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TypeScript

fix: include .env example files

ogsamrat408f5c700c08
diff --git a/apps/server/src/context/PARITY.sha256 b/apps/server/src/context/PARITY.sha256
index 04075aa1..1bbe4c09 100644
--- a/apps/server/src/context/PARITY.sha256
+++ b/apps/server/src/context/PARITY.sha256
@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ d772119f2785b6926cd765a44589c171542d5e79b3677bfa076851775d794480 outside.ts
d7c5638ca9204a9c51a4552e7a9b09cf7beeae9c63d9352d5950118fd5536967 pm-config.ts
932c1eff09d540590abf99ede63447f4e0af9396096d325fa5fcfbcde49eda10 privacy.ts
0e04845a2d0ad2136c01a61d3ed1193b62ef99f5b82e1f555b7c97bb6dc18773 processes.ts
-d7cb7384da5a3b2c7e82a45f05f1b9258bb84a7f3510de8eb6f1da478b4157f0 redact-policy.ts
-ecb628437615d261d3f7f1f02bc05ce000b16b1040c5804e8ffaf9d7ed9fe471 redact-vectors.json
+741f4327c70500feb644c8e0820060097e282ff1f121dba8ce1979604867bbc0 redact-policy.ts
+820d0a976b16769db789e9b5b3162f3cff096ab7948dcac54d009943a4557492 redact-vectors.json
d8c0636406c8cd9d55f9fb06af8827b3d1b73247393f48aaca2ef053ccf5a1ff services.ts
92030e186fcd58a6acaeb9acbaac67c8003d12d0c2eb9e29113faa701885b0eb setup.ts
d51d434283f757f0ed45bb6996a74fb5bf9e1d56f34146e99df3c392cde5ea19 shell-aliases.ts
diff --git a/apps/server/src/context/redact-policy.ts b/apps/server/src/context/redact-policy.ts
index f45b12b8..d9901487 100644
--- a/apps/server/src/context/redact-policy.ts
+++ b/apps/server/src/context/redact-policy.ts
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ export function looksRandomName(value: string): boolean {
/**
* Credential files: any non-placeholder value of a secret-named key there is
- * a credential. `.env*` except examples and templates, `.npmrc`, `.pypirc`,
+ * a credential. `.env*` except examples and templates, `*.env`, `.npmrc`, `.pypirc`,
* `.netrc`, `.pgpass`, `.git-credentials`, `credentials` (`.aws/credentials`),
* kubeconfig.
*/
@@ -151,6 +151,8 @@ export function isCredentialFile(path: string | undefined): boolean {
if (!path) return false;
const name = path.split(/[\\/]/).pop()!.toLowerCase();
if (name.startsWith(".env")) return !/(?:example|sample|template|dist|defaults?)$/.test(name);
+ // A named env file (`prod.env`, `docker/production.env`) is a `.env` by another name.
+ if (/^.+\.env$/.test(name)) return true;
return [".npmrc", ".pypirc", ".netrc", "_netrc", ".pgpass", ".git-credentials", "credentials", "kubeconfig", "config.kube"].includes(name)
|| name.endsWith(".kubeconfig");
}
diff --git a/apps/server/src/context/redact-vectors.json b/apps/server/src/context/redact-vectors.json
index c9162e5a..00d4c0c8 100644
--- a/apps/server/src/context/redact-vectors.json
+++ b/apps/server/src/context/redact-vectors.json
@@ -229,6 +229,12 @@
"expect": "DB_PASSWORD=supersecretword",
"context": "app/.env.example"
},
+ {
+ "name": "named env file any value",
+ "input": "DB_PASSWORD=supersecretword",
+ "expect": "DB_PASSWORD=[REDACTED]",
+ "context": "docker/production.env"
+ },
{
"name": "npmrc token",
"input": "//registry.npmjs.org/:_authToken=np⟨+⟩m_Oc6Qi7ggAMKfjlaTNJkd38tGFzUnusvrIPab",
diff --git a/apps/server/src/session-archive/files-used-policy.ts b/apps/server/src/session-archive/files-used-policy.ts
index 0feb6592..0598f101 100644
--- a/apps/server/src/session-archive/files-used-policy.ts
+++ b/apps/server/src/session-archive/files-used-policy.ts
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ const SECRET_WORD = /(?:^|[/._-])(?:secrets?|credentials?|tokens?|passwords?|pas
/** Whether a path names a file that must never be archived (anywhere). */
export function isSecretUsePath(absolute: string): boolean {
const portable = absolute.replaceAll("\\", "/");
- if (ENV_FILE.test(portable)) return !/\.env\.(?:example|sample|template|dist|defaults)$/i.test(portable);
+ if (ENV_FILE.test(portable)) return !/\.env\.(?:example|sample|template|dist|defaults?)$/i.test(portable);
if (isSecretFile(portable) || isSecretFolder(portable)) return true;
return SECRET_WORD.test(portable.split("/").at(-1) ?? "");
}
diff --git a/apps/server/src/session-uploader.test.ts b/apps/server/src/session-uploader.test.ts
index 0ebc8d73..7cb9d451 100644
--- a/apps/server/src/session-uploader.test.ts
+++ b/apps/server/src/session-uploader.test.ts
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ import {
filterUploadDiff,
isUploadableWebUrl,
isUploadPathDenied,
+ isUploadFileDenied,
isPathLikeKey,
isSecretAssignmentKey,
isSecretAssignmentValue,
@@ -70,6 +71,58 @@ describe("session uploader privacy", () => {
expect(isUploadPathDenied("src/app.ts")).toBe(false);
});
+ test("keeps a .env template in scrubbed snapshots; the archive and every real .env still deny it", () => {
+ for (const path of [".env.example", "app/.env.sample", "config/.env.template", ".env.dist", ".ENV.EXAMPLE", ".env.defaults"]) {
+ expect(isUploadFileDenied(path)).toBe(false);
+ // What is stored byte for byte never takes one.
+ expect(isUploadPathDenied(path)).toBe(true);
+ }
+ for (const path of [".env", ".env.local", ".env.production", ".env.example.local", "secrets/.env.example", ".env.example/x.txt", "keys/.env.sample"]) {
+ expect(isUploadFileDenied(path)).toBe(true);
+ }
+ // A template's values are scrubbed as its .env's would be, under both rule sets.
+ const filled = "PORT=3000\nAPI_TOKEN=abcdefgh123\nDATABASE_PASSWORD=Summer2024!\nJWT_SECRET=supersecretjwt\nAPI_KEY=<your-api-key>\n";
+ const policy = Symbol.for("omnirush.redactionPolicy");
+ const holder = globalThis as unknown as Record<symbol, unknown>;
+ const before = holder[policy];
+ try {
+ for (const rules of ["legacy", "client-v3"]) {
+ holder[policy] = rules;
+ for (const file of [".env.example", "app/.env.sample"]) {
+ expect(redactUploadContent(file, filled)).toMatch(/^PORT=3000\nAPI_TOKEN=\[REDACTED[^\n]*\nDATABASE_PASSWORD=\[REDACTED[^\n]*\nJWT_SECRET=\[REDACTED[^\n]*\nAPI_KEY=<your-api-key>\n$/);
+ const diff = filterUploadDiff(`diff --git a/${file} b/${file}\n--- a/${file}\n+++ b/${file}\n@@ -0,0 +1 @@\n+DATABASE_PASSWORD=Summer2024!\n`).diff;
+ expect(diff).toMatch(/\+DATABASE_PASSWORD=\[REDACTED/);
+ }
+ }
+ } finally {
+ holder[policy] = before;
+ }
+ });
+
+ test("denies a named env file (prod.env) everywhere and scrubs it as a credential file", () => {
+ for (const path of ["prod.env", "app.env", "docker/production.env", "Config/Staging.ENV", ".local.env", "tests/fixtures/app.env"]) {
+ expect(isUploadFileDenied(path)).toBe(true);
+ expect(isUploadPathDenied(path)).toBe(true);
+ }
+ for (const path of ["src/env.ts", "prod.env.example", "environment.yml", "src/load.env.ts", "envs/readme.md"]) {
+ expect(isUploadFileDenied(path)).toBe(false);
+ }
+ const policy = Symbol.for("omnirush.redactionPolicy");
+ const holder = globalThis as unknown as Record<symbol, unknown>;
+ const before = holder[policy];
+ try {
+ for (const rules of ["legacy", "client-v3"]) {
+ holder[policy] = rules;
+ for (const file of ["prod.env", "docker/production.env"]) {
+ const text = redactUploadText("PORT=3000\nDATABASE_PASSWORD=Summer2024!\n", { context: file, mode: redactModeForPath(file) }).text;
+ expect(text).toMatch(/^PORT=3000\nDATABASE_PASSWORD=\[REDACTED/);
+ }
+ }
+ } finally {
+ holder[policy] = before;
+ }
+ });
+
test("redacts private keys and provider-style secrets before upload", () => {
const result = redactUploadText([
"AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=AKIA1234567890123456",
diff --git a/apps/server/src/session-uploader.ts b/apps/server/src/session-uploader.ts
index dc0b7046..e49d5699 100644
--- a/apps/server/src/session-uploader.ts
+++ b/apps/server/src/session-uploader.ts
@@ -1317,11 +1317,41 @@ function pathComponents(path: string): string[] {
return path.replaceAll("\\", "/").split("/").filter(Boolean);
}
-/** The unconditional denials that apply to any component, directories included. */
-function hasDeniedComponent(parts: string[]): boolean {
+// A `.env` template FILE (`.env.example`, `.env.sample`, ...): the variable
+// names a project needs, committed for others to copy. The files-used policy
+// (session-archive/files-used-policy.ts) and context/redact-policy.ts already
+// treat these templates as no credential; a turn that reads or edits one
+// cannot be replayed while the snapshot withholds it.
+const ENV_TEMPLATE = /^\.env\.(?:example|sample|template|dist|defaults?)$/;
+
+function isEnvTemplate(parts: string[]): boolean {
+ return ENV_TEMPLATE.test(parts.at(-1)?.toLowerCase() ?? "");
+}
+
+/**
+ * A named env FILE (`prod.env`, `docker/production.env`): a `.env` by another
+ * name, denied and scrubbed as one (redact-policy's isCredentialFile agrees).
+ */
+function isNamedEnvFile(lowerName: string): boolean {
+ return /^.+\.env$/.test(lowerName);
+}
+
+/**
+ * The scrub context of a file kept in the snapshot or the git block. A `.env`
+ * template is scrubbed as its `.env`: redact-policy's isCredentialFile exempts
+ * templates, so without this a secret-named value that does not look
+ * generated (`DB_PASSWORD=Summer2024!`) would leave in a template that a
+ * user filled with real values.
+ */
+function snapshotScrubContext(path: string): string {
+ return isEnvTemplate(pathComponents(path)) ? path.replace(/\.[^./\\]+$/, "") : path;
+}
+
+/** The unconditional denials that apply to any component, directories included. `keepEnvFile`: the last component is a `.env` template to keep. */
+function hasDeniedComponent(parts: string[], keepEnvFile = false): boolean {
return parts.some((part, index) => {
const lower = part.toLowerCase();
- return lower.startsWith(".env")
+ return (lower.startsWith(".env") && !(keepEnvFile && index === parts.length - 1))
|| DENIED_EXACT_NAMES.has(lower)
|| DENIED_SUFFIXES.some((suffix) => lower.endsWith(suffix))
|| DENIED_CREDENTIAL_NAME.test(lower)
@@ -1358,9 +1388,24 @@ export function isUploadDirectoryDenied(path: string): boolean {
* extension, in which case it is kept and scrubbed like any other source file.
*/
export function isUploadPathDenied(path: string): boolean {
+ return uploadPathDenied(path, false);
+}
+
+/**
+ * The same rule for the snapshot's own files and git block, whose text is
+ * scrubbed before it leaves: there a `.env` template is kept (isEnvTemplate).
+ * Everything stored byte for byte (the project archive, files outside the
+ * workspace, attachments) keeps to isUploadPathDenied.
+ */
+export function isUploadFileDenied(path: string): boolean {
+ return uploadPathDenied(path, true);
+}
+
+function uploadPathDenied(path: string, scrubbed: boolean): boolean {
const parts = pathComponents(path);
- if (hasDeniedComponent(parts)) return true;
+ if (hasDeniedComponent(parts, scrubbed && isEnvTemplate(parts))) return true;
const name = parts.at(-1)?.toLowerCase();
+ if (name && isNamedEnvFile(name)) return true;
if (!name || hasScrubbedExtension(name)) return false;
return parts.some((part) => hasDeniedWords(part.toLowerCase()));
}
@@ -1947,7 +1992,7 @@ function redactUploadContentCounted(path: string, text: string): { text: string;
const json = redactUploadJsonText(text, path);
if (json !== null) return { text: json, count: json === text ? 0 : 1 };
}
- return redactUploadText(text, { context: path, mode: redactModeForPath(path) });
+ return redactUploadText(text, { context: snapshotScrubContext(path), mode: redactModeForPath(path) });
}
// --- file-aware trace scrub --------------------------------------------------
@@ -2777,7 +2822,7 @@ async function walkFallback(
} else await walkFallback(root, fullPath, ignoreRules, listing, priorityPaths);
} else if (entry.isFile() || entry.isSymbolicLink()) {
// Capture v2: a symlink is listed too (never followed; the scan records its target).
- if (isUploadPathDenied(path)) {
+ if (isUploadFileDenied(path)) {
listing.denied += 1;
if ((listing.deniedPaths ??= []).length < MAX_LISTED_EXCLUSIONS) listing.deniedPaths.push(path);
} else listing.paths.push(path);
@@ -2792,7 +2837,7 @@ function filterListing(candidates: string[], priorityPaths: ReadonlySet<string>
let denied = 0;
for (const path of candidates) {
if (!path) continue;
- if (isUploadPathDenied(path)) {
+ if (isUploadFileDenied(path)) {
denied += 1;
if (deniedPaths.length < MAX_LISTED_EXCLUSIONS) deniedPaths.push(path);
} else eligible.push(path);
@@ -2965,7 +3010,7 @@ function parseGitStatus(raw: string, prefix = ""): { entries: GitStatusEntry[];
const path = repoPath.slice(prefix.length);
if (!path) continue;
if (code !== "??" && code !== "!!") dirty = true;
- if (isUploadPathDenied(path)) continue;
+ if (isUploadFileDenied(path)) continue;
if (entries.length >= MAX_GIT_STATUS_ENTRIES) continue;
const uploadPath = portablePathForUpload(path);
if (uploadPath.length > MAX_GIT_PATH_CHARS) continue;
@@ -3067,14 +3112,14 @@ export function filterUploadDiff(raw: string, inputTruncated = false): { diff: s
if (!section.startsWith("diff --git ")) continue;
const headerEnd = section.indexOf("\n");
const path = diffHeaderPath(headerEnd === -1 ? section : section.slice(0, headerEnd));
- if (!path || isUploadPathDenied(path)) continue;
+ if (!path || isUploadFileDenied(path)) continue;
if (/^(?:Binary files .* differ|GIT binary patch)/m.test(section)) continue;
// Capture v2: a binary type is never diffed as text (its bytes go to the byte-exact archive), and
// a section that was not valid UTF-8 (utf8DiffText) never reaches here.
if (isKnownBinaryPath(path)) continue;
// A diff is text even when the file is JSON: hunks are not parseable documents.
// Each file's section under the mode its path selects, as the file's snapshot.
- const redacted = redactUploadText(section, { context: path, mode: redactModeForPath(path) }).text;
+ const redacted = redactUploadText(section, { context: snapshotScrubContext(path), mode: redactModeForPath(path) }).text;
const size = Buffer.byteLength(redacted);
if (used + size > MAX_UPLOAD_DIFF_BYTES) {
truncated = true;
@@ -5303,7 +5348,7 @@ export class SessionUploader {
const path = workspaceRelativePath(state.root, prefix ? `${prefix}/${relative}` : relative);
if (!path) return;
this.reportTouched(state, path);
- if (isUploadPathDenied(path)) return;
+ if (isUploadFileDenied(path)) return;
if (path === ".gitignore" || path.endsWith("/.gitignore")) {
// New ignore rules can hide or reveal any number of files: forget what
// git answered so far and rescan the tree with the rules as they stand.
@@ -5666,7 +5711,7 @@ export class SessionUploader {
state.turnWrittenPaths.set(path, Date.now());
state.turnToolWrites.add(path);
}
- if (isUploadPathDenied(path) || state.touchedPaths.has(path)) return;
+ if (isUploadFileDenied(path) || state.touchedPaths.has(path)) return;
state.touchedPaths.add(path);
this.markDirty(state, path);
this.queueChangedPath(state, path);
@@ -6377,7 +6422,7 @@ export class SessionUploader {
private queueChangedPath(state: SessionState, filename: string): void {
if (state.finished) return;
const path = workspaceRelativePath(state.root, filename);
- if (!path || isUploadPathDenied(path)) return;
+ if (!path || isUploadFileDenied(path)) return;
// Several events for one path before its capture starts collapse into one read.
if (state.pendingJournal.has(path)) return;
state.pendingJournal.add(path);
@@ -6514,7 +6559,7 @@ export class SessionUploader {
// listing vouches for (the paths a targeted scan inspects, and every
// journal entry), in one batch: nothing git ignores now leaves the
// machine, whatever it answered when the event arrived.
- const reported = targeted && previous !== null ? [...dirty].filter((path) => !isUploadPathDenied(path)) : [];
+ const reported = targeted && previous !== null ? [...dirty].filter((path) => !isUploadFileDenied(path)) : [];
const journaled = type === "change" || type === "end" ? [...state.changeJournal.values()] : [];
const checked = [...new Set([...reported, ...journaled.map((entry) => entry.path)])];
const ignored = checked.length > 0 ? await this.ignoredPaths(state, checked, true) : new Set<string>();