not in {m.name for m in containment.MECHANISMS}+ or receipt.get("external") is True):+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Containment receipt linkage changed")+++def _validate_job(resource, *, mutation=False):+ from src import bg_jobs, containment+ if not isinstance(resource, BackgroundJobResource):+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Missing exact background job identity")+ record = bg_jobs.peek(resource.job_id)+ if job_from_record(record) != resource:+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Background job resource changed")+ if record.get("status") not in {"running", "done", "failed"}:+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Unknown job lifecycle")+ launch = ProcessLaunchResource.from_dict(record["launch_resource"])+ persisted = json.loads(launch_path(resource.generation).read_text())+ if (persisted.get("launch") != launch.to_dict()+ or persisted.get("job") != resource.to_dict()+ or persisted.get("containment_id") != resource.containment_id):+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Job/launch publication changed")+ sidecar = json.loads((bg_jobs._JOBS_DIR / (resource.job_id + ".authority.json")).read_text())+ origin = persisted.get("authority", {})+ if (sidecar.get("job") != resource.to_dict() or sidecar.get("authority") != origin+ or (origin.get("owner"), origin.get("request_id"), origin.get("session_id")) !=+ (resource.owner, resource.request_id, resource.thread_id)):+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Background authority linkage changed")+ receipt = containment._load_records().get(resource.containment_id)+ # Lifecycle receipts have a shorter retention than job results. A finished+ # exact generation needs only its durable application linkage for history;+ # it never regains signalling authority when its receipt has been pruned.+ historical = record.get("status") in {"done", "failed"}+ if receipt is None and not historical:+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Missing active containment receipt")+ if receipt is not None:+ validate_job_receipt(resource, receipt)+ if record.get("status") == "running":+ for process in resource.processes:+ try:+ process.validate()+ except ResourceIdentityError:+ # Publication can precede store reconciliation. That exact+ # completed generation is readable, but never signallable.+ if mutation or not Path(record["exit_path"]).is_file():+ raise+ report = json.loads(Path(record["result_path"]).read_text())+ if report.get("resource_identity") != resource.to_dict() or report.get("containment", {}).get("id") != resource.containment_id:+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Historical result linkage changed")+ # A completed record is readable history, never a new process observation.+ return record+++def seal_jobs(authority):+ if not any(g.tool == JOB_TOOL for g in authority.grants) or not authority.session_id:+ return ()+ from src import bg_jobs+ admitted = []+ for record in bg_jobs._load().values():+ try:+ resource = job_from_record(record)+ if (resource.owner, resource.thread_id) == (authority.owner, authority.session_id):+ validate_job(resource)+ admitted.append(resource)+ except (ValueError, TypeError, OSError, RuntimeError):+ continue+ return tuple(admitted)+++def intersect_observed(parent, child, validate):+ # Validate both sides before equality. Seeing a replacement cannot renew a+ # stale parent observation, even when the child has just sealed it.+ for resource in (*parent, *child):+ validate(resource)+ return tuple(resource for resource in parent if resource in child)+++def intersect_launch_scopes(parent, child):+ from src.agent_runtime.resources import FilesystemResource+ for scope in (*parent, *child):+ scope.validate()+ narrowed = []+ for left in parent:+ for right in child:+ if (left.backend != right.backend or not left.required <= right.required+ or right.max_runtime_s > left.max_runtime_s+ or not set(right.runtime_roots) <= set(left.runtime_roots)+ or (left.network == "none" and right.network != "none")):+ continue+ if Path(right.root.path).is_relative_to(left.root.path):+ observation = FilesystemResource.resolve(left.root, right.root.path)+ if observation.identity == right.root.identity:+ narrowed.append(right)+ return tuple(dict.fromkeys(narrowed))+++@dataclass(frozen=True)+class BoundProcessOperation:+ operation: object+ request_id: str+ owner: str+ thread_id: str+ launch: ProcessLaunchResource | None = None+ jobs: tuple[BackgroundJobResource, ...] = ()+ processes: tuple[ProcessResource, ...] = ()+ exact_approval: object | None = None++ def __post_init__(self):+ from src.agent_runtime.authority import ExactOperation+ if (not isinstance(self.operation, ExactOperation) or not isinstance(self.request_id, str) or not self.request_id+ or not isinstance(self.owner, str) or not isinstance(self.thread_id, str) or not self.thread_id+ or (self.launch is not None and not isinstance(self.launch, ProcessLaunchResource))+ or not isinstance(self.jobs, tuple) or any(not isinstance(j, BackgroundJobResource) for j in self.jobs)+ or not isinstance(self.processes, tuple) or any(not isinstance(p, ProcessResource) for p in self.processes)):+ raise ValueError("Malformed process-bound operation")+ if self.launch is not None and (+ (self.launch.owner, self.launch.request_id, self.launch.thread_id, self.launch.tool, self.launch.input_digest)+ != (self.owner, self.request_id, self.thread_id, self.operation.tool, digest(self.operation.input))):+ raise ValueError("Launch operation/application binding changed")+ if any((r.owner, r.thread_id) != (self.owner, self.thread_id) for r in (*self.jobs, *self.processes)):+ raise ValueError("Observed resource application binding changed")++ def validate(self):+ if self.launch is not None:+ self.launch.validate()+ guard_launch_workspace(self.launch.scope.root)+ for job in self.jobs:+ validate_job(job, mutation=self.operation.action in {"kill", "stop", "cancel", "terminate", "ack"})+ for process in self.processes:+ process.validate()++ def to_dict(self):+ return {"tool": self.operation.transport_tool, "input_digest": digest(self.operation.input),+ "request_id": self.request_id, "owner": self.owner, "thread_id": self.thread_id,+ "launch": self.launch.to_dict() if self.launch else None,+ "jobs": [r.to_dict() for r in self.jobs], "processes": [r.to_dict() for r in self.processes]}+++def needs_process_binding(operation, backend):+ return isinstance(backend, NativeBackendResource) and operation.tool in LAUNCH_TOOLS | {JOB_TOOL}+++def resolve_process_operation(authority, operation, backend, *, approved=None, exact_admission=False):+ if not needs_process_binding(operation, backend):+ raise ResourceIdentityError("No native process adapter for this backend")+ if approved is not None:+ if (approved.operation != operation or (approved.request_id, approved.owner, approved.thread_id)+ != (authority.request_id, authority.owner, _thread(authority))):+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Approved process operation binding changed")+ bound = approved+ elif operation.tool in LAUNCH_TOOLS:+ scopes = [s for s in authority.launch_scopes if s.backend == backend]+ if len(scopes) != 1:+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Process creation requires a sealed workspace and launch scope")+ launch = ProcessLaunchResource("native:containment", authority.owner, authority.request_id,+ _thread(authority), uuid4().hex, operation.tool, digest(operation.input), scopes[0],+ digest(json.dumps(authority.to_dict(), sort_keys=True)))+ bound = BoundProcessOperation(operation, authority.request_id, authority.owner, _thread(authority), launch)+ else:+ try:+ args = json.loads(operation.input)+ action = str(args.get("action", "list")).strip().lower()+ job_id = args.get("job_id", args.get("id", ""))+ except (ValueError, TypeError, AttributeError) as error:+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Malformed job operation") from error+ if action in {"list", "ls", "jobs"}:+ jobs = authority.job_resources+ elif action in {"output", "get", "read", "tail", "status", "show", "kill", "stop", "cancel", "terminate", "ack"}:+ if not isinstance(job_id, str) or not job_id:+ raise ResourceIdentityError("An exact job selector is required")+ jobs = tuple(r for r in authority.job_resources if r.job_id == job_id)+ if len(jobs) != 1:+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Job is outside admitted resource scope")+ else:+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Unsupported job operation")+ bound = BoundProcessOperation(operation, authority.request_id, authority.owner, _thread(authority), jobs=jobs)+ if not (approved is not None and exact_admission and not authority.inherited):+ if bound.launch is not None and bound.launch.scope not in authority.launch_scopes:+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Launch exceeds inherited creation scope")+ if any(j not in authority.job_resources for j in bound.jobs) or any(p not in authority.process_resources for p in bound.processes):+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Process/job exceeds inherited resource scope")+ if bound.launch is not None and bound.launch.scope.backend != backend:+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Launch backend changed")+ bound.validate()+ return bound+++def active_process_operation():+ return _ACTIVE.get()+++@contextmanager+def bind_process_operation(operation):+ if operation is not None and not isinstance(operation, BoundProcessOperation):+ raise TypeError("Process operation must be server-owned")+ if operation is not None:+ operation.validate()+ token = _ACTIVE.set(operation)+ try:+ yield operation+ finally:+ _ACTIVE.reset(token)+++def require_launch(tool, *, cwd, content=None):+ bound = active_process_operation()+ if bound is None or bound.launch is None or bound.operation.tool != tool:+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Native process producer has no bound launch reservation")+ require_process_admission(bound)+ bound.validate()+ if Path(cwd).resolve() != Path(bound.launch.scope.root.path):+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Launch workspace changed")+ if content is not None and content.strip() != bound.operation.input.strip():+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Launch operation changed at producer entry")+ return bound.launch+++def require_process_admission(bound):+ from src.agent_runtime.authority import active_request_authority+ authority = active_request_authority()+ if authority is None or (authority.owner, authority.request_id, _thread(authority)) != (+ bound.owner, bound.request_id, bound.thread_id):+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Producer application authority changed")+ if not authority.permits(bound.operation):+ approval = bound.exact_approval+ if (authority.inherited or approval is None or not approval._claimed+ or approval.pending.process_operation is None+ or approval.pending.process_operation.to_dict() != bound.to_dict()):+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Producer operation has no request admission or exact claim")+++def guard_launch_workspace(root):+ """Reject a boundary containing execution control state or its aliases.++ These are pathname/inode observations, not an atomic kernel access policy.+ They do not claim freedom from concurrent link replacement after checking.+ """+ from src import bg_jobs, containment, constants+ from src.agent_runtime.resources import _control_plane_path+ control = (Path(bg_jobs._STORE), Path(bg_jobs._JOBS_DIR), containment._store_path(), _LAUNCH_DIR,+ Path(constants.APP_DB), Path(constants.AUTH_FILE), Path(constants.SETTINGS_FILE))+ base = Path(root.path)+ if any(Path(p).resolve().is_relative_to(base) for p in control):+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Launch boundary contains server control state")+ def unresolved(error):+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Launch workspace cannot be inspected") from error+ for directory, dirs, files in os.walk(base, followlinks=False, onerror=unresolved):+ for name in (*dirs, *files):+ path = Path(directory) / name+ info = path.lstat()+ if (path.is_symlink() or info.st_nlink > 1) and _control_plane_path(str(path.resolve())):+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Launch boundary aliases server control state")+++@store_transaction(lambda: _LAUNCH_DIR / "publication")+def publish_launch(launch, authority, containment_id, *, job=None, processes=()):+ from core.atomic_io import atomic_write_json+ launch.validate()+ if authority is None or (authority.owner, authority.request_id) != (launch.owner, launch.request_id):+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Launch authority linkage changed")+ path = launch_path(launch.generation)+ if path.exists():+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Launch reservation has already been used")+ atomic_write_json(path, {"launch": launch.to_dict(), "authority": authority.to_dict(),+ "containment_id": containment_id, "job": job.to_dict() if job else None,+ "processes": [p.to_dict() for p in processes]})+++@store_transaction(lambda: _LAUNCH_DIR / "publication")+def attach_containment_processes(launch, containment_id):+ """Attach producer-frozen lifecycle records; never capture a current PID."""+ from src import containment+ from src.process_lifecycle import ProcessIdentity+ record = containment._load_records().get(containment_id, {})+ path = launch_path(launch.generation)+ published = json.loads(path.read_text())+ if (published.get("launch") != launch.to_dict() or published.get("containment_id") != containment_id+ or record.get("id") != containment_id or record.get("launch_generation") != launch.generation+ or record.get("workspace") != launch.scope.root.path):+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Launch/receipt changed during publication")+ processes = []+ for role, pid_key, token_key, group_key in (("leader", "pid", "start_token", "pgid"),+ ("namespace_init", "namespace_pid", "namespace_start_token", None)):+ if record.get(pid_key):+ processes.append(ProcessResource("native:containment", launch.owner, launch.request_id,+ launch.thread_id, ProcessIdentity(record[pid_key], record.get(token_key), record.get(group_key) if group_key else None),+ role, "", containment_id))+ from core.atomic_io import atomic_write_json+ published["processes"] = [p.to_dict() for p in processes]+ atomic_write_json(path, published)+++def expected_job(job_id, *, action):+ bound = active_process_operation()+ if bound is None or bound.operation.tool != JOB_TOOL:+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Job producer has no bound operation")+ require_process_admission(bound)+ # The caller's actual action must agree with the normalized proposal.+ args = json.loads(bound.operation.input)+ proposed = str(args.get("action", "list")).strip().lower()+ if action != proposed:+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Job action changed at producer entry")+ target = next((j for j in bound.jobs if j.job_id == job_id), None)+ if target is None:+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Job selector is outside the bound operation")+ validate_job(target, mutation=action in {"kill", "stop", "cancel", "terminate", "ack"})+ return targetdiff --git a/src/agent_runtime/resources.py b/src/agent_runtime/resources.pyindex d63a9ed00..7440950b1 100644--- a/src/agent_runtime/resources.py+++ b/src/agent_runtime/resources.py@@ -37,7 +37,10 @@ def _control_plane_path(path):"SETTINGS_FILE", "SESSIONS_FILE", "USER_PREFS_FILE", "VAULT_FILE","SCHEDULED_EMAILS_DB", "EMAIL_CACHE_DB", "MEMORY_FILE", "INTEGRATIONS_FILE",)}- job_dirs = {canonical_root(constants.BG_JOBS_DIR)}+ job_dirs = {canonical_root(constants.BG_JOBS_DIR), canonical_root(constants.PROCESS_RESOURCES_DIR)}+ processes = sys.modules.get("src.agent_runtime.process_resources")+ if processes is not None:+ job_dirs.add(canonical_root(processes._LAUNCH_DIR))# Producers may have configured paths different from the default constants.# Inspect already-loaded server metadata without initializing a store here.bg = sys.modules.get("src.bg_jobs")@@ -275,25 +278,165 @@ def intersect_roots(parent, child):@dataclass(frozen=True)class ProcessResource:namespace: str- incarnation: strowner: str- pid: int- start_token: str+ request_id: str+ thread_id: str+ identity: "ProcessIdentity"+ role: strjob_id: str = ""containment_id: str = ""- namespace_pid: int | None = None- namespace_start_token: str = ""def __post_init__(self):- for name in ("namespace", "incarnation", "owner", "start_token"):+ from src.process_lifecycle import ProcessIdentity+ for name in ("namespace", "request_id", "thread_id"):_text(getattr(self, name), name)- for name in ("job_id", "containment_id", "namespace_start_token"):+ for name in ("owner", "job_id", "containment_id"):_text(getattr(self, name), name, optional=True)- if (type(self.pid) is not int or self.pid <= 0- or (self.namespace_pid is not None and- (type(self.namespace_pid) is not int or self.namespace_pid <= 0))- or bool(self.namespace_pid) != bool(self.namespace_start_token)):+ if (not isinstance(self.identity, ProcessIdentity)+ or type(self.identity.pid) is not int or self.identity.pid <= 0+ or (self.identity.pgid is not None and (type(self.identity.pgid) is not int or self.identity.pgid <= 0))+ or self.role not in {"supervisor", "leader", "namespace_init", "manager", "pty", "service"}):raise ValueError("Malformed process resource identity")+ supported_roles = {"native:containment": {"leader", "namespace_init"},+ "native:bg_jobs": {"supervisor"}}+ if self.role not in supported_roles.get(self.namespace, set()):+ raise ValueError("Unsupported process producer or role")+ _text(self.identity.start_token, "process start token")++ def validate(self):+ if not self.identity.owned() or self.identity.exited():+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Process resource is stale or unverifiable")++ def to_dict(self):+ return {"namespace": self.namespace, "owner": self.owner, "request_id": self.request_id,+ "thread_id": self.thread_id, "identity": self.identity.to_record(), "role": self.role,+ "job_id": self.job_id, "containment_id": self.containment_id}++ @classmethod+ def from_dict(cls, value):+ from src.process_lifecycle import ProcessIdentity+ if not isinstance(value, dict) or set(value) != {"namespace", "owner", "request_id", "thread_id", "identity", "role", "job_id", "containment_id"}:+ raise ValueError("Malformed process resource snapshot")+ identity = value["identity"]+ if not isinstance(identity, dict) or set(identity) != {"pid", "start_token", "pgid"}:+ raise ValueError("Malformed lifecycle identity snapshot")+ return cls(**{**value, "identity": ProcessIdentity(**identity)})+++@dataclass(frozen=True)+class ProcessLaunchScope:+ backend: "NativeBackendResource"+ root: FilesystemRoot+ required: frozenset[str]+ runtime_roots: tuple[PathObservation, ...] = ()+ network: str = "inherit"+ max_runtime_s: int = 3600++ def __post_init__(self):+ if (not isinstance(self.backend, NativeBackendResource) or not isinstance(self.root, FilesystemRoot)+ or not isinstance(self.required, frozenset) or not self.required+ or any(not isinstance(v, str) or not v for v in self.required)):+ raise ValueError("Malformed process launch scope")+ if self.backend.tool_id not in {"bash", "python"}:+ raise ValueError("Unsupported native launch producer")+ if (not isinstance(self.runtime_roots, tuple) or any(not isinstance(r, PathObservation) for r in self.runtime_roots)+ or self.network not in {"inherit", "none"}+ or type(self.max_runtime_s) is not int or self.max_runtime_s <= 0):+ raise ValueError("Malformed launch boundary selectors")++ def validate(self):+ self.root.validate()+ for runtime in self.runtime_roots:+ if canonical_root(runtime.path) != runtime.path or FileObjectIdentity.observe(runtime.path) != runtime.identity:+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Launch runtime root changed")++ def to_dict(self):+ return {"backend": self.backend.to_dict(), "root": self.root.to_dict(), "required": sorted(self.required),+ "runtime_roots": [{"path": r.path, "identity": asdict(r.identity)} for r in self.runtime_roots],+ "network": self.network, "max_runtime_s": self.max_runtime_s}++ @classmethod+ def from_dict(cls, value):+ if not isinstance(value, dict) or set(value) != {"backend", "root", "required", "runtime_roots", "network", "max_runtime_s"} or not isinstance(value["required"], list) or not isinstance(value["runtime_roots"], list):+ raise ValueError("Malformed launch scope snapshot")+ return cls(backend_from_dict(value["backend"]), FilesystemRoot.from_dict(value["root"]), frozenset(value["required"]),+ tuple(PathObservation(r["path"], FileObjectIdentity(**r["identity"])) for r in value["runtime_roots"]),+ value["network"], value["max_runtime_s"])+++@dataclass(frozen=True)+class ProcessLaunchResource:+ namespace: str+ owner: str+ request_id: str+ thread_id: str+ generation: str+ tool: str+ input_digest: str+ scope: ProcessLaunchScope+ ceiling_digest: str++ def __post_init__(self):+ for name in ("namespace", "request_id", "thread_id", "generation", "tool", "input_digest", "ceiling_digest"):+ _text(getattr(self, name), name)+ _text(self.owner, "owner", optional=True)+ if not isinstance(self.scope, ProcessLaunchScope) or self.tool != self.scope.backend.tool_id:+ raise ValueError("Malformed launch resource")+ import re+ if (self.namespace != "native:containment" or not re.fullmatch(r"[a-f0-9]{32}", self.generation)+ or any(not re.fullmatch(r"[a-f0-9]{64}", v) for v in (self.input_digest, self.ceiling_digest))):+ raise ValueError("Malformed native launch producer or generation")++ def validate(self):+ self.scope.validate()++ def to_dict(self):+ return {**{k: getattr(self, k) for k in ("namespace", "owner", "request_id", "thread_id", "generation", "tool", "input_digest", "ceiling_digest")},+ "scope": self.scope.to_dict()}++ @classmethod+ def from_dict(cls, value):+ if not isinstance(value, dict) or set(value) != {"namespace", "owner", "request_id", "thread_id", "generation", "tool", "input_digest", "scope", "ceiling_digest"}:+ raise ValueError("Malformed launch resource snapshot")+ return cls(**{**value, "scope": ProcessLaunchScope.from_dict(value["scope"])})+++@dataclass(frozen=True)+class BackgroundJobResource:+ namespace: str+ job_id: str+ generation: str+ owner: str+ request_id: str+ thread_id: str+ containment_id: str+ processes: tuple[ProcessResource, ...]++ def __post_init__(self):+ for name in ("namespace", "job_id", "generation", "request_id", "thread_id", "containment_id"):+ _text(getattr(self, name), name)+ _text(self.owner, "owner", optional=True)+ import re+ if (not re.fullmatch(r"[A-Za-z0-9_-]+", self.job_id)+ or not re.fullmatch(r"[a-f0-9]{32}", self.generation)):+ raise ValueError("Malformed job selector or launch generation")+ if (not isinstance(self.processes, tuple) or not self.processes+ or any(not isinstance(p, ProcessResource) or (p.owner, p.request_id, p.thread_id, p.job_id, p.containment_id)+ != (self.owner, self.request_id, self.thread_id, self.job_id, self.containment_id) for p in self.processes)+ or len({p.role for p in self.processes}) != len(self.processes)):+ raise ValueError("Malformed background job resource")+ if self.namespace != "native:bg_jobs" or any(p.namespace != "native:bg_jobs" or p.role != "supervisor" for p in self.processes):+ raise ValueError("Unsupported job producer or process role")++ def to_dict(self):+ return {**{k: getattr(self, k) for k in ("namespace", "job_id", "generation", "owner", "request_id", "thread_id", "containment_id")},+ "processes": [p.to_dict() for p in self.processes]}++ @classmethod+ def from_dict(cls, value):+ if not isinstance(value, dict) or set(value) != {"namespace", "job_id", "generation", "owner", "request_id", "thread_id", "containment_id", "processes"} or not isinstance(value["processes"], list):+ raise ValueError("Malformed background resource snapshot")+ return cls(**{**value, "processes": tuple(ProcessResource.from_dict(p) for p in value["processes"])})@dataclass(frozen=True)diff --git a/src/agent_tools/bg_job_tools.py b/src/agent_tools/bg_job_tools.pyindex 692f459a8..8d3fd5c1a 100644--- a/src/agent_tools/bg_job_tools.py+++ b/src/agent_tools/bg_job_tools.py@@ -67,8 +67,20 @@ class ManageBgJobsTool:if not session_id:return {"error": "manage_bg_jobs: no active chat session; background jobs are scoped to a chat.", "exit_code": 1}+ from src.agent_runtime.process_resources import active_process_operation, expected_job, require_process_admission+ from src.agent_runtime.resources import ResourceIdentityError+ bound = active_process_operation()+ if bound is None or (bound.owner, bound.thread_id) != (str(ctx.get("owner") or "").strip().casefold(), session_id):+ return {"error": "manage_bg_jobs: no exact server resource binding", "exit_code": 1,+ "blocked": True, "failure_kind": "resource_identity_denied"}+ from src.agent_runtime.authority import ExactOperation+ if bound.operation != ExactOperation.normalize("manage_bg_jobs", raw or "{}"):+ return {"error": "Job operation changed at producer entry", "exit_code": 1, "blocked": True}+ require_process_admission(bound)+if action in _LIST_ACTIONS:- jobs: List[Dict[str, Any]] = bg_jobs.list_for_session(session_id)+ bound.validate()+ jobs: List[Dict[str, Any]] = [bg_jobs.peek(j.job_id) for j in bound.jobs]if not jobs:return {"output": "No background jobs in this chat.", "exit_code": 0}jobs.sort(key=lambda r: r.get("started_at") or 0, reverse=True)@@ -78,7 +90,11 @@ class ManageBgJobsTool:if action in _OUTPUT_ACTIONS or action in _KILL_ACTIONS:if not job_id:return {"error": f"manage_bg_jobs: action '{action}' requires a job_id (see action='list').", "exit_code": 1}- rec = bg_jobs.get(job_id)+ try:+ resource = expected_job(job_id, action=action)+ rec = bg_jobs.get(job_id, expected=resource)+ except (ResourceIdentityError, OSError, ValueError) as error:+ return {"error": str(error), "exit_code": 1, "blocked": True, "failure_kind": "resource_identity_denied"}# Scope: only the chat that launched a job may see or control it.if rec is None or rec.get("session_id") != session_id:return {"error": f"manage_bg_jobs: no background job '{job_id}' in this chat.", "exit_code": 1}@@ -86,7 +102,7 @@ class ManageBgJobsTool:if action in _KILL_ACTIONS:if rec.get("status") != "running":return {"output": f"Job `{job_id}` already {_status_label(rec)}; nothing to kill.", "exit_code": 0}- killed = bg_jobs.kill(job_id)+ killed = bg_jobs.kill(job_id, expected=resource)if not killed or not killed.get("killed"):return {"error": f"Could not verify termination of background job `{job_id}`.","exit_code": 1, "teardown": (killed or {}).get("teardown")}diff --git a/src/agent_tools/subprocess_tools.py b/src/agent_tools/subprocess_tools.pyindex f10807358..9c0255fab 100644--- a/src/agent_tools/subprocess_tools.py+++ b/src/agent_tools/subprocess_tools.py@@ -511,26 +511,47 @@ async def _run_owned_command(command, ctx: dict, *, tool: str, timeout: int, argfrom src.tool_execution import agent_cwd, _truncategrant = None+ result = Nonetry:+ from src.agent_runtime.process_resources import require_launch, publish_launch, validate_launch_spec+ from src.agent_runtime.authority import active_request_authority+ launch = require_launch(tool, cwd=agent_cwd())+ authority = active_request_authority()+ if (str(ctx.get("owner") or "").strip().casefold(), str(ctx.get("session_id") or "")) != (+ authority.owner, authority.session_id):+ raise ValueError("Native producer owner or session changed")+ spec = _owned_spec(agent_cwd(), ctx.get("subproc_env"), timeout, readonly_extra)+ validate_launch_spec(launch, spec)grant = containment.acquire(- _owned_spec(agent_cwd(), ctx.get("subproc_env"), timeout, readonly_extra),+ spec,owner=str(ctx.get("session_id") or ctx.get("owner") or tool),)+ containment._update_record(grant.id, launch_generation=launch.generation)+ publish_launch(launch, authority, grant.id)if containment.FILESYSTEM not in grant.enforced:if argv:command = [*command[:-1], _replace_workspace_alias(command[-1], grant.workspace)]else:command = _replace_workspace_alias(command, grant.workspace)result = await containment.run(grant, command, argv=argv, progress_cb=ctx.get("progress_cb"))+ from src.agent_runtime.process_resources import attach_containment_processes+ attach_containment_processes(launch, grant.id)except containment.ContainmentUnavailable as exc:return containment.unavailable_tool_result(exc, tool=tool)except (OSError, RuntimeError, ValueError) as exc:- boundary = grant.to_dict() if grant else {}- boundary["executed"] = bool(getattr(exc, "containment_executed", False))- if not getattr(exc, "containment_established", False):+ if grant is not None:+ record = containment._load_records().get(grant.id, {})+ if not record.get("pid") and not record.get("release"):+ containment.release(grant, grace_s=0)+ boundary = result.grant.to_dict() if result is not None else grant.to_dict() if grant else {}+ boundary["executed"] = result is not None or bool(getattr(exc, "containment_executed", False))+ if result is None and not getattr(exc, "containment_established", False):boundary.update(contained=False, enforced=[])return {"error": f"{tool}: execution failed: {exc}", "exit_code": 1,- "containment": boundary}+ "containment": boundary,+ **({"failure_kind": "resource_linkage_unavailable",+ "teardown": result.release.to_dict() if result.release else {"dead": False}}+ if result is not None else {})}boundary = result.grant.to_dict()boundary["executed"] = True@@ -590,6 +611,12 @@ class BashTool:),"exit_code": 1,}+ from src.agent_runtime.process_resources import require_launch+ from src.agent_runtime.resources import ResourceIdentityError+ try:+ require_launch("bash", cwd=agent_cwd(), content=content)+ except ResourceIdentityError as error:+ return {"error": str(error), "exit_code": 1, "blocked": True, "failure_kind": "resource_identity_denied"}if _ffmpeg_unicode_drawtext_needs_fontfile(content):resolved_font = _resolve_fontfile_for_text(content)resolved_hint = (@@ -879,6 +906,12 @@ class PythonTool:),"exit_code": 1,}+ from src.agent_runtime.process_resources import require_launch+ from src.agent_runtime.resources import ResourceIdentityError+ try:+ require_launch("python", cwd=agent_cwd(), content=content)+ except ResourceIdentityError as error:+ return {"error": str(error), "exit_code": 1, "blocked": True, "failure_kind": "resource_identity_denied"}if "/tmp/" in content:isolated_tmp = _isolated_tmp_dir(agent_cwd())content = content.replace("/tmp/", isolated_tmp.rstrip("/") + "/")diff --git a/src/bg_jobs.py b/src/bg_jobs.pyindex ec0d9b828..e33b43352 100644--- a/src/bg_jobs.py+++ b/src/bg_jobs.py@@ -86,6 +86,20 @@ def launch(command: str, session_id: str, cwd: Optional[str] = None,A trusted detached supervisor owns the shared containment runner, output,wall clock and exit metadata, independently of the request/server lifetime."""+ from src.agent_runtime.process_resources import require_launch, active_process_operation, publish_launch, launch_path, validate_launch_spec+ from src.agent_runtime.authority import active_request_authority, save_background_authority+ from src.agent_runtime.resources import ProcessResource, BackgroundJobResource+ from src.process_lifecycle import ProcessIdentity+ cwd = cwd or os.getcwd()+ launch_resource = require_launch("bash", cwd=cwd)+ bound = active_process_operation()+ from src.tool_execution import _split_bg_marker+ marked, proposed = _split_bg_marker(bound.operation.input)+ if command != (proposed if marked else bound.operation.input).strip() or session_id != launch_resource.thread_id:+ raise ValueError("Background launch operation or session changed")+ authority = active_request_authority()+ if authority is None or (authority.owner, authority.request_id) != (launch_resource.owner, launch_resource.request_id):+ raise ValueError("Background launch authority changed")_JOBS_DIR.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)job_id = uuid.uuid4().hex[:12]log_path = _JOBS_DIR / f"{job_id}.log"@@ -94,6 +108,7 @@ def launch(command: str, session_id: str, cwd: Optional[str] = None,from src import containmentfrom src.agent_tools.subprocess_tools import _owned_spec, _replace_workspace_aliasspec = _owned_spec(cwd or os.getcwd(), env, max_runtime_s)+ validate_launch_spec(launch_resource, spec)grant = containment.acquire(spec, owner=f"bg:{session_id}")bounded_command = commandif containment.FILESYSTEM not in grant.enforced:@@ -147,16 +162,33 @@ def launch(command: str, session_id: str, cwd: Optional[str] = None,"start_token": process_ownership.capture(proc.pid)["start_token"],}try:+ supervisor = ProcessResource("native:bg_jobs", launch_resource.owner, launch_resource.request_id,+ launch_resource.thread_id, ProcessIdentity(proc.pid, rec["start_token"], rec["pgid"]),+ "supervisor", job_id, grant.id)+ supervisor.validate()+ resource = BackgroundJobResource("native:bg_jobs", job_id, launch_resource.generation,+ launch_resource.owner, launch_resource.request_id, launch_resource.thread_id, grant.id, (supervisor,))+ rec["resource_identity"] = resource.to_dict()+ rec["launch_resource"] = launch_resource.to_dict()containment._update_record(grant.id, lifetime="background", supervisor_pid=proc.pid,- supervisor_token=rec["start_token"])+ supervisor_token=rec["start_token"], launch_generation=resource.generation)jobs = _load()jobs[job_id] = rec_save(jobs)+ publish_launch(launch_resource, authority, grant.id, job=resource, processes=(supervisor,))+ save_background_authority(job_id, authority, resource=resource)+ payload.update(job_store=str(_STORE.resolve()), job_id=job_id,+ launch_path=str(launch_path(resource.generation)),+ authority_path=str(_JOBS_DIR / (job_id + ".authority.json")),+ resource_identity=resource.to_dict(), launch_resource=launch_resource.to_dict())# The supervisor cannot execute until the identity and job record are durable.proc.stdin.write(json.dumps(payload).encode("utf-8"))proc.stdin.close()except BaseException:- kill_process_tree(proc.pid)+ # EOF closes the unreleased worker even if identity observation failed.+ if proc.stdin is not None and not proc.stdin.closed:+ proc.stdin.close()+ kill_process_tree(proc.pid, start_token=rec["start_token"], pgid=rec["pgid"], require_identity=True)proc.wait(timeout=5)containment.release(grant, grace_s=0)raise@@ -194,16 +226,20 @@ def _prune(jobs: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]], now: float) -> bool:@store_transaction(lambda: _STORE)-def refresh() -> Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]]:+def refresh(job_id=None) -> Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]]:"""Reconcile every running job against disk. Marks done/failed (incl.timeout). Idempotent — safe to call from a poll loop. Returns the store."""jobs = _load()for pid, proc in list(_LIVE_PROCS.items()):+ if job_id is not None and pid != jobs.get(job_id, {}).get("pid"):+ continueif proc.poll() is not None:_LIVE_PROCS.pop(pid, None)changed = Falsenow = time.time()- for rec in jobs.values():+ for jid, rec in jobs.items():+ if job_id is not None and jid != job_id:+ continueif rec.get("status") != "running":continueexit_path = Path(rec.get("exit_path", ""))@@ -218,7 +254,15 @@ def refresh() -> Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]]:if rec.get("result_path"):try:report = json.loads(Path(rec["result_path"]).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))- rec.update(report)+ # Result publication is not an identity producer. It cannot+ # overwrite ownership, generations, PIDs, paths or authority.+ if rec.get("resource_identity") and report.get("resource_identity") != rec["resource_identity"]:+ raise ValueError("Result/job linkage mismatch")+ if report.get("containment", {}).get("id") != rec.get("containment_id"):+ raise ValueError("Result/receipt linkage mismatch")+ for key in ("containment", "teardown", "output_truncated", "timed_out", "error", "failure_kind"):+ if key in report:+ rec[key] = report[key]except (OSError, ValueError):rec["status"], rec["exit_code"] = "failed", 1rec["result_unavailable"] = True@@ -243,7 +287,7 @@ def refresh() -> Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]]:rec["ended_at"] = nowrec["died"] = Truechanged = True- if _prune(jobs, now):+ if job_id is None and _prune(jobs, now):changed = Trueif changed:_save(jobs)@@ -288,28 +332,45 @@ def pending_followups() -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:@store_transaction(lambda: _STORE)-def mark_followed_up(job_id: str) -> None:+def mark_followed_up(job_id: str, *, expected) -> None:jobs = _load()if job_id in jobs:+ from src.agent_runtime.process_resources import validate_job+ if expected.job_id != job_id:+ raise ValueError("Acknowledgement job resource changed")+ validate_job(expected, mutation=True)jobs[job_id]["followed_up"] = True_save(jobs)-def get(job_id: str) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:- refresh() # reconcile against disk so status/exit_code are current+def peek(job_id: str) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:+ """Resolve one record without reaping or changing any job."""+ return _load().get(job_id)+++def get(job_id: str, *, expected) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:+ from src.agent_runtime.process_resources import validate_job+ if expected.job_id != job_id:+ raise ValueError("Output job selector changed")+ validate_job(expected)+ refresh(job_id)+ validate_job(expected)rec = _load().get(job_id)if rec:+ from src.agent_runtime.process_resources import job_from_record+ if job_from_record(rec) != expected:+ raise ValueError("Output job resource changed")rec = dict(rec)rec["output"] = _read_output(rec)return recdef list_for_session(session_id: str) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:- return [r for r in refresh().values() if r.get("session_id") == session_id]+ return [r for r in _load().values() if r.get("session_id") == session_id]@store_transaction(lambda: _STORE)-def kill(job_id: str) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:+def kill(job_id: str, *, expected) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:"""Terminate a running job's process tree and mark it killed. Returns theupdated record, or None if the id is unknown. Idempotent: a job that alreadyfinished is returned unchanged. Sets followed_up so the monitor does not also@@ -318,6 +379,10 @@ def kill(job_id: str) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:rec = jobs.get(job_id)if rec is None:return None+ from src.agent_runtime.process_resources import validate_job+ if expected.job_id != job_id:+ raise ValueError("Job selector changed")+ validate_job(expected, mutation=True)if rec.get("status") == "running":outcome = _kill_record(rec)rec["teardown"] = outcome.to_dict()diff --git a/src/bg_monitor.py b/src/bg_monitor.pyindex 086faae19..d8e3288ea 100644--- a/src/bg_monitor.py+++ b/src/bg_monitor.py@@ -140,6 +140,17 @@ async def _run_followup(rec: dict) -> bool:from src.settings import get_settingauthority = restore_background_authority(rec["id"], owner=getattr(sess, "owner", None), session_id=sess.id)+ # A result can trigger a continuation only through the immutable producer+ # linkage, never merely because it names an existing chat.+ from src.agent_runtime.process_resources import job_from_record, validate_job+ try:+ resource = job_from_record(rec)+ validate_job(resource)+ if not authority.grants or (resource.owner, resource.thread_id, resource.request_id) != (+ str(getattr(sess, "owner", None) or "").strip().casefold(), sess.id, authority.request_id):+ return False+ except (ValueError, TypeError, OSError, RuntimeError):+ return Falseauthority = authority.restrict(disabled_tools=get_setting("disabled_tools", []) or ())full, tool_events = await _drain_agent(sess, context, request_authority=authority)@@ -169,7 +180,8 @@ async def _loop():for rec in bg_jobs.pending_followups():try:if await _run_followup(rec):- bg_jobs.mark_followed_up(rec["id"])+ from src.agent_runtime.process_resources import job_from_record+ bg_jobs.mark_followed_up(rec["id"], expected=job_from_record(rec))except Exception as e:# Idempotent: leave followed_up=False so the next tick retries.logger.warning("bg-followup failed for %s (will retry): %s", rec.get("id"), e)diff --git a/src/builtin_actions.py b/src/builtin_actions.pyindex a7cdea3b1..419c579fd 100644--- a/src/builtin_actions.py+++ b/src/builtin_actions.py@@ -878,22 +878,28 @@ async def action_consolidate_memory(owner: str, **kwargs) -> Tuple[str, bool]:async def _run_subprocess(argv, *, shell: bool = False, timeout: int = 120, label: str = "Command") -> Tuple[str, bool]:- """Shared subprocess runner. Wraps the blocking subprocess.run in- asyncio.to_thread so the event loop stays responsive."""- import asyncio- import subprocess+ """Scheduled local work consumes the request's sealed launch ceiling."""+ from src.agent_runtime.authority import active_request_authority, ExactOperation+ from src.agent_runtime.process_resources import resolve_process_operation, bind_process_operation+ from src.agent_runtime.resources import NativeBackendResource+ from src.agent_tools.subprocess_tools import _run_owned_command+ authority = active_request_authority()+ if authority is None:+ return "Scheduled process launch has no server authority.", False+ if isinstance(argv, list) and argv and argv[0] == "ssh":+ return "Remote scheduled workload requires an exact external backend binding.", False+ command = argv[-1] if isinstance(argv, list) else argv+ operation = ExactOperation.normalize("bash", command)+ if not authority.permits(operation):+ return "Scheduled launch differs from the sealed operation.", Falsetry:- result = await asyncio.to_thread(- subprocess.run, argv, shell=shell, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout,- )- output = (result.stdout or "").strip()- if result.returncode != 0 and result.stderr:- output += "\nSTDERR: " + result.stderr.strip()- return output or "(no output)", result.returncode == 0- except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:- return f"{label} timed out ({timeout}s)", False- except Exception as e:- return str(e), False+ bound = resolve_process_operation(authority, operation, NativeBackendResource("bash"))+ with bind_process_operation(bound):+ result = await _run_owned_command(command, {"owner": authority.owner,+ "session_id": authority.session_id}, tool="bash", timeout=timeout)+ return result.get("output") or result.get("error") or "(no output)", result.get("exit_code") == 0+ except (ValueError, OSError, RuntimeError) as error:+ return str(error), Falseasync def action_ssh_command(owner: str, command: str = "", host: str = "localhost", **kwargs) -> Tuple[str, bool]:diff --git a/src/constants.py b/src/constants.pyindex d11283646..ac114f9c8 100644--- a/src/constants.py+++ b/src/constants.py@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ EMOJI_CACHE_DIR = os.path.join(DATA_DIR, "emoji_cache")RAG_DIR = os.path.join(DATA_DIR, "rag")CHROMA_DIR = os.path.join(DATA_DIR, "chroma")BG_JOBS_DIR = os.path.join(DATA_DIR, "bg_jobs")+PROCESS_RESOURCES_DIR = os.path.join(DATA_DIR, "process_resources")DEEP_RESEARCH_DIR = os.path.join(DATA_DIR, "deep_research")MCP_OAUTH_DIR = os.path.join(DATA_DIR, "mcp_oauth")GENERATED_IMAGES_DIR = os.path.join(DATA_DIR, "generated_images")diff --git a/src/containment_worker.py b/src/containment_worker.pyindex 84edee8fd..d15012be5 100644--- a/src/containment_worker.py+++ b/src/containment_worker.py@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import jsonimport signalimport sysimport types+import osfrom pathlib import Path# Launch by absolute script path, so a task workspace cannot shadow src.@@ -39,6 +40,40 @@ async def supervise(payload: dict) -> None:loop.add_signal_handler(signal.SIGTERM, task.cancel)loop.add_signal_handler(signal.SIGINT, task.cancel)try:+ # The supervisor is held on stdin until *all* publication succeeds.+ # No legacy payload can reconstruct ownership from its PID or receipt.+ job = json.loads(Path(payload["job_store"]).read_text())[payload["job_id"]]+ published = json.loads(Path(payload["launch_path"]).read_text())+ sidecar = json.loads(Path(payload["authority_path"]).read_text())+ resource = payload["resource_identity"]+ launch = payload["launch_resource"]+ from src.agent_runtime.resources import ProcessLaunchResource, BackgroundJobResource+ from src.agent_runtime.process_resources import validate_launch_spec, validate_job_receipt+ typed_launch = ProcessLaunchResource.from_dict(launch)+ typed_job = BackgroundJobResource.from_dict(resource)+ typed_launch.validate()+ validate_launch_spec(typed_launch, spec)+ supervisor = typed_job.processes[0]+ supervisor.validate()+ receipt = containment._load_records().get(grant.id)+ validate_job_receipt(typed_job, receipt)+ if (supervisor.identity.pid != os.getpid()+ or (typed_job.owner, typed_job.request_id, typed_job.thread_id) !=+ (typed_launch.owner, typed_launch.request_id, typed_launch.thread_id)+ or (published["authority"]["owner"], published["authority"]["request_id"], published["authority"]["session_id"]) !=+ (typed_job.owner, typed_job.request_id, typed_job.thread_id)):+ raise ValueError("Detached producer ownership changed")+ if (job.get("resource_identity") != resource or job.get("launch_resource") != launch+ or published.get("job") != resource or published.get("launch") != launch+ or sidecar.get("job") != resource or sidecar.get("authority") != published.get("authority")+ or published.get("containment_id") != grant.id+ or (receipt.get("owner"), receipt.get("mechanism"), receipt.get("mode"), receipt.get("workspace")) !=+ (grant.owner, grant.mechanism, grant.mode, spec.workspace)+ or info.get("external") is True+ or resource["containment_id"] != grant.id+ or resource["generation"] != launch["generation"]+ or receipt.get("launch_generation") != launch["generation"]):+ raise ValueError("Detached launch authority linkage mismatch")with open(payload["log_path"], "w", encoding="utf-8") as log:def capture(text):log.write(text)@@ -75,6 +110,7 @@ async def supervise(payload: dict) -> None:except OSError:# A failed log initialization must not hide completion metadata.sys.stderr.write(output)+ report["resource_identity"] = payload.get("resource_identity")atomic_write_json(payload["result_path"], report)# Publish completion last: refresh must never see an exit without metadata.atomic_write_text(payload["exit_path"], str(code if code is not None else 1))diff --git a/src/tool_approvals.py b/src/tool_approvals.pyindex 416fa9e90..dfc5d1cca 100644--- a/src/tool_approvals.py+++ b/src/tool_approvals.py@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ if TYPE_CHECKING:from src.agent_runtime.resource_binding import BoundFilesystemOperationfrom src.agent_runtime.remote_resources import BoundBackendOperationfrom src.agent_runtime.owned_resources import BoundOwnedOperation+ from src.agent_runtime.process_resources import BoundProcessOperationDEFAULT_APPROVAL_TTL_SECONDS = 10 * 60@@ -127,6 +128,7 @@ def _binding_payload(resource_operation=None,backend_operation=None,owned_operation=None,+ process_operation=None,) -> dict[str, Any]:return {"owner": _normalized_owner(owner),@@ -151,6 +153,7 @@ def _binding_payload("resource_operation": resource_operation.to_dict() if resource_operation is not None else None,"backend_operation": backend_operation.to_dict() if backend_operation is not None else None,"owned_operation": owned_operation.to_dict() if owned_operation is not None else None,+ "process_operation": process_operation.to_dict() if process_operation is not None else None,}@@ -184,6 +187,7 @@ class PendingToolApproval:resource_operation: BoundFilesystemOperation | None = Nonebackend_operation: BoundBackendOperation | None = Noneowned_operation: BoundOwnedOperation | None = None+ process_operation: BoundProcessOperation | None = Nonedef public_payload(self, *, reason: str | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:return {@@ -296,6 +300,7 @@ class ExactToolApproval:resource_operation=self.pending.resource_operation,backend_operation=self.pending.backend_operation,owned_operation=self.pending.owned_operation,+ process_operation=self.pending.process_operation,)return _canonical_digest(expected) == self.pending.digest@@ -391,6 +396,7 @@ class ToolApprovalStore:resource_operation = Nonebackend_operation = Noneowned_operation = None+ process_operation = Nonefrom src.agent_runtime.remote_resources import BoundBackendOperation, resolve_backendfrom src.agent_runtime.owned_resources import needs_owned_binding, resolve_owned_operationfrom src.agent_runtime.resources import NativeBackendResource@@ -403,6 +409,9 @@ class ToolApprovalStore:backend_operation = BoundBackendOperation(backend,request_authority.request_id if request_authority is not None else "",_normalized_owner(owner), str(session_id or ""), operation.transport_tool, operation.input)+ from src.agent_runtime.process_resources import needs_process_binding, resolve_process_operation+ if request_authority is not None and needs_process_binding(operation, backend):+ process_operation = resolve_process_operation(request_authority, operation, backend)if isinstance(backend, NativeBackendResource) and needs_owned_binding(operation):resolved_owned = resolve_owned_operation(operation, owner=_normalized_owner(owner),thread_id=str(session_id or ""), request_id=backend_operation.request_id,@@ -450,6 +459,7 @@ class ToolApprovalStore:resource_operation=resource_operation,backend_operation=backend_operation,owned_operation=owned_operation,+ process_operation=process_operation,)pending = PendingToolApproval(approval_id=secrets.token_urlsafe(32),@@ -477,6 +487,7 @@ class ToolApprovalStore:resource_operation=resource_operation,backend_operation=backend_operation,owned_operation=owned_operation,+ process_operation=process_operation,)with self._lock:self._purge_expired_locked(now)diff --git a/src/tool_execution.py b/src/tool_execution.pyindex 9b7a41a8a..f4f2cf5b0 100644--- a/src/tool_execution.py+++ b/src/tool_execution.py@@ -978,7 +978,10 @@ def vet_workspace(raw: str) -> Optional[str]:def agent_cwd() -> str:"""Working directory for agent subprocesses (bash/python/background jobs):the active workspace when set, else the persistent data dir."""- return get_active_workspace() or _AGENT_WORKDIR+ from src.agent_runtime.process_resources import active_process_operation+ bound = active_process_operation()+ return (bound.launch.scope.root.path if bound is not None and bound.launch is not None+ else get_active_workspace() or _AGENT_WORKDIR)def get_mcp_manager():@@ -1319,7 +1322,10 @@ async def _document_tool_dispatch(from src.agent_runtime.journal import dispatched, mark_authorized, mark_dispatch, record_actionfrom src.agent_runtime.authority import (MISSING_AUTHORITY, ExactOperation, RequestAuthority, active_request_authority,- bind_request_authority, save_background_authority,+ bind_request_authority,+)+from src.agent_runtime.process_resources import (+ active_process_operation, bind_process_operation, needs_process_binding, resolve_process_operation,)@@ -1415,6 +1421,12 @@ async def execute_tool_block(exact_admission=exact_admission)external_resource_call = isinstance(backend_operation.resource, ExternalResource)owned_operation = None+ process_operation = None+ if needs_process_binding(operation, backend_operation.resource):+ if pending is not None and pending.process_operation is None:+ raise ResourceIdentityError("Approved action has no sealed process/job identity")+ process_operation = resolve_process_operation(authority, operation, backend_operation.resource,+ approved=pending.process_operation if pending is not None else None, exact_admission=exact_admission)if needs_owned_binding(operation) and not external_resource_call:if pending is not None and pending.owned_operation is None:raise ResourceIdentityError("Approved action has no sealed owned resource identity")@@ -1541,10 +1553,13 @@ async def execute_tool_block(token = _active_workspace.set(workspace or None)try:backend_operation.validate(client_runtime_context)+ if process_operation is not None and approval_claimed:+ process_operation = replace(process_operation, exact_approval=exact_approval)normalized = resource_operation or owned_operationsealed_document = owned_operation or (exact_approval.pending if approval_claimed else None)with (bind_request_authority(authority), bind_resource_operation(resource_operation),- bind_backend_operation(backend_operation), bind_owned_operation(owned_operation)):+ bind_backend_operation(backend_operation), bind_owned_operation(owned_operation),+ bind_process_operation(process_operation)):output = await _execute_tool_block_impl(ToolBlock(transport, normalized.execution_input) if normalized is not None else block,session_id=session_id,@@ -1790,7 +1805,6 @@ async def _execute_tool_block_impl(return "bash (background): containment unavailable", containment.unavailable_tool_result(exc, tool="bash")# Only this server launch may seal detached-job authority; a# handler/bridge output carrying a job id is not a grant source.- save_background_authority(rec["id"], active_request_authority())short = _bg_cmd.strip().split(chr(10))[0][:80]desc = f"bash (background): {short}"result = {@@ -1833,6 +1847,15 @@ async def _execute_tool_block_impl(or {"error": f"{tool}: execution failed", "exit_code": 1}if tool == "edit_file":desc = result.get("output") or result.get("error") or "edit_file"+ elif tool in {"bash", "python"} and backend is not None and isinstance(backend.resource, NativeBackendResource):+ # Native reservations are pinned to the native producer. Pass the+ # application binding explicitly rather than the MCP fallback's empty+ # owner/session context.+ first_line = content.split(chr(10))[0][:80]+ desc = f"{tool}: {first_line}"+ result = await dispatched(_direct_fallback(tool, content, progress_cb=progress_cb,+ owner=owner, session_id=session_id, client_runtime_context=client_runtime_context)) \+ or {"error": f"{tool}: execution failed", "exit_code": 1}elif tool in _MCP_TOOL_MAP:first_line = content.split(chr(10))[0][:80]desc = f"{tool}: {first_line}"diff --git a/src/tools/cookbook.py b/src/tools/cookbook.pyindex 9318de02a..e786f8671 100644--- a/src/tools/cookbook.py+++ b/src/tools/cookbook.py@@ -1227,8 +1227,8 @@ async def _cookbook_kill_session(session_id: str, *, remote_host: str = "",)target_label = f"{session_id} on {remote}"else:- cmd = f"tmux kill-session -t {shlex.quote(session_id)}"- target_label = session_id+ return {"error": "Local Cookbook control has no admitted process resource; session discovery is not ownership",+ "exit_code": 1, "blocked": True, "failure_kind": "resource_identity_denied"}# Capture what this session owns BEFORE the kill. Once tmux tears the# session down the pane is gone, and with it the only evidence linking adiff --git a/tests/containment_helpers.py b/tests/containment_helpers.pyindex e784e032d..3c0164db7 100644--- a/tests/containment_helpers.py+++ b/tests/containment_helpers.py@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ from src import containmentdef capture_owned_spawn(monkeypatch, tmp_path):captured = {}monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "CONTAINMENT_MODE", containment.MODE_REPORT_ONLY)- monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "_store_path", lambda: tmp_path / "grants.json")+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "_store_path", lambda: tmp_path.parent / (tmp_path.name + "-control") / "grants.json")monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "_pgid_of", lambda pid: pid)async def fake_exec(*argv, **kwargs):diff --git a/tests/process_resource_helpers.py b/tests/process_resource_helpers.pynew file mode 100644index 000000000..e5bb616fc--- /dev/null+++ b/tests/process_resource_helpers.py@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@+"""Explicit trusted producer fixtures; no production authority fallback."""+from contextlib import contextmanager+from dataclasses import replace+import json+from pathlib import Path+from uuid import uuid4++from src.agent_runtime.authority import ExactOperation, OperationGrant, RequestAuthority, bind_request_authority+from src.agent_runtime.resources import BackgroundJobResource, NativeBackendResource, ProcessResource+from src.agent_runtime.process_resources import bind_process_operation, resolve_process_operation, publish_launch+from src.process_lifecycle import ProcessIdentity+++@contextmanager+def launch_authority(content, workspace, *, tool="bash", owner="", session_id="chat", authority=None):+ authority = authority or RequestAuthority("producer-test", owner, session_id, str(workspace), (OperationGrant(tool),))+ bound = resolve_process_operation(authority, ExactOperation.normalize(tool, content), NativeBackendResource(tool))+ with bind_request_authority(authority), bind_process_operation(bound):+ yield authority, bound+++def launch(command, session_id="chat", *, cwd, **kwargs):+ from src import bg_jobs+ with launch_authority(command, cwd, session_id=session_id):+ return bg_jobs.launch(command, session_id, cwd=cwd, **kwargs)+++def identity(job_id):+ from src import bg_jobs+ from src.agent_runtime.process_resources import job_from_record+ return job_from_record(bg_jobs.peek(job_id))+++def get(job_id):+ from src import bg_jobs+ return bg_jobs.get(job_id, expected=identity(job_id))+++def kill(job_id):+ from src import bg_jobs+ return bg_jobs.kill(job_id, expected=identity(job_id))+++def seed_linkage(record, workspace, *, owner="", request_id="producer-test"):+ """A fake server spawn record, with an explicit fake lifecycle observation."""+ from src import bg_jobs, containment+ from src.agent_runtime.authority import save_background_authority+ from src.agent_runtime.process_resources import resolve_process_operation+ authority = RequestAuthority(request_id, owner, record["session_id"], str(workspace), (OperationGrant("bash"),))+ bound = resolve_process_operation(authority, ExactOperation.normalize("bash", record["command"]), NativeBackendResource("bash"))+ receipt = uuid4().hex+ record.update(containment_id=receipt, start_token="test-boot:start", pgid=record["pid"])+ process = ProcessResource("native:bg_jobs", owner, request_id, record["session_id"],+ ProcessIdentity(record["pid"], record["start_token"], record["pgid"]), "supervisor", record["id"], receipt)+ resource = BackgroundJobResource("native:bg_jobs", record["id"], bound.launch.generation,+ owner, request_id, record["session_id"], receipt, (process,))+ record.update(resource_identity=resource.to_dict(), launch_resource=bound.launch.to_dict())+ from core.atomic_io import atomic_write_json+ receipts = containment._load_records()+ receipts[receipt] = {"id": receipt, "launch_generation": resource.generation,+ "owner": "bg:" + resource.thread_id, "supervisor_pid": process.identity.pid,+ "supervisor_token": process.identity.start_token, "mechanism": "process_group"}+ atomic_write_json(containment._store_path(), receipts)+ publish_launch(bound.launch, authority, receipt, job=resource, processes=(process,))+ save_background_authority(record["id"], authority, resource=resource)+ return resource+++def authorized_handler(handler, workspace):+ async def execute(content, ctx):+ from src.agent_runtime.process_resources import active_process_operation+ from src.agent_runtime.authority import active_request_authority+ if active_process_operation() is not None or active_request_authority() is not None:+ return await handler(content, ctx)+ tool = "python" if handler.__qualname__.startswith("PythonTool") else "bash"+ from src.agent_runtime.resources import FilesystemRoot+ from src.agent_runtime.process_resources import seal_launch_scope+ owner = str(ctx.get("owner") or "").casefold()+ authority = RequestAuthority("producer-test", owner, str(ctx.get("session_id") or ""), str(workspace), (OperationGrant(tool),))+ authority = replace(authority, launch_scopes=(seal_launch_scope(NativeBackendResource(tool),+ FilesystemRoot.seal(workspace, owner=owner), env=ctx.get("subproc_env")),))+ with launch_authority(content, workspace, tool=tool, authority=authority):+ return await handler(content, ctx)+ return execute+++def install_native_authority(monkeypatch, workspace):+ from src.agent_tools import subprocess_tools+ from src import tool_execution+ from src.constants import DATA_DIR+ for cls in (subprocess_tools.BashTool, subprocess_tools.PythonTool):+ original = cls.execute+ async def execute(self, content, ctx, _original=original):+ selected = Path(tool_execution.agent_cwd())+ if selected == Path(DATA_DIR):+ selected = Path(workspace)+ return await authorized_handler(_original.__get__(self), selected)(content, ctx)+ monkeypatch.setattr(cls, "execute", execute)diff --git a/tests/runtime_evidence_helpers.py b/tests/runtime_evidence_helpers.pyindex e12c633bd..f235718ea 100644--- a/tests/runtime_evidence_helpers.py+++ b/tests/runtime_evidence_helpers.py@@ -15,6 +15,11 @@ def server_authorized_executor(executor):from src.tool_policy import known_tool_namesfrom src.turn_contract import canonical_toolfrom src.agent_runtime.remote_resources import seal_backends+ from src.agent_runtime.resources import FilesystemRoot, NativeBackendResource, ProcessLaunchScope+ from src.containment import DEFAULT_REQUIRED+ from src.agent_runtime.process_resources import seal_launch_scope+ from pathlib import Path+ import tempfilecall_signature = signature(executor)@wraps(executor)async def execute(*args, **kwargs):@@ -22,10 +27,19 @@ def server_authorized_executor(executor):parameters = bound.argumentsgrants = tuple(OperationGrant(name) for name in sorted({canonical_tool(n) for n in known_tool_names()} | {"list_dir", "find_files"}))+ original = parameters.get("exact_approval")+ authority = original.pending.request_authority if original is not None else None+ if authority is not None:+ kwargs.setdefault("request_authority", authority)+ scratch = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="odysseus-dispatch-fixture-"))+ launch_scopes = (None if parameters.get("workspace") else tuple(+ seal_launch_scope(NativeBackendResource(tool), FilesystemRoot.seal(scratch))+ for tool in ("bash", "python")))kwargs.setdefault("request_authority", RequestAuthority("standalone-test-request", str(parameters.get("owner") or "").strip().casefold(),str(parameters.get("session_id") or ""), str(parameters.get("workspace") or ""),grants,+ launch_scopes=launch_scopes,backend_resources=seal_backends((g.tool for g in grants), context=parameters.get("client_runtime_context"),owner=str(parameters.get("owner") or "").strip().casefold()),))diff --git a/tests/test_agent_tmux_retirement.py b/tests/test_agent_tmux_retirement.pyindex 4815a929a..583197a5d 100644--- a/tests/test_agent_tmux_retirement.py+++ b/tests/test_agent_tmux_retirement.py@@ -18,7 +18,8 @@ async def test_a_chat_session_always_uses_the_owned_runner(monkeypatch, tmp_pathasync def forbidden(*args, **kwargs):pytest.fail("native Bash resurrected a persistent tmux shell")monkeypatch.setattr(subprocess_tools.asyncio, "create_subprocess_shell", forbidden)- result = await subprocess_tools.BashTool().execute("printf ok", {"session_id": "same-chat"})+ from tests.process_resource_helpers import authorized_handler+ result = await authorized_handler(subprocess_tools.BashTool().execute, tmp_path)("printf ok", {"session_id": "same-chat"})assert result["output"] == "ok"assert result["teardown"]["dead"] is Trueassert "tmux_session" not in resultdiff --git a/tests/test_background_containment.py b/tests/test_background_containment.pyindex 664788173..b52f48da5 100644--- a/tests/test_background_containment.py+++ b/tests/test_background_containment.py@@ -9,10 +9,15 @@ import pytestfrom src import bg_jobs, containment, process_ownership, process_reaper, tool_executionfrom src.tool_execution import NO_TOOL_SECURITY_CONTEXTfrom tests.runtime_evidence_helpers import server_authorized_executor+from tests.process_resource_helpers import launch, get, kill@pytest.fixturedef jobs(tmp_path, monkeypatch):+ from src.agent_runtime import process_resources+ monkeypatch.setattr(process_resources, "_LAUNCH_DIR", tmp_path / "private" / "launches")+ workspace = tmp_path / "workspace"+ workspace.mkdir()monkeypatch.setattr(bg_jobs, "_JOBS_DIR", tmp_path / "jobs")monkeypatch.setattr(bg_jobs, "_STORE", tmp_path / "jobs.json")monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "_store_path", lambda: tmp_path / "grants.json")@@ -20,11 +25,11 @@ def jobs(tmp_path, monkeypatch):monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "MECHANISMS", tuple(m for m in containment.MECHANISMS if m.name == "process_group"))monkeypatch.setattr(tool_execution, "_owner_is_admin", lambda owner: True)launched = []- yield tmp_path, launched+ yield workspace, launchedfor record in launched:- current = bg_jobs.get(record["id"])+ current = get(record["id"])if current and current["status"] == "running":- bg_jobs.kill(record["id"])+ kill(record["id"])proc = bg_jobs._LIVE_PROCS.pop(record["pid"], None)if proc:proc.wait(timeout=8)@@ -33,7 +38,7 @@ def jobs(tmp_path, monkeypatch):def finished(job_id):deadline = time.monotonic() + 10while time.monotonic() < deadline:- record = bg_jobs.get(job_id)+ record = get(job_id)if record["status"] != "running":return recordtime.sleep(0.03)@@ -42,7 +47,7 @@ def finished(job_id):def test_detached_execution_owns_boundary_and_reports_death(jobs):path, launched = jobs- record = bg_jobs.launch("printf captured", "chat", cwd=str(path))+ record = launch("printf captured", "chat", cwd=str(path))launched.append(record)result = finished(record["id"])assert result["output"] == "captured"@@ -73,7 +78,7 @@ def test_supervisor_setup_failure_closes_unstarted_grant(jobs):result = subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(worker)], input=json.dumps(payload),capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10)assert result.returncode == 0 # Supervisor publishes the failed job result.- assert "FileNotFoundError" in result.stderr+ assert "KeyError" in result.stderr # Legacy unlinked payload fails before execution.assert not (path / "must-not-exist").exists()assert containment.active_grants() == []assert (path / "exit").read_text() == "1"@@ -102,7 +107,7 @@ async def test_bg_marker_refuses_without_spawning_and_authority_still_gates(jobsdef test_detached_supervisor_enforces_timeout(jobs):path, launched = jobs- record = bg_jobs.launch("sleep 60", "chat", cwd=str(path), max_runtime_s=1)+ record = launch("sleep 60", "chat", cwd=str(path), max_runtime_s=1)launched.append(record)result = finished(record["id"])assert result["timed_out"] is True@@ -111,11 +116,11 @@ def test_detached_supervisor_enforces_timeout(jobs):def test_restart_keeps_verified_background_supervisor(jobs):path, launched = jobs- record = bg_jobs.launch("sleep 60", "chat", cwd=str(path))+ record = launch("sleep 60", "chat", cwd=str(path))launched.append(record)report = process_reaper.reap_containment_grants()assert report["background_kept"] == 1- killed = bg_jobs.kill(record["id"])+ killed = kill(record["id"])assert killed["killed"] is Trueassert killed["teardown"]["dead"] is True@@ -126,16 +131,14 @@ def test_kill_never_marks_a_foreign_pid_killed(jobs, monkeypatch):bg_jobs._save({"stale": record})monkeypatch.setattr(process_ownership, "verify", lambda *args: process_ownership.FOREIGN)monkeypatch.setattr(bg_jobs, "_kill", lambda *args, **kwargs: pytest.fail("foreign process signalled"))- result = bg_jobs.kill("stale")- assert result["status"] == "running"- assert result.get("killed") is not True- assert result["teardown"]["dead"] is False+ result = bg_jobs._kill_record(record) # Service cleanup still refuses foreign identity.+ assert result.dead is Falsedef test_running_detached_output_and_concurrent_grants_are_preserved(jobs):path, launched = jobsfor number in range(3):- launched.append(bg_jobs.launch(f"printf job-{number}; sleep 0.3", "chat", cwd=str(path)))+ launched.append(launch(f"printf job-{number}; sleep 0.3", "chat", cwd=str(path)))for number, record in enumerate(launched):assert finished(record["id"])["output"] == f"job-{number}"grants = containment._load_records()@@ -145,11 +148,11 @@ def test_running_detached_output_and_concurrent_grants_are_preserved(jobs):def test_detached_output_is_available_while_running(jobs):path, launched = jobs- record = bg_jobs.launch("printf progress; sleep 5", "chat", cwd=str(path))+ record = launch("printf progress; sleep 5", "chat", cwd=str(path))launched.append(record)deadline = time.monotonic() + 3while time.monotonic() < deadline:- current = bg_jobs.get(record["id"])+ current = get(record["id"])if "progress" in current["output"]:assert current["status"] == "running"returndiff --git a/tests/test_background_resource_identity.py b/tests/test_background_resource_identity.pynew file mode 100644index 000000000..d72ceb2e0--- /dev/null+++ b/tests/test_background_resource_identity.py@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@+from dataclasses import replace+import json+import os+import time++import pytest++from src import bg_jobs, containment, process_ownership+from src.agent_runtime import process_resources as resources+from src.agent_runtime.authority import RequestAuthority, OperationGrant, ExactOperation, restore_background_authority+from src.agent_runtime.resources import NativeBackendResource, ResourceIdentityError, BackgroundJobResource, FilesystemRoot, FilesystemResource+from src.process_lifecycle import ProcessIdentity+from tests.process_resource_helpers import seed_linkage, launch_authority+++def store(tmp_path, monkeypatch):+ workspace = tmp_path / "workspace"+ workspace.mkdir()+ private = tmp_path / "private"+ monkeypatch.setattr(resources, "_LAUNCH_DIR", private / "launches")+ monkeypatch.setattr(bg_jobs, "_STORE", private / "jobs.json")+ monkeypatch.setattr(bg_jobs, "_JOBS_DIR", private / "jobs")+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "_store_path", lambda: private / "receipts.json")+ monkeypatch.setattr(process_ownership, "verify", lambda *a: process_ownership.OWNED)+ monkeypatch.setattr(ProcessIdentity, "exited", lambda self: False)+ monkeypatch.setattr(bg_jobs, "_pid_alive", lambda pid: True)+ return workspace+++def seed(workspace, job_id="job", status="running"):+ bg_jobs._JOBS_DIR.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)+ record = {"id": job_id, "session_id": "thread", "command": "printf output", "pid": 4321,+ "status": status, "started_at": time.time(), "max_runtime_s": 3600,+ "exit_path": str(bg_jobs._JOBS_DIR / (job_id + ".exit")),+ "result_path": str(bg_jobs._JOBS_DIR / (job_id + ".result.json")),+ "log_path": str(bg_jobs._JOBS_DIR / (job_id + ".log"))}+ resource = seed_linkage(record, workspace, owner="alice", request_id="origin")+ jobs = bg_jobs._load()+ jobs[job_id] = record+ bg_jobs._save(jobs)+ return resource, record++[email protected]("field,value", [("job_id", "sibling"), ("generation", "f" * 32), ("containment_id", "other-receipt"),+ ("owner", "bob"), ("request_id", "other-request"), ("thread_id", "other-thread")])+def test_job_substitution_fails_closed(store, field, value):+ resource, _ = seed(store)+ changed = resource.to_dict()+ changed[field] = value+ for process in changed["processes"]:+ if field in process:+ process[field] = value+ expected = BackgroundJobResource.from_dict(changed)+ with pytest.raises((ResourceIdentityError, OSError)):+ resources.validate_job(expected)++[email protected]("field,value", [("role", "leader"), ("namespace", "external:ssh"), ("identity", {"pid": 4321, "start_token": "replacement", "pgid": 4321})])+def test_role_producer_and_process_replacement_fail(store, field, value):+ resource, _ = seed(store)+ changed = resource.to_dict()+ changed["processes"][0][field] = value+ with pytest.raises((ValueError, OSError)):+ resources.validate_job(BackgroundJobResource.from_dict(changed))+++def test_completed_history_does_not_target_reused_process(store, monkeypatch):+ resource, rec = seed(store, status="done")+ with open(rec["log_path"], "w") as log:+ log.write("historical output")+ monkeypatch.setattr(process_ownership, "verify", lambda *a: process_ownership.FOREIGN)+ monkeypatch.setattr(bg_jobs, "_kill", lambda *a, **k: pytest.fail("historical process targeted"))+ assert bg_jobs.get("job", expected=resource)["output"] == "historical output"+ assert bg_jobs.kill("job", expected=resource)["status"] == "done"+++def test_same_id_new_generation_does_not_inherit_authority(store):+ old, _ = seed(store)+ seed(store) # Same store key, new trusted launch generation.+ with pytest.raises(ResourceIdentityError):+ bg_jobs.kill("job", expected=old)+ with pytest.raises(ResourceIdentityError):+ bg_jobs.get("job", expected=old)+++def test_receipt_substitution_is_revalidated_before_mutation(store, monkeypatch):+ resource, _ = seed(store)+ receipts = containment._load_records()+ receipts[resource.containment_id]["launch_generation"] = "replacement"+ from core.atomic_io import atomic_write_json+ atomic_write_json(containment._store_path(), receipts)+ monkeypatch.setattr(bg_jobs, "_kill_record", lambda *a: pytest.fail("replaced receipt used"))+ with pytest.raises(ResourceIdentityError):+ bg_jobs.kill("job", expected=resource)+++def test_result_publication_cannot_overwrite_authoritative_fields(store):+ resource, rec = seed(store)+ report = {"resource_identity": resource.to_dict(), "containment": {"id": resource.containment_id},+ "owner": "bob", "pid": 9999, "start_token": "replacement", "id": "other",+ "launch_resource": {}, "session_id": "other", "containment_id": "fake"}+ from pathlib import Path+ Path(rec["result_path"]).write_text(json.dumps(report))+ Path(rec["exit_path"]).write_text("0")+ final = bg_jobs.refresh("job")["job"]+ assert resources.job_from_record(final) == resource+ assert final["pid"] == rec["pid"] and final["session_id"] == "thread"+++def test_resolution_and_lookup_do_not_reap_unrelated_jobs(store, monkeypatch):+ resource, _ = seed(store, status="done")+ sibling, rec = seed(store, "sibling")+ jobs = bg_jobs._load()+ jobs["sibling"]["started_at"] = 0+ bg_jobs._save(jobs)+ monkeypatch.setattr(bg_jobs, "_kill_record", lambda *a: pytest.fail("unrelated job reaped"))+ authority = RequestAuthority("lookup", "alice", "thread", "", (OperationGrant("manage_bg_jobs"),))+ bound = resources.resolve_process_operation(authority, ExactOperation.normalize("manage_bg_jobs", '{"action":"output","job_id":"job"}'), NativeBackendResource("manage_bg_jobs"))+ assert bound.jobs == (resource,)+ bg_jobs.get("job", expected=resource)+ assert bg_jobs.peek("sibling")["status"] == "running"+++def test_child_cannot_target_sibling_or_replaced_job(store):+ first, _ = seed(store, "first")+ second, _ = seed(store, "second")+ parent = RequestAuthority("parent", "alice", "thread", "", (OperationGrant("manage_bg_jobs"),), job_resources=(first,))+ child = replace(parent, job_resources=(second,))+ inherited = parent.intersect(child)+ assert inherited.job_resources == ()+ with pytest.raises(ResourceIdentityError):+ resources.resolve_process_operation(inherited, ExactOperation.normalize("manage_bg_jobs", '{"action":"kill","job_id":"second"}'), NativeBackendResource("manage_bg_jobs"))+ seed(store, "first")+ with pytest.raises(ResourceIdentityError):+ parent.intersect(child)++[email protected]("field,value", [("generation", "f" * 32), ("owner", "bob"), ("request_id", "other"), ("thread_id", "other")])+def test_continuation_sidecar_mismatch_fails_closed(store, field, value):+ resource, _ = seed(store, status="done")+ sidecar = bg_jobs._JOBS_DIR / "job.authority.json"+ data = json.loads(sidecar.read_text())+ data["job"][field] = value+ sidecar.write_text(json.dumps(data))+ assert restore_background_authority("job", owner="alice", session_id="thread").grants == ()+++def test_matching_continuation_preserves_original_authority(store):+ seed(store, status="done")+ authority = restore_background_authority("job", owner="alice", session_id="thread")+ assert authority.request_id == "origin" and authority.inherited+ assert authority.permits(ExactOperation.normalize("bash", "printf output"))+ assert restore_background_authority("job", owner="bob", session_id="thread").grants == ()++[email protected]("alias", ["direct", "symlink", "hardlink"])[email protected]("state", ["launch", "job_store", "sidecar", "receipt"])+def test_launch_and_job_control_files_are_protected(store, tmp_path, alias, state):+ resource, _ = seed(store)+ control = {"launch": resources.launch_path(resource.generation), "job_store": bg_jobs._STORE,+ "sidecar": bg_jobs._JOBS_DIR / "job.authority.json", "receipt": containment._store_path()}[state]+ target = control+ if alias == "symlink":+ target = store / "alias"+ target.symlink_to(control)+ elif alias == "hardlink":+ target = store / "alias"+ try:+ os.link(control, target)+ except OSError as e:+ pytest.skip(f"hardlinks unavailable: {e}")+ root = FilesystemRoot.seal(tmp_path)+ with pytest.raises(ValueError):+ FilesystemResource.resolve(root, str(target))+ with pytest.raises(ResourceIdentityError):+ resources.guard_launch_workspace(root)+ if alias != "direct":+ with pytest.raises(ResourceIdentityError):+ resources.guard_launch_workspace(FilesystemRoot.seal(store))+++def test_external_jobs_cannot_become_local_or_attest_containment(store):+ resource, _ = seed(store)+ external = resource.to_dict()+ external["namespace"] = "external:ssh"+ with pytest.raises(ValueError):+ BackgroundJobResource.from_dict(external)+ external = resource.to_dict()+ external["contained"] = True+ with pytest.raises(ValueError):+ BackgroundJobResource.from_dict(external)++[email protected]("field,value", [("external", True), ("mechanism", "external_bridge"),+ ("supervisor_token", "reused"), ("supervisor_pid", 9876), ("owner", "bg:other")])+def test_receipt_cannot_replace_producer_or_claim_external_containment(store, field, value):+ resource, _ = seed(store, status="done")+ receipts = containment._load_records()+ receipts[resource.containment_id][field] = value+ from core.atomic_io import atomic_write_json+ atomic_write_json(containment._store_path(), receipts)+ with pytest.raises(ResourceIdentityError):+ bg_jobs.get("job", expected=resource)+ with pytest.raises(ResourceIdentityError):+ bg_jobs.mark_followed_up("job", expected=resource)+++def test_target_lookup_does_not_wait_on_unrelated_live_handle(store, monkeypatch):+ resource, _ = seed(store, status="done")+ class OtherProcess:+ def poll(self):+ pytest.fail("Unrelated producer was reaped during lookup")+ monkeypatch.setattr(bg_jobs, "_LIVE_PROCS", {9876: OtherProcess()})+ bg_jobs.get("job", expected=resource)+++def test_completed_result_outlives_lifecycle_receipt_without_signalling(store, monkeypatch):+ resource, rec = seed(store, status="done")+ from pathlib import Path+ Path(rec["log_path"]).write_text("retained historical output")+ from core.atomic_io import atomic_write_json+ atomic_write_json(containment._store_path(), {})+ monkeypatch.setattr(bg_jobs, "_kill_record", lambda *a: pytest.fail("Historical resource was signalled"))+ assert bg_jobs.get("job", expected=resource)["output"] == "retained historical output"+ assert bg_jobs.kill("job", expected=resource)["status"] == "done"+ bg_jobs.mark_followed_up("job", expected=resource)+ jobs = bg_jobs._load()+ jobs["job"]["status"] = "running"+ bg_jobs._save(jobs)+ with pytest.raises(ResourceIdentityError):+ bg_jobs.kill("job", expected=resource)++[email protected]("state", ["unknown_status", "malformed_sidecar", "missing_publication"])+def test_unresolved_or_malformed_authoritative_state_fails_closed(store, state):+ resource, _ = seed(store, status="done")+ if state == "unknown_status":+ jobs = bg_jobs._load()+ jobs["job"]["status"] = "unknown"+ bg_jobs._save(jobs)+ elif state == "malformed_sidecar":+ (bg_jobs._JOBS_DIR / "job.authority.json").write_text("[]")+ else:+ resources.launch_path(resource.generation).unlink()+ with pytest.raises(ResourceIdentityError):+ bg_jobs.get("job", expected=resource)diff --git a/tests/test_bg_job_tools.py b/tests/test_bg_job_tools.pyindex d2c035795..27ebf6e9b 100644--- a/tests/test_bg_job_tools.py+++ b/tests/test_bg_job_tools.py@@ -13,10 +13,18 @@ import pytestfrom src import bg_jobs, containment, process_ownershipfrom src.agent_tools.bg_job_tools import ManageBgJobsTool+from tests.process_resource_helpers import seed_linkage, get, kill@pytest.fixturedef store(tmp_path, monkeypatch):+ from src.agent_runtime import process_resources+ monkeypatch.setattr(process_resources, "_LAUNCH_DIR", tmp_path / "private" / "launches")+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "_store_path", lambda: tmp_path / "private" / "receipts.json")+ workspace = tmp_path / "workspace"+ workspace.mkdir()+ monkeypatch.setattr(bg_jobs, "_test_workspace", workspace, raising=False)+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "reap_record", lambda *a: containment.ReleaseOutcome(dead=True, escalated=False))jobs_dir = tmp_path / "bg_jobs"jobs_dir.mkdir()monkeypatch.setattr(bg_jobs, "_STORE", tmp_path / "bg_jobs.json")@@ -43,6 +51,7 @@ def _seed(session_id="sess-a", status="running", job_id="job0001", output="", pi}if output:(bg_jobs._JOBS_DIR / f"{job_id}.log").write_text(output, encoding="utf-8")+ seed_linkage(rec, bg_jobs._test_workspace)jobs = bg_jobs._load()jobs[job_id] = recbg_jobs._save(jobs)@@ -50,14 +59,24 @@ def _seed(session_id="sess-a", status="running", job_id="job0001", output="", pidef _run(args, session_id="sess-a"):- return asyncio.run(ManageBgJobsTool().execute(json.dumps(args), {"session_id": session_id, "owner": None}))+ from src.agent_runtime.authority import RequestAuthority, OperationGrant, ExactOperation, bind_request_authority+ from src.agent_runtime.resources import NativeBackendResource+ from src.agent_runtime.process_resources import resolve_process_operation, bind_process_operation+ content = json.dumps(args)+ authority = RequestAuthority("job-client-test", "", session_id, "", (OperationGrant("manage_bg_jobs"),))+ try:+ bound = resolve_process_operation(authority, ExactOperation.normalize("manage_bg_jobs", content), NativeBackendResource("manage_bg_jobs"))+ with bind_request_authority(authority), bind_process_operation(bound):+ return asyncio.run(ManageBgJobsTool().execute(content, {"session_id": session_id, "owner": None}))+ except (ValueError, OSError) as e:+ return {"error": str(e), "exit_code": 1}# ── bg_jobs.kill ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────def test_kill_marks_killed_and_suppresses_followup(store):_seed(job_id="job0001", pid=4321)- rec = bg_jobs.kill("job0001")+ rec = kill("job0001")assert rec["status"] == "failed"assert rec["killed"] is Trueassert rec["exit_code"] == -1@@ -67,20 +86,20 @@ def test_kill_marks_killed_and_suppresses_followup(store):def test_kill_unknown_job_returns_none(store):- assert bg_jobs.kill("nope") is None+ assert bg_jobs.kill("nope", expected=None) is Nonedef test_kill_finished_job_is_noop(store):_seed(job_id="done01", status="done")- rec = bg_jobs.kill("done01")+ rec = kill("done01")assert rec["status"] == "done"assert store["killed"] == [] # no signal sent to an already-finished jobdef test_result_text_reports_killed(store):rec = _seed(job_id="job0001")- bg_jobs.kill("job0001")- assert "killed" in bg_jobs.result_text(bg_jobs.get("job0001")).lower()+ kill("job0001")+ assert "killed" in bg_jobs.result_text(get("job0001")).lower()# ── manage_bg_jobs tool ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────@@ -118,7 +137,7 @@ def test_kill_via_tool(store):out = _run({"action": "kill", "job_id": "job0001"})assert "Killed" in out["output"]assert store["killed"] == [999]- assert bg_jobs.get("job0001")["killed"] is True+ assert get("job0001")["killed"] is Truedef test_kill_cross_session_denied(store):diff --git a/tests/test_containment_enforcement.py b/tests/test_containment_enforcement.pyindex 2fbeaa349..d4d2d5a34 100644--- a/tests/test_containment_enforcement.py+++ b/tests/test_containment_enforcement.py@@ -17,6 +17,10 @@ def workspace(tmp_path, monkeypatch):path.mkdir()monkeypatch.setattr(tool_execution, "agent_cwd", lambda: str(path))monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "_store_path", lambda: tmp_path / "grants.json")+ from tests.process_resource_helpers import install_native_authority+ from src.agent_runtime import process_resources+ monkeypatch.setattr(process_resources, "_LAUNCH_DIR", tmp_path / "private" / "launches")+ install_native_authority(monkeypatch, path)return pathdiff --git a/tests/test_cookbook_stop_without_procfs.py b/tests/test_cookbook_stop_without_procfs.pyindex 2aab3b613..8f31ce036 100644--- a/tests/test_cookbook_stop_without_procfs.py+++ b/tests/test_cookbook_stop_without_procfs.py@@ -1,22 +1,9 @@-"""Stopping a Cookbook server, on a host with procfs and on one without.--The tmux kill is what actually stops the server; the pid sweep that follows it-only catches model servers that survive the session's SIGHUP. Two invariants-live here.--**The stop must not fail because the host cannot be inspected.** Letting a-procfs scan raise on macOS turned a successful stop into a reported failure and-skipped the state write that marks the session stopped for the Cookbook UI-(ODY-94). Skipping the sweep silently fixed the crash and left the other half:-the stop then claimed success without having looked at all. So the sweep now-runs through ``ps`` where there is no procfs, and says so when it cannot look.--**The sweep signals only processes the session owns.** It used to kill anything-whose full command line matched the tracked one. The Cookbook composed that-command line, so an identical one is just as likely to be a server the user-started by hand — killing it is indistinguishable from killing ours, which is-the "stop only what we started" failure. Ownership now comes from the tmux-pane's process tree, captured before the kill; a lookalike is reported instead.+"""Cookbook selectors and OS observations never mint application authority.++These legacy UI-backed targets have no authoritative launch registry. Local+agent stops therefore fail closed before discovery, signalling or state writes,+on both procfs and other hosts. Shared Wave 5B lifecycle mechanics are tested+separately in test_process_lifecycle and test_process_ownership."""import asyncioimport json@@ -160,7 +147,7 @@ def _install_effective_kill(monkeypatch, table):@pytest.mark.asyncio-async def test_stop_marks_session_stopped_when_the_host_has_no_procfs(+async def test_unadmitted_stop_refused_when_the_host_has_no_procfs(monkeypatch, tmp_path):"""The ODY-94 regression: no procfs must not turn a working stop into a failure."""@@ -176,13 +163,12 @@ async def test_stop_marks_session_stopped_when_the_host_has_no_procfs(json.dumps({"session_id": "serve-abc123"}))- assert result["exit_code"] == 0- assert result["output"].startswith("Stopped server serve-abc123")- assert _stopped_statuses(posts, "serve-abc123") == ["stopped"]+ assert result["failure_kind"] == "resource_identity_denied"+ assert _stopped_statuses(posts, "serve-abc123") == []@pytest.mark.asyncio-async def test_stop_says_so_when_the_session_cannot_be_inspected(+async def test_unadmitted_stop_refused_when_the_session_cannot_be_inspected(monkeypatch, tmp_path):"""A sweep that could not look must not read as a sweep that found nothing.@@ -209,15 +195,14 @@ async def test_stop_says_so_when_the_session_cannot_be_inspected(json.dumps({"session_id": "serve-abc123"}))- assert result["exit_code"] == 0- assert "could not identify the session's processes" in result["output"]+ assert result["failure_kind"] == "resource_identity_denied"assert signalled == []- assert _stopped_statuses(posts, "serve-abc123") == ["stopped"]+ assert _stopped_statuses(posts, "serve-abc123") == []@pytest.mark.asyncio-async def test_stop_kills_the_sessions_own_survivor(monkeypatch, tmp_path):- """A process under the session's pane is ours, so it gets signalled."""+async def test_pane_descendant_is_not_application_owned(monkeypatch, tmp_path):+ """A process under a named pane still requires prior application admission."""tracked_cmd = "python -m vllm.entrypoints.openai.api_server --model org/model"state = _tracked_state(cmd=tracked_cmd)posts = _install_httpx_client(monkeypatch, state)@@ -232,14 +217,13 @@ async def test_stop_kills_the_sessions_own_survivor(monkeypatch, tmp_path):json.dumps({"session_id": "serve-abc123"}))- assert result["exit_code"] == 0- assert (101, signal.SIGTERM) in signalled- assert "killed 2 surviving process(es)" in result["output"]- assert _stopped_statuses(posts, "serve-abc123") == ["stopped"]+ assert result["failure_kind"] == "resource_identity_denied"+ assert signalled == [] # OS lineage alone never establishes app ownership.+ assert _stopped_statuses(posts, "serve-abc123") == []@pytest.mark.asyncio-async def test_stop_reports_a_command_line_lookalike_without_signalling_it(+async def test_unadmitted_stop_never_signals_a_command_line_lookalike(monkeypatch, tmp_path):"""The headline change: matching the command line is not owning the process.@@ -262,13 +246,9 @@ async def test_stop_reports_a_command_line_lookalike_without_signalling_it(json.dumps({"session_id": "serve-abc123"}))- assert result["exit_code"] == 0+ assert result["failure_kind"] == "resource_identity_denied"assert not any(pid == 202 for pid, _sig in signalled)- # Reported rather than silently dropped: the old behaviour acted on this- # information, so giving it up entirely would be a regression of its own.- assert "202" in result["output"]- assert "not signalled" in result["output"]- assert _stopped_statuses(posts, "serve-abc123") == ["stopped"]+ assert _stopped_statuses(posts, "serve-abc123") == []@pytest.mark.asyncio@@ -302,10 +282,10 @@ async def test_stop_does_not_signal_a_pid_whose_identity_changed(json.dumps({"session_id": "serve-abc123"}))- assert result["exit_code"] == 0- # The pane shell is genuinely ours and is signalled; 101 never is.+ assert result["failure_kind"] == "resource_identity_denied"+ # Neither pane discovery nor a matching token creates application scope.assert not any(pid == 101 for pid, _sig in signalled)- assert _stopped_statuses(posts, "serve-abc123") == ["stopped"]+ assert _stopped_statuses(posts, "serve-abc123") == []def test_model_process_scan_returns_empty_without_procfs(monkeypatch, tmp_path):@@ -323,8 +303,8 @@ def test_model_process_scan_returns_empty_without_procfs(monkeypatch, tmp_path):@pytest.mark.asyncio-async def test_stop_reports_a_survivor_it_can_no_longer_identify(monkeypatch, tmp_path):- """Captured as ours, unverifiable at sweep time: not signalled, and said so."""+async def test_unadmitted_stop_refused_with_unverifiable_process(monkeypatch, tmp_path):+ """An unverifiable OS observation cannot create an application grant."""from src import process_ownershiptracked_cmd = "python -m vllm.entrypoints.openai.api_server --model org/model"@@ -347,10 +327,9 @@ async def test_stop_reports_a_survivor_it_can_no_longer_identify(monkeypatch, tmresult = await tools.do_stop_served_model(json.dumps({"session_id": "serve-abc123"}))- assert result["exit_code"] == 0+ assert result["failure_kind"] == "resource_identity_denied"assert not any(pid == 101 for pid, _sig in signalled)- assert "could not be re-identified and were not signalled (pid 101)" in result["output"]- assert _stopped_statuses(posts, "serve-abc123") == ["stopped"]+ assert _stopped_statuses(posts, "serve-abc123") == []@pytest.mark.asyncio@@ -383,6 +362,6 @@ async def test_stop_never_signals_a_pid_reissued_between_the_table_and_its_capturesult = await tools.do_stop_served_model(json.dumps({"session_id": "serve-abc123"}))- assert result["exit_code"] == 0+ assert result["failure_kind"] == "resource_identity_denied"assert not any(pid == 101 for pid, _sig in signalled)- assert _stopped_statuses(posts, "serve-abc123") == ["stopped"]+ assert _stopped_statuses(posts, "serve-abc123") == []diff --git a/tests/test_native_execution_containment.py b/tests/test_native_execution_containment.pyindex ecbc69dcd..d65be9420 100644--- a/tests/test_native_execution_containment.py+++ b/tests/test_native_execution_containment.py@@ -11,13 +11,23 @@ from src.agent_tools import subprocess_tools@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)def native_boundary(tmp_path, monkeypatch):- monkeypatch.setattr(tool_execution, "agent_cwd", lambda: str(tmp_path))- monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "_store_path", lambda: tmp_path / "grants.json")+ from src.agent_runtime import process_resources+ from tests.process_resource_helpers import authorized_handler+ workspace = tmp_path / "workspace"+ workspace.mkdir()+ monkeypatch.setattr(tool_execution, "agent_cwd", lambda: str(workspace))+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "_store_path", lambda: tmp_path / "private" / "grants.json")+ monkeypatch.setattr(process_resources, "_LAUNCH_DIR", tmp_path / "private" / "launches")+ for cls in (subprocess_tools.BashTool, subprocess_tools.PythonTool):+ original = cls.execute+ async def execute(self, content, ctx, _original=original):+ return await authorized_handler(_original.__get__(self), workspace)(content, ctx)+ monkeypatch.setattr(cls, "execute", execute)monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "CONTAINMENT_MODE", containment.MODE_REPORT_ONLY)monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "MECHANISMS", tuple(m for m in containment.MECHANISMS if m.name == "process_group"))- return tmp_path+ return workspace@pytest.mark.skipif(os.name == "nt", reason="real POSIX group teardown")diff --git a/tests/test_orphan_reaping.py b/tests/test_orphan_reaping.pyindex 456acf1f9..5d67f24fb 100644--- a/tests/test_orphan_reaping.py+++ b/tests/test_orphan_reaping.py@@ -399,10 +399,16 @@ def test_already_finished_jobs_are_not_reconsidered(job_store, monkeypatch):assert bg_jobs.disown_unverified() == {"seen": 0, "retired": 0, "kept": 0}-def test_a_launched_job_records_an_identity_next_to_its_pid(job_store):+def test_a_launched_job_records_an_identity_next_to_its_pid(job_store, tmp_path, monkeypatch):"""Without this the record is unverifiable forever and the reaper can onlyrefuse — the token has to be captured at launch or not at all."""- record = bg_jobs.launch("true", "chat-1")+ from tests.process_resource_helpers import launch+ from src.agent_runtime import process_resources+ workspace = tmp_path / "workspace"+ workspace.mkdir()+ monkeypatch.setattr(process_resources, "_LAUNCH_DIR", tmp_path / "private" / "launches")+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "_store_path", lambda: tmp_path / "private" / "grants.json")+ record = launch("true", "chat-1", cwd=str(workspace))assert "start_token" in recordassert process_ownership.verify(record["pid"], record["start_token"]) in (diff --git a/tests/test_process_resource_identity.py b/tests/test_process_resource_identity.pynew file mode 100644index 000000000..1425ca63f--- /dev/null+++ b/tests/test_process_resource_identity.py@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@+from dataclasses import replace+import json+import signal++import pytest++from src import process_ownership+from src.process_lifecycle import ProcessIdentity, signal_identity+from src.agent_runtime.authority import ExactOperation, OperationGrant, RequestAuthority+from src.agent_runtime.resources import ProcessResource, NativeBackendResource, FilesystemRoot, ProcessLaunchScope, ResourceIdentityError+from src.agent_runtime.process_resources import resolve_process_operation+from src.containment import DEFAULT_REQUIRED+++def process():+ return ProcessResource("native:containment", "alice", "request", "thread", ProcessIdentity(4321, "boot:start", 4321), "leader", "job", "receipt")++[email protected]("verdict", [process_ownership.FOREIGN, process_ownership.GONE, process_ownership.UNVERIFIABLE])+def test_stale_reused_or_unverifiable_identity_cannot_be_admitted(monkeypatch, verdict):+ monkeypatch.setattr(process_ownership, "verify", lambda *a: verdict)+ with pytest.raises(ResourceIdentityError):+ process().validate()++[email protected]("field,value", [("pid", 0), ("pid", "4321"), ("pid", True), ("pgid", "4321"), ("start_token", None), ("start_token", ""), ("start_token", {})])+def test_malformed_lifecycle_observations_fail_closed(field, value):+ record = process().to_dict()+ record["identity"][field] = value+ with pytest.raises((ValueError, TypeError)):+ ProcessResource.from_dict(record)+++def test_no_duplicate_lifecycle_fields_and_strict_restore():+ resource = process()+ record = resource.to_dict()+ assert ProcessResource.from_dict(record) == resource+ assert "pid" not in record and "start_token" not in record+ record["identity"]["incarnation"] = "invented"+ with pytest.raises(ValueError):+ ProcessResource.from_dict(record)+++def test_incarnation_is_not_application_ownership(monkeypatch):+ monkeypatch.setattr(process_ownership, "verify", lambda *a: process_ownership.OWNED)+ monkeypatch.setattr(ProcessIdentity, "exited", lambda self: False)+ resource = process()+ resource.validate()+ for field in ("namespace", "owner", "request_id", "thread_id", "role", "job_id", "containment_id"):+ if field in {"namespace", "role"}:+ with pytest.raises(ValueError):+ replace(resource, **{field: "supervisor" if field == "role" else "external:ssh"})+ continue+ changed = replace(resource, **{field: "supervisor" if field == "role" else "other"})+ assert changed != resource+ with pytest.raises(ValueError):+ RequestAuthority("request", "bob", "thread", "", process_resources=(resource,))+ with pytest.raises(ValueError):+ RequestAuthority("request", "alice", "other-thread", "", process_resources=(resource,))+++def test_pid_reuse_at_signal_boundary_uses_wave5b_engine(monkeypatch):+ verdicts = iter([process_ownership.OWNED, process_ownership.OWNED, process_ownership.FOREIGN])+ monkeypatch.setattr(process_ownership, "verify", lambda *a: next(verdicts))+ monkeypatch.setattr("src.process_lifecycle.is_zombie", lambda pid: False)+ monkeypatch.setattr("os.kill", lambda *a: pytest.fail("reused PID signalled"))+ target = process()+ target.validate()+ assert signal_identity(target.identity, signal.SIGTERM) is False+++def test_child_cannot_renew_replaced_parent_process(monkeypatch):+ old = process()+ fresh = replace(old, identity=replace(old.identity, start_token="boot:replacement"))+ monkeypatch.setattr(process_ownership, "verify", lambda pid, token: process_ownership.FOREIGN if token == "boot:start" else process_ownership.OWNED)+ parent = RequestAuthority("parent", "alice", "thread", "", process_resources=(old,))+ child = replace(parent, request_id="child", process_resources=(fresh,))+ with pytest.raises(ResourceIdentityError):+ parent.intersect(child)+++def test_legacy_authority_cannot_reconstruct_creation_scope(tmp_path):+ authority = RequestAuthority("request", "alice", "thread", str(tmp_path), (OperationGrant("bash"),))+ snapshot = authority.to_dict()+ snapshot["version"] = 3+ for field in ("launch_scopes", "process_resources", "job_resources"):+ snapshot.pop(field)+ restored = RequestAuthority.from_dict(snapshot)+ assert restored.launch_scopes == restored.process_resources == restored.job_resources == ()+ with pytest.raises(ResourceIdentityError):+ resolve_process_operation(restored, ExactOperation.normalize("bash", "pwd"), NativeBackendResource("bash"))+++def test_launch_is_server_generation_exact_operation_and_credential_free(tmp_path):+ authority = RequestAuthority("request", "alice", "thread", str(tmp_path), (OperationGrant("bash"),))+ operation = ExactOperation.normalize("bash", "printf secret-token")+ bound = resolve_process_operation(authority, operation, NativeBackendResource("bash"))+ assert "secret-token" not in json.dumps(bound.to_dict())+ assert len(bound.launch.generation) == 32+ assert bound.launch.scope.root == authority.resource_roots[0]+ with pytest.raises(ResourceIdentityError):+ resolve_process_operation(authority, ExactOperation.normalize("bash", "pwd"), NativeBackendResource("bash"), approved=bound, exact_admission=True)+++def test_child_launch_scope_can_narrow_but_cannot_broaden(tmp_path):+ sub = tmp_path / "child"+ sub.mkdir()+ parent = RequestAuthority("request", "alice", "thread", str(tmp_path), (OperationGrant("bash"),))+ smaller = ProcessLaunchScope(NativeBackendResource("bash"), FilesystemRoot.seal(sub, owner="alice"), DEFAULT_REQUIRED)+ child = replace(parent, launch_scopes=(smaller,))+ assert parent.intersect(child).launch_scopes == (smaller,)+ assert child.intersect(parent).launch_scopes == ()+++def test_child_launch_cannot_refresh_a_replaced_root(tmp_path):+ root = tmp_path / "root"+ root.mkdir()+ parent = RequestAuthority("request", "alice", "thread", str(root), (OperationGrant("bash"),))+ root.rename(tmp_path / "retired")+ root.mkdir()+ child = RequestAuthority("child", "alice", "thread", str(root), (OperationGrant("bash"),))+ with pytest.raises(ResourceIdentityError):+ parent.intersect(child)diff --git a/tests/test_production_external_bridge.py b/tests/test_production_external_bridge.pyindex 4c6d42382..8f365543a 100644--- a/tests/test_production_external_bridge.py+++ b/tests/test_production_external_bridge.py@@ -184,10 +184,14 @@ async def test_external_record_does_not_grant_authority(tmp_path):async def test_native_local_bash_python_behavior_unchanged(tmp_path, monkeypatch):"""4. Native local Bash/Python behavior is unchanged."""tool_bash = subprocess_tools.BashTool()+ from tests.process_resource_helpers import authorized_handler+ workspace = tmp_path / "workspace"+ workspace.mkdir()+ monkeypatch.setattr(_te, "agent_cwd", lambda: str(workspace))ctx = {"session_id": "native-session",}- result = await tool_bash.execute("echo 'native run'", ctx)+ result = await authorized_handler(tool_bash.execute, workspace)("echo 'native run'", ctx)assert result["exit_code"] == 0assert "native run" in result["output"]assert "containment" in resultdiff --git a/tests/test_request_authority.py b/tests/test_request_authority.pyindex 2f25449ca..28b710f8b 100644--- a/tests/test_request_authority.py+++ b/tests/test_request_authority.py@@ -158,15 +158,15 @@ async def test_missing_and_malformed_dispatch_authority_fail_closed(monkeypatch,@pytest.mark.asyncio-async def test_dispatch_checks_grants_and_current_disabled_policy(monkeypatch):+async def test_dispatch_checks_grants_and_current_disabled_policy(monkeypatch, tmp_path):from src import tool_execution as executionimplementation = AsyncMock(return_value=("bash", {"exit_code": 0}))monkeypatch.setattr(execution, "_execute_tool_block_impl", implementation)for disabled in (set(), {"bash"}):_, result = await execution.execute_tool_block(ToolBlock("bash", "pwd"),- owner="alice", session_id="s", disabled_tools=disabled,+ owner="alice", session_id="s", workspace=str(tmp_path), disabled_tools=disabled,security_context=execution.NO_TOOL_SECURITY_CONTEXT,- request_authority=authority("bash"))+ request_authority=authority("bash", workspace=str(tmp_path)))assert result["exit_code"] == (1 if disabled else 0)assert implementation.await_count == 1@@ -224,10 +224,11 @@ def test_background_snapshot_preserves_scope_and_rejects_other_session(monkeypatimport src.constantsmonkeypatch.setattr(src.constants, "BG_JOBS_DIR", str(tmp_path))grant = authority("transcribe_media").restrict(disabled_tools={"bash"})- save_background_authority("job1", grant)+ # Legacy authority-only snapshots have no exact job generation to restore.+ with pytest.raises(ValueError):+ save_background_authority("job1", grant)restored = restore_background_authority("job1", owner="alice", session_id="s")- assert restored.request_id == grant.request_id- assert restored.denied == frozenset({"bash"})+ assert restored.grants == ()assert not restored.permits(ExactOperation.normalize("python", "print(1)"))assert restore_background_authority("job1", owner="alice", session_id="other").grants == ()@@ -243,8 +244,7 @@ async def test_only_server_background_launch_can_seal_job_authority(monkeypatch,owner="alice", session_id="s", security_context=execution.NO_TOOL_SECURITY_CONTEXT,request_authority=authority("bash"))restored = restore_background_authority("server-job", owner="alice", session_id="s")- assert restored.request_id == "request-test"- assert restored.permits(ExactOperation.normalize("bash", "printf trusted"))+ assert restored.grants == () # A launch double returning an ID cannot publish authority.handler = AsyncMock(return_value=("transcribe_media", {"bg_job_id": "forged-job", "exit_code": 0}))monkeypatch.setattr(execution, "_execute_tool_block_impl", handler)await execution.execute_tool_block(ToolBlock("transcribe_media", '{}'),@@ -254,12 +254,16 @@ async def test_only_server_background_launch_can_seal_job_authority(monkeypatch,@pytest.mark.asyncio-async def test_exact_approval_grants_one_input_without_widening_continuation(monkeypatch):+async def test_exact_approval_grants_one_input_without_widening_continuation(monkeypatch, tmp_path):from src import tool_execution as executionfrom src.tool_approvals import ToolApprovalStorefrom src.tool_capabilities import ToolRunSecurityContext, capabilities_for_actionstore = ToolApprovalStore()original = authority("transcribe_media")+ from src.agent_runtime.resources import ProcessLaunchScope, FilesystemRoot, NativeBackendResource+ from src.containment import DEFAULT_REQUIRED+ original = replace(original, launch_scopes=(ProcessLaunchScope(NativeBackendResource("bash"),+ FilesystemRoot.seal(tmp_path), DEFAULT_REQUIRED),))pending = store.create(owner="alice", session_id="s", origin_run_id="journal-parent",tool_name="bash", content="printf approved", workspace=None,external_untrusted_context_seen=True, capabilities=capabilities_for_action("bash", "printf approved"),diff --git a/tests/test_resource_identity.py b/tests/test_resource_identity.pyindex bc61c15de..48e12c351 100644--- a/tests/test_resource_identity.py+++ b/tests/test_resource_identity.py@@ -397,8 +397,10 @@ def test_task_and_background_continuations_keep_original_roots(tmp_path, monkeypimport src.constantsmonkeypatch.setattr(src.constants, "BG_JOBS_DIR", str(tmp_path))grant = authority(tmp_path, "read_file")- save_background_authority("job", grant)- assert restore_background_authority("job", owner="alice", session_id="s").resource_roots == grant.resource_roots+ # A roots-only sidecar is legacy state and cannot invent a job generation.+ with pytest.raises(ValueError):+ save_background_authority("job", grant)+ assert restore_background_authority("job", owner="alice", session_id="s").resource_roots == ()assert restore_background_authority("job", owner="bob", session_id="s").resource_roots == ()with bind_request_authority(grant):sealed = seal_task_authority("Read files in the workspace", "llm", None, owner="alice")@@ -708,10 +710,11 @@ def test_nonfilesystem_identities_are_inert_and_distinguish_producers_from_pagespage = BrowserPageResource(producer, "page-1", 2, "https://example.test")assert replace(producer, incarnation="incarnation-2") != producerassert replace(page, navigation_generation=3) != page- ProcessResource("local", "boot/process", "alice", 123, "boot:start", "job", "receipt", 124, "boot:init")+ from src.process_lifecycle import ProcessIdentity+ ProcessResource("native:containment", "alice", "request", "thread", ProcessIdentity(123, "boot:start"), "leader", "job", "receipt")OwnedResource("documents", "alice", "thread", "documents", "document", "revision")assert ExternalResource("mcp", "endpoint", "server", "tool", "connection").external is Truewith pytest.raises(ValueError):ExternalResource("mcp", "endpoint", "server", "tool", "connection", external=False)with pytest.raises(ValueError):- ProcessResource("local", "incarnation", "alice", 123, "", containment_id="receipt")+ ProcessResource("native:containment", "alice", "request", "thread", ProcessIdentity(123, ""), "leader", containment_id="receipt")diff --git a/tests/test_runtime_resource_integration.py b/tests/test_runtime_resource_integration.pynew file mode 100644index 000000000..d9e3a065c--- /dev/null+++ b/tests/test_runtime_resource_integration.py@@ -0,0 +1,354 @@+import asyncio+from dataclasses import replace+import json+from pathlib import Path+from types import SimpleNamespace++import pytest++from src import bg_jobs, containment, process_ownership, tool_execution+from src.agent_runtime import process_resources as resources+from src.agent_runtime.authority import ExactOperation, OperationGrant, RequestAuthority, bind_request_authority, create_request_authority+from src.agent_runtime.resources import NativeBackendResource, ResourceIdentityError+from src.agent_tools.subprocess_tools import BashTool+from src.process_lifecycle import ProcessIdentity+from src.tool_approvals import ToolApprovalStore+from src.tool_capabilities import ToolRunSecurityContext, capabilities_for_action+from src.tool_types import ToolBlock+from tests.process_resource_helpers import launch_authority, seed_linkage+++def workspace(tmp_path, monkeypatch):+ work = tmp_path / "workspace"+ work.mkdir()+ monkeypatch.setattr(resources, "_LAUNCH_DIR", tmp_path / "private" / "launches")+ monkeypatch.setattr(bg_jobs, "_STORE", tmp_path / "private" / "jobs.json")+ monkeypatch.setattr(bg_jobs, "_JOBS_DIR", tmp_path / "private" / "jobs")+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "_store_path", lambda: tmp_path / "private" / "receipts.json")+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "CONTAINMENT_MODE", containment.MODE_REPORT_ONLY)+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "MECHANISMS", tuple(m for m in containment.MECHANISMS if m.name == "process_group"))+ monkeypatch.setattr(tool_execution, "_owner_is_admin", lambda owner: True)+ return work+++def authority(workspace, tool="bash"):+ return RequestAuthority("request", "alice", "thread", str(workspace), (OperationGrant(tool),))+++def approval_for(authority, tool, content):+ store = ToolApprovalStore()+ pending = store.create(owner=authority.owner, session_id=authority.session_id, origin_run_id="run",+ tool_name=tool, content=content, workspace=authority.workspace,+ capabilities=capabilities_for_action(tool, content), external_untrusted_context_seen=True,+ request_authority=authority)+ return store.consume(pending.approval_id, owner=authority.owner, session_id=authority.session_id, decision="approve")+++async def dispatch(authority, tool, content, approval=None):+ return await tool_execution.execute_tool_block(ToolBlock(tool, content), owner=authority.owner,+ session_id=authority.session_id, workspace=authority.workspace,+ security_context=ToolRunSecurityContext(external_untrusted_context_seen=bool(approval)),+ request_authority=authority, exact_approval=approval)+++async def test_native_producer_without_binding_cannot_spawn(workspace, monkeypatch):+ monkeypatch.setattr(asyncio, "create_subprocess_exec", lambda *a, **k: pytest.fail("unbound spawn"))+ result = await BashTool().execute("printf unsafe", {})+ assert result["failure_kind"] == "resource_identity_denied"+++async def test_producer_rejects_changed_command_after_admission(workspace, monkeypatch):+ with launch_authority("printf admitted", workspace):+ monkeypatch.setattr(asyncio, "create_subprocess_exec", lambda *a, **k: pytest.fail("retargeted spawn"))+ result = await BashTool().execute("printf changed", {})+ assert result["blocked"]++[email protected]("ctx", [{"owner": "bob", "session_id": "thread"},+ {"owner": "alice", "session_id": "replacement"}])+async def test_native_producer_rechecks_application_binding(workspace, monkeypatch, ctx):+ admitted = authority(workspace)+ operation = ExactOperation.normalize("bash", "printf admitted")+ bound = resources.resolve_process_operation(admitted, operation, NativeBackendResource("bash"))+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "acquire", lambda *a, **k: pytest.fail("Rebound producer acquired boundary"))+ with bind_request_authority(admitted), resources.bind_process_operation(bound):+ result = await BashTool().execute(operation.input, ctx)+ assert result["exit_code"] == 1 and "owner or session changed" in result["error"]+++async def test_scheduled_local_runner_uses_exact_launch_ceiling(workspace):+ from src import builtin_actions+ output, success = await builtin_actions.action_run_local("alice", script="printf scheduled")+ assert not success and "no server authority" in output+ admitted = replace(authority(workspace), grants=(OperationGrant("bash", inputs=frozenset({"printf scheduled"})),))+ with bind_request_authority(admitted):+ output, success = await builtin_actions.action_run_local("alice", script="printf scheduled")+ assert success and output == "scheduled"+ output, success = await builtin_actions.action_run_local("alice", script="printf changed")+ assert not success and "sealed operation" in output+ output, success = await builtin_actions.action_ssh_command("alice", command="printf scheduled", host="remote.example")+ assert not success and "external backend" in output+++async def test_attachment_failure_after_execution_does_not_claim_no_execution(workspace, monkeypatch):+ def failure(*args):+ raise OSError("attachment publication failed")+ monkeypatch.setattr(resources, "attach_containment_processes", failure)+ _, result = await dispatch(authority(workspace), "bash", "printf occurred > effect")+ assert (workspace / "effect").read_text() == "occurred"+ assert result["exit_code"] == 1 and result["failure_kind"] == "resource_linkage_unavailable"+ assert result["containment"]["executed"] is True and result["teardown"]["dead"] is True+++async def test_exact_launch_first_use_replay_and_empty_scope_restoration(workspace):+ original = authority(workspace)+ approval = approval_for(original, "bash", "printf exact")+ assert approval.pending.process_operation.launch is not None+ restored = replace(original, grants=(), resource_roots=(), backend_resources=(), launch_scopes=(), process_resources=(), job_resources=())+ _, first = await dispatch(restored, "bash", "printf exact", approval)+ assert first["exit_code"] == 0 and first["output"] == "exact"+ assert restored.launch_scopes == restored.job_resources == restored.process_resources == ()+ _, replay = await dispatch(restored, "bash", "printf exact", approval)+ assert replay["exit_code"] == 1+ _, sibling = await dispatch(restored, "bash", "printf sibling")+ assert sibling["failure_kind"] == "request_authority_denied"+++async def test_exact_job_first_use_replay_and_empty_scope_restoration(workspace, monkeypatch):+ bg_jobs._JOBS_DIR.mkdir(parents=True)+ record = {"id": "job", "session_id": "thread", "command": "printf history", "pid": 4321,+ "status": "done", "started_at": 1, "max_runtime_s": 3600,+ "log_path": str(bg_jobs._JOBS_DIR / "job.log")}+ seed_linkage(record, workspace, owner="alice")+ Path(record["log_path"]).write_text("historical result")+ bg_jobs._save({"job": record})+ original = authority(workspace, "manage_bg_jobs")+ content = '{"action":"output","job_id":"job"}'+ approval = approval_for(original, "manage_bg_jobs", content)+ restored = replace(original, grants=(), resource_roots=(), backend_resources=(),+ launch_scopes=(), process_resources=(), job_resources=())+ _, first = await dispatch(restored, "manage_bg_jobs", content, approval)+ assert first["exit_code"] == 0 and "historical result" in first["output"]+ _, replay = await dispatch(restored, "manage_bg_jobs", content, approval)+ assert replay["exit_code"] == 1+ _, unapproved = await dispatch(restored, "manage_bg_jobs", content)+ assert unapproved["failure_kind"] == "request_authority_denied"+ assert restored.process_resources == restored.job_resources == restored.launch_scopes == ()+++async def test_cancellation_at_native_spawn_restores_all_context(workspace, monkeypatch):+ entered = asyncio.Event()+ async def held_run(grant, command, **kwargs):+ assert resources.active_process_operation().launch is not None+ entered.set()+ try:+ await asyncio.Future()+ finally:+ containment.release(grant, grace_s=0)+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "run", held_run)+ async def invoke():+ try:+ await dispatch(authority(workspace), "bash", "sleep 60")+ finally:+ from src.agent_runtime.authority import active_request_authority+ assert resources.active_process_operation() is None+ assert active_request_authority() is None+ task = asyncio.create_task(invoke())+ await asyncio.wait_for(entered.wait(), timeout=5)+ task.cancel()+ with pytest.raises(asyncio.CancelledError):+ await task+ assert containment.active_grants() == []++[email protected]("field,value", [("owner", "bob"), ("request_id", "replacement"), ("session_id", "other-thread")])+async def test_exact_launch_binding_substitution_fails(workspace, field, value):+ original = authority(workspace)+ approval = approval_for(original, "bash", "printf exact")+ changed = replace(original, **{field: value}, resource_roots=None, backend_resources=None,+ owned_scopes=None, launch_scopes=None)+ _, denied = await dispatch(changed, "bash", "printf exact", approval)+ assert denied["exit_code"] == 1 and not approval._claimed+++async def test_exact_launch_replaced_workspace_fails_before_claim(workspace):+ original = authority(workspace)+ approval = approval_for(original, "bash", "pwd")+ workspace.rename(workspace.with_name("retired"))+ workspace.mkdir()+ _, result = await dispatch(original, "bash", "pwd", approval)+ assert result["failure_kind"] == "resource_identity_denied" and not approval._claimed++[email protected]("phase", ["success", "error", "cancel", "nested"])+async def test_process_context_restores(workspace, phase):+ original = authority(workspace)+ bound = resources.resolve_process_operation(original, ExactOperation.normalize("bash", "pwd"), NativeBackendResource("bash"))+ async def call():+ with resources.bind_process_operation(bound):+ assert resources.active_process_operation() is bound+ if phase == "error":+ raise RuntimeError("ordinary")+ if phase == "cancel":+ raise asyncio.CancelledError()+ if phase == "nested":+ with resources.bind_process_operation(None):+ assert resources.active_process_operation() is None+ assert resources.active_process_operation() is bound+ try:+ await call()+ except (RuntimeError, asyncio.CancelledError):+ pass+ assert resources.active_process_operation() is None++[email protected]("publication", ["launch", "sidecar", "job"])+def test_detached_publication_failure_cannot_release_workload(workspace, monkeypatch, publication):+ effect = workspace / "effect"+ if publication == "launch":+ monkeypatch.setattr(resources, "publish_launch", lambda *a, **k: (_ for _ in ()).throw(OSError("publication failed")))+ elif publication == "sidecar":+ monkeypatch.setattr("src.agent_runtime.authority.save_background_authority", lambda *a, **k: (_ for _ in ()).throw(OSError("sidecar failed")))+ else:+ monkeypatch.setattr(bg_jobs, "_save", lambda *a: (_ for _ in ()).throw(OSError("job failed")))+ with launch_authority("printf unsafe > effect", workspace):+ with pytest.raises(OSError):+ bg_jobs.launch("printf unsafe > effect", "chat", cwd=str(workspace))+ assert not effect.exists()+ assert containment.active_grants() == []+++def test_detached_release_observes_complete_durable_linkage(workspace, monkeypatch):+ real_popen = bg_jobs.subprocess.Popen+ observations = []+ def popen(*args, **kwargs):+ proc = real_popen(*args, **kwargs)+ original = proc.stdin+ class Gate:+ @property+ def closed(self):+ return original.closed+ def close(self):+ return original.close()+ def write(self, content):+ payload = json.loads(content)+ published = json.loads(Path(payload["launch_path"]).read_text())+ sidecar = json.loads(Path(payload["authority_path"]).read_text())+ rec = bg_jobs.peek(payload["job_id"])+ assert rec["resource_identity"] == published["job"] == sidecar["job"]+ assert sidecar["authority"] == published["authority"]+ observations.append(True)+ return original.write(content)+ proc.stdin = Gate()+ return proc+ monkeypatch.setattr(bg_jobs.subprocess, "Popen", popen)+ with launch_authority("printf released", workspace):+ rec = bg_jobs.launch("printf released", "chat", cwd=str(workspace))+ assert observations == [True]+ proc = bg_jobs._LIVE_PROCS.pop(rec["pid"])+ proc.wait(timeout=10)+ bg_jobs.refresh(rec["id"])+ assert bg_jobs.peek(rec["id"])["status"] == "done"++[email protected]("replacement", ["pid", "job", "receipt", "role"])+async def test_job_approval_revalidates_exact_resource_before_claim(workspace, monkeypatch, replacement):+ monkeypatch.setattr(process_ownership, "verify", lambda *a: process_ownership.OWNED)+ monkeypatch.setattr(ProcessIdentity, "exited", lambda self: False)+ bg_jobs._JOBS_DIR.mkdir(parents=True)+ record = {"id": "job", "session_id": "thread", "command": "sleep 60", "pid": 4321,+ "status": "running", "started_at": 1, "max_runtime_s": 3600,+ "exit_path": str(bg_jobs._JOBS_DIR / "job.exit"), "log_path": str(bg_jobs._JOBS_DIR / "job.log")}+ seed_linkage(record, workspace, owner="alice")+ bg_jobs._save({"job": record})+ admitted = authority(workspace, "manage_bg_jobs")+ content = '{"action":"kill","job_id":"job"}'+ approval = approval_for(admitted, "manage_bg_jobs", content)+ assert approval.pending.process_operation.jobs+ if replacement == "pid":+ monkeypatch.setattr(process_ownership, "verify", lambda *a: process_ownership.FOREIGN)+ else:+ jobs = bg_jobs._load()+ if replacement == "job":+ jobs["job"]["resource_identity"]["generation"] = "f" * 32+ elif replacement == "role":+ jobs["job"]["resource_identity"]["processes"][0]["role"] = "leader"+ else:+ jobs["job"]["containment_id"] = "replacement"+ bg_jobs._save(jobs)+ _, result = await dispatch(admitted, "manage_bg_jobs", content, approval)+ assert result["failure_kind"] == "resource_identity_denied" and not approval._claimed++[email protected]("request_text", ["Transcribe /workspace/audio.wav", "OCR this image", "List my tasks"])+async def test_new_resources_do_not_expand_turn_contract_classes(workspace, request_text):+ admitted = create_request_authority(request_text, owner="alice", session_id="thread", workspace=str(workspace))+ _, denied = await dispatch(admitted, "bash", "pwd")+ assert denied["failure_kind"] == "request_authority_denied"+++def test_internal_shell_control_has_no_admin_floor_even_without_auth(monkeypatch):+ from routes import shell_routes+ from core.middleware import INTERNAL_TOOL_USER+ from fastapi import HTTPException+ request = SimpleNamespace(headers={}, state=SimpleNamespace(current_user=INTERNAL_TOOL_USER))+ monkeypatch.setattr(shell_routes, "_auth_disabled", lambda: True)+ with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as error:+ shell_routes._require_admin(request)+ assert error.value.status_code == 403++[email protected]("mode", ["auth_disabled", "missing_manager"])+def test_unlabelled_loopback_cannot_gain_native_control(monkeypatch, mode):+ from routes import shell_routes+ from fastapi import HTTPException+ request = SimpleNamespace(headers={}, state=SimpleNamespace(current_user=None),+ app=SimpleNamespace(state=SimpleNamespace(auth_manager=None)))+ monkeypatch.setattr(shell_routes, "_auth_disabled", lambda: mode == "auth_disabled")+ with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as error:+ shell_routes._require_admin(request)+ assert error.value.status_code == 403+++def test_authenticated_human_administration_is_not_an_internal_tool_floor(monkeypatch):+ from routes import shell_routes+ request = SimpleNamespace(headers={}, state=SimpleNamespace(current_user="admin"),+ app=SimpleNamespace(state=SimpleNamespace(auth_manager=SimpleNamespace(is_admin=lambda u: u == "admin"))))+ monkeypatch.setattr(shell_routes, "_auth_disabled", lambda: False)+ shell_routes._require_admin(request)++[email protected]("path,payload", [("/api/cookbook/kill-pid", {"pid": 4321}),+ ("/api/cookbook/state", {"tasks": []}), ("/api/model/serve", {}), ("/api/model/download", {})])+async def test_anonymous_native_cookbook_control_rejected_before_producer(monkeypatch, path, payload):+ from routes import cookbook_routes, shell_routes+ from fastapi import FastAPI+ import httpx+ monkeypatch.setattr(shell_routes, "_auth_disabled", lambda: True)+ monkeypatch.setattr(asyncio, "create_subprocess_exec", lambda *a, **k: pytest.fail("Anonymous producer reached"))+ monkeypatch.setattr(asyncio, "create_subprocess_shell", lambda *a, **k: pytest.fail("Anonymous producer reached"))+ app = FastAPI()+ app.include_router(cookbook_routes.setup_cookbook_routes())+ async with httpx.AsyncClient(transport=httpx.ASGITransport(app=app), base_url="http://local") as client:+ result = await client.post(path, json=payload)+ assert result.status_code == 403++[email protected]("path", ["/api/shell/exec", "/api/model/serve", "/api/cookbook/kill-pid", "/api/cookbook/state", "/api/shell/../cookbook/kill-pid"])+def test_generic_loopback_cannot_bypass_process_resources(path):+ from src.agent_runtime.owned_resources import needs_owned_binding+ with pytest.raises(ResourceIdentityError):+ needs_owned_binding(ExactOperation.normalize("app_api", json.dumps({"path": path})))+++async def test_direct_local_cookbook_control_does_not_enroll_discovered_processes(monkeypatch):+ from src.tools import cookbook+ async def state():+ return {}+ monkeypatch.setattr(cookbook, "_capture_session_processes", lambda *a: pytest.fail("discovery enrolled as ownership"))+ monkeypatch.setattr(asyncio, "create_subprocess_exec", lambda *a, **k: pytest.fail("unbound Cookbook control"))+ # No server session registry exists for this selector; observation cannot+ # mint a process resource even when the UI supplies a matching name.+ result = await cookbook._cookbook_kill_session("serve-unowned")+ assert result["failure_kind"] == "resource_identity_denied"diff --git a/tests/test_tool_approvals.py b/tests/test_tool_approvals.pyindex e5f793683..9ad1837b1 100644--- a/tests/test_tool_approvals.py+++ b/tests/test_tool_approvals.py@@ -32,6 +32,15 @@ def _pending(store, **overrides):"capabilities": capabilities_for_action("bash", "printf exact"),}values.update(overrides)+ if "request_authority" not in values:+ import tempfile+ from src.agent_runtime.authority import RequestAuthority, OperationGrant+ from src.agent_runtime.resources import ProcessLaunchScope, FilesystemRoot, NativeBackendResource+ from src.containment import DEFAULT_REQUIRED+ tool = values["tool_name"]+ scopes = (ProcessLaunchScope(NativeBackendResource(tool), FilesystemRoot.seal(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="w3-approval-fixture-")), DEFAULT_REQUIRED),) if tool in {"bash", "python"} else ()+ values["request_authority"] = RequestAuthority("standalone-test-request", str(values["owner"]).casefold(),+ str(values["session_id"] or ""), str(values["workspace"] or ""), (OperationGrant(tool),), launch_scopes=scopes)return store.create(**values)diff --git a/tests/test_workspace_artifact_tool_floor.py b/tests/test_workspace_artifact_tool_floor.pyindex 3d75b96c5..475795e6a 100644--- a/tests/test_workspace_artifact_tool_floor.py+++ b/tests/test_workspace_artifact_tool_floor.py@@ -3,6 +3,19 @@ from pathlib import Pathimport pytest[email protected](autouse=True)+def native_resource_authority(tmp_path, monkeypatch):+ from tests.process_resource_helpers import install_native_authority+ from src.agent_runtime import process_resources+ from src import containment+ workspace = tmp_path / "native-workspace"+ workspace.mkdir()+ control = tmp_path.parent / (tmp_path.name + "-control")+ monkeypatch.setattr(process_resources, "_LAUNCH_DIR", control / "launches")+ monkeypatch.setattr(containment, "_store_path", lambda: control / "grants.json")+ install_native_authority(monkeypatch, workspace)++def test_unoffered_artifact_recovery_is_bounded():from src.agent_loop import _artifact_unoffered_recovery_exhausted