A desktop coding agent with free access to frontier models.
Browser tasks
A browser task keeps its conversation, selected tab and signed-in context across website tools, DOM controls and images. The built-in browser uses Electron's persistent browser partition. Tab ownership isolates control and visibility; it does not create a different website account for every conversation.
User experience
- List the conversation's tabs and reuse a matching page, or open the requested URL in a new owned tab. Before loading a new origin, review Allow website navigation? in the panel. Allow origin in this tab authorizes exact scheme, host and port for this tab and conversation, not reading or actions. A new tab stays blank until acceptance. Localhost previews need the same explicit approval; there is no blanket localhost exemption or private-network ban. An ambiguous reference needs actual tab context.
- Review website access in the browser panel. This allows reading that origin for this conversation during the current desktop process.
- Discover site tools. Prefer a relevant structured integration or site tool; otherwise observe the page and use its visible controls. A fresh image can support a coordinate action when a control has no useful DOM reference.
- Review each website action separately. A site's read-only annotation is advisory. Approvals bind the operation to its tab and current page. After a site callback returns, review its complete bounded result locally before choosing Share result. This separately authorizes disclosure to the conversation and its model provider. Denying keeps the payload private; it does not undo the action or permit an automatic retry.
- Choose Take over to pause the conversation's browser operations. Sign in directly in the page, then choose Resume browser. The next action needs a new observation. Opening another tab cannot bypass takeover.
- Observe the requested result. An input event being dispatched and a site callback returning are separate from the user's desired outcome being met.
Background tabs keep their conversation ownership and cannot switch the visible
conversation. An initial open can wait on its blank tab for the panel to mount
and the owner to select it, within the task's 30-second timeout. Timeout or
cancellation dismisses the pending approval and releases the new tab; the
dialog's longer 60-second limit cannot revive it. Other background operations
needing approval return needs_attention; the user selects the tab and retries.
Ordinary popup windows stay in
owned built-in tabs, using the same profile and opener. Non-HTTP(S) popups are
refused. A closed tab is an explicit error, never silently replaced.
Execution contract
The existing Browser extension's installed identity now resolves to the desktop
browser host. Its tools are browser_tabs, browser_open, browser_observe,
browser_act, browser_navigate, and browser_handoff. The site tools remain
webmcp_list_tools and webmcp_call_tool. The trusted execution context supplies
the conversation ID; it is not a model argument. The authenticated loopback
bridge is an internal desktop capability, not an external browser connection.
The supported tools do not expose arbitrary evaluation, raw CDP, cookies, storage, network response bodies, uploads or the system clipboard. This is a browser-tool boundary; it does not sandbox unrelated shell tools or user-added plugins with independent machine permissions.
Each tab allows one operation at a time. There is no mutation queue. DOM observations carry random IDs and expire after 15 seconds, DOM changes or navigation, scrolling or viewport changes. Coordinate clicks require an image scaled to the page viewport and recheck its pixels before dispatch. Actions consume their observation before dispatch. A failure or cancellation clears it. Timeouts and uncertain outcomes prohibit automatic replay, including switching to another method to repeat the action.
Navigation consent, browser read access, action approval and result disclosure
are separate. Navigation grants are in-memory, tab-and-owner scoped, and are
revoked on takeover, cancellation or closure. They are never inherited by a new
tab or popup. Takeover stops pending task loads; subsequent manual address-bar
navigation, browser controls or page input allow manual browsing without creating
task grants. Resume requires new navigation consent. None of these approvals can
expand the organization's managed policy. The existing async checkPolicy
boundary checks task access, DOM actions, site-tool discovery and invocation,
and result sharing. There is no renderer-managed website grant or parallel
policy cache. execution.browserOrigins matches exact scheme, host and port
and intersects across policies; it does not union host patterns or wildcards.
Electron's existing installPolicyRequestHook remains the only
onBeforeRequest listener. It checks all network requests, including redirects,
frames, subresources, scripted requests and uploads. blockBrowserUploads
remains authoritative. User consent cannot bypass it, and a denied request
never falls back to an external browser.
The same request listener holds task-controlled main-frame requests, including cross-origin redirects, before dispatch until the target origin is approved. It rechecks managed policy after acceptance and checks cancellation, tab identity and ownership before releasing the request. A paused task cannot acquire grants or treat a late redirect as manual browsing. Legacy automation open also goes through the task host's pre-load consent gate.
This is not a complete browser egress sandbox. The origin consent gate applies to main-frame navigation, not every subresource: frames, images, scripts, fetches and other subresources remain governed by the existing managed request policy. If that policy permits them, a loaded website can contact other origins without another navigation prompt. Exact URL origins are not a DNS/IP classification or DNS-rebinding defense, and the browser still shares its persistent signed-in profile across conversations.
Tasks use the built-in browser's existing sign-in. Sign in directly in the page and resume the task; the persistent partition keeps that session available. The separately enabled login-sync feature can also supply that shared sign-in. Browser task tools neither read another browser's profile nor enroll sites in sync; its native consent and managed-desktop restrictions remain unchanged.
Popups force the same sandbox, context isolation and same-origin security as ordinary tabs, regardless of website-supplied features. The per-frame preload installs only an isolated, sandboxed bridge; it exposes no Node APIs to website JavaScript. Native computer use owns OS app and window sessions separately; browser tools do not acquire OS pointer control.
Activity retains operation names and state, not arguments, result bodies or cookies. Observations intentionally return requested page content to the conversation. Password and one-time-code fields require user handoff; image capture refuses pages with those fields. Use controlled fixtures for evidence. Site callbacks may return secrets under arbitrary field names, so key-name redaction is insufficient. Their results remain local until the separate disclosure review succeeds. Missing review support, denial, cancellation or policy loss withholds the payload and preserves the uncertain-action receipt.
WebMCP compatibility
The host implements the imperative document.modelContext path with an
isolated preload bridge. When the runtime does not supply that API, the existing
compatibility implementation supplies it. Discovery validates names, bounded
JSON Schemas, frame policy and origin. Every invocation rechecks the document,
frame, schema and registration, both before and after approval. Handles carry
the requesting conversation and navigation revision. Discovery spanning a
navigation is rejected instead of publishing stale handles.
Input schemas use a bounded JSON Schema 2020-12 subset. pattern,
patternProperties and all format validators (including regex) are
unsupported, including in nested schemas and definitions. Discovery reports
each rejected descriptor in rejectedTools without hiding valid tools. Those
schemas are rejected before compilation or action approval, not silently
accepted with their constraints ignored. Literal data and property names may
still contain those words. References are limited to named local $defs or
definitions entries; arbitrary JSON pointers, remote and dynamic references
are unsupported.
The supported subset includes same-origin frames and explicitly delegated secure
cross-origin frames. Declarative HTML form tools, the older
navigator.modelContext API and external-browser WebMCP are unsupported.
Returned capability metadata names those limits. A website result remains
untrusted even if its tool claims to be read-only.
Integration boundaries
Conversation-owned tabs, background-view parking, viewport recovery, team execution policy, native computer use and workflow dashboard panels remain owned by their current implementations. Browser tasks reuse those boundaries. External profile syncing is provided separately by merged #4452. The browser access mechanism from #4481 is superseded by the merged execution policy in #4564; this feature adds no Den policy fields or login-import API.
Design sources
The native boundary follows Electron's sandbox contract.
These are public contracts and examples reviewed on September 4, 2026. They motivate the choices above; they do not document another product's private planner, prompts, permission classifier or runtime implementation.
- WebMCP draft: document-scoped tools, registrations, cancellation, origin restrictions and untrusted metadata. The draft is not a finalized W3C standard, so the supported subset is explicit.
- Chrome WebMCP preview: imperative and declarative approaches are distinct capabilities. A runtime must not advertise declarative support merely because imperative registration works.
- Public site-tools behavior: tools share the live page and authentication, disappear as the page changes, and still require review. Callback completion does not establish asynchronous outcomes.
- Public browser behavior: separate built-in profile, site access distinct from sensitive action approval, and direct sign-in handoff. These are user-visible patterns, not an implementation blueprint.
- Public browser-extension behavior: existing external tabs are a different connection, and dedicated integrations can be preferable when available. No external connection is inferred here.
- Playwright locators and actionability: prefer meaningful controls and recheck visibility, enabled state and hit testing before input. This host uses Electron DOM references rather than introducing another browser process or Playwright-owned authentication context.
- Playwright isolation: browser contexts isolate cookies and storage. Sharing one persistent profile here is therefore explicitly different from account isolation.
- Electron navigation and popup APIs and security guidance: enforce navigation in the main process, keep renderer isolation, and control popup creation. The existing all-request policy hook covers programmatic loads.
Verification and limits
webmcp-browser-agent is the browser-task journey: real engine plugins with a
deterministic provider and controlled website witnesses for consent, signed-in
invocation, DOM/image fallback, popup isolation, exact iframe delegation,
cancellation, stale observations and observed completion.
browser-tabs-owned-by-thread and browser-panel-viewport-recovery own
background visibility and viewport restoration. Managed-policy coverage must
exercise exact origins, their intersection and upload restrictions through the
existing native/server boundary. Source checks alone are not runtime proof;
these journeys require fresh evidence after reconstruction.
The implementation is model-independent. Text-only models can use page text and site tools; visual work requires an image-capable model or user assistance. The desktop and its local server must run on the same machine. A remote server without its own desktop browser returns an unavailable result; this does not connect to a different machine's external browser. The deterministic provider verifies tool availability, execution context and result delivery and a verified completion answer in the conversation. It does not prove open-ended planning quality for every provider. Direct control of external browser profiles, declarative WebMCP, closed-shadow-root DOM references, file transfer and restart restoration of live tab handles remain outside the browser-task subset. Login sync retains its separately documented support limits.